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This study examines Presidential authority to order United States

armed forces to participate in major armed hostilities in the absence
of a Congressional declaration of war.
The study is based upon an analysis of
Framers of the Constitution,

(2)

(1)

the \dews of the

actual practice as revealed by

seven significant undeclared "wars" over the course of American
history,

(3)

the views of the United States Supreme Court, wiiich

are, of course, authoritative regarding the meaning of the Constitu-

tion, and (4) statutory limitations upon the President,

mth

special

emphasis upon the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

Relying upon post-Constitutional Convention comnentaries

,

it was

found that Congress and not the President was intended to have the
except
power to initiate war (as opposed to hostilities short of war)

in cases of attack upon the nation.

War with
Congressional power was affirmed in the undeclared Naval
France (1797-1800)

,

the
in which the legislature authorized in advance

conduct of hostilities.

In the Barbary conflicts of 1801-1802 and
1815, Presidents ordered
the navy abroad in shows of force without Congressional
authority, and

although Congress authorized hostilities, the authorizations
delegated

broad discretionary powers to the President.
The Boxer Expedition of 1900 was the paradigm case of
the intro-

duction of troops into hostilities on sole Presidential authority
in
order to protect Americans abroad.
In the Tanpico incident of 1914, President Woodrow Wilson
ordered

the blackade of a Mexican port simultaneous with a resolution of
support

from Congress.

In 1916, Wilson again sent troops to Mexico following

Poncho Villa's raids on American border toms, and although the legislature was not informed in advance, it gave indirect approval.

Wilson was also President during the north Russian and Siberian
interventions of 1918.

These interventions grew out of the First World

War but were aimed at Japan and the Russian coinnunists rather than
Germany, the declared enemy.

The Korean War (1950) was conducted without reliance upon either
treaty or statute, although the United States was carrying out United

Nations resolutions, and Congress appropriated money and drafted troops
to conduct the war.

Although some believed the Vietnam War to have been begun on sole
Presidential authority, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and the Southeast

Asia Treaty provided Congressional authorization for the initiation of
the conflict after 1964.

The 1973 War Powers Resolution attenpts to restrict Presidental

authority to introduce troops into hostilities or imminent hostilities,

vi

but probably encroaches upon the President's
powers as the Commnder
in Chief.

The Supreme Court has not yet authoritatively
decided where the
line between Presidential and Congressional
war- commencing authority

should be drawn.

Although the Court has left open the possibility

that such an issue could be decided in future
cases, it does not seem

likely that such decisions will actually be rendered.

vii
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CHAPTER
THE POWER TO

MKE

WAR:

I

THE ORIGINAL

UNDERSTANDING
I ntrod u ction

The Supreme Court justices themselves have not always

agreed upon the weight to be attached to the original un-

derstanding of the Constitution.

Consider Chief Justice

Taney's view that
it speaks not only in the same words, but with the
same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it
came from the hands of its framers...!

Contrast Mr. Justice Frankfurter's assertion in uhe
Steel Seizure Case.
It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the
Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has

written upon them.?Although Taney's formula is too rigid, it is nevertheless essential to a thorough analysis of the meaning of
the Constitution that we examine not only its language but
the original understanding of its authors.

What was meant by the Framers when they empowered

Congress "To declare War," "To raise and support Armies,"
and "To provide and maintain a Navy," "To make Rules for
^Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How.
(1857)

(U.S.)',

393,

426

.

^Youngs tovm Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610 (1951).

the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces,"
and "To provide for calling forth the Militia
to.

.

.repel

Invasions?"^
And what further was meant by the statesmen who
wrote
the following?

"The executive Power shall be vested in a

President of the United States of America,"- "The President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the

United States, and of the Militia of the several States,

when called into actual service of the United States." "He
shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambas-

sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls..," And finally,

"he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers:

he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."^
In order to interpret these phrases from the Consti-

tution we will examine not only the debates within the

Constitutional Convention, but also law and practice prior
to the Ratification of 1789,

and significant commentary

upon the issue immediately thereafter.

We turn first to

the period preceding the Constitution.
3u.S.

4lbid.

Const,
,

art.

art.
II.

I,

sec.

8,

els.

11-13, 15.

3

War-Making Before the Constituti on
Regarding British practice, Blackstone
is unambiguous:
the power to commence war is part of
the
Royal prerogative.

With regard to foreign concerns the king
is the
delegate or representative of his people
In the
king therefore, as in a centre, all the
rays of h5
people are united, and form, by that union,
a consistency, splendour, and power, that make him
feared and
respected by foreign potentates; who would scruple
to enter into any engagement, that must afterwards
be revised and ratified by a popular assembly.
W^at
is done by the royal authority, with regard
to foreign
powers, is the act of the whole nation; what is done
without the king's concurrence is the act only of prif
j
vate men ...
Upon the same principle the king has also the sole
prerogative of making war and peace...
So that, in order to make a war completely effectual,
it is necessary, with us in England, that it be publicly declared, and duly proclaimed by the king's authority; and then, all parts of both the contending nations,
from the highest to the lowest, are bound by it. And,
wherever, the right resides of beginning a national
war, there must also reside the right of ending it, or
the power of making peace.
,

Locke distinguished executive power in domestic matters from the "power of war and peace, leagues and alliances,

and all the transactions with all persons and communities

without the commonwealth."

This power over external mat-

ters Locke termed "federative," and then cautioned against

reading too much into the distinction.
.Though, as I said, the executive and federative

^Blackstone s Comjr.e ntarie s by St. George Tucker 5 vols,
Dennis and Co,. 1965),
(1803; reprint 'ed., Buffalo, N.Y.:
1:252, 257, 258.
'

4

power Ox every coiranunity be reallv distinct
in themselves, yet they are hardly to be' separated
and placed
at the same time in the hands of distinct
persons. 6
In short, Locke considered the power
to commence war
to properly rest with the same institution
charged with the

exercise of the executive power.

And in Montesquieu's tripartite scheme of powers, so
influential with the Americans, the power to make

V7ar

is

considered executive by its very nature.
In every government there are three sorts of power:
the legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and the executive in
regard to matters that depend on the civil law.
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate
enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and am.ends or abrogates those that have been already enacted. By the
second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides
against invasions.
By the third, he punishes criminals,
or determines the disputes that arise between individuals.
The latter we shall call the judiciary power,
and the other simply the executive power of the state

As Corwin points out, however, acceptance of these

views by the Framers of the United States Constitution "was

qualified at the outset by the allocation of the war-deo

daring power

How great a qualification

to Congress.'

^John Locke, Of Civil Government intro. W.F. Carpenter
(London:
Everyman' s Library 1947) bk. 2:146,148.
,

,

^Baron
T.

bk.

Nugent

,

de Montesquieu, The Spir it of the Laws
Haffner Publishing Co.
W^5J
York:

('New

,

trans,

,

11:6.

^Edward S. Corwin, T he Presiden t: O ffi ce and Powers
1787-1957 4th rev, ed. (New York: New York University
Press, 1957)
p. 418.
,

,

,

this was we have yet to discover.

£Mt

It is clear, h owever

.

the Euro_£_ean thinkers most influential in /mierica

c onsider ed,

war-making an executive function

We must next

.

examine the Am.erican colonial governorship.
The British colonies in North America (1607-1775)
had, at first, governorships with an ill-defined political
role.

By mid-18th century, England tightened control over

its possessions, and the Crown appointed the governors in

eight of the thirteen colonies, and got to approve propri-

etary appointments in three others.

The "royal governor

became the primary political link between the King and his
colonial subjects."^
But the governors did not rule alone; they had to

work closely with the colonial assem.blies, the upper chamber of which served as the governor's council.

The lower

chamber held the purse strings, an effective weapon in disputes between the colonists on the one side, and the Crown
and its representative, the governor, on the other.

Much

of the mistrust of executive power in evidence just after

independence can be traced to this unhappy colonial experience.

'•^

As to military powers, the Royal governors, or "cap-

^Joseph Kallenbach, The American Chief Executive (New
Harper a Row Publishers, Inc., VJbbj p, ^.
York;
,

Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison,
3d
Its Or igins and Development
The Americ an Const itut ion:
lnc.,'^6J)', pp,^+-35.
ear TNew Yortcl W,W. Norton 6c Co.
"-^Ibid.,

5;

Alfred

II,

,

,

tains general," as they were often titled,
had complete

authority over the colonial military force, but
usually
found themselves dependent upon the assembly for
supporting
legislation.

Furthermore, as subordinates of the Crown,

the governors could not declare a colony to be at

V7ar

ex-

,

cept perhaps against Indians, and then only with advice of

Council and immediate notification of the home government

Following the outbreak of the French and Indian

VJars

in 1754, Great Britain established a permanent standing

army in America to be headed by a Commander in Chief.

The

latter officer eventually assumed most of the military power heretofore exercised by the colonial governors, as well
as becoming the principal administrator of i.mperial affairs

in America,

The Commander in Chief and the sizeable force

he commanded were increasingly resented by the colonials
for what they considered encroachments on their liberties

and usurpations of civil

authority,-'-'^

1

Leonard Woods Labaree Royal Governmen t in America
A Study of the British Coloni al System Before" 1783 (New
Yale University Press, 1930.) pp. 92 and note 1, 107Haven:
:

,

108; Evarts Boutell Greene, The Prov incial Governor in Th e
Eng li sh Colonie s of No rth America ~(TB9b; rep r t ed.
New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1966), pp. 105-7.

m

Clarence E. Carter, "The
12Labaree, pp. 108-109;
A Phase of Imperial Unity
Office of Commander in Chief
on the Eve of the Revolution." in Richard B. Morris, ed.
Columbia
T he Era of the American Revolution (New York.
University Press, W5/y.
:

In addition to contributing to the
causes of the

American Revolution, the Commander in
Chief and his forces
probably convinced the Americans that
standing armies were
undesirable and that the military must be made

subordinate

to civilian authority.

Under the Constitution, the latter

was accomplished by making the President, a
civilian, the

Commander in Chief.

-'^

Turning to the period follov7ing the Declaration of
Independence, we find thirteen sovereign states, each having weak executives in varying degrees of subordination
to

their respective legislatures, all loosely bound by the

Articles of Confederation after 1781.

During the Revolu-

tionary War the state governors exercised power more freely
in military affairs than in other areas.

With approval of

the council (the irpper chamber of the legislature; this in-

stitution was carried ever from the colonial period) a

governor could call out the state militia and even assume
personal command.

Moreover, once the militia was mobilized,

the Revolutionary governor, being the commander in chief,

had "sole direction of their

use."-^'^'"

Although the new states, the colonial experience
fresh in mind, intentionally kept their executives weak in
l^U.S. Const, art.

II,

sec.

2,

cl.

1.

"'^^Margarct Rurnham Macmillan, Th e War Governors in
Columbia University
the Anr^erican RcvTolution (New York:

Press";~l'9TI)T p. '62V"KaIlenbach, p.

21.

8

almost every respect, they uniformly made
them commanders
in chief.

This was in part due to the exigencies
of the war;

under such pressures the South Carolina legislature
once
delegated sweeping emergency powers to its executive.!-'^
The early state constitutions demonstrate the
breadth
of military power vested in the governors.

1776 Delaware Constitution provided

thai:

Article

9

of the

"The president,"

as it styled its executive,

with the advice of the privy council, may embody the
militia, and act as captain-general and commander-inchief of them, and the other military force of this
State, under the laws of the same. 16
Article XXVI of the South Carolina charter of the
same year is interesting because it is the only state con-

stitution explicitly prohibiting its executive from making

war
That the president and commander-in-chief shall have
no power to make war or peace, or enter into any final
treaty, without the consent of the general assembly
and legislative council.

Contrast the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,

Chapter II, Section

Article VII, whose words are repeated

I,

almost verbatim in the New Hampshire organic law of 1784.
l^Kelley and Harbison, pn. 34-35, 96>
pp.

18,

21,

Kallenbach,

27.

^^Ben: Perley Poorc, ed. The Federal and State Consti
tut ions, Colonial Chartt^rs an d otner Organic L avjs o"f the
Burt Frarlclin,
2d. cT. (New York:
U ni;tcd States 2~volc.
T572), 1:275.
,

^^Ibid.

,

.

2:1619.

,

Not only were these executives
authorized to personally
lead the militia of their respective
states, but they were
given "full power,"
for the special defence and safety of the
wealth, to assemble in martial array, and commonput in warlike posture, the inhabitants thereof.,. 18

The early state governors did not betray the
trust

reposed in them in regard to military affairs.

Furthermore,

their general weakness (i.e., in other than military
affairs)

,

combined with legislative inefficiency and growing

conservative fears of overly-democratic assemblies all
served to dissipate the colonial legacy of executive mistrust.

In fact, by the time the United States Constitution

was V7ritten, the pendulum had swung back in favor of in-

creased executive power.

Thus it is said that the model

for the national presidency was the governorship of New

York, the strongest of the state governorships

That legislative power was feared more than executive
at the time of the Framing is evident from. Madison's ex-

tensive comments on the subject in Fe deralist No. 48, in

which we find the following statement.
The legislative department is everywhere extending
the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into
l^ibid,, 1:965.

For New Hampshire, ibid., 2:1288.

•^^Charles C. Thach, The Creation of the Presideiicy
1775-178 9 Johns Hopkins UniverVity StVdI-es 'i'h "Historical
and PoTItical Science, ser. XL, no. 4 (1922; reprint ed.
New York: Da Capo Press, 1969), pp. ^-)9, 51-52, 76.
,

10

its impetuous vortex. ^0

And Jefferson, who could not be accused of
any conservative bias against popular assemblies, comments

in his

No tes_on_the Sta te of Virg.ini a as follows.

All the powers of governm.ent legislative, executive
and judiciary, result to the legislative body
The
concentrating tnese in the same hands is precisely the
definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands and not by a single one.
173 despots
would surely be as oppressive as one.^l
,

'

But before we turn our full attention to the Framers

views on executive power, let us examine the forerunner of
their handiwork, the Articles of Confederation.

Under the

Articles, which "governed" the newly independent states

from 1781 to 1789, ultimate military

pov7er lay

Congress in which each state had one vote.

with the

However, Con-

gress could not "engage in a war," among other significant

governmental acts, "unless nine states assent to the same."^^
On the positive side, the Articles provided the follow-

ing in regard to war-maki.ng.
"^^Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The
Federalist Papers ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New
American Library, 1964), p. 309.
,

^^Thomas Jefferson, The Porta b le Jefferso n, ed.
The Viking Press, 1975),
Merrill D. Peterson (New York
:

p.

164.

22Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A Hist or y of the
Un ited States During th e Con feder ation, T78 1 -i7^ (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., T^TOr, p. zT; Articles of Confederation, art. IX,

11

The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power cf determining on
peace and war except in the cases mentioned in the sixth
article ... 23

The relevant section of the sixth article referred
to reads as follows.

No state shall engage in any war without the consent
of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such
state be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have
received certain advice of a resolution being foraied
by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the
danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay, till
the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted ... 24

Note the use of the phrases "engage in.., war," and

"determining on... war," as opposed to

vzhat

appears on its

face to be the narrower power to "declare War" vested in

Congress by the Constitution.

The United States Supreme

Court had occasion to comment on the extent of Congress'

military powers under the Articles in the case of Fenhallow,
et,

al.

V.

Doane's Administrators.'^-^

Penhallow turned on the authority of certain prize
tribunals established by the Continental Congress.

In up-

holding their jurisdiction Justice Paterson commented as
f ollov7S

Congress was the general, supreme, and controlling
council of the nation, the centre of union, the centre
of force, and the sun of the political system. ..In
Congress vjere vested, because by Congress were exer-

^^Articles cf Confederation, art. TX.
2^Ibid.

,

^^3 Dall.

art.

VI.

(U.S.)

54;

1 L.

Ed.

507

(1795),

cised wiuh the approbation of the
people, the riphts
peace... In every givernmenf
.here inust be a supreme power or will;
the riehts of
war and Peace are component parts of
this supremacy..
It It be asked, by whom, during our
revolutionary
war, was iociged, and by whom was exercised
reme authority? No one will hesitate for this sudan answe?.
it was lodged in and exercised by
Congress ... 26
Of course, one of the problems with the Articles
of

Confederation, aside from the fact that too little
power

was given to the central government, was that they did
not

provide for an executive branch.

Administration was handled

at first by ad hoc committees, later reduced in number and

supplanted in major areas (e.g.,
by permanent departments.

VJar,

and Foreign Affairs)

Still there was "lack of execu-

tive unity" with no one agency "to formulate a common policy
and control

a

number of co-ordinated ministries "^^
.

This attempt to administer by committees subordinate
to Congress "failed, and failed lamentably," and led to the

conclusion that

a

strong separate executive was necessary.

This conclusion was reinforced by experiences with state

governments during the same period.

Thus, the Great Conven-

tion aimed at asserting executive strength and independence
of Congress.

"The idea... that the jealous)^ of kingship was

a controlling force in the Federal Convention," one analyst

points out,
26] L. Ed.
at 1 L. Ed. 531.

518.

See also Mr. Justice Blair's opinion

27Kelley and Harbison, pp. 102, 107.

13

The majority of
^^''^
ini^^';
delegates""T^
brought with thera no far-reaching distrust-'the
of executive power, but rather a sobering
consciousness
that. .iL^was necessary for them. ..to secure
a sfrone
^'
albeit sate, national executive. 28
_

.

'

^1^IJ1^^}S^^'&

and the Constitutional Convent on

In the Convention of 1787,

those delegates favoring

a strong independent executive, modeled after the
more pow-

erful of the state governors, generally prevailed,

Wliile

this gives us a sense of the general course of the Conven-

tion with regard to the Presidency, it tells us little about
the war-making power in particular 29
.

In its first two months the Convention was preoccupied

with the scheme of government outlined in the Virginia
Plan.

It also considered the alternative Nevj Jersey Plan,

a draft by Pinckney of South Carolina,

and an able speech

by Alexander Hamilton, detailing that statesman's own ideas
for a government.

The Virginia Plan provided for the institution of a

"National Executive" which "ought to enjoy the Executive
rights vested in Congress by the Confederation,"

On its

face this resolution begs the question of the division of

war-making power between the Congress and the President,
because it is not clear whether the Framers thought such
28Thach, pp.
2 9 Ibid

.

,

52,

52

passim..

^'^Kallenbach

,

p.

37

14

power to be executive or legislative in
nature. 31
It will be recalled that Blacks tone,
Locke and

Montesquieu believed war-making to be essentially
executive.
If the views of these authorities, all well
known to
the

Framers, were accepted, adoption of this resolution
would
imply the vesting of war-making in the National
Executive. 32

Perhaps this is

v;hy

some delegates expressed reserva-

tions about accepting the resolution when it was introduced
to the Committee of the VJhole on June 1, 1787.

Madison

described the proceedings as follows.
Mr. Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was
afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress
might extend to peace and war which would render the
Executive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towi.t an elective one.
Mr. Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a
single person.
Mr. Rutlidge
said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho' he v;as not for
giving him the power of war and peace. ..
Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving
most energy dispatch and responsi.bility to the office.
He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British
Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive
powers.
Some of these prerogatives were of a legislative nature.
Among others that of war and peace. The
only pollers he conceived strictly Executive were those
33
of executing the laws, and appointing of f icers
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

In Georgia delegate William Pierce's account of the

same proceedings, Wilson is to have said, in addition:

31virginia Plan, Res. 7, in Max Farrand, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 3 vols. (New Haven:
iTIll TTTl..
YZT'e' University 'Press
,

,

32see pp. 3-4, supra.
33Farrand, Records, 1:64-6, brackets omitted.

15

Making peace and war are generally determined
bv
Writers on the Laws of Nations to be
legislative
^
powers, -J^
And in the notes of Rufus King of Massachusetts,
the
following is attributed to Madison:
Mad:
agrees wth, VJilson in his difinition of executive powers--executive powers ex vi termini, do not
include the Rights of war & peace &c but the powers
shd. be. contined and defined... 35
.

Thus, among those

v7ho

spoke to the issue at the Con-

vention that day, none would concede to the Executive the
powers of war and peace.

This suggests that the Framers

were inclined to break with Blackstone, Locke and
Montesquieu, although the issue was not resolved that day,
and the power to make peace was ultimately vested in the

President and Senate in the form of the treaty-making

authority
The New Jersey Plan, which was presented as the

sm.all'

state alternative to the Virginia Plan, provided for a

plural executive

course rejected early on), with the

(a

power, among others,
to direct all military operations; provided that none
of the persons composing the federal Executive shall
on any occasion take command of any troops, so as to
personally conduct any enterprise as General, or in

other capacity.^'''
34ibid.

,

pp.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

36ij.s.

73-74.
70,

Clorst,

art.

II,

sec.

37rarrand, Records, 1:244.

2,

cl

.

2,

16

Under the New Jersey Plan, Congress was to retain
all

powers vested in it by the Articles of Confederation,
except where expressly modified.

This implies that the direc-

tion of foreign affairs and the commencement of war, as

opposed to the direction of military operations, were to

remain v/ithin the power of Congress. 3^
Pinckney's Plan, the most detailed of those discussed
so far, modeled its section on the executive after the New

York State Constitution.

The Pinckney draft was used by

the Committee of Detail (discussed below) in the preparation
of much of what came to be article II of the United States

Constitution. 39

Pinckney's article

7

provided that "The Senate shall

have the sole and exclusive power to declare V/ar."

eighth article vested the "Executive Power,.. in

a

His

President,"

and provided that "He shall be Commander in chief of the

army

na\^ of the United States & of the Militia of the

6c

several states. "^0

Hamilton's proposals were not formally before the
Convention, but were outlined in a speech in opposition to
the New Jersey Plan,

His ideas are interesting because

he was an advocate of a strong executive, and later, writing

38see New Jersey Plan, Res. no,

2,

ibid., p.

243.

^^Hax Farrand, T he rraminp, of the Const i tiition of
United St aces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962),

pri29.
^^Farrand, R ecor ds

,

3:599-600.

t:he

17

under the pseudonym "Pacificus," argued for
extended Presidential power in foreign affairs Z'^In the course of his address to the Convention
of

June 18, 1787, Hamilton suggested that the Executive
"have
the direction of war when authorized or begun," but that
the Senate "have the sole power of declaring war."^^^

One plausible interpretation of the phrase "authorized or begun," is that the President was only to direct

wars "authorized" by Senatorial declaration of war or
"begun" by foreign invasion of the United States, in which
case the President may act without v/aiting for a declaration.

This interpretation suggests:

that Hamilton did

(1)

not wish the President to have the power to commence hostilities except in defense against attack, and

(2)

that he

understood the term "declaring" war to mean "authorizing"
it. ^3

Whatever Hamilton meant, it is nevertheless true that
his plan provoked neither discussion nor support.

The

Convention moved into its second phase, in which a five-

man Committee of Detail carefully wove excerpts from the
Pinckney and New Jersey plans, and the New York. State Con-

^llbid., p. 617^ Farrand, Framing
"Pacificus" is discussed below.
^"^Far rand,

Records

.

pp.

,

87-88.

1:292.

^^See Charles A. Lofgren, "VJar-Making Under the ConThe Original Understanding" in Richard A, Falk,
stitution:
4 vols.
ed. The Vi etnam War a nd International Law
1968-76),
Press,
University
Princeton
(Princeton, N.J.:
4:581.
,

stitution into those elements of the
Virginia Plan already
approved by the Convention '^"^
.

It was out of this Coinmittee that
the first details

of the various war-power provisions appeared.

report, presented to the Convention August

6,

The Committer
1787.

listed

among the powers of Congress the power "To make
war."

At

the same time it vested the "Executive Power
of the United

States... in a single person," to be styled the President.

Apparently, the Committee of Style considered the power to
"make war" legislative as opposed to exec:utive in nature,
or at least better left in the hands of Congress.

The re-

ported draft authorized the President to "receive Ambassadors," and provided that "He shall be commander in chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia

of the Several States."
to "make treaties

.

But the Senate alone was authorize

"'^5

All through August, 1787, the draft of the Committee
of Detail was reviewed by the

v.^hole

article, clause by clause.

It was during this process,

Convention, article by

on August 17, that the most important exchange of all re-

garding war-making took place.

Below is reproduced Madison

account of the debate as it appears in Farrand's Records of
Framing

,

pp.

^^Farrand, Records

,

2:182.

'^^Farrand,

89,

^^Farrand, Frmning^, p. 134.

125-126,
183,

185.

128-129.

,

.
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g|Jlder|l_towentic^

The editor's notes and brackets

"To make war"
Mr Pinkney opposed the vesting this
power in the
Legislature.
Its proceedings were too slow
It wd
meet but once a year.
The Hs. of Reps, would be too
numerous for such deliberations. The Senate
xvould be
the best depositary, being more acquainted
with foreign affairs, and most capable of uroper
resolutions
it the btates are equally represented in
Senate so
as to give no advantage to large States, the
power
will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their
all at stake
such cases as well as the large States.
It would be singular for one-authority to make war
and another peace.
Mr Butler.
The Objections agst the Legislature
lie in a great degree agst the Senate.
He was for
vesting the power in the President, who will have all
the requisite qualities, and will not make wax but when
the Nation \<f±ll support it.
Mr Madison and Mr Gerry moved to insert "declare,"
striking out "make" war; leaving to the ExecuHve" TFie
power to repel suZden attacks.
Mr Sharman thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war.
"Make" better than "declare" the latter narrowing the
power too much.
_Mr Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a
motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. Elseworth.
there is a material difference between the cases of making war and making peace
It
shd. be more easy to get out of war, than into~it,
X^Jar also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended with intricate & secret negociaticns
Mr. Mason was agst giving the power of war to the
Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it;
or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be
entitled to it. He v/as for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred
"
declar e' to 'make".
On the Motion to insert declare --in place of Make
it was agreed to.
N.H. no. Mas. abst. Cont no." Pa ay. Del. ay.

m

,

.

.

S.C. ay. Geo-ay.
Pinkney' s motion to strike out vzhole clause,
disagd. to without call of States.
Mr Butler moved to give the Legislature power of
peace, as they were to have that of v/ar.

Md.

ay.
Mr.

Va.

ay.

N.C. ay.

Mr Go-rry 2ds. him.

.

.

^7

The last motion failed, 10-0, and then the
Convention
adjourned for the day. The asterisk following
Connecticut's

vote on the motion to substitute "declare" for
"make," refers to an interesting footnote of Madison's,

It reads as

follows,
'^On the remark by Mr. King that "ma;k_e"
V7ar might
be understood to "conduct" it which was' an Executive
function, Mr. Elseworth gave up his objection and the
vote of Cont was changed tO'-ay.'^S

With Connecticut voting in the negative, the vote
total was 7-2; with Connecticut in the affirmative it was
8-1.

Indeed,

in Madison's original Journa l of the Conven-

tion, and in his separate "Detail of Ayes and Noes," he

shows that the motion was voted upon twice.

However, the

vote tallies show that the motion lost on the first vote,
4-5, while gaining 8-1 approval the second time.

There is

no separate record of a 7-2 vote.^^
It should also be noted that Madison's recording of

the vote breakdowns in the original Journal and in the De-

tail of Ayes and Noes was sometimes innaccurate, sometimes
Furthermore, if two separate

difficult to understand.

votes took place, as seems likely, we don't know when during the debates they occurred, since in the full account

^'Farrand, Records
^^Ibid.

,

p.

319.

-^^ibid.

,

p,

313.

,

2:318-319.
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(quoted above) only one vote is recorded
along with

Connecticut's switch. ^0

Lacking this information we cannot say for
sure what
led the delegates to approve the measure to
substitute

"declare" for "make."

Was Connecticut alone persuaded by

the argument that "make" included "conduct," an
executive

function; and therefore was this argument in Madison's

footnote relatively insignificant?
Or was this the argument that caused a rejected motion
to be reconsidered and adopted;
ly significant?

in v/hich case it is extreme-

Since we do not know, and since we do not

know the point in the proceedings at which the proposal
was rejected (if it was), or approved, we cannot speak with

certainty about the intention of the delegates. ^1
But if we cannot draw conclusions with finality be-

cause of some uncertainties in the Convention records, can

we nevertheless formulate some generalizations from the
record available?

The opening comment by Pinc'Kney of South

Carolina seems clear.

Consistent with his own plan of

government, he would have vested the war-making power in
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

xiii-xiv;

Lofgren, in Falk, 4:577-578.

I also find it odd that Massachusetts
51ibid.
p. 5/8.
was recorded as "absent" for both votes even though Gerry,
See
a Massachusetts delegate, cosponsored the proposal.
Farrand Be cords 2:VjA, 319.
•

,

,

,

,
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the Senate, rather than the entire
legislature as provided
for in the Committee of Detail plan.^^

Pierce Butler, also part of the South Carolina
delegation, disagreed, and argued that the war-making
power
should lie with the President.

Butler's was the most

forthright claim in behalf of executive war-power, and
it
is significant in that it was not adopted.

It was probably

Butler's comment vjhich delegate Gerry said he "never ex-

pected to hear in a republic

"^"^
.

Gerry then offered his own proposal, which Madison
cosponscred, substituting "d eclare war" for "make war;

leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks."
Next follov/ed the curious comment of Roger Sherman of

Connecticut, an early proponent of an executive subordinate
to the legislature.^*^

Sherman "thought it stood very well" with the words
"make war," and objected to changing it to "declare war"
on the grounds that this would narrow Congress' power too
rauch.

He may also have felt that the substitute motion

would leave to the President the power to "commence war,"
and this he opposed.

55

George Mason of Virginia preferred "declare" to
^^Farrand, Records, 2:182, 3:599.

Farrand, R ecords

,

2:318.

^^Farrand, Re cord s

,

1:5,

^'Farrand, Records

2:318,

2:318.

.
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"make" and did not trust the Executive
with "the power of
war." Mason apparently believed it would
be too easy to
go to war if such authority were lodged
with the President
alone
Next, Madison records a vote on the motion
to substi-

tute "declare," and he footnotes the

coiranent

of Rufus King

to the effect that "make war" might include the
power to
c^^'^HCt war,

properly an executive function.

was accepted, perhaps as

a

The substitute

result of, perhaps without regard

to King's remarks.

Pinckney's motion to strike the vjhole clause, probably

preparatory to

a

proposal to vest the war-making power in

the Senate alone, was then rejected.

Also voted down was

Butler's motion to give Congress the "power of peace, as
they were to have that of war."^^

Given the doubts about the accuracy of the voting

record and the confusion about the point in the debate at

which the votes were taken, what minimum conclusions may
be drawn from these crucial proceedings?
First, Butler's idea to grant the President sole

war-making power was rejected.

Gerry spoke against it

after having offered his motion to reduce
^^Ibid.

57ibid.
^^Ibid.

,

p.

319

som.ev/hat

Congres-

^

slonal war power.

Mason also spoke against it while

ing adoption of the Gerry motion.

urg.-

Therefore, to its

sponsors and supporters, the reduction of
Congress' £ower
to "make" war cHd not thereby vest the
ver^ same power in
the_

Presided.

Butler admitted as much following the vote

to substitute "declare" for "make" war, when
he confessed

that the legislature was to have the power of war.
Second, Congressional power wa£ najrrowed in some

fashion when the Madison-Gerry motion was adopte d.

Sherman

opposed the motion for narrowing the power too much.

Gerry

wished to transfer to the President "the power to repel
sudden attacks," and this certainly was intended.

It also

seems likely that King's suggestion that the President have

authority to conduct war once begun met with general approval.

However, it is not clear

,

as is sometimes asserted,

that this debate demonstrated a desire on the part of the

Framers to limit the President to so lel y the power to repel sudden attacks and to conduct war once begun.

The

thrust of the motion was to reduce Congressional power to
the advantage of the Executive.

The extent of the reduc -

tion is not entirely clea r from thi s debat e

.

^

Third, Pinckney's motion to strike the whole war-

power clause, perhaps preliminarily to
59But see Raoul Berger,
in Falk, 4:604.

a

proposal to vest

"War-Making by the President"

.
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the power in an institution other
than the whole Congress,
was rejected.
This indicates that the Framers
were determlued to. mainjtain the power of the
le^lative_ branch to
d eclare war

Beyond the three propositions above, the
intent of
the Framers is not clear.
But of course the crucial

ques-

tion remains unanswered:

which agency was empowered to

commence or ini_tiate hostilities?

Relying upon Congress'

powers to declare war, and grant letters of marque and
reprisal, Lofgreii concludes that "Congress would have nearly

complete authority over the commencement of war."60

Lofgren reasons that undeclared wars were common
enough at the time of the Framing so that the Founders

would not "leave such an 5.mportant power unvested."

In

addition, the practice of issuing letters of marque and

reprisal had fallen into disuse by the time Article
tion

8,

clause 11 was established.

I,

sec-

He therefore finds it

"plausible" that the letters of marque clause was designed
to give Congress

(as opposed to the President) whatever

war- commencing power did not inhere in the declaration of

war clause.^
However, Lofgren offers no evidence to substantiate
his interpretation of the letters of marque and reprisal
clause, and

I

could find none in the record of the Conven-

^^U.S. Const, art.
Fall;, 4:601.
^•-Lofgren,

I,

sec.

8,

in Falk, 4:594-8.

cl.

11

^

Lofgren, in

tion proceedings.

Furthermore, he admits that the great

European treatises on international law, with which
the
Framers were familiar, distinguished between declared
or
"perfect"

vjars

and undeclared or "imperfect" wars.

In

adopting the word "declare" in the Constitution, the
Framers may well have been using the word in this narrow
sense, thus limiting Congress' power to "perfect" wars
alone. ^2

The fact is that a number of contradictory interpretations are compatible with the evidence discussed so far;

and that is because the

e vidence

this point does not enable us

to_

we have review ed up to

conclude with certainty

which branch was empowered by the Framers to initia te hostilities
.

.

.

Unfortunately, the "make/declare war" debate was the

last significant act of the Constitutional Convention with

respect to Presidential war-making power.

Most of the per-

tinent Presidential powers (e.g., executive power, command-

er-in-chief, and power to receive ambassadors) had been

recommended by the Committee of Detail and did not generate
controversy

"-^
.

The only modifications in the work of the Committee
See Eugene V. Rostow, "Great Cases
590-3,
62xbid.
Falk, 4:768-769.
Act"
Powers
Made Bad Law:' The War

m

;

^^See p.

18,

supra.

,
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of Detail with respect to Presidential
war powers x.ere as
follows.
1.

His powers as Commander in Chief of the
State

militia were restricted.

They were only to take effect

when those forces were "called into the actual
service of
the United States. "^^
2.

tended.

Presidential power over foreign affairs was exThe power to make treaties, which had been lodged

in the Senate alone, was transferred to the President,
with

the proviso that the Senate give its "advice and consent,"

and that two-thirds of the Senators present approve the

treaty
The Federal Convention completed its work in September,
1787, without any further debate over the issues concerning
us.

The debates we have examined reveal precious little

about the Framers

ment of war.

'

intentions with regard to the commence-

Perhaps it is best to withhold our conclusions

until after we have analyzed post-Convention commentaries
on the subject.

It is to these commentaries that we now

turn our attention,

Post-Co nve ntion Commentaries on War-Making
By far the most famous of commentaries upon the newly

fashioned Am.erican system of government were those essays
^^Farrand, Records
65ibid.

,

pp.

,

2:426-427.

498-499.

.

by Hamilton, Madison and John Jay, known
collectively as

Ike_Z£^eralist

making

And yet here too are

.

fex^

words about war-

.

There is Hamilton's comment in the 23rd paper to
the effect that national security powers "ought to exist

without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee
or to define the extent and variety of national exigen-

cies..,"

But this was hardly a plea for unlimited Presi-

dential or Congressional war power; it was rather a brief
for federal power over national defense unhampered by

state interference.^^
In No. 41, Madison contents himself with the con-

clusion that the power of declaring war is necessary, and

needs no defense, and so he never considers the relative
roles of the President and Congress in war -making
The 69th essay is, for us, the

m.ost

^
.

interesting,

Here Hamilton draws a comparison between the war powers
of the Presidency on the one hand, and the war powers of

the British monarch and certain state governors on the

other
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army
In this respect his
and navy of the United States.
authority would be nominally the same with that of th
king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior
It would amount to nothing more than the supto it.
reme command and direction of the military and naval
66Rossiter, Federali s t Papers
67ibid.

,

p.

256.

,

p.

153

29

forces as first general and adip.iral
of the Confederacy; while that of the British king
extends to the
oeclaring of war and to the raising and
reRulatin^^ of
fleets and armies.-.all whichTl^e
Conilf Eufl^^nLr
consideration, would appertain to the
legislative 68
.

In this view, the President, as ConTmander
in Chief,
is no more than a top military officer,
with power to make

major decisions in war-time, but without the
clare

pox^er to de-

Wliile Ham.ilton does not say that the
President

vzar.

may never commence hostilities, the narrow definition
of
his Commander in Chief pov/ers suggests that he may not
do
so under that authority.

ferently, the Pre sident

'

Or,
s

to state the same thing dif-

p ower s as Commander in Chief do

not provide him with authority to commence war. 69
It should be kept in mind that this is the view of

the same "Publius" who extolled the virtues of a "vigorous

executive" in Federalist No. 70.

"Energy

5-n

the Executive,"

declared Hamilton,
is a leading charact er in the definition of good government
It is essential to the protection of the
communit}?- against foreign attacks.., 70
.

But was executive "energy" to be displayed in the ini-

tiation of hostilities without

a

declaration of war?

"Publius" does not say; but when he enumerates the various

administrative activities to be superintended by the Pres^^Ibid.

,

pp.

^il7-A18,

footnote omitted.

^^Corwin, The Presi dent

,

p.

228.

70Rossiter, Fede ralis t Pap ers, p. 423,
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ident, no such power is listed.

The actual conduct of foreign negotiations,
the
paratory plans of finance, the application and prebursement of the public moneys in conformity to disthe
general appropriations of the legislature, tne
arranpement of the army and navy, the directions of the
operations Ox- V7ar-~ these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to be most properly
understood by the administration of government.'^

Nowhere in this list, and nov7here in T he Federal ist
is it suggested that the President may commence war on his

own authority.

And Hamilton's treatm.ent of the Commander

in Chief clause in the sixty-ninth paper suggests by impli-

cation that the President has no such power.
All told, the F ederalis t is not very helpful.

VJlien

we turn to the debates in the state conventions considering
adoption of the Constitution, we find one James Iredell,
delegate to the North Carolina convention reiterating the

Hamiltonian view.

Iredell thought Presidential military

powers comparable to those of the state governors, but not
to the king of England.

The President, therefore, is to command the military
forces of the United States, and this power I think a
proper one: at the same ti.me it will be found to be
A very material difference may
suf f i.ciently guarded.
be observed between this power, and the authority of
the king of Greau Britaia under similar circumstances.
The king of Great Britain is not only the commander-inchief of the land and naval forces, but has power, in
He has also
time of war, to raise fleets and armies.
has not
President
The
the authority to declare v^ar.
nor
authority,
ovm
the power of declaring war by his
are
powers
These
that of raising fleets and armies.

^^Alcxandcr Hamilton, Federalist No. 72, in Rossiter,
Federal ist Papers pp. 435-A36,
,
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vested in other hands. The power of declarine.
war is
expressly given to Congress, that is, to the two
branches of the legislature ... 72
At the South Carolina convention. Pierce Butler,
who,
it will be recalled had suggested at Philadelphia
that war-

making be vested in the President, described the rejection
of his proposal as follows.
It was first proposed to vest the sole power of making
peace or war in the Senate; but this was objected to
as inimical to the genius of a republic, by destroying
the necessary balance they were anxious to preserve.
Some gentlemen were inclined to give this pov/er to the
President; but it was objected to, as throwing into
his hands the influence of a monarch, having an opportunity of involving his country in a war whenever he
wished to promote her destruction. 73

One William Wilson, delegate to the Pennsylvania

convention, urged the adoption of the Constitution for

these reasons.
This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it.
It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve
us in such distress; for the important power of declarthis
ing war is vested in the legislature at large;
declaration must be made with the concurrence of the
from this circumstance we
House of Representatives:
that nothing but our
conclusion
may draw a certain
national interest can draw us into a war. 74

Wilson's comment is interesting because he uses "in72jonathan Elliot, ed. The Deba tes in the s ev eralState Conv e ntions, on the ad option of tKe Fede ral "Cons tituti on, as recomme nded by the General Convencion at Philadel
J.B".
phiaj i n T78T7Td ed. 5 volc"TPhiladelphia
4:107-108.
1863-1891),
LT^p'incott CO.
,

:

,

73ibid.

,

p.

263.

74Elliot, Debates, 2:528.

,

volve us in" war and "declaring war"
interchangeably,
thereby suggesting a broad construction
of the Congressional power to declare war.
But the testimony

of a single

delegate is not much to go by, and the
debates in the
state conventions seem to have offered no
other pertinent
remarks.
(New York proposed two Constitutional
amendments,
one requiring a two-thirds vote in Congress
for a declaration of war; the other prohibiting the President
from per-

sonally assuming command of an army in the field.

Neither

were adopted.
Events in Washington's administration soon provided
the backdrop for further elucidation of the President's

powers in foreign affairs.

Since the occasional papers

surrounding these events are so close to the framing of
the Constitution in time, and involve some of the same per-

sonages, they may be considered a part of the views of

the Fiamers

The event was President Washington's Proclamation of
1793,

issued on Presidential authority, calling for neutral-

ity (although it shunned the word) on the part of the United

States in the

V7ar

between France and England.

Pro-French

S3nnpathizers considered the Proclamation an unwarranted "tilt
tovjard Great Britain,

thus i.nspiring Hamilton, writing as

"Fdcificus," tu publish a series of newspaper articles
^^Elliot, Debates, 1:330.

de^.

^
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fending the Proclamation 7
*'Pacificus" No,

1

aims at setting out the consuitu-

tional basis for the President's action
in response to the
charge that Congress' power to determine
on peace and war
as established by Article I,

usurped.

Section 8, Clause 11 had been

Hamilton's defense rests upon

that Article II, Section

1,

Clause

1,

the'

proposition

"The executive Pow-

er shall be vested in a President of the
United States of

America," is an affirmative grant of general power to
the
President

.

'^'^

This broad undifferentiated grant of power is only

partially de tailed in the remainder of Article II, which,
along with other parts of the Constitution (e.g., Article
I,

Section

this power.

Clause 11), contains certain exceptions to

8,

Finally, since a proclamation of neutrality

is "merely an Executive Act'' the President was warranted

in issuing same.^^

As for the charge that Congress' power to declare

war is undermined, Hamilton retorts:
The answer to this is, that however true it may be,
^^Corwin, The President

,

pp.

178-179,

''^Ibid.
p. 179; Alexander Hamilton, The Papers of
Alexa nder Hamil ton, ed, Harold C. Syrett (Nev7 YonT! Columbia University Press, 1961--). 15 (1969): 39.
,

7SHamilton, Papers

,

15:39-40.

that the right of the Legislature to declare
war includes the right of judging v/hether the
Nation be un"^^^'^ ''^^
not--it will not folio
that the^ executive is in any case excluded
from a sim
liar rignt_^of Judgment, in the execution of
its own

Hamilton develops this response with a hypothetical
example.

Wliat

if,

he asks, there had been a treaty obli-

gating the United States to fight alongside' France in case
that ration went to war?

And what if a new government came

to power in France with policies openly hostile toward

Great Britain?

X\fould

not the President, if he extended

recognition to that new government by virtue of his authority to "receive ambassadors," have placed the Legislature

under an obligation to declare war?^^
"Pacificus" continues as follows,
This serves as an example of the right of the Executive, in certain cases, to determine the condition of
the Nation, though it m.ay consequentially affect r,b,e
proper or improper exercise of the Power of the Legislature to declare war.
The Executive indeed cannot
control the exercise of that power--further than by the
exercise of its general right of objecting to all acts
of the Legislature; liable to being overruled by two
The Legislature is
thirds of both houses of Congress.
free to perform its own duties according to its own
sense of them- -though the Executive in the exercise of
its constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent
state of things which ought to V7eigh in the legislative
decisions.
From the division of the Executive Power
there results, in reference to it, a concurren t authority, in the distributed cases. 81
79ibid.
SOibid.

Sllbid.

,

p.

40.

,

p

Al.

,

pp.

41-42.

,

35

In short, although the President
cannot declare war.

his foreign affairs powers, rocted in
the Executive Power
vested in him, enable the President to
confront Congress

with faits accoinpli^ which the Congress may
or may not
support. 82

T^^ys^

Hamilton concedes that Congress has the

final word on war and peace.
The legislature alvone can interrupt those blessings
/ of peace j, by placing the Nation in a state of War. 83
But he concedes no more to Congress than the final

word
It deserves to be remarked, that as the parricipation
of the senate in the making of Treaties and the power
of the Legislature to declare war are exceDtions out
of the general 'Executive Power' vested in' the President, they are to be construed strictly--and ought to
be extended no further than is essential to their execution.

To sum up:

it was Hamilton's view that only C ongress

can commence war, in the sense of authorizing protracted

hostilities.

However, the initiative in foreign affairs

lies with the President and he may, as a result, create

situations which lead to war.
Such clai-ms for Presidential povjer did not sit well

with the pro-French faction, led by Jefferson, who, on
another occasion had expressed his understanding of war-

making under the Constitution.
82corwin, The P
8

-^Hamilton, Papers

84ibid.

,

p.

42,

.

15:42.

"

.
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^^"^^^^l^^jdy given in example one effectual
check
to the Dog of x^ar by transferring the
power of letExecutive to the Legislative
body, .Lrgm those who are to spend to
those who are
to pay,

^

Although Jefferson had approved of the Proclamation
of neutrality he implored Madison to rebut "Pacif
icus

.

Nobody ansvjers him and his doctrines are taken for
confessed.
For God's sake, my dear Sir, take up your
pen, select the most striking heresies and cut him
to pieces in face of the public. 86
Madison responded with his own series of articles
signed "Helvidius," and published late in the summer of 1793.
First off Madison rejects the

extraordinary doctrine that the pox^^ers of making war
and treaties are, in their nature, executive, and
therefore comprehended in the general grant of executive power, where not especially and'strictly excepted out of the grant,
"Helvidius" contends that executive powe r can only be exercised where there is already law to be executed

that making

;

a treaty or declaring war require no pre-existing laws; and

that therefore such powers are more legisla tive than executive

m

nature.

88

Furthermore, the Framers of the Constitution must

have considered war-making a legislative power because they
^^Thomas Jefferson to James Madison,
1789, Portable Jeff erson

p.

,

6

September

451.

^^Quoted in Corwin, The Pres iden t,

p.

180.

^

'James Hadlyoii, "Helvidiub" No. 1, Letters and__other
Lip
~J7~B
writings cf James Madison 4 vols. (PhiladelpHia
plncott L Corr~T5l35TT~Tn:i2"613
,

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

6iA-615

:

.
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listed the pov7er to declare war among the
powers of Congress "without any other qualification than
what is common
to every other legislative act."^^
Secondly, whatever the extent of executive
power, it

cannot extend to "authority clearly placed by the
consti-

tution in another department."

"The declaring of war,"

Madison points out,
is expressly made a legislative function.
Whenever,
then, a question occurs, whether war shall be declared,
or whether public stipulations require it, the question necessarily belongs to the department to which
those functions belong; and no other department can be
in the execution of its proper functions if it should
undertake to decide such a questionT^Ti

Thirdly, v/hen "Pacificus" suggests that the right to

judge whether or not the United States is obligated to go
tc war is concurrent

(i.e.,

shared by both Congress and

the President), he is inconsistent, imprudent and in error.

He is inconsistent argues "Helvidius", because he had included
the power of judging whether or not the United States is
obligated, to go to V7ar within the power to declare war,

which be admitted is vested in the legislature.^-^
He is imprudent because the branches m^ight reach con-

tradictory conclusions, thus embarrassing the United
States before the world.

^'^^Ibid.

,

p.

616

^^Jamco Madison,
^llbid.

,

p.

Finally, argues "Helvidius,"

622.

"Helvidius" no.

2,

ibid., p.

623.

.

.

"Pacificus" is in error because the
notion of such a concurrent power finds no warrant in any
of the provisions of
the Constitution, and violates the
principle of separation
of powers
In suiDinary, Madison tries to refute
all of Hamilton's

major contentions.

lie

rejects Hamilton's claims for Pres-

idential power in foreign affairs as encroachments
upon

Congressional war power.
...the legislature is the only competent and constitutional organ of the will of the nation, that is of
Its disposition, its duty, and its interest, in relation to a commencement of war.
In exercising the constitutional power of deciding a
question of war, the legislature ought to be as free
to decide, according to its own sense of the public
good, on one side as on the other side.^^
.

Presidential fait s accompli s would rob the Congress
of its power to freely decide for war or peace, and are

therefore without constitutional warrant.
However, while Hamilton and Madison disagree about
the extent of Presidential power over foreign policy, they

agree upon a question of fundamental importance to our
study.

Both Hamilton and Madison agree that the last word

on the commencement of war rests with Congress and not the

President.

That this is Madison's view cannot be doubted;

the passage just quoted settles the issue.

^^"Helvidius" ncs

^^"Helvidius" no.

.

2,3,
5,

ibid., pp. 622-39

ibid., pp. 648-649.
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As for Hamiltcn. recall that it was
"Pacificus" who

remarked as follows.
The legislature alone can interrupt those
blessings
/of peace/, by placing the Nation in a
state of War. 94
Thus, even the foremost proponent of
Presidential

power in foreign affairs of his day concedes that
only Congress may place the United States "in a state of
War."
This is most significant and will weigh heavily in
the con-

clusions we are about to draw.
Conclusions
1.

Under British law and theory the war power was

part of the Executive power, and resided in the

CrowTi.

Montesquieu and Locke considered the war power to be executive in nature.

At the Constitutional Convention the Pres-

ident was initially granted all of the executive powers

formerly invested in the Continental Congress, but this was

objected to in part because it would have given the President the power of war and peace.
2,

In Convention,

the Committee of Detail vested the

"executive power" in the President, while giving Congress
the power to "make war."

The full Convention changed the

phraseology to "declare war," leaving certain war-powers
to the President,

While the full significance of the

change is not clear, one effect
9 ^ Kami 1 1 o n

,

Papert>

,

15

:

4.

vjas

to empower the Presi-

40

dent to respond unilaterally in case of attack
on the na-

tion

.

3.

Post" Convention commentaries, such as the Fed-

eralist Papers, the record of the debates in the state ratifying conventions, and the "Helvidius-Pacif icus" debate

suggest that contemporaries believed that the Constitution
gave Congress the final word on the comm.encement of war.

While there are a number of uncertainties, the origi -

understa nding, of the Co nstitution seems to have been
that Congr ess

aiid C ongress

alone h ad the power to initiate

war unless the country was attacked, or perhap s
nent danger of attack

,

in immi-

.

Perhaps "Helvidius" was right when he exclaimed:
In no part of the constitution is more wisdom to be
found, than in the clause V7hich confides the question
of war or peace to the legislature, and not to the ex-

ecutive department ^5
.

Nevertheless, "Pacificus"' message should not be forgotten;' and it is that the Congress will have to take into

account what the President has done in foreign affairs when
it considers whether or not to commence war.

For the Pres-

ident has a right, says "Pacificus,"
in certain cases, to determine the condition of the
Nation, though it may consequently affect uhe proper
or improper exercise of the Power of the Legislature
The Executive indeed cannot control
to declare vjar.
power ... though the Executive in
that
of
the exercise

^5 James Madison,

"Helvidius" no.

4,

Letters, 1:543.

the exercise of its constitutional powers, may
estab
lish an antecedent state of things which ought to
weigh in the legislative decisions. 96
Hamj.lton, Papers

,

15:41-42

,

-
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CHAPTER

II

THE UNDECLARED NAVAL WAR WITH FRANCE.

1797

-1800

Introduction

America's first undeclared war began in
1797, quite
early in the nation's history. However, it was
hardly

an ex-

ample of excessive claims on behalf of Presidential
war power.
On the contrary, Congress authorized nearly every
hostile
act undertaken in the Adams administration.

The roots of the so-called Quasi War lay in the war

between France and England which began in 1793.

The United

States wished to maintain its profitable sea-trade with both
of the great European powers, as well as with their Carib-

bean possessions.

Naturally, both France and Great Britain

resented any third party trading with the enemy.

The newly

independent United States, a military weakling with no navy
or standing army, rapidly became a pawn in the great power

struggle

'.

Although the United States was bound by treaty to
France

2

Washington proclaimed American neutrality in the

European conflict in his famous Proclamation of April 22,
•^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomat i c History of the AmeriPrentice-Hall
can People 9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
66-91.
Inc.
1974)
pp.
,

,

,

^United States, Department of State, Treaties and
Agreements o f the Uni t ed States, 1776International
Other
Government Print
1949 comp. Charles iT Bevans (Washington
Commerce," TS
and
Amity
of
"Treaty
Tng~Office, 1971), 7:763,
"TS
No.
Alliance,
82, 17 July
of
No. 83, 17 July 1778; "Treaty
:

,

1778.

-

.
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1793.

3

(This was the Proclamation that prompted
the "Helvi-

dius-Pacificus" debate.^)

The Proclamation did little good,

because immediately thereafter Great Britain seized
American
vessels and their crews carrying on

a

profitable food trade

with France.^
Americans were not yet over their outrage at British
depredations when France began to retaliate by seizing American merchant ships carrying supplies to England.^
followD-ng year,

Early the

1794, Britain eased its seizure policy and

even offered indemnification for American losses.

Conse-

quently, the United States began negotiating with England,
out of which issued the Jay Treaty.^

The Jay Treaty, ratified by Washington August 14, 1795

aroused great opposition from both France and her supporters
in America, amongst whom most of the Jeffersonian Republican

could be numbered. The reasons for their anger are readily

England had forced the United States to make con-

apparent:

cessions which V7ere clearly unfavorable to France,

g

3

A Co mpilation of t he M esJames D. Richardson, ed
Bu
(New Yorlcl
sages and Papers of the Presidents "KT^vols
1:148-149.
Inc.,
1897),
Literature,
o±~nationai
reau
,

.

,

.

4

See my chap.

^Bailey, p.
^Ibid.

,

p.

supra.

1,

73.

74.

Treaties and Or.her Tnterna t Tonal Agreements
"Treaty with (ireat Britain oi Amity Commerce and Nav
12 13
igation," TS No. 105, 28 October 1795; Bailey, pp. /4-8?..
^U.

:

S.

,

,

,

^Samuel F. Bemis Jay's Treaty (New Raven:
versity Press, 1962), pp. TSS^GlTrw^SO
,

Yale Uni

^

.
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In fact, a number of Jay Treaty
provisions appear to

be inconsistent with articles contained
in the Franco-

American Treaties of Alliance and of Amity and
Conmierce.
For example, Article 24 of the Treaty of Amity
and Com-

merce prohibited the neutral signatory (the United
States)
from granting port privileges to the privateers of any
nation at war (England) with the other signatory (France)

.

But Article 25 of the Jay Treaty stipulated that British

war ships and privateers were to have port privileges in
the United States. 10
In addition, by Article 17 of the Jay Treaty, the

United States form.ally acquiesced in the British policy
of disrupting sea trade with France.

This clause permitted

seizure of cargoes belonging to or destined for an enemy,
the American merchant to be indemif ied
By contrast, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with

France embodied a principle long urged by the Americans:
"Free ships make free goods."

This meant that the merchant

ships of an ally were free to carry any goods, regardless
of ovmership

origin or destination, provided only that war

,

material not be transported to an enemy,
^U S Trea ties and Othe r Interna t ional Agreements
.

.

1 -.111

,

IQ u.S. Trea ties and Other International Agreem ents
"
12:28-29':

l^Ibid.
1 ^ U.S.

7:771, art.

,

pp.

25-26.

Treaties and Oth er In teinatio'^al Agreements
25.

,

,
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The Ouas i War
As noted above, French attacks on American
shipping

had begun in 1793, before the Jay Treaty.

In early 1795

they subsided, but in the last months of Washington's ad-

ministration, following proclamation of the Jay Treaty,

depredations vjere renewed.
that, henceforth,

On July 2,

1796, France decreed

she shall treat the vessels of neutrals

"in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to

treat them."^^

Within one year of this proclamation. Secretary of
State Pickering reported, France had seized 316 American
vessels. 1^

To make matters worse, Charles Cotesworth

Pinckney, whom Washington had appointed as the new minister to France was rebuffed by the French Directory.

And

the President of the five-man Directory, Monsieur Barras,

made a public address openly insulting the American government.

Thus, by the time Adams took office, diplomatic re-

15
lations with France had been severed.

On March

2,

1797, two days before Adams'

inaugura-

tion, France issued another decree, this one clearly aimed
at American commerce.

Enemy goods in neutral ships were

^^Gardner W. Allen, Our Nav al War with France (1909;
Hamdon Conn.: Archon Books, 196/), pp. 30-31,
reprint ed
.

,

,

•'"^Bailey,

IVilen,

p.
p.

93.
22;

Bailey, p. 93

.

.

declared subject to seizure.

Furthermore, any i^^erican

serving on an enemy ship "shall be from
that act alone declared a pirate and treated as such"; in
other words,
hanged, even if he had been forcibly impressed
into the

British navy.

Finally, any American vessel not carrying a

^'gqi4_£a£e--a list of the crew prepared in a form

deemed proper by French authorities—was to be considered
good prize
On March 25th, Adams called for

Congress to be convened May

15.

"'"'^

a

special session of

His goal was to get

Congressional approval for new negotiations with France
coupled with measures for national

defense,-'-^

Republicans were alarmed, fearing Adams was going to
ask Congress for war measures against France,

Many Fed-

eralists, on the other hand, were opposed to negotiations.

Hamilton was not, as he secretly advised Adams' cabinet.
As a result, Adams' address to the Special Session of the

Fifth Congress, on May 16, 1797, accurately reflected

Hamilton

s

views.

Adams' message dealt only with France.

He decried

the rebuff of C.C. Pinckney and the speech of Monsieur
l^Allen, pp.

32-33, 298-299.

^^Richardson, 1:222-223.
18/^lexander De Conde, T he Quasi- War (New York

Charles Scribner's Sons,
19 Ibid.

,

pp.

18-25,

1966"),

p.

18

Barras as having "inflicted a wound in
the American
breasc", but vowed, in the interest of
peace, to "institute a fresh attempt at negotiation."
At the
same time,

attacks on American vessels require, Adams
told the Congress, some measures of defense.
In the long run, a navy
seems essential, he noted; for now. Congress
should equip
the three frigates begun during Washington's
administra-

tion and not yet made sea-worthy, and provide smaller
ships which, along with the frigates, could convoy
unarmed

merchantships

In addition, he urged Congress to augment

.

the regular artillery and cavalry, revise the laws for the

organization of the militia, and form a "provisional army."
Not much was accomplished in that special session.

The House spent the rest of May haggling over the formal

response to the President's speech.

customary then.)

On June

5,

1797,

(A formal reply was
a

series of resolutions

establishing the principles (details were to be v7orked
out by legislative committee) of Adams' defense program

were offered.

The Republicans opposed the program as be-

ing likely to lead to war with France; they urged delay

until completion of the negotiations,'^-^
20Thomas H. Benton, Abridgment of the Debates of
Congres_s (New York:
D. Appleton, 1857), 2:114-17.
^^U.S., Congress, Debates and Proceedings j-n the
Congress of the Uni ted S tates 17_89-1824 (Washington:
T5"Tff:' / Hereinafter
Gales ancfSeaton
cited as "Annals" 7
,

;

Some debate on the war-powers of the
President did
take place.
The Federalists wished to give Adams a
relatively free hand in using whatever naval power
Congress might

authorize; the Republicans wished to constrain him.

Federal-

ist Congressman Otis offered a representative argument
in

response to a Republican amendment limiting the use of the

navy to the jurisdiction of the United States.
KR. OTIS sais ha objected to the amendment, because
it appeared repugnant to the powers placed in the
President by the Constitution.
If a naval force was
raised, it would rest with the President how it
should be employed, as he was commander-in-chief.
The Legislature could say whether the vessels should
be employed offensively or defensively, but to say
at what precise place they were to be stationed,
was interfering with the duty of comniander-in-chief
and although he would have no right to send these
vessels to the West Indies, or as convoys yet he
might defend the seaccast as he pleased.

The amendment was defeated, 49-38.

position was made clear during debate on
proved in the Senate, providing

a

The Republican

a bill already ap-

naval force for the pro-

tection of trade,
denied the right of the President
MR. NICHOLAS
to apply the naval force of the United States to any
object he pleased. Wlien a force was raised for a
particular object, he agreed that it was his business
to direct the manner in which this forces should be
used; but to say he had the right to apply it at his
discretion, was to make him master of the United
States; if that were the case, he said, the powers
of the House V7ere gone. When they raised men for
the protection of the frontier, would the President, he asked, send them to any other place? He insisted upon it that they had a right to say the veP'
sels should be kept in the ri^^er Dclav^'are, if Lhey
.

.

.

Annals, 7:2.90.

49

pleasd; the President: might afterwards
direct their
conduct
If a contrary doctrine were to
prevail if
.hey did not give up the right of
declaring war / they
gave up the power, which would inevitably
lead to war 23

Congressman Harper, a Federalist from South
Carolina,
cleverly argued that the use of the navy ought
to be left to
the President because he had no authority to employ

it in any

but peaceful manner; to do otherwise "would be a breach
of
his power."

"He,

therefore, could not," Harper conceded,

"repel any violation of our rights by force, except previously authorized by Congress

"^^^
.

The Republicans were not convinced.
S.

Representat5-ve

Smith pointed out that "{i}f the power of em.ploying the

frigates was v7holly left with the President, though he had

not the power of declaring war, yet he might so employ them
as to lead to war.""^

Though the Republicans were outnum-

bered, they combined with moderate Federalists to force com-

promises and inaction.
As

a

result, the only legislation enacted that is

pertinent to this study is as follows.

Privateering by Amer-

icans against nations V7ith which the United States is at

peace or against other Americans was outlawed.

Arms and

ammunition exports were banned, and their importation en~

23^nals, 7:362-363.
2^Ibid., p. 364.
^^Ibid.
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couraged.

Port and harbor defenses were improved.

A de-

tachment of militia was authorized: eighty
thousand men
to be called up from the various states.
Taxes

on vellum,

parcliment, paper,

and on salt were established.

act "providing a Naval Armament" was passed.

And the

'^"^

The Naval Armament Act empowered the President,
"should he deem it expedient, to cause the frigates United
States, Constitution, and Constellation, to be manned and

employed."

This act also authorized the President to use the

Treaury Department's revenue cutters "to defend the seacoastl'^^

A frigate, incidentally, was

three-masted sail ship carry-

a

ing between twenty-eight and forty-four guns on one or two
decks.

Cutters were much smaller vessels, carrying less

than twenty guns.

The British and other European navies

were vastly superior, since they had whole squadrons consisting of ships-of -the-line
Perhaps the

m.ost

,

i.e.,

seventy--f our gun ships.

important action of this first ses-

sion of the Fifth Congress was the confirmation by the

Senate of Adams' selections of the men to make up the new
comiTiission to France.

of moderate views.

Adams wanted a three-man commission

His Cabinet, on the other hand, wanted

^^Annals, 9:3685-3701.
^''l

Stat.

28

1 Stat.

520-23.

523-5 (1797).

^^Harold H. Sprout and Margaret Sprcit The Rise of
American Nava l Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
K-ess, 1939), p. 43.
,

three.

Federalists.

Adams nominated C.C. Pinckney (still

in Europe after his rejection by France).
John Marshall,
a Federalist lawyer and later Supreme
Court Chief Justice,

and Francis Dana, a Massachusetts judge.

When Dana de-

clined to serve, Adams replaced him-~without
consulting
his Cabinet- -with Elbridge Gerry, a moderate
Republican.
The Senate confirmed, and Marshall and Gerry left
for

France in late July, 1797.29
The commissioners were instructed as follows.

were to negotiate

a

They

new treaty with France designed to

supersede all prior pacts; the new agreement was to last
for ten or twenty years.

The United States was to accept

no blame for the current crisis, nor was it to agree to

anything inconsistent with the Jay Treaty.

Compensation

for losses due to French depredations v/ere to be sought:,

but were not to be considered indispensable to a treaty

agreement.

The United States could grant France the same

privileges granted England in the Jay Treaty, including

abandoning the "free ships, free goods" principle.

Finally,

the United States was to eliminate a clause in the Treaty
of Alliance obligating it to guarantee French possessions
in America;

and the provision in a consular convention

signed in 1788, calling for prize courts in American ports.
29De Conde, pp. 28-29, 35
30ibid.

,

pp.

44-45.

.

The Americans would have to negotiate
with France's
new Minister of Foreign Relations, the wily
Charles Maurice
de Talleyrand-P^ripord.
Talleyrand was responsible
to the

five-^rnan

Executive Directory.

He was instructed to aban-

don requiring American ships to carry a role
d'equipage.

but to delay indenmif ication for American losses.

Further-

more, he was to end future depredations only if France

were granted the same rights given England by the Jay
Treaty
The envoys met Talleyrand in Paris in early October,
1797.

He was polite, but refused to start negotiations.

Later that month, Talleyrand's agents contacted the envoys
informally, and requested as a prelude to negotiations a

bribe for the French officials, a promise of an American
loan to France, and a retraction of some of Adams' comments

before the special session of Congress, last May 16th.
(Soon thereafter, the Americans were shocked to learn that
the bribe demand totaled about a quarter of a million dollars.)

The comjnissioners were not morally outraged; they

would pay the customary diplomatic douceur - -but only after
a treaty V7as agreed to, not as a preliminary to negotiations

As November drew near, Napoleon's triumph over

Austria strengthened France's bargaining position with the
31lbid,

,

p,

-"^^ibid.

,

pp.

43.

46-47

.
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United States; her domination over Western
Europe was assured.

The rest of 1797 saw nothing but repeated
demands
for bribe money, coupled with repeated
American refusals.

The envoys also refused to agree to the loan
because they
felt it would violate American neutrality.

Furthermore,

they refused to disavow any of President Adams' speech.

When the Fifth Congress opened its second session in midNovember, the legislators knew nothing of the diplomatic

stalemate
On November 23, 1797, Adams urged the second session

of the Fifth Congress, in light of "increasing depreda-

tions" by France, to approve of the "precautionary meassures" he had recommended last May.

But the Congress pre-

ferred to await news of the progress of the negotiations
D.n

a

Paris.

On March 4, 1798, the administration received

number of dispatches, some in code, detailing the fail-

ure of the mission, the solicited bribes, and an account
of a new French decree aimed at American commerce.

^'^

Adams asked his cabinet if he should recommend a

declaration of war to Congress.

Secretary of State

Pickering favored it, but Hamilton counseled Secretary of

War McHenry to urge defensive measures.

At first, feel-

ing the United States had no choice, Adams drafted a war

message:

later he scrapped it, in part because he thought

33ibid.

,

^"^Annals,

pp.

48-52.

7:631;

De Conde, p.

66,

the Congress would not approve a
declaration of war.^S
On March

5.

the President forwarded one of the
un-

coded dispatches to Congress, explaining that
it was so important he wanted it to be "inrniediately made
known." The

dispatch stated "chat there exists no hope

.

.

.

that the

objects of our mission will be in any way accomplished."
It also included details of the latest French
decree.

Adams

reported receipt of other disptaches, yet to be deciphered.
On January 18, the Directory had declared that a

ship's cargo is no longer covered by its flag.

In other

words, goods once transported from an enemy (British) port
are subject to seizure- -even if on board a neutral (American) ship and ovmed by a citizen of a neutral state.

This

new decree was broadly enough interpreted to include items
other than cargo --such as navigational instruments --which

had been manufactured in England.
On March 19, 1798, Adams sent a message to Congress,

repeating his call for defensive measures to protect merchantships and "exposed portions" of United States terriHe told Congress that after examination and consid-

tory.

eration of all the envoys' communications, "I perceive

.

^^De Conde, pp. 67-68.
^^Annals,
^''De

7:1200-1202.

Conde, p. 53.

,
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no ground of expectation that the objects
of their mission
con be accomplished on terms compatible
with
the safety,

honor, or the essential interests of the
nation."

Further-

more, he rescinded an order of Washington's
prohibiting

the arming of American vessels.

Congressional Republicans were alarmed; they feared
that the Administration would lead them into war with
France.

Congressman Sprigg of Maryland proposed three

resolutions, one of which declared "that under existing

circumstances, it is not expedient for the United States to

resort to war against the French Republic."

This touched

off a debate on the war-making power.

Representative Sitgreaves opposed the resolutions;
since Congress alone could declare

vzar,

he reasoned, sim-

ply forebearing "is a sufficient expression of their senti-

ment that such a declaration would be inexpedient." Representative Bladwin disagreed; we should, he suggested, turn
to the Constitution for direction.

Baldw5.n "did not be-

lieve it was intended that this House should merely be
the instrument to give the sound of war; the subject seemed
to be placed wholly in the hands of the Legislature.

he went on
^^Annals, 8:1271-1272
3'Ibid., p. 1319ff.

That,"
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was the understanding of the country when
there was
no Government
existence, and he believed this
was the meaning of the Constitution
But
some persons declare that the present state
of things
IS already a state of war; ... if the
House does
not believe this to be a true position, this resolution ought to be agreed to
.^0

m

.

.

Mr. Otis, a Federalist, countered with a proposal
to

use "the Constitutional words" in the resolution, substituting "declare" for 'iresort to."

Representative Nicholas rose

to protest that in its original wording "the mischief was

met, whilst the other meant nothing."

He explained that

if gentlemen were ready to say we v/ere not prepared
to declare war, and at the same time were not ready
to say it is not expedient to resort to war, it proved
that they thought war might be made without beinp
^ declared. ^1

Then Nicholas spoke to the heart of Republican fears.
Has not the Executive, he asked rhetorically, taken measures

which would lead to war, leaving Congress with no choice on
the matter?

He was certain the Constitution gave Congress

the power over the progress of vjhat led to v^ar, as
well as the power of declaring war; but if the President could take the measures which he had taken,
with respect to arming merchant vessel?,, he, and not
Congress, had the power of making war.^"^

The Sprigg resolutions died; but they were quickly

overshadowed by the effects of a new, and successful, Re-

publican-supported resolution.
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

1320-1321.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

1321-24.

^+2ibid.

This measure, offered by
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extreme Federalists to embarras France and her American
sympathizers, called for the President to release all the

dispatches referred to in his March 19th message to Congress.

The extreme Federalists, unlike the Republicans,

were apparently aware in advance of the explosive nature
of the dispatches.

The House resolution passed on April

2,

1798.^3

Adams hastily complied the very next day,

He for-

warded the envoys' instructions along with their decoded
dispatches, using the initials, W, X, Y, and Z in place
of the names of Talleyrand's bribe-demanding agents.

Republicans

vv^ere

The

stunned, the Federalists emboldened.

Soon, newspapers published or reported about the

''XYZ

dis-

patches", and Congress had copies printed for distribution.

Thereafter, Congress and the public turned against France.
In the meantime, the mission to France broke up.

Talleyrand, desirous of negotiating with the envoy most

sympathetic to France- -Mr. Gerry- -successfully alienated

Marshall and Pinckney by repeatedly demanding an American
loan.

In addition, he flattered Gerry into believing he

was the last hope for a Franco-American rapprochement.

So

in the Spring of 1798, Marshall sailed for America, to be

treated like

a

hero, Pinckney remained with his family in

43De Conde, pp. 71-72,
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

72-75.

'^^

58

southern France, and Gerry, although without
authority to
negotiate a treaty on his own, remained in
Paris.

The Envoys did not know it, but their dispatches

would be used to whip up an ant i -French frenzy in
America.
The Federalists promoted the hysteria in order
uo obtain

support for their war program, and, not incidentally, to

discredit and destroy the Republican party.

Throughout the Spring and Summer of 1798, the Congress continued to debate various war measures proposed
by the Federalists.

As is often the case with legislatures,

the immediate issue was sometim.es masked by discussions of

abstract principles of constitutional and international
law.

Debates turning on the question of the war-making

power are of particular interest.
On April 18, the House took up

a

bill already passed

by the Senate, which authorized the President to procure
up to sixteen vessels rated at no more than twenty-two

guns,

to be employed as convoys or however the President

thought proper.

Representative Harper, a Federalist,

supported the measure on the grounds that once the ships

were provided the President has the Constitutional authority to employ them as he pleases "conformably to the state
of peace."

It

argued, "to

f

^•^Ibid.

is the business of the Congress, Harper

the state of the country, and provide

.

D.

53-58, 92-93
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force; that of the President to employ
the force, accord"^^
ing to that state.

The next day, Congressman Dayton, Federalist,
sup-

ported Harper's argument, noting that the President
derived
his authority from the Constitutional provision
making him

Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.
publican, disagreed.

Mr.

Gallatin, Re-

There is a difference, he declared,

hetv/een the power to command, which the President has, and

the "application of a force," which is a legislative function.

"Besides," he added,
if this power of granting convoys in the President
be taken for granted ... a distinction must be
assumed which is not recognized in the Constitution,
vi.7.
between the power of making war, and the
power of committing hostility. Because it necessarily results from, the power of granting convoys,
that the President also has the power of authorizing the commision of hostilities.
Convoys are
granted for the protection, by force, of our trade,
and any attack is hostility; and until the distinction
was assumed, it was impossible to allow
that the President had any such power.
:

.

.

.

Representative Dana, Federalist, took issue with
Gallatin's assertion that authorizing convoys will produce
V7ar.

He suggested that convoys are measures of defense,

and,

citing Vattel, added that "defense is not hostility;

nor do mere reprisals amount to war."

GaliatD.n retorted

that Dana was making mere verbal and legal distinctions,
that convoys would likely mean fighting, and there is "no

^^Annals, 8:1445-1446.
^^IbiJ., p. 1456.

-

,

60

difference in fact betvjeen fighting and war."^S

ultimately,

the Republicans managed to delete any reference
to convoys,

and to reduce to tvjelve the number of ships to be
procured.
But a Republican measure to prohibit convoying was

defeated.

In May and June, under great pressure from extreme

Federalists and fearing for the safety of his envoys who had
yet to return from France, Adams again considered asking for
a declaration of war.

Not all Federalists agreed, however.

Hamilton, for one, felt that Adams should put the onus on

Congress by declaring that his authority went only "so far
and no farther,

but that our trade required

"

sive protection."

"a more exten-

Hamilton went on, in the same letter to

Secretary of War McHenry, May 17, 1789, to describe the
limits of Presidential authority as follows.
Not having seen the law which provides the Naval
A rmament I cannot tell whether it gives any new
power to the President that is any power whatever
with regard to the employirient of the Ships. If not,
,

and he is left at the foot of the Constitution, as
I understand to be the case, I am not ready to say
that he has any other power than merely to employ
the Ships as Convoys with authority to repel force
and to repress~Tibsf o^ce (but not to capture)
tilities within our waters including a marine league from our coastsAnything beyond this must fall under the idea of reprisals & requires the sanction of that Department
,

^^Ibid., pp. 1.503-1504, 1510-1511.

^^Mar sha 1 1 Sme 1 s er The Congres s Fouiids _th_£ Navy
1787-1798 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University oF'Notre Dame Press,
r93l577''pp. 145-146; Act to provide an additional Armament,
,

1 Stat.* 552

(1798).

50 De Conde, p.

89

.

r.i

wtiich is to declare or make war.
In so delicate a case, in one which involves
so
important a consequence as thai: of War--my opinion
IS that no doubtful authority ought
be

by the President

i

-'l

)

exercised

Adams never did ask for a declaration of war, and

Congress continued to pass war legislation.

A Senate bill authorizing the President to raise

a

"provisional army" also roused strong Republican opposition,
and some debate on Presidential

poxsrer.

The Republicans

argued that the Constitution empowered the Legislature alone
to raise an army, but this bill turned that power over to

the President. Gallatin warned:
admiit the

{I}f Congress were once to

principle that they have a right to vest in the

President powers placed in their hands by the Constitution,
that instrument would become a piece of blank paper. "^^

The Federalists responded that the bill was not in-

tended to transfer any Congressional pov^ers

,

that the Pro-

visional Army would be raised by the Legislature, and that
the President could act only in the evert of certain contin-

gencies

,

viz., a declaration of war against the United

States, an invasion, or, imminent danger of invasion.

Re-

publicans thought the last contingency too vague, but on May
11 the bill passed the House.

The Republicans were

^'"United States, Office of Naval Records and Library,
Naval Documents relatin g to the Quasi War with Fran ce, 7 vols
(1935)
t
(To ve r ninentP r
(VJashinf^ton
g Orfice, 1933-38)
75.
:

^^Annals, 8:1520.

m m

.L

:

able to reduce the size of the force from the
twenty thousand approved by the Senate, to ten thousand. ^3
As public indignation over the XYZ dispatches
mounted,
so did the aggressiveness of the Federalist war
program.

On May 22, Representative Sitgreaves introduced a series
of resolutions instructing private armed vessels to "take
or destroy" any French cruiser attacking an American ship,

and to retake any American craft so captured.

Also, public

armed ships would be ordered to "take or destroy" French
cruisers found within blank miles of the American coast.
The Republicans angrily opposed the measures as being tan-

tamount to war.

"It is true," Gallatin fumed,

they are not a declaration of war; but they go to the
making or partial war. Was it ever heard that letters
of marque were given to public vessels?
re/_ These
solutions J are instructions to our public" vessels to
make war ^4
.

The Sitgreaves resolutions were abandoned however,

because the Senate had already completed and forwarded to
the House a bill designed to do the

coast of French cruisers.

sam.e

thing;

On May 28, 1798,

clear the

"An Act more

effectually to protect the commerce and coasts of the U.S."
was approved by Congress.

By this act the President was

authorized to instruct the navy to "seize, take and bring
into port" armed vessels that have committed depredations

•^^ibid.

,

1641-89.

^^Ibid.

,

1783,

1809.
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or are found "hovering" on the American
coast for that

purpose. 55

Thus. Adams became the first Chief
Executive

to preside over a limited, but undeclared
war.

John Marshall arrived in America in midJune, 1798.
He was feted, and a toast at one of the
parties in his

honor became a patriotic Federalist rallying cry:
lions for defense, but not a cent for tribute."

"MilIt referred,

of course, to the refusal of the commissioners to
meet the

bribe and loan demands of Messieurs W,X,Y,and

Z.

Marshall

then advised Adams that, in his opinion, the French Directory did not want full-scale war with the United States.

Adams, who bad be now been caught up in the war hysteria

himself, postponed his decision to ask Congress for a

declaration of war.
Adams instead sent

a

special message to Congress on

June 21, announcing the end of the mission to France, his

pleasure at Marshall's safe return, and his refusal to
send any more ministers to France unless assurances of their

proper and respectful treatment were given.

5

The extreme

Federalists were disappointed; they were hoping that Adams

would ask for

a

declaration of war.

man Allen, Federalist, offered
55l Stat.

56De Conde, pp.
,

resolution to establish a

Annals, 9:3733;

561;

57Richardson

a

92-95.

1:256.

On July 5, Congress-

Smelser, pp.

165-166

,,,

64

committee to declare the state of relations
between the
United States and France.
But the moderate Federalists
and Republicans killed the measure. They
also defeated
extreme Federalist attempts to make unarmed
French ships
legitimate subjects of attack; such measures would
have

altered America's defensive posture,
As it was, the tumultuous second session of the

Fifth Congress enacted over a score of bills related to
the Quasi War.

The principal legislation established a

separate Navy Department 59 authorized procurement of twelve
,

twenty -two -gun ships, ^0 and ten smaller vessels (gallies),61

permitted the President to accept an additional twelve ships
as gifts or loans in exchange for six percent bonds, 62

empowered the President to raise a Provisional Army^^

^^^^

enlarge the regular military, 64 authorized the seizure of

French armed ships, ^5 fortified ports and harbors,
^^Ibid.

PP

^^1 Stat

,

95,

553 (1798).

.

60ibid.

P-

552.

61lbid.

P-

556.

^^ibid.

P-

575.

Ibid.

p.

558.

P-

604.

65ibid.

D

561.

66ibid.

P-

6^-1

Ibid.

,

103-106

.

i.

554.

p^.^^

"

vided arms and ammunition

established a Marine Corps,

,

suspended trade with France and her dependencies,^^
and
abrogated all treaties with France.
In addition,
it

adopted the notorious Alien and Sedition Acts, aimed
at

repressing opponents of Federalist policies

7''"

Of the legislation produced in the second session,

the following are pertinent to the war -making power of the

President.

An act providing "an additional regiment of

artillerists and engineers" empowered the President to employ same "in the field,

or the fortifications upon the

seacoast, as, in his opinion, the public service shall require.

70

The Provisional Army Act author i2:ed the President to

enlist up to ten thousand men "in the event of a declaration of war against the United States, or of actual invasion
.

.

.

or of imminent danger of such invasion discovered, in

his opinion, to exist, before the next session of Congress.'"^

^'''ibid.

,

p.

555.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

594.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

565.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

578.

-^^Ibid.,

pp.

^^Ibid., pp.

566,

570,

552-553.

^^Ibid., p. 558.

577,

596.

66

The law "more effectually to protect the
commerce and
coasts of the United States" pointed out that French
cruisers

had "committed depredations" against American merchant
ships
in violation of Franco -American treaty agreements.

the President

Therefore,

authorized to order the navy to "seize,

vjas

take, and bring into

,

.

.

port

.

.

.

armed vessel{s} which

shall have committed, or which shall be found hovering on the
coasts of the United States for the purpose of committing, de-

predations"

against American vessels; and to retake any Amer-

ican ship so captured.''^
This last piece of legislation, enacted late May,

was supplemented in July by the "Act further to protect the

commerce of the United States."

President to instruct the navy

The latter empowered the
to "subdue,

seize, and take

any French armed vessel, vjhich shall be found within the

jurisdictional limits of the United States or elsewhere, on
the high seas."

75

Section two enabled the President to grant

"special commissions" to private armed vessels to act in
76
similar fashion.

Finally, in mid- July, "An Act to augment the Army of
the United States, and for other purposes," was approved,
74 Ibid.,

p.

561

^^Ibid.

p.

578.

,

^^Ibid., p. 579.
'^''ibid.

,

p.

604.

^'^

67

Section two authorizes the President to
enlist twelve infantry regiments and six troops of "light
dragoons" (mounted
troops)

"for and during the continuance of the
existing
differences between the United States and
the French Repub"^^
lic.
,

The two acts to protect commerce are. the most
important in authorizing the hostilities of the war.

The war has

been called a "quasi war," and these acts are said to
be
"half -measures," in part, because the United States never

formally declared war against France.

measures" in another sense as

V7ell,

But they are "half-

as evidenced by the lim-

ited nature of the hostilities they permit.

In both the May

Act and its July supplement, attacks are permitted on French

armed vessels only.

This omits unarmed, French merchant ves-

sels, which would be normal subjects for attack in a war.^"^

Secondly, although preparations for a ground war are
the objects of the Provisional Army and Army augmentation

legislation, no provision is made for the use of these troops
in hostilities.

Actually, the Provisional Army was never re-

cruited, and in early 1800, Congress effectively revoked

these measures.
-^^Ibid.

^^De Conde, p. 96
80 Ibid.

,

pp.

255-256.

.

.

Third, not only are naval hostilities alone
permitted,

but these are limited in locale as well as
subject.

Even

the "Act further to protect commerce" excludes
attacks on

French ships in their o\m territorial waters.

Incidentally,

this raises some question about the legitimacy of American

naval operations off the coasts of French possessions in
the West Indies

(discussed below)

Under the July Commerce Act over a thousand "special

commissions"

V7ere

issued to American private armed ships.

But because they could not attack any but armed French vessels, unarmed merchant ships being proscribed,

there was

not enough private profit incentive for real American pri-

vateering.

This was especially true since the British

navy had practically cleared the seas of French merchant
ships
By the Fall of 1798, the infant United States Navy

and American armed merchantships had discouraged French

corsairs from operating off the American coast.
V7ere

Operations

then expanded to the Caribbean, where French privateers

had been feasting off burgeoning United States trade.

The

American Navy operated out of St. Domingue (Haiti), where
we had m.ajor sugar interests, and Guadeloupe.

French possessions, although French rule in

St.

Both were
Dom.ingue

was only nominal after Francois Dominique Toussaint
81 Ibid.

.

p.

127

69

(L'Ouverture) led a black slave revolt there. 82

The French cruisers had been based off
these islands,
so the principal action of the war took
place there.

the beginning of 1799,

By

the United States Navy was success-

fully convoying a resurgent American commerce in
the West
Indies.

On March 14,

1799,

the French governor-general

of Guadeloupe declared war on the United States, and
formally ordered the seizure of American ships.

But this had no

effect on the war because the United States Navy had, by
then, restrained French privateers in the Caribbean. 83

Even before the Navy curtailed their privateers,

France had resolved to avoid

United States.
decision.

a

complete rupture with the

Several factors contributed to the French

On August 1, 1798, Admiral Nelson destroyed

the French fleet in Aboukir Bay, Egypt,

France needed

supplies which could be shipped in American bottoms, and
did not want to lose the revenue from trade with the

United States.

Furthermore, an expansion of the war would

jeopardize Republican chances in the next American Presidential elections, and might even have led to an Anglo-

American alliance to wrest French possessions in America.
Finally,

the XYZ affair created a scandal in France, caus-

ing Talleyrand to disavow his own agents.

82ibid., pp.

126-128;

83De Conde, pp.

128-30.

Allen, pp.

From that point

34-35.

,
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on,

Talleyrand sought peace. ^4

The French Minister of Foreign Relations
proceeded
to contact William Vans Murray, United
States Minister to
the Batavian Republic (Netherlands)
and through him for,

warded a conciliatory message to

Adam.s

.

But the same day

the letter was sent-~July 9, 1798--the Directory
ordered

an embargo on American ships in French ports.

On July 31,

after an appeal from Talleyrand, the Directors reversed
themselves, and in addition, revoked the commissions of

their West Indies privateers, recalled corrupt prize court
judges, repealed the requirement of the role

d'

equi page

and called for neutral and allied vessels to be respected. ^5
On December

8,

1798, Adams addressed the Fifth Con-

gress at the opening of its third session.

He announced

that France "appears solicitous to impress the opinion that
it is averse to the rupture with this country," but that

nothing in its conduct ought cause us to relax defensive
measures.

If appropriate assurances vjere to be given that

he would be received, Ad.ams would send another minister to

France.

And, if France agrees to "make reparation" for

American commercial damages, and to "desist from hostility",
"friendly intercourse" can be restored.

commended that the Navy be increased.
84ibid.

,

pp.

140,

144,

161

85ibid.

,

pp.

147,

151,

153

86Annals, 9:2A20-24.

Finally, Adams re-

71

During that session, Congress enacted
legislation to
augment the Army, Navy and Marines, and provided
relief for

American seamen.

It authorized the President to retaliate

against captured Frenchmen for the harsh treatment
afforded

captured Americans impressed into the British navy.

It

outlawed diplomacy by private citizens, such as that attempted by the idealistic Quaker, Dr. George Logan.
ly,

Final-

it further suspended trade with France and her depend-

encies, while allowing the President to make exceptions.
(The last-mentioned clause was added to enable the Uniued

States and Tous saint L'Ouverture to work out an agreement
of mutual interest.")

87

After receiving word of additional conciliatory gestures by Talleyrand in a dispatch from William Vans Murray,

Adams decided to seek peace.

He nominated Murray to be the

new Minister Plenipotentiary to France, but then expanded
the mission to three, adding Supreme Court Chief Justice

Oliver Ellsworth and Patrick Henry.

Henry declined because

of advancing age, and was replaced by William Richardson

Davie, a Federalist governor of North Carolina,

Despite

extreme Federalist opposition to any new peace initiative,
the Senate confirmed,
later,

late February, 1799.

the Fifth Congress adjourned.

87ibid., pp.

3795-.3693;

8«De Conde, pp. 174-85.

A few days

88

De Conde

,

p.

136.

Negotiations were delayed because of the instability
of the French government:

the Directors were purged in

the Summer of 1799, and on November

9

(18 Brumaire)

of

that year, Napoleon overthrew the Directory and replaced
it with a Consulate of three.

That same month, the new

American commission to France sailed to Europe.

Napoleon,

the First Consul, was virtual dictator of France, and

Talleyrand, who had been forced out in the Summer purge,

was reinstated as Minister of Foreign Relations.

Despite desires for peace on both sides, the naval

war continued.

In fact,

the United States Navy captured

more French armed vessels in 1800 than in any other year
of the war.

In addition,

the Adams administration sought

to undermine French influence in Santo Domingo by aiding

Toussaint L'Ouvcrture.

The Navy first blockaded, then

bomharded the port of Jacmel, controlled by Toussaint
rival.

Having assured the rival

defeat,

's

the United

States then reopened trade with those parts of the island

under Toussaint

's

control.

As a prelude to negotiations, in December, 1799,

Napoleon nullified all the remaining anti-neutral decrees
of the Directory,

Negotiations began April

2,

1800.

They

stalled however, over the status of the Franco -American
S^ibid.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

214-25.

.

pp.

210-211.

,
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Treaties of 1778 and the Consular Convention
of 1788, as
well as the question of indeimities
(The Congress had
nullified the Treaties, but France would not
recognize the
validity of the abrogation unless the United
States dropped
.

indenfliif ication claims.)

The Americans broke the deadlock by offering to
nego-

tiate an end to the current hostilities while postponing

indefinately the treaties and indemnities questions.

Napoleon liked the idea and a treaty known as the Convention
of Mortefontaine was completed in September,

1800.^-'-

1800 was a Presidential election year in the United

States, and the Federalist party entered it badly split.

The breach between the Hamiltonians and Adams had widened

beyond repair.

Early in the year the President dismissed

his Secretaries of War and State (McHenry and Pickering)

and replaced them with more moderate Federalists.

In the

Spring, the Federalists caucused and selected Adams and

Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to be their Presidential and

Vice-Presidential standard-bearers, respectively.

But

the Hamiltonians were secretly hoping that Pinckney would

receive more electoral votes than Adams.
Adams heard little from the negotiators.

U.S. Treaties and Other Inter 231-55;
Agr e en.eri t s 7:801, IS No. 85, 31 July 1801.

^^-Ibid.
r.

a tiona 1

He feared

,

pp.

92 De Conde,

,

pp.

2/0-72

France might stall until after the elections,
in the hope
of a Republican victory.
As a result, he again considered
asking Congress for a declaration of
full-scale
war, but

V7as

dissuaded by his new Secretary of State, John
Marshall.

When the Presidential electors were chosen on
October 14,
word of the Convention of Mortef ontaine had not yet
reached
the United States.

In November, news of the agreement was

published in American newspapers; but on December

3,

1800,

the electors denied the Federalists control of the Execu-

tive branch.
On December 11, 1800, the day before Adams learned
of his defeat, Governor Davie, one of the negotiators, ar-

rived in the United States with the official text of the
Convention.

Article

1

declared "a firm, inviolable, and

universal peace, and a true and sincere Friendship" between
the signatories.

The second article confessed the inabili-

ty of the parties "to agree at present" on the status of

the Franco-American Treaties or on indemnity claims, and

called for further negotiations "at a convenient tim.e."
Meanwhile, Article

2

stipulated, the Treaties "shall have

no operation," and relations between the countries are to
be governed by the Convent ion

^'^
.

Other provisions concerned commicrce (to be on a
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

m^ost

280-85.

^^Ibid., pp. 288, 352-353;
Internat i onal Agr eements 7:802.
,

U.S. Treaties and Other

75

favored nation basis), and neutral rights
(no roles
d'

equipage required, free ships make free goods-except

for an explicit, narrow list of contraband,
and stricter

stop-and-search procedures) .^^
On December 15, 1800, Adams submitted the Convention to the Senate with a recommendation for consent.

Moderate Federalists and Republicans generally approved;
the more extreme Federalists were opposed.

As a result,

the Senate at first failed to give the necessary two-thirds

approval,

Upon resubmission, the Senate reversed itself

with the reservation that Article

2

(respecting the Treaties

and indemnities) be expunged, and that an eight-year expiration date be added to the pact.

Adams reluctantly agreed with the Senate '.s modifications,

and recalled American warships from the West Indies.

Talleyrand, meanwhile, called upon French prize courts to
adopt the "free ships, free goods" principle, and asked
the Minister of Navy and Colonies to curb privateers.

Adams left the exchange of ratifications to his successor,
97
but the Quasi War with France was now over.

France refused to exchange ratifications with the

Jefferson administration because of the Senate's provisions.
U.S. Treaties and O ther
Conde, pp. 234, 353-70;
7:801-11.
Int e rnationa l Agreements,
95]3e

^^Richardson, 1:303,
^^De Conde, pp.

288-95.

She wished neither to pay indemnities,
nor to agree to the
abrogation of the Treaties.
She offered to accept

the Con-

vention with the reservations only if the
United States
dropped indeiTinification claims altogether.
The Jefferson
administration agreed, and ratifications were
exchanged

on July 31, 1801.^^

The_^aas i War and the Pre sident_^s_War Powers

When John Adams ordered naval operations against
France, he acted with express authorization from Congress.

Furthermore, his orders did not exceed the boundaries of
the authorization, except perhaps for the naval operations
in the territorial waters of France's possessions in the

Caribbean.

Postponing for the moment discussion of the

operations off the French West Indies, let us examine the

war powers granted President Adams.
Since the Quasi War was a naval

V7ar,

the most perti-

nent acts were the two designed to "protect commerce" by
the use of private and public armed vessels,

Under the

May 28, 1798 Act, the President was empowered to order the

Navy to seize French armed vessels "which shall have com-

mitted or which shall be found hovering on the coasts of
the United States, for the purpose of committing depreda^^ U.S. Trea ries and Other International Agreem.ents

7:801, and notes

1,

2.

^^See notes 74-78 and accompanying text, supra.

>
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tions on" American ships.

The Act of July

9,

1798 authorized the President to

instruct the Navy and cornmanders of specially
conimissioned
private armed vessels to seize any armed French
ship found
either within the jurisdictional limits of the
United
States or on the high seas.^^^
By these Acts, especially the July legislation,
the

Congress authorized limited warfare against France.

Ac-

cordingly, President Adams could and did order American

vessels to attack armed French ships in the United States

territorial waters or anywhere on the high seas.

As has

been noted, above, the Congress did not authorize land operations against France, attacks on unarmed French vessels,

including merchant ships, or naval operations within the

territorial waters of France and her possessions.

Their

limitations notwithstanding, these Acts mark the first
time in American history that a President was authorized
to conduct warfare without a declaration of war by Con-

gress.

This undeclared war did not, however, result in a

growth in Presidential power, because the President acted
almost exclusively within the bounds of prior legislative
It may in fact be argued that the Quasi War

prescription.

establishes a precedent for some kind of prior legislative
^^"^1

Stat.

101 Ibid.

,

578
p.

604,

78

approval before the President orders the
conduct of hostilities without a declaration of war.^^^

^^^^^

we may note that the Constitution is by no means
unambiguous regarding the pov^er of Congress to authorize
hostili-

ties without a declaration of war.

Article

1,

Section

8,

Paragraph 11 of the Constitution gives Congress the power
to "declare War,

{and} grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal."

The Constitution does not discuss explicitly hostilities without a declaration of war.

Some have taken the "let-

ters of marque and reprisal" clause to establish by implica-

tion Congressional authority in this

area.-'-^'^

However, the

meaning of the phrase is unclear, since the practice of issuing such letters was obsolete when the Constitution was
written, and the Kramers never commented on the clause.

private vessels commissioned under the July

9,

The

1798, Act are

said to be "letters of marque" or privateers, but the Consti-

tutional phraseology was never used in the legislation

"^^^
.

The uncertainty of the Constitution regarding hosti•^^^See, e.g., Merlo Pusey, The Way W e Go To War
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969), pp. 4^53; ArtHir M.
Schlesinger, Jr. The I mperia l Presidency (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1973)T~ppT~TT^2T
,

103

See, e.g.,

Schlesinger, p. 21.

The President was authorized
238-239.
1 Stat. 570 (1798).
to grant "special commissions."
^^'^Grob, pp.
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lities without a declaration of war
was exploited by both
proponents and opponents of the Quasi War
with France.
Albert Gallatin opposed the section of a
bill that empowered
the President to convoy merchant ships
on the grounds that
convoying meant hostilities, and therefore, in
order for
the President to have such a power, "a distinction
must be

assumed which is not recognized in the Constitution,
viz:

between the power of making war, and the power of committing
hostility, "105
The Federalists responded that the President, as Com-

mander-in-Chief, could use whatever military or naval force
Congress provided as he thought best, provided he do so in

conformity with the "state" (i.e., state of war or of peace)
in which Congress places the nation.

Alexander Hamilton's views on the question, at that
time, are most interesting, especially in light of his pre-

viously published broad interpretation of Presidential
(Hamilton adopted a broad construction in a

war-pov.Ter,

series of articles under the pseudonymn "Pacificus."

James Madison, writing as "Helvidius," defended
interpretation.)
War McHenry

,

In his May,

a

narrower

1798 letter to Secretary of

Hamilton argued that the President could only

undertake what amounted to defensive measures when acting
accompanying text,

siipra.

•lO^see note 48 and accompanying text,

supra.

^^^See note 47

and.

on his own,

i.e., without Congressional
approval.

Specifically, Hamilton reasoned, convoying
was permissible, provided that attacking ships were
merely repelled
and not captured.

Furthermore, hostilities in American

territorial waters could be repressed under color of
presidential authority.

But anything beyond this, Hamilt(:on

cautioned, requires legislative sancti on 107

From the positions of Gallatin, the Congressional
Federalists, and Hamilton we may distill three contrasting
viev7S of the power of the President to conduct hostilities

without legislative approval.

Gallati.n's is the narro\^7est

interpretation, for if the Constitution does not distin-

guish between war and hostilities, and the power to make

war is legislative, then the executive has no authority to
order hostilities unilaterally.

The second position, that

of the Congressional Federalists, is the broadest:

the

only restriction on the President's use of the navy is
that he must not place the country in a state of war without Congressional sanction.

Under this view, the President

may order hostilities short of war without Congressional
approval.

Hamilton's view falls somewhere in between; he

seems to feel that the President may undertake purely de-

^See

Later,
text accompanying note 51, supra.
Hamilton, writing as "Lucius Crassus," did a complete about
face and scorned President Jefferson for adopting the very
posit:ion Hamilton himself espoused in the McHenry letter.
See my chap. 3, infra.
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fensive measures on his own, but that he requires
Congressional approval for anything beyond them.
As it turned out, President Adams, with one
possible

exception, did nothing without prior authorization by
the
Congress.

Thus it was established as practice that without

a declaration of war, but with the appropriate enabling

legislation, the President may order American vessels to

attack and seize the armed vessels of another nation.
The possible exception to Adams' strict adherence to
the language of Congressional war-measures came during the

naval operations in the West Indies,

The July

9,

1798 Act

further to protect commerce authorized American ships to
seize any French armed vessel "within the jurisdictional
limits of the United States, or elsewhere, on the high

While it is not apparent that Congress considered

seas."

the coastal V7aters of the United States to be part of the

"jurisdictional limits," the idea that states had a maritime boundary, the "marine league", would seem to have been

well established at the time of the Quasi

1

DP,

VJar.-^'^°

Since American naval operations off the shores of

French possessions in the Caribbean did not take place,
strictly speaking, on the high seas, they may well have exA clearer viola-

ceeded the directions of the Legislature.
1

AO

Charles G, Fenvjick, Internationa l Law 4th ed.
Appleton-Century-Crof ts 1965) p. 443,
(New York:
,

,

,

,

s

tion was the American intervention in
the civdl war in
St, Domingue.
In early 1800, United States
naval vessels
first blockaded, then bombarded, the port of
Jacmel,
St,

Domingue, in order to defeat Tou&saint L
Ouverture
"

'

rival. 109

The authority to bombard

a

port for strategic (or

economic) advantage, not having been granted by Congress,
was simply assumed by the President.

These operations

clearly exceeded the terms of Congressional authorization.
By contrast, whatever naval operations took place within
the maritime boundary of Guadeloupe after March 14, 1799

would seem to be justified by the declaration of war
against the United States issued by the island's governor
on that date.
Out of claims of salvage rights for captured ships

and damages suffered by merchants arose some court cases of
interest.

The first of such cases, Bas v. Tingy,

no

was

decided by the Supreme Court in February, 1800, while hostilities were being conducted.

one-half allowance

Captain Tingy

's

claim for

for an American ship he recaptured

from a French privateer was challenged on the ground that
the 1799 law granting such an allowance for ships and goods

'"retaken from the enemy'" was not applicable to France.
109see text accompanying note 90. supra.
^^°4 Dall.

(U.S.)

37;

1

L.

Ed.

731 (1800)

France, the plaintiff reasoned,
was not an "enemy- within
the meaning of the Act because it
and the United States were

not really at

war."*"-^-^

Thus the case turned on whether
or not the United
States and France were at war despite
the lack of a formal
declaration.
Four Supreme Court justices opined,
seriatim,
that war indeed existed, although a limited
or "imperfect"
war.
Justice Chase noted that "Congress is empowered
to de-

clare a general war, or Congress may wage a
limited war;

limited in place, in objects, and in time."

He went on to

describe the limitations adopted by Congress in
the Franco-

American conflict.

"There is no authority given to commit

hostilities on land; to capture unarmed French vessels, nor
even to capture French armed vessels, lying in a French port
,.112

Chase, like his fellow justices, assumed that Con-

gress has the authority to initiate hostilities

declaration of war.

without a

His dictum that armed French vessels

in a French port were not legitimate objects of capture sup-

ports our contention that American naval operations within
the maritime boundaries of the French West Indies exceeded

Congressional guidelines.

vols.

^'"•^John B. Moore, A Digest of Int e rnat ional Law,
New York
MS~ Press'"," 1070)" 7
(1906; reprint ed.
:

,

15G.
•'•'^1

L.

Ed.

731,

734.

8
;

A year and

a

half after Tingy received his favorable

judgment, the Supreme Court reviewed the merits
of another
salvage claim in Talbot v. Seeman.^^^ Captain
Talbot of th(
"U.S,S. Constitution" claimed salvage rights on
a ship ori-

ginally owned by a Hamburg merchant, seized by France,
and

recaptured by the plaintiff.

In August,

1801,

Chief Jus-

tice John Marshall wrote a decision in Talbot's favor.

The legitimacy of Talbot's action, Marshall noted,

depends upon the state of Franco-American relations at the
time of the recapture.

To determine this, the jurist con-

tinued in a revealing bit of dictum, one must examine the

relevant acts of Congress.

To use Marshall's own words,

t__/he whole powers of war being, by the constitution
of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of
that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in
this inquiry,
It is not denied, nor in the course of
the argument has it been denied, that congress m.ay
authorize general hos tilities
or partial hostilill'^
ties

L

,

.

.

,

.

.

.

After reviewing the legislation in question, the
Court found the United States to have been
state of hostilities

"''-^
.

5.n

a "limited

Furthermore, since Congress in-

tended that French armed vessels be captured, and Talbot's

prize appeared to be just such' a vessel, the recapture
was lawful.
l^^i cr.

(U.S.)

1^^2 L. Ed.
ll^ibid.

,

p.

15,
25.

1;

24.

2 L.

Ed.

15

(1301)

85

Those claiming losses due to French
depredations
against their merchantships did not fare
as well, however.
France had obtained United States renunciation
of indem-

nity claims against her upon the exchange
of ratifications
of the Convention of Mortef ontaine

.

1

16

Throughout the

nineteenth century, the United States government
continually refused to accept any liability on its part
for the dam-

ages.

Rills for relief were twice vetoed, by Presidents

Polk (1846) and Pierce (1855), respectively.
1885,

Finally, in

Congress authorized the Court of Claims to take up

what had come to be knovrn as the "French Spoliation Cases. "117
The Court of Claims was prohibited from awarding

judgments, but it could offer an advisory opinion regarding the liability of the Federal government.

United States,

In Gray v.

the Court of Claims, relying principally

upon the instructions to the commissioners who negotiated
the Convention of Mortef ontaine

,

held that the hostilities

with France had not placed the United States in
war.

a

state of

Bas v. Tingy, which held to the contrary, was decided

before the instructions were prepared, the Court noted,
Since no war existed, damage claims for property

losses were valid; and since the United States government
•^^^See note 98 and accompanying text,

^^'^Moore,

Digest

118 21 Ct.

CI.

,

6:10.22-25.

340 (1886),

supra.

^

.
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let France out of its obligations for diplomatic
considerations,

it should make good the losses.

Despite the Gray de-

cision, French spoliation claims dragged on well into
the
1 1

twentieth century.

Q
"

Finally, we consider the case of Little v. Barreme,
in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the author-

ity of Congress to restrict the Commander-in-Chief.-^^^
It seems that by Act of Congress, American vessels,

including those disguised as ships of another nation were
subject to seizure if found sailing toward a French port.
As a consequence, one Captain Little seized and brought to

port a vessel, the "Flying Fish," which he believed to be

American-owned
Unfortunately for Little, the ship

vjas

owned by Danes,

and furthermore, was returning from a French port rather than

headed toward one.

In the ensuing litigation,

Chief Justice

John Marshall spoke for the Supreme Court in finding that

Little had exceeded the law, and that even Presidential com-

mands to the contrary would be unavailing.

Marshall wrote

as follows.
It is by no m.eans clear that the President of the
United States, whose high duty it is to 'take care
and who is
that the laws be faithfully executed,
of the
navies
and
armies
the
of
chief
in
commander
authspecial
any
without
not,
might
United States,
'

^^^Grob, p.
^^^2 Cr.

53.

(U.S.) 169, 8 L. Ed.

^^^1 Stat. 613 (1799),

243 (1804).
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ority for that purpose, in the then
existing state
of things, have empowered the
officers coimnlnding
the armed vessels of the United
States to seize Ld
send into port for adjudication,
American vessels
which were forf^jted by being engaged
in this iiiicit coininerce -"^^
.

With these words, Marshall voiced tentative
approval
of Presidential authority to seize the
property of United
States citizens in war -time --even in the absence
of an act

of Congress.

However, he concluded as follows.

the legislature seems to have prescribed that
the manner in which this law shall be carried into
execution, was to exclude seizure of any vessels
not bound to a French port. Of consequence, however
strong the circumstances might be, which induced
Captain Little to suspect the Flying Fish to be an
American vessel, they could not excuse the detention of her, since he would not have been authorized
to detain her had she really been American -^^^
.

.

.

.

The sum and substance of the Little ruling is that
the Congress may regulate the conduct of hostilities if it
so desires, any orders of the Commander-in-Chief to the con-

trary notwithstanding.

Had such a rule been applied to the

bom.bardment of the port of Jacmel, St. Dominique

,

'''^^

there

could be no doubt of the outcome.
Thus, in terms of legislative, executive and judicial

pronouncements on the subject, the Quasi War with France is
a clear victory for Congressional power over the commencement

and conduct of war.
^^-^8 L.

Fd.

243,

245.

^^^Ibid., p. 246.

^^^See note 106 and accompanying text, supra
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CHAPTER

III

HOSTILITIES ON THE BARBARY COAST
Historical

S etting

The Barbary episode marks one of che
earliest examples
of the threat of force for diplomatic
purposes on sole Presidential authority.
The hostilities that ensued were fought
almost entirely on the seas, although there was
one land

operation.

Most of the actual fighting occurred subsequent

to an act of Congress designed to authorize
naval hostili-

ties

,

The Barbary coast stretches across two thousand miles
of north Africa along the Mediterranean,

This gave the

Barbary regencies, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli,
easy access to Mediterranean shipping lanes.

As a result

of long-standing enmity between Christian Europe and Moslem

north Africa, the merchant ships of weaker European states
were always in danger of being seized and of having their
crews enslaved.

The Barbary nations would declare war, seize the enemy merchant ship on the high seas, and then sign

a

treaty,

the terms of which always called for an annual tribute, in

order to end the conflict.

The Barbary rulers expected

presents as part of the negotiating process, and there were
often additional pa^^ments required in order to ransom crews

held captive.

After a time, if payments were in arrears

,

.
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or suddenly thought to be inadequate,
the flagstaff of the

offending nation would be chopped down in
a symbolic declaration of war, merchant ships would be
seized, and the

"diplomatic" process would begin anew.^
This practice had gone on continually since
the six-

teenth century, and if the European nations had not
been

competing with each other so fiercely, they might
have com-

bined and subdued the Barbary once and for all.

Instead,

each European country entered into the most advantageous

treaty it could obtain, all the while hoping that the

Barbary would continue to prey upon the ships of rivals.

Benjamin Franklin quoted British merchants as saying, "if
there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's while to

build one. "^
Thus, while the European nations referred contemptu-

ously to the Barbary as "pirates," they accorded them a

measure of international status by entering into treaties

with them.
As the Americans developed a thriving sea trade on

the Mediterranean, they too became vulnerable.

No sooner

Ray W, Irwin, The Diplomatic Relat i ons of the United
States With the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816 (Chapel Hill, N.C
University of North Carolina Press, 1931) pp. 1-19; Glenn
Tucker Dawn Like Thunder; The Barba r y Wars and the Birth
Th e Bobbs -Merrill Com.pany
of the U S Navy ( T n d an o I s
Inc.
1963)
pp. 43-56; Gardner W. Allen, Our N avy and The
i905)
Barbary Corsaii s (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co
2-6
pp
,

,

i

.

,

a}.''

]

:

,

,

.

.

-^Quoted in Irwin, p.

17.

,

t

s

3
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had the United States

the protection of the British

losl:

navy following the American Revolution than Algiers
and

Morocco began menacing its merchant ships.
The United States was in

a

difficult position.

It

was heavily in debt and could not e?sily pay for Barbary
diplomacy.

It was also militarily weak, without any navy

whatsoever.

In 1784, under the Articles of Confederation,

the Congress resolved to obtain treaties with the Barbary

states, commissioning Adam.s

,

Franklin and Jefferson to

arrange them,'^
But Congress was less willing to provide the money

needed for negotiating with Barbary.
unwise.

He wrote Jefferson on July

Adams thought this
3,

1786 that it was

"wisest for Us to negotiate and pay the necessary Sum."^

Noting the value of American shipments in the Mediterranean,
Adams observed.
At present we are Sacrificing a Million annually
to Save one Gift of two hundred Thousand Pounds.
This is not good 0Economy...6
But Jefferson was more militant.
3xrwin, pp.
^Irv7in,

p.

20,

25;

Allen, p.

If we must buy

13.

27.

5 John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, The A dams-Je fferson
The Comp le te C orro pcndence Between T homas
Le ters;
Je"fTerson and Abigail ancl JolTn Adams ," ed. Lester J. Cappon,
2~l^ls .""IChapel Hill, NTC: "University of North Carolina
Press, 1959), 1;139.

^Ibid.

-

Q1

peace, he responded

t.o

Adams on July 11, let us not delay.

"But," he went on, "I should prefer the
obtaining it by war.'^
While still governed by the Articles, the
United
Staces did manage to obtain a treaty with
Morocco,^ but this
did not insure against attacks by the other Barbary
states.
In 1793, Algiers,

the most powerful of them, seized eleven

American vessels and took 109 men captive.^

'

Congress responded by voting for a naval armament,

with the proviso that ship construction stop should peace
with Algiers be obtained.

President Washington signed the

measure into law on March 27,

1794."'"^

The preamble made

Congressional motives crystal clear.
the depredations committed by the Algerine
corsairs on the commerce of the United States
render it necessary that a naval force should be
provided for its protection
.

.

.

.

.

While construction of six ships was underway, a

rather

expensive treaty with Algiers was obtained,

12

and

Washington asked Congress whether it wanted him to stop
^Ibid.

,

p.

142.

o

United States, Department of State, Treaties and
Other Internationa l Agreeme nts of the U n ited States, 1/75T949 comp. Charles I 7 Be vans (Washington^ Government Print
Tng"Office, 1971), 9:1278; "Treaty of Peace and Friendship,"
TS No. 244-1, 15 July 1786.
,

9

Irwin, p.

60.

'^An Act to provide a naval armament,

1

Stat. 350 (1794)

i^ibid.
^^U.

S.

Tre aties and Other Int ernational Agre ements,
1, 7 March 1796.
slid Amity ''~TS~Ko

5:32 "Treaty of Peace

,

.

3

.

construction in light of the "loss
which the public would
incur." 1
Ir, a compromise,
Congress authorized completion
of three of the ships;
the "Constitution."
ti

the "United

States," and the "Constellation."!'^
This was the beginning of the United
States Navy.
And none too soon, because the expensive
settlement with

Algiers only served to whet the appetites of
the other
Barbary rulers.
First Tunis, and then Tripoli commandeered

American vessels in 1796.

After intervention by Algiers

an agreement with Tripoli was arranged in the
following
year.

But it took nearly the v/hcle period of the Adams

administration to arrive at

a

satisfactory pact with Tunis.

While Adams was President (1797-1801) relations with

Barbary were complicated by the naval war with France.

Quasi

VJar

The

so preoccupied the United States that it could not

respond anywhere else militarily.

During this period, prob-

lems in the Mediterranean mounted.

^^James D. Richardson, ed
A Compilation of the Mes sages and Papers of the Pre sidents" 1789-1897 10 vols~
(Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1896), 1:193.
,

,

,

''^An act supplementary to an act entitled "an act to
provide a naval armament," 1 Stat, 453 (1796).

15

Irwin, pp.

84-91.

l^U S. Treaties and Other In ter national Agreements
11:1070 ^^reaty of Peace and Friendship," TS No. 358,
10 June 1797.
•'''ibid.,

p.

igation," TS No.

,

1088 "Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Nav360, ratified 10 January 1800,
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In 1799,

the Bey of Tunis, angered by the
failure

of the United States to deliver certain
supplies as promised, demanded new gDfts and threatened
war.^^
^-^^^

same time, the Pasha of Tripoli, envious
of what he re-

garded as the more favorable treatment of Algiers
and
Tunis,

consul

threatened and made new demands upon the American
•'-^
.

In September,

1800, an American brigade was seized

by Tripoli and held for nearly

a

month, ^0

Finally, the

United States was humiliated by the Dey of Algiers, who
impressed an American frigate and forced it to sail to

Turkey under the Algerine flag. 21

Were it not for the Quasi War, the Barbary coast
hostilities might well have occurred during the Adams
ministration.

ad-

Consider this excerpt from a letter of

Adams' Secretary of State,

The importance of sending a naval force into the
Mediterranean, to shew the Barbary powers our capacity to defend our commerce, and to annoy them, lias
been repeatedly urged;... and should our differences
with France be settled by our Envoys now at Paris,
and either of the Regencies break their peace with
^^Irwin, pp.

98-99.

19

Ibid.

,

p.

96,

20ibid.

,

p.

97.

21lbid.

,

pp,

94-95,

us, OUT whole naval force may be sent
against them... 22

On the other hand, as a result of the
pressures of
the Quasi War, Congress,

in 1798,

authorized the President

to buy, build, borrow or accept as gifts
additional fri-

gates and up to two dozen smaller war ships.

Furthermore,

a separate naval department was created. ^3

By the conclusion of the Adams administration in

March, 1801, the United States had obtained treaties with
all of the Barbary states.

Despite this, diplomatic re-

lations were deteriorating, and American commerce in the

Mediterranean was increasing 24

i\ost

.

portent ious of all

was the fact that the United States had built up a naval
force during the Quasi War v/ith France, and by late 1800
that war was over.
The Tripo litan War

Thomas Jefferson assumed the office of President in
March, 1801.

By April, he had already decided to send

some United States warships on
nean. 25

cruise to the Mediterra-

a

"It is conceived," Samuel Smith of the Navy De-

22u,S., Office of Naval Records and Library, Naval
Documents Related to the United States Wars with the Bar Government Printing
barv Po wer s "6 vollT (Washington
Office, 1939-44), 1(1939) :343,
:

,

^^See my chapter two, supra.
2^Irwin, p.

101.

Smith was
25so wrote Samuel Smith on April 1, 1801.
performing the duties of the Secretary of the Navy. Naval
Documents, 1:425.

:
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partiP.ent

wrote on April 10, 1801, "...that
such

squadron
Cruizing in view of the Barbary Powers
will have a tendency
to prevent them from seizing on
our Commerce, whenever
Passion or a Desire of Plunder might
Incite them thereto. "26
On May

2.0,

a

1801, Secretary of State James Madison

sent the following message to the United
States consuls at
Tunis and Algiers

The proofs which have been given by the Bashaw
/Pasha/
of Tripoli of hostile designs against the
United States
have, as you will learn from Commodore Dale,
determ-ined
the President to send into the Mediterranean
a squadron
of three frigates and a sloop of war, under the
command of that officer.
Should war have been declared
or hostilities commenced, tnis force will be
immediately employed in the defence and protection of our
commerce against the piracies of that regency... 27

Madison then explained why they had decided to send

a naval

force to the Mediterranean at this time.
The present moment is peculiarly favorable for the
experiment, not only as it is a provision against an
immediate danger, but as we are now at peace and amity
with all the rest of the world, and as the force employed would, if at home, be at nearly the expense,
with less advantage to our mariners ... 28
On the same day, orders were given to Captain Richard

Dale from the office of the Secretary of the Navy.

"I am

therefore instructed by the President to direct," the orders stated.
26 ivjaval Document s,

27lbid.
2^Ibid.

,

p,

460.

1:429
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that you proceed with all possible
expedition with
tne squadron under your command, to the
Mediterranean
it wixl be proper for you to touch at
Gibraltar
on
your arrival at Gibraltar you will be able to
ascertain whether all or any of the Barbary Powers
shall
have declared War against the United States...'29

Should he find that all is "tranquil," Dale's
instructions

were to proceed to each Barbary port in turn, informing
the

American consuls there that his intentions are "perfectly
friendly," deliver presents to Algiers, and present letters to the rulers of Algiers and Tunis and a message from

President Jefferson to the Pasha of Tripoli, explaining the

purpose of the mission. 30

"But," Dale's orders continued,

should you find on your arrival at Gibraltar that all
the Barbary Powers, have declared War against the
United States, you will then distribute your force in
such a manner, as your judgment shall direct, so as
to best protect our commerce and chastise their insolence- -by sinking, burning or destroying their ships
and Vessels vjherever you shall find them... 31
Finally, Dale was instructed to establish a blockade off the ports in question if Algiers alone or Tunis
and.

Tripoli, either separately or in combination, had de-

clared war, "so as effectually to prevent any thing from
-30

going in or coming out.'
The Congress, it should be noted, was not in session,

having adjourned in March, 1801, not to meet until December
29ibid.

,

p,

30ibid.

,

pp.

31lbid.

,

p.

32ibid,

465.
46.5-466.

467.
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of that year. 33

Therefore, Jefferson undertook this
ac-

tion on his own authority.

While Dale was receiving his orders,
unbeknownst to
the administration at the time, the Pasha
of Tripoli
de-

clared war against the United States, symbolically
chopping down the American flagstaff on May 14, 1801.34
Dale arrived at Gibraltar, July

1,

T^cn

the American consul

there led him to believe that Tripoli had commenced hostillties.

35

Dale felt his f;uspicions confirmed by the pre-

sence of two Tripolitan ships at anchor.

And, although

the Tripolitan commander denied being at war with the Uni-

ted States, Dale was convinced that the cruisers were

headed for the Atlantic in search of American merchantships.

Accordingly, he ordered an American frigate to

-^^

remain at Gibraltar to keep watch over the Tripolitan
vessels.

Dale then sailed to Algiers and then to Tunis; both
stops were uneventful.

On July 24,

1801, he reached Tri-

poli and informed the Pasha that in response to his declaCongress Debat es and Proceedings in the Con33u S
ress
of
the
United
States, 1789- 1824 (Washington:
Gales
g
/Hereinafter cited
and Seaton, '1834-56)
10:1082, ll':10.
,

.

,

,

,

as "Annals^;^/.

34j^^i^^ p

3^06.

3^ Naval Documents

36ibid.

,

1:497.

.

ration of war, he would coimnence hostilities
against any
Tripolitan vessels he encountered.
In fact, however, very
little occurred, and Dale lifted the blockade
shortly

there-

after

-^^
.

One exchange between the American schooner,
"Enter-

prise," and a Tripolitan vessel resulted in the defeat
of
the Barbary craft, which was stripped of gear and left
free to limp back to port.^^

Excepting the victory of the "Enterprise," Dale's
fleet accomplished little else in 1801, other than block-

ading the two Tripolitan ships at Gibraltar, and convoying

American merchantmen through the Mediterranean
When the seventh Congress opened its first session
in December,

1801, President Jefferson forvjarded his an-

nual message.

In it he informed Congress of hostilities

with Barbary.

"To this state of general peace with which

we have been blessed," he noted,
one only exception exists.
Tripoli, the least considerable of the Barbary States, had come forward
with demands unfounded either in right or in compact,
and had permitted itself to denounce war on our failure to comply before a given day. The style of the
demand admitted but one answer.
I sent a small squadron of frigates into the Mediterranean, with assurances
to that power of our sincere desire to remain in peace,
but with orders to protect our commerce against the
threatened attack.
The measure was seasonable and
37Allen, Barbar y, pp.
^^Irwin, pp.
39ibid.

.

p.

109-110.
109.

97-99.

.
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salutary.
The Bey /sic7 had already declared
war
His cruisers were out.
Two had arrived at Gibraltar
Mediterranean was blockaded and
?hnt''T?^'^\i?
that of the Atlantic
peril.
The arrival of our
squadron dispelled the danger. 40

m

Jefferson went on to describe the successful
encounter of the "Enterprise" with a Tripolitan

cruiser, ex-

plaining the failure of the American ship to take
the
prize as follows.

Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction
ol Congress, to go beyond the line of
defense, the
vessel, being disabled from committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew.
The Legislature
will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures of offense also, they will place our force on an
equal footing with that of its adversaries.
I communicate all material information on this subject,
that in the exercise of this important function confided by the Constitution to the Legislature exclusively their judgment may form itself on a knowledge
and consideration of every circumstance of weight. ^1

Writing as "Lucius Cassius," Hamilton derided
Jefferson's explanation of the failure to seize the Tri-

politan vessel. 42

Hamilton rejected the "extraordinary

position" that the President was somehow limited by the

Constitution in ordering a response to a declaration of
wa r by another country.

The Constitution, Hamilton ob-

'^Opresident Jefferson's First Annual Message,
1:326-327.
8, 1801 Richardson

December

^Ijbid.

,

,

p.

,

327.

42Alexander Hamilton, "Lucius Cassius No. 1 " in
T he Works of Alexander Hamilton ed. Henry Cabot Lodge,
246-52
8
G.P. Putnam s Sons n d )
12 vols. (New York:
,

,

'

,

.

.

,

:
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served, contains no such "express
prohibitions" upon the

President
That instrument has only provided affirmatively
that.
The Congress shall have power to declare'
war;
the plain meaning of which is, that it is
tne peculiar and exclusive province of Congress
to change that state
^il^- the nation is at ^ace
into a state ot war; whetFer from calculations
of policy, or from provocations or Injuries received; in other words, it belongs to Congress
only, to go to war.
But when a foreign nation
declares or openly and avowedly makes war upon
the United States, they are then by the
very
fact already at war and any declaration on the
part of Congress is nugatory; it is at least
unnecessary ^-^
,

,

.

In short, while Hamilton concedes that only Congress

can commence a war on behalf of the United States, he in-

sists that the President needs no legislative authorization
to order a full response to

V7ar

commenced or declared by

another nation.
Nearly a week after Jefferson's address, the Committee of the Whole of the House of Representatives proposed

that the President be authorized "further and more effec-

tually to protect the commerce of the United States against
the Barbary Powers "^^
.

15.

Debate ensued the next day, December

An amendment was offered to expunge

the words, "further

and more," as they might be interpreted as authorizing the

President to increase the navy at his discretion.

The amend-

ment failed, however, and a comniittee was formed to propose
43

Ibid., pp.

249-250, emphasis in the original

^^Annals, 11:325-326.

.
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appropriate legis lation
On Thursday, January

7,

1802, Representative. Smith

reported a bill "for the protection of American
commerce
and seamen in the Mediterranean," empowering
the President
to equip and employ vessels as he sees
necessary,
to com-

mission privateers, and to capture Tripolitan ships.
The House Committee of the Whole debated the bill
briefly
on the 21st, rejecting amendm.ents to broaden it to
cover

the other Barbary states, ^7

The debates reported in the

Annals of Congress raise the constitutional question of
the President's war-power only obliquely.

We can infer

that there was some unrecorded debate of such nature from
the comments of Representative Bayard of Delaware.

It is

reported that Bayard

wished it left to the direction of the President to
exercise the power vested in him when he should think
proper. .He wished tlie President to do this by the
authority of law; this would prevent those doubts
that have been expressed, by some, of the constitutionality of his measures ... The gentleman from Connecticut
says there are no doubts on his mind but that the
President has a Constitutional right, as the Commanderin-Chief of the Army and Navy, to do as he has done;
but it should be remicmbered that many have doubts... '^S
.

,

.

.

Early in February, 1802, the House agreed to certain
^5ibid.

,

pp.

326-39.

^^ibid.

,

pp.

405-406.

^7ibid.

pp.
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Senate amendments to the proposal, entitled,
"An Act for
the protection of the Coirmerce and Seamen
of the United
States, against the Tri.politan Cruisers '"'+9
^^e measure
became law on February 6, 1802.
Its preamble
,

and first

two sections read:

Whereas the regency of Tripoli, on the coast of
Barbary, has commenced a predatory warfare aeainst
the United States
Be it enact ed. .That it shall be lawful fully to
equip, officer, man, and employ such of the armed
vessels of the United States, as may be judged requisite by the President of the United States, for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof
on the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas
Sec. 2.
And be it further enacted, That it shall
be lawful for the President of the United States to
instruct the commanders of the respective public vessels aforesaid, to subdue, seize, and make prize of
all vessels, goods, and effects, belonging to the Bey
/_sic7 of Tripoli, or to his subj ects
and also to
cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or
hostility as the state of war will justify, and may,
in his opinion, require. 50
.

_

.

.

.

The last three of its five sections deal with privateers and the length of service for American seamen.
In accordance with the statute, the President and

Secretary of the Navy signed orders to all ships of war,

directing
sels. 51

them, to

seize and make prize of Tripolitan ves-

Plans were readied to send a relief squadron to

the Mediterraneans-Dale's fleet was still there--and
^9ibid.

,

502 Stat,

p.

474.

129

(1802)

5lNaval Documents, 2:60
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Captain Richard

V.

Morris was ordered to take command
on

March 11. 1802.52
On March 20, Morris was ordered to seize
and make

prize of all Tripolitan vessels, to blockade
the port of
Tripoli and convoy American vessels as far as could
be

done consistent with the blockade. ^3
On April 20,

the administration decided to reaffirm

its desire for treaty negotiations.

Instructions from

Secretary of the Navy Smith, received months later in the

Mediterranean by Morris included the following.
The President conceiving that the period has arrived
when negotiations for peace with the Bashaw /Pasha/
of Tripoli may be opened under circumstances which
promise an advantageous issue...
i_7t has been determined to lay all our Naval force under your command
before Tripoli ... Holding out the olive Branch in one
hand 6c displaying in the other the means of offensive
operations, may produce... an advantageous treaty... 54

Morris arrived at Gibraltar on May 25, where he re-

mained through August, occasionally convoying American
ships through the Straits, blockading one of the Tripolitan

cruisers at Gibraltar, repairing his ship, the "Chesapeake,"
and standing by in response to reports of Moroccan threats. 55

During this summer (of 1802) relations with Barbary
52ibid.

P-

82.

^^Ibid.

p.

92.

^^Ibid.,

p.

130

55 Irwin

P-

114

,
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deteriorated rapidly.

Morocco, heretofore peaceful, de-

clared war on the United States in June, when both
Com-

modores Dale and Morris refused passports to ships carry^
ing grain from Morocco to Tripoli.

Tripoli, taking advan-

tage of the large number of American merchantships in the

Mediterranean, captured a brig on June 17, took it to
Algiers, and presented its crew to the Dey as a gift.

The

Bey of Tunis meanwhile, repeatedly demanded that an American

warship be built for him.

Finally, Algiers continually

protested the delay in payment of annuities as stipulated
by treaty; the Dey refused cash instead of military and

naval stores; and he demanded that the /Vmerican consul be

replaced
That summer, too, Sweden, which had been at

V7ar

with

and consequently was blockading Tripoli, made peace, and

removed its vessels.

S7
'

The two remaining American ships

were soon forced to leave for supplies; and when no ship
from Morris' fleet replaced them, Tripoli's harbor stood
unobstructed.
By all accounts the Morris mission was a failure,

although it would seem that full blame could not fairly
be attributed to the Commodore.
56ibid,

,

pp.

57jbid.

,

p.

58A].len,

119-120.
123.

Barbary

,

p.

111.

Nevertheless, the admin-
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istration despaired of losing whatever advantage the more

militant policy was to have given them, and planned, in the
spring of 1803, major concessions to obtain peace. 59

Con-

gress, meanwhile, appropriated money for the construction
of four smaller,

swifter craft, like the "Enterprise,"

apparently hoping such vessels would be more effective.
Morris established his long-delayed blockade of

Tripoli in late May, 1803.

After a skirmish with some

Tripolitan boats, and additional unsuccessful negotiations

with the Pasha, the Commodore lifted the blockade (June 26,
1803)

,

believing it unnecessary, and fearing renewed hosti-

lities with the other Barbary states. 61

Morris was then recalled by the Secretary of the Navy,

censured by a court of inquiry for lack of "'diligence or
activity'" in operations against Tripoli, and had his com-

mission revoked by the President.
headed by Captain Edward Preble,

A new squadron, to be
V7as

readied in the spring

and summer of 1803, to replace Morris' fleet.

The Preble

squadron consisted of seven ships, five of which were small

Preble's orders were essentially like Morris',

gunboats.

with emphasis on maintaining
'

62
a blockade of Tripoli.

59ir^in, p. 128.
60Act of February 28, 1803,

Barbary

,

p,

136.

61lrwin, p. 127.
62ibid.

,

p.

129.

2

Stat.

206; Allen,
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While Preble's squadron was sailing (each ship
left
the United States on its own, at about two-week
intervals

throughout the summer of 1803)
merchantship.

,

Morocco seized an American

One of Preble's ships caught the Moroccan

vessel however, freed the American captives, and hauled
the boat to the port of Tangier to negotiate with the Emperor.

Negotiations proved successful; Morocco agreed to

ratify the treaty of 1786 and recognize the blockade of
Tripoli. 63
Tv^o

of Preble's fleet, the frigate "Philadelphia,"

and the smaller "Vixen" were dispatched to Tripoli to es-

tablish a blockade in October, 1803.

The smaller ship left

after a few weeks to search for Tripolitan vessels.

Two

weeks later, the "Philadelphia" ran aground pursuing a

Tripolitan ship, and was captured with its crew of over
three hundred.

The Pasha then raised his price for ransom

and peace substantially.

But in February,

1804, Stephen

Decatur and a small band of followers successfully executed
a bold plot to destroy the "Philadelphia "^^
.

This angered the Pasha, but did not bring him to
terms; and, of course, he still held the crew.

Negotia-

tions between Preble and the Barbary ruler continued without

progress in June.

In July, Preble brought his whole squad-

63ibid.

,

pp.

132-133.

6^Ibid.

pp,

132-35.

,
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ron to Tripoli, along with eight vessels
belonging to the
King of the Two Sicilies, also at war
with Tripoli.
In

August a battle ensued in which three Tripolitan
vessels
were captured and the city of Tripoli was shelled.

There-

after, the Pasha reduced his demands considerably,
but still

no agreement could be reached.

During this time period--spring and summer of 1804-tensions V7ith Tunis mounted.

angered when
by

a

a

The Bey of Tunis had been

Tripolitan vessel carrying property owned

Tunisian subject was captured by the "Enterprise" in

the fail of 1803.

and negotiate.

Commodore Morris went to Tunis to try

After going on shore and agreeing to re-

turn the seized goods, additional demands were made.

Morris
ments.

V7as
66

detained and held until he agreed to the payUpon learning of the capture of the "Philadelphia"

by Tripoli, the Bey threatened war and prepared during the

winter and spring for attacks upon American commerce.

\Jhen

Preble arrived in the Mediterranean, he wrote home for additional ships to meet the Tunisian threat and
to negotiate--bu.t remained on his ship,

Bey,

V7ent to

Tunis

Preble wrote the

assuring him satisfactory indemnification for his

seized goods; by the end of April, 1804, an agreement was
65ibid.

,

pp.

138-139,

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

124-125.
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reached.
In May,

1804, the Bey of Tunis renewed his theats

at the report of Tunisian craft captured by
the United States

Nothing come of this however, and by summer's end a
grain
shortage in Tunis wholly diverted the Bey's attention.

Thus

ended the Tunisian threat.
Back home, the eighth Congress briefly debated and

passed an extension of the act to protect commerce and seamen of 1802.

In addition to itn authorization of an import

duty to defray the cost of naval operations, the act of

March 26, 1804 empowered the President to order naval operations against any hostile Barbary power.

The first section

explains that its purpose is to defray the expense of
equipping, officering, manning, and employing such
of the armed vessels of the United States as may
be deemed requisite by the President
for protecting the commerce and seamen thereof, and for
carrying on warlike operations against the Regency
of Tripoli, or any other of the Barbary Powers,
which may commit hostilities against the United
.^9
States.
.

.

.

.

The Act was to remain in effect until three months

after the President ratified a treaty of peace with Tripoli,
"unless the United States should then be at war with any

other of the Barabary Powers.

"'^^

^^Ibid., pp. 140-141.
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

141,

142.

^^Annals, 13^1210-25;
^^2 Stat.
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(1804).
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The Tripoli question was still
unresolved wh(len
William Eaton, former United States
consul
to Tunis.,

se-

cured in 1803, the President's permission
to conduct land
operations in Tripoli, 71 The plan,
hatched by Eaton and
James L. Cathcart, who served as consul
to three
of the

Barbary states, had been outlined as early
as 1801.72
called for American support for a coup d'etat
by a brother
of the Pasha of Tripoli, in the hope that
the
brother, in-

debted to the United States for helping him to
power, would
do nothing counter to American interests in the
Mediter-

ranean

'^'^
.

Another relief squadron of four frigates was sent to
the Mediterranean, with Samuel Barron to replace Preble as

squadron commander.

The administration left it up to the

fleet commander to decide whether or not to adopt the plan
to aid the rival brother.

Barron arrived in the Mediter-

ranean- -with Eaton aboard- -in September, 1804.

The Pasha,

meanwhile, had driven his brother into exile, but Eaton

persuaded Barron to let him go to Egypt to arrange for the
rival's return.
ber

8,

The "Argus" took Eaton to Cairo on Decem-

1804.74

71irT,.7in,

p.

72ibid.

pp.

,

143,

110-111, note 25, p.

73ibid.

7^Allen, Barbar y, pp.

220,

229.
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Meanwhile, the brother, named Hamet Karamanli.

V7a
'as

engaged in an uprising in Egypt against Ottoman
rule; this
delayed their meeting until early February,
1805,
Hamet
and Eaton worked out a written convention
providing for the

United States to do everything consistent with its
honor
and interest to establish Hamet as sovereign of Tripoli.
For his part, Hamet agreed to indemnify the United States
for its expenses with tribute money from other states,
to

release Americans held prisoner in Tripoli, and to form a

permanent peace treaty with the United States without tribute.^^

A force of approximately four hundred men (three hundred Arabs, only ten Americans and about ninety others of

various nationalities) was formed, with Eaton as commander.
The plan was to march overland to Derne

,

an eastern pro-

vince of Tripoli, where they would attack, and with the help
of American sea forces which were to meet them, put Hamet

into power.

After an arduous trek over about five hundred

miles of Libyan desert, Eaton's force attacked the city of
Derne, on April 27, 1805, v/hile three small American gun-

boats shelled the other side of town.

The Pasha's rein-

forcements were barely beaten off and the

to\«7n

was held.

No sooner had this occurred V7hen a message was recei.ved

75ibid.
76ibid.

,

230-32

,

Ill

stating that a treaty with the Pasha had been obtained and
that Eaton

'n

forces were to be vjithdrawn from

Derne.^'''

Throughout the winter and spring of 1804-05, the
Un:ited States maintained a blockade of Tripoli

Com-

modore Barron, meanwhile, was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Eaton's plan to restore Hamet,

Barron had

no confidence in Hamet; he thought the approximately five

hundred-mile march from Derne to Tripoli too long and hazardous; he feared for the American prisoners, should the

Pasha be pushed too hard; he did not think he was authorized to commit the United States to the restoration of
Hamet; and finally, his

ov^ti

failing health, made him an-

xious to conclude a treaty with Tripoli and quit the Medi-

terranean 79
In early 1805, the Pasha seemed anxious for peace.

Consul-General to Barbary Tobias Lear arrived at Tripoli
May 26, 1805 to begin negotiations,

An exchange of pri-

soners was agreed to, with the United States paying sixty

thousand dollars since it had the fewer captives.

The

treaty called for the Americans and Hamet to withdraw im-

mediately from Derne, and for the restoration of Hamet
family to him.

's

A secret clause, however, gave the Pasha

77irwin, pp.

147-148.

^^Allen, Barbary

79irwin, pp.

,

p.

149-52,

221.

four years to release the family.

The treaty established

peace between Tripoli and the United States,
without annuities or payments beyond the customary gifts
upon an exchange of consuls.

It also provided that captives would

not be enslaved in future conflicts, that passports for
ships would be provided.

The agreement was completed in

early June, 1805.
The treaty aroused controversy in the United States.
It vzas suggested by some that the sixty thousand dollars

ransom fee was unnecessarily high, or not necessary at all.
Another stir was created over treatment of the Pasha's
brother, who claimed, in a letter "to the People of the

United States," that his compact with Eaton included assurances that the throne would be recovered for him.

There

might have been more commotion had the secret clause granting the Pasha four years to return Hamet's family been

made public.

(The secret agreement was revealed in 1807,

and even the Jefferson administration expressed surprise
Finally, m.any felt that Barron and

at its existence.)

Lear acted hastily in prohibiting Eaton from attempting a
siege on the city of Tripoli.

Nevertheless

,

the Senate ratified the treaty, 21-8,

on April 12, 1806, thus formally ending hostilities with
SOlbid.

^^Ibid.

,
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,

pp.
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Tripoli. 82
Lat er Relations with Barbar y

While Tobias Lear was negotiating an end to
the
Tripolitan war in 1805. troubles were brewing with

Tunis

once again.

In late April,

1805, a

sir.all

Tunisian craft

with two prizes it had taken tried unsuccessfully to run
the blockade at Tripoli.

Tunis then threatened war when

the American squadron commander. John Rodgers

,

who had

succeeded the ailing Samuel Barron, refused to release
them. 83

Once the treaty with Tripoli was negotiated, Rodgers

decided to settle with Tunis.

By August,

1805, the bulk

of the United States squadron was in Tunis harbor.

The

Bey of Tunis now agreed to renew the treaty of 1797, and

send an ambassador to the United States to dispose of the

issue of the captured Tunisian vessels.

These negotiations

proved difficult, but no hostilities ensued, and in January, 1807. under pressure of

V7ar

with Algiers, the Bey of

Tunis accepted ten thousand dollars as indemnification for
his losses.

After this relations with Tunis remained
OA

fai.rl}''

satisfactory."^

^^Ibid.
p. 154; U.S. Treaties and Other International
"Treaty of Peace and Amity," TS No.
Agreements 11:1070
35'9, 17 Ap'ril 1006.
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"
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Shortly thereafter, when relations between the

United States and England worsened, the American fleet
was
gradually withdrawn from the Mediterranean altogether.

With the protection of the American navy gone, shipping
was once again vulnerable.

In 1807,

the Dey of Algiers

seized three merchantships when the United States failed
to deliver naval supplies as stipulated by treaty.

the Dey released the ships in exchange for cash.

Later,
In 1808

he renewed his demands for naval stores, and might have

taken further action had not an American storeship arrived.

From 1808-12, relations with Algiers were good.^^
In the summer of 1812, at the instigation of the

British, Algiers rejected as insufficient the tribute

brought by an American ship, ordered Consul-General Lear
to depart, and threatened to keep the supply-ship and en-

slave all Americans if the difference were not made up im-

mediately in cash.

Lear borrowed the m.oney and obtained

release of the ship, and then left Algiers.

The Dey then

sent his cruisers out in search of American merchantships.
In late August, 1812, Algiers seized an American brigade

and its crew of eleven.

With the War of 1812 now underway,

the United States was unable to pass through the Straits
of Gibraltar, which were blocked by the British navy.

85ibid.

,

pp,

168-71.

As

115
a result it could neither
meet Algiers'

threats, nor con-

tinue to trade heavily in the
Mediterranean 86
.

\^en the war with England ended,
the administration
of James Madison sought to reckon
with
Algiers.

On Febru-

ary 23, 1815, Madison sent a message
to Congress reminding
that body of the Dey's mistreatment
of Lear, other "acts
of... overt and direct warfare," and
the holding and rough
treatment of American citizens in Algiers,
Madison went
on to note that the end of the war with
England would

mean renewed

Air.erican trade in the

Mediterranean, "within

the range of the Algerine cruisers."

He concluded by re-

commending to Congress "an act declaring the
existence of
a state of war between the United States
and the
Dey and

Regency of Algiers. "^^
On March 2, 1815, the Congress passed "An Act for

the protection of.

.

.Commerce.

.

.against the Algerine crui-

sers," whose wording was much the same as the Act of

February

6,

1802, except that it was directed at the Dey

of Algiers instead of the Regency of Tripoli.

Additional motivations for the aggressive American

policy at this juncture were the small size of Algiers'
navy, and her hostile relations with Italy, Spain, Holland,
^^Ibid.

,

171-73.

pp.

87j^.|<.ha^^so^,

^

1;554.

S^Annals, 28:1275-80;

3

Stat.

230 (1815).

.
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Prussia, Denmark and Russia--all
at the same
cordingly, two squadrons were formed,

time..

Ac-

one to be headed by

William Bainbridge, the other by Stephen
Decatur.
manders were instructed to obtain an
early

The com-

peace without

tribute or presents and to arrange the
release of American
prisoners

Decatur's flotilla arrived at Gibraltar June
15, 1815,
and proceeded to capture two Algerine vessels.
He then

sailed to Algiers, agreed to return the vessels
and demanded ratification of a treaty calling for the
abolition of
tribute, release of American prisoners, indemnification
for
the ship seized in 1812, restoration of other
American

property, and the treatment of future captives as prisoners
of war rather than slaves.

The Dey agreed to the treaty. 90

Early in 1815, Tunis and Tripoli permitted prizes
seized from the British by Am.erican privateers and brought
into the Barbary ports, to be retaken by England.

United States protested this action, claiming
of treaties, but to no avail,

a

The

violation

So after concluding the

pact with Algiers, Decatur, on his

o\\Ti

authority, sailed

to the other Barbary ports where he successfully demanded

indemnification for loss of the prizes.

Bainbridge fol-

lowed Decatur with a show of force in Tunis
S^Irwin, pp.

176-177

90ibid.

177-79.

,

pp.

,

Tripoli and

Algiers, and both squadrons sailed
for home in October. ^1
Late in December. 1815. the
Senate approved and the
President ratified the new treaty
with Algiers.
But the
Dey chafed under the agreement,
which he considered humiliating, and complained that one
of the vessels captured
by Decatur was never returned.
As of the spring
of 1816.

the Dey refused to exchange
ratifications of the treaty.

Hostilities might have been renewed had not
intervened.

third party

a

That summer a fleet of Dutch and British
ship

under Lord Exmouth attacked Algiers, virtually
destroying
their fleet and doing considerable damage to
92
the city.

When an American flotilla appeared in October,
1816,
Algiers was still in disarray. After receiving
instruc-

tions, the American negotiators sent the Dey an
ultimatum

with which he reluctantly complied.

The result was a re-

newal of the treaty which the Dey had agreed to, then rejected.

The most advantageous American negotiations with

Barbary were thus concluded in December, 1816.

(Curiously

enough, this last treaty, by some error, was not approved

and ratified until 1822.)

After this date, American rela-

tions with Barbary remained peaceful.
91 Ibid.

,

pp.

180-181.

92ibid.

,

pp.

182,

93ibid,

,

pp.

185-186.

184--185.

n

.
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Con pjjosio^

f1ict s

an d the Cons^itutin

The principal constitutional
issues surrounding the
conflicts with Barbary concern:
(1) che international
status of the Barbary powers, and
the effect of their status (if any) on the decision to
use force against them;

President Jefferson's unilateral decision
to order
Dale's fleet to the Mediterranean, and
the hostilities attendant to Dale's mission; (3) the nature
of the Congressional acts of February 6, 1802 and March
(2)

2,

1815;

and,

(4)

the actual conduct of the Barbary wars.
(1)

If,

as was often bitterly alleged by their vic-

tims, the Barbary were no more than pirates,
then the

war- declaring power of Congress (Article

I,

section

8,

para-

graph 11) might be considered irrelevant on the grounds
that war is only declared against states
the other hand,

,

not pirates.

On

the power of dealing with piracy was ex-

plicitly granted to the Legislature by Article

I,

section

8,

paragraph 10 of the Constitution, which gives Congress power
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of

Nations

Pirates were generally viewed as individual miscreants,

roaming the seas purely for personal gain.

They were dis-

tinguished from those seafaring predators who acted as
agents of a state.

Pirates were, by their crimes, "dena-

.

.
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tionalized"^~associated with no state-which
is why they
were subject to lawful capture by

the ships of any nation. 54

As was the custom of the day, the
United States Constitution
provided for the granting of letters
of marque and reprisal
(Article I, section 8, paragraph
11), which were govern-

mental commissions for private ships to
prey on the vessels
of its enemies.

Ships thus commissioned were distinguished

from mere pirates.

Judging by their practice of selective
depredations
in accordance with the foreign policy
of their rulers,

the

Barbary corsairs seem more like privateers than
pirates.
The fact that the United States entered into diplo-

matic relations with the Barbary powers is further
evidence
that they were states and not mere pirates.

Prior to Com-

modore Dale's mission in 1801, the United States negotiated,
and ratified with Senate approval as is constitutionally

required, three treaties, each with
regency. 96

xhus

,

a

different Barbary

as of 1801, all of the Constitutional

procedures for engaging in relations with a foreign state
were strictly observed with the Barbary powers.
94citing Grotius, Fenwick states that "a body of
pirates did not constitute a state and... the laws of war
did not apply to their acts..." Charles G. Fenwick, International L aw 4th ed. (New York; Appleton-Century-Crof ts
1^65)

,

p.

5^14

^^Fenwick, p. 505,
^^See notes 12, 16 and 17, supra.
A fourth treaty,
with Morocco, was made during the period of the Articles of
Confederation.
See note 8, supra.

Furthermore, in his message to the
Congress justifying Dale's mission. President
Jefferson never suggested
that the United States confronted
simple piracy.
To the

contrary, he noted that Tripoli had
declared war, that h e
had ordered defensive measures,
which is why no prizess
were taken, and that the legislature
was invited to autho rize measures of offense. ^7

We conclude, therefore, that the Barbary
corsairs
were not pirates, and that the Constitutional
procedures
for engaging in hostilities with a foreign
state applied
to them,
(2)

Dale's small fleet of warships was ordered
by

President Jefferson to the Mediterranean while
Congress
was not in session.

Thus,

the decision to undertake hosti-

lities against the Barbary states was initiated by the
Com-

mander in Chief (of the Navy) rather than the Congress.
This statement is subject to
ever.

som.e

qualification, how-

When Congress established the naval force in 1794,

it explicitly declared its purpose to be the protection of

American commerce against "the depredations of the Algerine
corsairs "^^
.

However, this act was to go out of effect after the
1795 treaty with Algiers, and so Congress passed a suppleO7

See notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text, supra,

98see note 10, supra.

mentary act in 1796, authorizing the
President to "continue
the construction and equipment"
of three of the war ships.
The 1796 supplement said nothing
about the use
of the ves-

sels. 99

While it may be argued that Congress
intended

s.
;ome

degree of Presidential discretion in the
use of the naval
force when it first authorized construction,
the naval armament acts could hardly be considered explicit
approval
for Dale's mission.
In addition, there is no evidence of
any prior consultation by the President with
Congress or
its members.

"Jefferson justified his orders to Dale on the
grounds

that he never directed anything "beyond the line of
defense. "100

Writing as "Lucius Crassus," Hamilton ridiculed

this line of argument.

But Hamilton's charge was that

Jefferson had underrepresented Presidential power, rather
than that he exceeded his authority.

Jefferson had instructed Dale to be prepared for hostilities.

He was directed to destroy foreign ships and

blockade foreign ports only if war had been declared or if
attacks on American ships had begun.

I^ile such instruc-

tions clearly contemplate defensive action, the dispatch of

war ships all the way to the Mediterranean may in itself
^^See note 14, supra.

lOORichardson, 1:327,

.

have been provocative.

At the least, the mission
was intended as a show of force in order
to intimidate the Barbary
rulers

Since there is no evidence that
Congress challenged
Jefferson's action or questioned his
explanation, the practice of Presidents unilaterally ordering
the armed forces
abroad in a show of force gained approval.
Jefferson's action,

in fact,

if not in law,

enhanced the war making powers

of the President,
(3)

Congress did formally approve hostilities
with

Tripoli on February

6,

1802, although Hamilton was surely

correct in saying that a Congressional declaration
is un-

necessary if the other party has declared war.

Nevertheless,

the "Act for the protection of the Commerce and Seamen
of
the United States, against the Tripolitan Cruisers,"
how-

ever clear its intent, may not have been, in form, a de-

claration of war.
The Act stated that Tripoli had "commenced

a

preda-

tory warfare against the United States," and that in response,

the President may, as he sees fit, employ armed

vessels to "subdue, seize and make prize of" Tripolitan
ships, or undertake other acts of hostility "as the state

of war will justify, and may, in his opinion, require

And again, on March
•^^^See note 50,

2,

supra.

1815,

"-^^-^
.

sim.ilar words v/ere used
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to authorize the President
to undertake hostilities
to pro-

tect conferee from the Algerine
cruisers even though President Madison expressly requested
a declaration of war.
Why
the Congress resorted to
this form is not entirely
clear.
Perhaps it reflects the limited
nature of the conflict, or
perhaps the desire of Congress
to permit the President to

determine whether or not. when, and
in what amounts force
was necessary.

Whatever the motivation, the form of
these acts contrasts clearly with the form of the
act authorizing hostilities with England in 1812.
Here the Congress explicitly
trumpeted that "war be and the same is hereby
declared to
exist" between the United States and Great
Britain; even

the title of the legislation was:

between the United Kingdom.
In conclusion,

March

2,

..

"An Act declaring war

and the United States

the Acts of February

6,

...

"1^2

1802 and

1815 would seem to be Congressional authoriza-

tions of hostilities just short of a declaration of war,

further establishing that Congress may authorize hostili^
ties without declaring
(4)

v/ar.

Finally, we consider the constitutional issues

raised by the actual conduct of uhe Barbary wars.

Three

10^2 Stat. 755 (1812).
This Act also states "that
the President of the united States is hereby authorized
to use the whole land and naval force of the United States
to carry the same into effect..."

belligerent operations in particular
are of questionable
legality.
First was Dale's blockading
of two Tripolitan
vessels anchored at Gibraltar.
Dale was ordered to stop at
Gibraltar and learn the
disposition of the Barbary powers
toward the United States.
He was only to take bellicose
action upon learning that
war had been declared.
The American consul at Gibraltar
informed him of Tripoli's hostile designs,
but the admiral
of the Tripolitan vessels denied that
war existed.
Nevertheless, Dale proceeded to block the
ships.

Given the contradictary claims of the
Tripolitan and
the American consul, was Dale's action
warranted? We would
have to conclude that it was.
Despite their commander's
protests, the Tripolitan vessels were, themselves,
evidence
that the Pasha of Tripoli had dispatched his
cruisers in

search of prey.
this.

The warnings of the consul only confirmed

In fact, Tripoli had declared war against the
United

States a month and a half before Dale arrived.

In sum,

the

constitutionality of the decision to send Dale to the Mediterranean notwithstanding, this particular phase of his

mission was legal.
The second activity of dubious constitutionality is

Eaton's land mission in Tripoli,

Was the plan to instigate

and support a coup d'etat in order to place into power
103 See text accompanying notes
29-36, supra
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someone sympathetic to American
interests warranted by the
Act of February 6, 1802? The
Act fell short of a declaration of all-out war and called,
essentially, for naval action to protect United States
merchantships and
crews.

the other hand,

On

the second section authorized
the President

to instruct the commander of the
naval squadron "to cause
to be done all such other acts of
precaution or hostility
as the state of v^ar will

j

ustif y

.

.

.

"^0^

President Jefferson approved Eaton's plan
in 1803;
once again, without any consultation
with Congress.

It

was left to squadron commander Samuel Barron
to decide
whether or not to pursue the plan, and by the

fall of 1804

he had been persuaded.

Was Eaton's mission, then, an "act

of precaution or hostility" justified by the
state of war,
in the words of the Act of 1802?

Broadly interpreted, these words of the Act would
seem to warrant any action suitable to wartime at Presidential discretion.

It is possible, however,

gress was thinking merely of
of Tripoli,

a

that the Con-

naval blockade of the port

The legality of Eaton's land mission thus de-

pends upon one's interpretation of the imprecise words of
the legislation.

The third issue surrounds Stephen Decatur's action as
coimnander of the American fleet in the Mediterranean in ac10'^2

Stat.

129

(1802), emphasis added.
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cordance with the Act of March

1815,

2,

The Act was speci-

fically directed at Algiers, but
Decatur, after having dealt
with the latter state, proceeded to
Tunis and then to Tripoli.

His fleet conducted a show of force
at both these
ports, but engaged in no hostilities.
Decatur undertook
this action on his own initiative 105
^ut of course he acted
under color of Presidential authority.
,

William Bainbridge, who commanded the second
American
squadron in the Mediterranean at the time,
followed
Decatur

with a similar display of might in Algiers, Tunis
and Tripoli.

.Were these actions before Tunis and Tripoli
warranted

by the 1815 legislation?

We would conclude in the negative.

The success of the missions--treaties were obtained from

Tunis and Tripoli without any hostilities--made any cri-

ticism unlikely.

Nevertheless, Madison's commanders clear-

ly exceeded their orders pursuant to an act of 'Congress.
(5)

To summarize, the Barbary conflicts set

cedent for an expanded Presidential

v/ar

a

pre-

making power, prin-

cipally because the 1801 naval action ordered by Jefferson
and the 1815 incidents under Madison went virtually un-

challenged.
-

Congress set a precedent for a more flexible mode of

authorizing hostilities than the formal declaration of war.
But this, too, redounded to the President, because the acts
10 -^Irwin, p.

180.

of February

6,

1802 and March 2.

1815 delegated to

broad discretion in the use of
force.

^
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CHAPTER

IV

THE BOXER EXPEDITION

^-L^i.?a]^Backgrqund
After the middle of the 17th
century China was ruled
by the Manchus, a people of
northern Asia, who pierced
the Great Wall, conquered China,
and established a new
dynastic order, the Ch'ing.
To consolidate their power
the Manchus left the uld administrative
system virtually
intact, and adopted traditional
Chinese customs.
As a

consequence, when confronted with new
ideas from the West,
the Manchus reacted quite conservatively.^

Trade relations with Europe were fairly
good, des-

pite inevitable frictions, until the mid-1800's,
when the
British government took over from the East India
Company

control of trade with China.

Christianity by missionaries
over one hundred years.

Even the propagation of

relatively unhindered for

V7as

In the early 18th century, when

the Emperor issued anti-Christian edicts, it was in res-

ponse to missionary threats to his authority.
The Opium War (1840) and the Arrow War (1856) were

fought to secure more favorable trading advantages in

China for the British government.

Afterwards the depen-

^Christopher Martin /"pseud ^Edwin Palmer Hoy t The
Boxer Rebe llion (London: Abelard-Schum.en Ltd., 1968)";
.

.

pp.

1'^2l,
o

^Chester Tan. The B oxer Ca tastrophe (New York:
Co lumbia University Press
1967)
pp. 3-7.
,

,
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dencies ringing the Chinese Empire
(^•barbarian",

fell,

under Western

as the Chinese now called
them)

control.

In the northeast Russia seized
huge tracts of land north
of the Amur River (1858).
In 1862. Portugal had solid

control over the southeastern port of
Macao.

In that

same year France occupied Annam to the
south (what is now
Laos and North Vietnam)
and Great Britain annexed Lower
,

Burma in the southwest.

(France secured the rest of what

it called Indo-China by 1887,

Burma by 1886.)

and England claimed Upper

In the northwest Russia claimed

large tract of land in Chinese Turkestan
(1871)

,

Hi,

but re-

stored part of it nine years later in exchange for
indemnity.

a

a

huge

In 1379, Japan took the Liuchiu Islands in the

East China Sea.^

The weakness of the Manchu dynasty at the hands of
the Western imperialists encouraged many Chinese to seek

internal reforms.

A young scholar, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, in-

fluenced by Christian ideas, formed a sect which soon
sought the overthrow of the Ch ing regime.
'

This touched

off the T'aip'ing Rebellion (1850), which the Manchus in

combination with conservative support took fourteen years
to suppress.^

-"Peter Fleming, The Siege at Peking (New York
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 195'^

%artin,

pp.

25-26;

Tan, p.

9.

^

^

1.30

In response to the T'aip'ing revolt
the Chinese de-

veloped a deep suspicion for anything
Western- -especially
Western religious and social ideas, and
later, manifestations of its industrialization, such as
the railroad and
telegraph.
The Manchu Court shared this
revulsion, but as

piece after piece of its empire was hacked off,
it realized
it would have to modernize sufficiently to
withstand
the

Western onslaught
In the 1880

.

's

a campaign was launched to build rail-

ways, open mines, construct dockyards, build naval
vessels,

establish naval acadamies

,

reorganize the army, and send

students to Europe to study military operations and munitions manufacturing.

Ironically, the first great chal-

lenge came not from the West, but from the newly mxodern-

ized Japan

.

The Sino-Japanese War of 1895 was a disaster for
China,

The decisive victory by Japan, which had imperial

designs of its own, opened China's eighteen provinces to
a fierce competition among the European povTers for com-

mercial concessions.

Were it not for this competition

among the imperialists, China proper might well have been

carved up into colonies
^MarLiu, p
^'Tan,

p.

9,

26

.

The European rivalry created a

7

balance of power, which, if
unbalanced, -would result in
China's dismemberment.
As it was, China was
compelled to grant additional
humiliating concessions, and sign
conventions giving the
European powers, Russia and
Japan so-called "spheres of
influence." These spheres
consisted of whole regions of
China in which the Manchus were
compelled to give one or
another of the Powers exclusive
privileges.

Nominally, the Manchu Emperor ruled
China,
Actually,
China was ruled by a combination
of the Imperial Court,
which was most influential in the,
central provinces, regional viceroys who had sx.orn allegience
to the Emperor
but were fairly independent, and local
leaders.
And the
Court itself was dominated by the crafty
old Empress
Dowager, aunt of the Emperor, Kuang-hsu.
In the 1890 's, once again through the
efforts of a

young Chinese scholar well versed in Western
thought, a
new reform movement sprang up. Only this time the
external
threat to China proper was graver than ever, and
the
ideas

of the reformers found favor with the Emperor.

For one

hundred days in 1898, decrees were issued commanding various ,reforms--only to have the Empress Dowager combine
with
the conservative faction to abort the movement and virtually imprison the Emperor.

''ibid.

,

pp.

11-14.

The Empress then proceeded to

^

.

:
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abolish the institutional
refonns. and, turning to
military
reorganization, prepared for armed
resistance to foreign
encroachments
.

Such were the conditions in
China at the start of
the Boxer rebellion.
We turn briefly to Sino-American
relations.
The United States obtained its
first treaty
with China after her defeat in
the Opium War.
The Treaty
of Wang Hiya, 1844, opened
five Chinese ports to American
commerce on a most-favored nation
basis. ^ The pact was
revised with some concessions favorable
to the United
States in the Treaty of Tientsin
(1858)
This agreement
opened additional ports to American
commerce (Article 14),
gave the American Representative the
same residence privileges at Peking, the capital, as any other
foreign minister (Article 6)
and required Chinese officials to defend
.

,

Americans in China "from all insult or injury of
any sort"
(Article 11).
Finally, the Chinese government agreed to
allow foreign Christians and native converts to
practice
and teach their religion unmolested (Article 29)
In short,

United States policy toward China was to

pursue whatever comjiiercial advantages arose as
^Ibid.

15-32.

pp.

,

a result

9

Paul H. Clyde, United States Poli cy TowardChina
Diplomatic and Public Documents. 1839-1 939 (New ToFk
Russell & Russell, 1964), pp. 13-21.
10 Ibid.

,

pp

.

47-57

'

^
10

of European oriental policies,
but neither to ally itself
with any of the European powers,
nor to wring concessions
by American force of arms.

Three American "interest groups"
were particularly
concerned with China.
First, there were the Christian
missionaries.
The American missionary movement
began in
the 1830's. and by 1900 over a fifth
of American invest-

ments in China consisted of missionary
property there.
The movement weakened however, as a
result of the Depression
of 1893, which hurt the churches
economically, and because
of critical attacks by lay writers.
Nevertheless, the public was sympathetic to the victims of
isolated antimissionary riots in China.

Second were business interests.

Investments in China

were relatively small (an estimated two percent of
United
States foreign trade), 12

b^t;

were growing.

China purchased

almost half of all United States cotton exports, and bought

substantial amounts of kerosene and wheat flour as well.
Still, China's greatest value to American business was as
a

potential market for United States goods '^
.

'-'-Marilyn B. Young, The Rhetoric of Empire:
American
China Policy, 1895-1901 (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvafT University Press, 1968;, pp. 76-87.

12

Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomati c History of the
American People 8th ed. (New^Yofk;' Ap pie ton Cent ury^'

,

Crofts,
l-^

1969)

,

p.

479.

Young, pp. 54-6.

'>

1'^

The third -group" with an eye
toward China were the
navalistc.
In tune with, or perhaps
ahead of the supernationalistic., expansionist views
of
the day,

thes,!e men,
led by Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan, envisioned Ameri,-ca a;
a great world power, and
necessarily, because of geography,

a great naval power.

And now (190C)

as a result of the

,

Spanish-American War, the United States was
an Asian power,
with a substantial army and navy fighting
a brutal

(and

increasingly unpopular) war to secure
control of the
Philippines.
(We should note that the Philippine

Islands

were Spanish possessions until the United
States war with
Spain--which was declared by Congress.) As early
as 1897

some naval elements sought a coaling station
for the United

States Navy in a Chinese port.

Their designs did not have

much impact on United States policy toward China, however.

'^'^

The effect of these interests on United States policy was by no m.eans negligible, however, and the influence

of the mercantilists can be seen in the most important

policy statement to precede the Boxer outbreak.

The state-

ment, first detailed in diplomatic messages to the European

powers and Japan in September 1899, became known as the
"Open Door Policy."

The memos were the brainchild of

W.W. Rockhill, an advisor to McKinley

John Hay.

'

s

Secretary of State,

Rockhill was in turn influenced by a British

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

5-6,

103-106.

I

.
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Far East expert, A,E,
Hippisley.

While the Open Door was
presented to and accepted
by
the American public as a
statement of noble principle-in
behalf of China's threatened
territorial

integrity-it was

in fact aimed at serving
America's self-interest.

The

September 1899 notes did not
oppose the spheres of influence, they accepted the spheres
as facts.
The aim was to
get each of the European Powers
to agree that within their
particular sphere, future American
coi.nmercial rights would
not be jeopardized.
Only the memo to England revealed

con-

cern with "maintaining the integrity
of China. "15
The Powers either interpreted the
note's ambiguities
to their own advantage, or responded
evasively.
The Open
Door had more of an effect upon the
electorate in the Presidential elections of 1900 than it did
upon hapless China.
.

The_Boxer Re bellion

Natural disasters often have political repercussions;
so it was with the Boxer movement.

In the central provinces

of Shantung and Chihli (where Peking is),
flood and famine

took a particularly savage toll on the Chinese
population
in 1898 and 1899.

It is in these districts that the anti-

foreign, anti-missionary riots known as the Boxer Rebellion

took place
l^Young, p.
l^Tan, pp.

131;

33-34.

Clyde, pp.

201-15;

Bailey, pp. 479-81
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It was not simply that the
Chinese blamed foreigners
for the ravages of nature;
rather, the misery attendant
to
the flood and famine made
foreign abuses that much
harder
to bear.
During the Hundred Days reform
movement the people

were warned about the danger of
foreign encroachments in
China.
And in the northern provinces,
where foreign powers
held leases, mistreatment of Chinese
by foreigners was not
uncommon.
After all, Germany began the rush
to obtain
spheres of influence in China by
landing troops
at the

port of Kiaochow, Shantung, and
seizing the city by force
of arms ^
.

But not only did the foreigners seize
Chinese terri-

tory forcefully; they also burned villages
and shot Chines e
at the slightest provocation.

Still, most of inland Chin a

was visited by no foreign troops.
did trav/el inland.

Missionaries, however,

They set up schools and hospitals and

converted many Chinese to Christianity.

But when Chinese

converts were prohibited from practicing traditional customs

,

and when they obtained favorable treatment in legal

disputes due to pressure from the clergy, public indignation rose.

18

It was in this period of great social dislocation

that the secret society,
^^Fleming, p. 29
^^Tan, p,

35,

I

Ho Ch'uan, or "Fists of Right-
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ecus Harmony" was formed and
flourished.

Its avowed aim

was to rid China of the foreign
devils by killing them
off; and for this purpose it
practiced martial arts. The
"Boxers", as the English called them,
touched a response.ve

chord in the Chinese of the northern
provinces, and th(le
movement spread rapidly.
Inland foreigners and Chinese
Christians now feared for their lives.
In 1899, vigorous
anti-Boxer measures by the Acting Governor
of Shantung
suppressed the movement in that district.
But in Chihli
province, seat of the Court and foreign legations,
the

story was dif f erent

•'-^
.

The Empress Dowager, conservative in her own right,

and since the collapse of the reform movement under
the in-

fluence of reactionary elements, was indecisive.

She did

not want another T'aip'ing revolt, but she too hated the
foreigners; she knew that foreign armies might well invade

China using the threat to their nationals as a pretext,
yet she could not bring herself to suppress the Boxers. ^0

Apparently there is evidence of an anti-Ch'ing faction among the Boxers.

It is argued that initial orders

to suppress the movement were aimed at this group,

that

this element was eliminated, and that later pacifying de-

crees v7erG part of
l^Ibid.

^^Ibid.

a

dynastic plan to use the Boxers

,

pp.

49-51.

,

pp,

56-70,

J
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against the foreigners 21
.

Whatever the case

my

be,

the

Boxers went wild in Chihli province
in 1900,

Fearing that the Chinese government
was either unable or unwilling to quell the
disturbances, the foreign
ministers in Peking began to urge their
own governments
to act.

As early as March 9, 1900, the United
States

Minister to China, Edwin Conger, telegraphed
Secretary of
State Hay advising a "naval demonstration
by war
vessels

of each Government

.., in

North China waters" should the

situation not improve. 22

Desirous of protecting American citizens, but not

wishing to be part of an allied threat to China,
Secretary
Hay replied six days later as follows.

Navy Department will detail ship for independent protection American citizens and interests in China.
Commander will communicate with you, probably from

Taku.

2

Taku was on the China coast, Peking about ninety

miles inland.

An American ship arrived at Taku on April

1900, but left at the end of the month telling Minister

Conger to communicate with Rear-Admiral Louis Kempff,

aboard the U.S.S. Newark, commander of the American fleet
^^Young, p.

144.

2?

U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the
Fore ign Relations o f the United Statec; l900
aching ton:
Government FrinTing Oft ice, 1^02), p. ITJT.
,

2^1bid.

,

p.

110.

(.V^

7,
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north of Hongkong. ^4

When the situation did not
improve Conger requested
a warship and K«mpff
arrived at Taku aboard the
Newark in
late May
Before May ended the foreign
ministers requested
legation guards the Chinese
foreign office agreed
.

;

to thirty guards per ministry, but
the growing foreign fleet
off

Taku dispatched 340 men for six
legations.

Kempff sent

fifty marines. 2^
In early June 1900. Conger wired
Hay that the minis-

ters and their families along with
the many Chinese con-

verts who had rushed to Peking might
be beseiged by the
Boxers with the possibility of rail and
telegraph lines
being cut off.
This proved an accurate prediction. 26
On June 10, Kempff contributed about
one hundred

marines tc a 2000-man force comm.anded by British
Admiral
Seymour headed to Peking (by rail) to relieve

the legations.

They never arrived.

Half-way to Peking strong resistance

from Boxers compelled them to retreat.

Their journey and

the Boxer victory was catalytic; pandemonium set in
all

along the railroad and Boxers rushed into the Forbidden
City of Peking,
24ibid.

,

pp.

^^Tan, pp.

119-120,

53-54.

26u.S. Foreign Relations,

1900, p,

141.
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China now moved toward war,
carried along by the rush
of events.
The Imperial Court issued
decrees to the Chinese
Army to stop the Seymour
expedition and prevent any
further
troop landings,
Compelled to choose between
suppression
of the Boxers and, in effect,
uniting with them against
the foreigners, the Throne
had chosen the latter course. ^7
On June 16, the Court again
ordered the Army to resist
foreign encroachments, and called
for the recruitment of
young Boxers. 28 Meanwhile, the
naval commanders off Taku,
now out of touch with Seymour (Boxers
had cut the telegraph
lines)
prepared an ultimatum calling for the
Chinese to
surrender the forts guarding the mouth of
the Pei-Ho River,
the water- route to Peking,
Admiral Kempff refused to sign
or to participate in the bombardment that
followed:
the
,

United States did not consider itself at war
with China. ^9

After the shelling began, an old American gunboat,
the U.S.S. Monocacy, was fired on, probably by
accident;
it headed upriver without returning fire.

But now that

hostilities had ensued Kempff changed his mind about American involvement.

The Secretary of the Navy received the

following wire from Kempff on June 20.
^^Tan, pp.
28 Ibid.

70,

,

p.

72.

^^Young,

p.

150

74

I

,
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Monocacy fired on by Taku

cally exists. 30

fn-rho

^^^^equate

r^r.

State of war practi-

...

The Administration had already
decided on its course
of action.
After June 11 nothing more had
been heard from
Minister Conger; the legations were,
in fact, completely
isolated and would not be heard from
again until mid- July.
On June 16. General MacArthur was
ordered to send an infantry regiment from the Philippines,
where he was conducting

military operations, to Taku. China.

And on the 22nd. over

his protests, he was told to send another
regiment. 31
In Peking,

the Empress Dowager had decided upon
her

course of action as well.

Enraged by

a

newly received set

of four demands which would have meant her
virtual surrender, and encouraged by early favorable military
reports

from Taku, an edict declaring war against the Powers
issued. June 21.

vjas

(The "Demand of Four Points" was likely

forged by one of the reactionaries to goad the Empress
30 U.S.,

Adjutant-General's Office. Correspondenc e relating to the W ar with Spain and conditions growing o uT~oT
the same
includin g the insurrection in th_e_Phi ippine is^
lands and the China relief e?g3e_ditj^n^JT3ctw^
general of the army an d "military "coiTimand 'e fs in tTie Unit ed
St ates. Cuba. Port o Rico'._ China
and the" Philippine islands
r?om April 15. 1898. to July/307~T9'D77'TVoT3T (•WasKinTtoi^
Government Printing Off ice7u)(r2")' T:9
!

.

31 Ibid.

,

1:412.

,

.

.
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into war; the military
report was overly optimistic.)
addition,
L.11C uuAers
Ro-x-pvq rir^t-^
^ 1, the
were to be organized
or^p-m ^ori to -pj
t.^.
fight
against
the foreigners

m

-u

The McKinley administration
was in a difficult position,
The Congress was not in
session.
If it joined in

concerted military action the
United States might end up
in a war with China of
unpredictable
dimensions.

The

anti-imperialists, who were sniping at
the Republicans for
America's sordid involvement in the
Philippines, would
surely make a war in China an issue
in the upcoming elections.

On the other hand, if the United
States did nothing
while its citizens and a couple of thousand
Chinese converts

were massacred in Peking, the public would
be outraged.
That Chinese declaration of war, noted
above,

was

for domestic purposes only; neither the
United States nor
any other country was told that China
considered herself
at war.

Diplomatic relations between the United States

and China were maintained throughout the troubled
period.
But after the fall of the forts at Taku, the foreign
troop

build-up and the hostilities continued.

Several hundred

United States soldiers participated in the battle of
Tientsin, largest city between Peking and the coast, and
just west of several foreign settlements now menaced by

Boxers
32Tan, pp.

73-75,

93-94.
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On July

news spread that Baron von
Ketteler, the
German minister who was among
the beseiged at Peking,
was
murdered by a Chinese soldier.
Rumor had it that
1

all the

ministers had been or would be killed.

Fearing China's

total dismemberment in reprisal,
the viceroys of the central and southern Chinese provinces
promised to keep the

peace in their areas.

One magistrate issued a personal

appeal to McKinley, urging the United
States to take the
lead in restraining the Powers.
After an emergency Cabinet meeting Secretary Hay issued the
July 3 circular. ^3
In this memo to the European Powers
and Japan,

the

United States reaffirmed its desire to be
at "peace with
the Chinese nation," but noted that Peking
was in
a con-

dition of "virtual anarchy."

The note stated American

intentions to work with the Powers to open
communication
to Peking,

to protect American lives, property and inter-

ests, and to keep the disorders from spreading to
other

parts of China.

It concluded by declaring that United

States policy
is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese

territorial and administrative entity, protect all
rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and
international law, and safeguard for the world the
principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts
of the Chinese Empire. 34
33Young, pp.
3^U.S.

161-162.

Foreign Relations, 1900,

p.

299

i

Upon ,ho direction of

,:hc

President, no express re-

nunciation of American territorial
desires in Cl.inn „.s
included in flip
i-ne ciicuiar.
cdmiln-r
This may have reflected
naval
desires for a coaling station
on the Chinese
35
;

coast.

Four days later, on July

7,

General MacArthur was

ordered to dispatch additional
American troops from the
Philippines to Taku.
General Adna Chaffee was appointed
commander of all American land
forces in China.
While
General Chaffee was sailing to China,
two American infantry
battalions joined an international
force of
about 5000 in

capturing Tientsin on July

13.

A few days later the

Chinese government declared a truce,
and Minister Conger
was beard from again for the first time
in over a month. 36
On July 20,

four days after it was sent. Secretary

Hay received the following telegram from
Conger.

"For one

month," the Minister declared,
have been besieged in British legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops.
Quick relief only can prevent general massacre. 37

we.

Now that Tientsin had fallen (July 13)

and there was

,

evidence that the ministers still lived another international relief expedition was formed.

On August 3,

the allied

35

Margaret Leech, I n the Days of McKinley (New YorkHarper & Bros.. 1959), p:~^7T.
36Young,
37 u.s.

p,

166;

Leech, pp,

520-521;

Foreign R elations. 1900,

p.

156.

Tan, p.

102.
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commanders at Taku, including General
Chaffee, planned an
advance on the Imperial city.
Foreign troops in China now
numbered about twenty thousand;
around one-fourth of these
were American 38
.

The allies were never certain
about the number of
troops necessary for a successful
expedition; after all,
since the bombing of the Taku
forts they had to fight the
regular Chinese Imperial Army as
well as the Boxers. Although estimates vary, approximately
sixteen thousand
troops left Tientsin for Peking
on August 4, 1900.
Half
of the expeditionary force consisted
of Japanese soldiers.
There were 2,500 Americans under
General Chaffee. 39

The Relief Expedition marched northwest
along the
banks of the Pei-Ho River toward Peking,
meeting stiff resistance along the way.
On August 14, the force arrived
at Peking, and after a skirmish the
legations were relieved
It was considered a miracle that the
victims of the two-

mon th seige were still alive.

Haven:

(President McKinley later

38F^itz Grob, The Relat i vity of War and Peace (New
Yale University Press7~T949) pp. 67 -W.
,

on

Colonel Richard E. Dupuy and Major General William
Baumer, TheJLittle Wars of the Uni ted States (New YorkHawthorne BooFs Inc., 1968), "^p. 115rn-^ UTS
Department
ot War, Ar rangem.ent of the Annual Re ports of the W ar Department for the vear ending .Tnnp "^0 TO'rTTl T^TTl
n"^^^<-^ir
r:
H.

,

.

L

(jj.

j:.tigineering anci

v,.niei:

or ura

Government Printing Office, 1900),

p.

m

ai

12

,
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reported to Congress that
sixty-five of the defenders were
killed, 135 wounded, and seven
children died of disease. ^0)
One historian has suggested that
one of the Chinese officials intervened on the ministers'
behalf. 41

The Empress Dowager hurriedly
moved her Court westward, as foreign troops rampaged
throughout the Forbidden
City.
As in Tientsin before it, Peking
was subjected to
rampant looting, burning and atrocities
of all sorts at
the hands of the foreign troops,
Thus was the relief of
the legations tarnished.
The Administration now faced the dilemma
of what to
do next.
Europe, and Germany in particular, was
calling
for the punishment of the Boxers and their
supporters in

the Manchu government.

(Indeed,

scores of punitary expedi-

tions in China were conducted by Europeans well
after Sino-

European negotiations were begun in October 1900.)

Pun-

ishment of the Boxers could well be the pretext for more

depredations against China and an end to both Chinese integrity and the Open Door.
On the other hand, MacArthur needed more troops in

the Philippines, and the anti-imperialists would surely

make political capital of
China,

a

more protracted involvement in

Privately, Secretary of State Hay summed up the
^^U-j,.^,goggi8"_ Relatio n's,

^^Tan, pp.

112-15.

1900

,

p.

xii.

.

American situation;

'Ve do not want to rob
China our-

selves, and our public
opinion will not permit us
to interfere, with an army, to
prevent others from robbing
her, "^2

Without making any declarations
of policy. American
troops were gradually withdrawn
from Peking
to Tientsin.

Enough remained in China for the
United States to have a
bargaining chip in the negotiations.
The United States
managed to restrain some of the
harsher demands for retribution offered in the talks, the
United States Navy never
did get its coaling station, and
McKinley was re-elected
President
The China _R elief Expedition and th e
Constituti on
The Congress had adjourned on June

7,

1900, just

before American military personnel were
dispatched to
China.

Congress was never convened in special session,

nor was there any suggestion that it be convened.

By the

time the second session of the Fifty-Sixth Congress
had
begun, December

3,

1900,

the United States had only a

token force in China.

The Expedition was successful in that casualties

were light, the beseiged Americans were rescued, and
more extensive Asian conflict was avoided.
42 Quoted in Young,
p.

186.

a
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serve to explain the lack
of Congressional response
to
President McKinley's detailed
account of the intervention
in China in his opening day
Message of December 3, 1900.^3

American military operations in
China were the subject of court consideration in
Hamilton v. McClaughry,
Warden.

Hamilton was stationed in China in
December, 1900,
when he was convicted by a
court-martial convened in Peking
for killing a fellow soldier.
The Fifty-Eighth Article
of War called for punishment by
such tribunals for murder
"/r7"n time of war."
Hamilton appealed on the ground
that

the court-martial had no jurisdiction
because the United
States was not at war in China at the time
of the act.^^

The Federal court ruled against Hamilton.

Judge

Pollock, who wrote the decision, declared that
"the exis-

tence of a condition of war must be determined by
the political department of the government; that the courts
take

judicial notice of such determination and are bound thereby.
By "political department," the judge evidently meant Con-

gress,

for he notes that the political department never

formally declared

V7ar

against China.

Moreover, he con-

cluded that Congress recognized a "condition of war"

when it raised the pay of the troops in China to that
^^34 Cong. Rcc. 2-13ff.
•'-^^136

F.

449

(C.C.

Kan.

1905).
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received in war-time. ^5
The Court relied upon Vattel's
definition of war,
cited in the Prize Cases
(1862)
as "that state in which
a
nation prosecutes its right by
force." Pollock reasoned
that since a nation has the
right to protect its citizens,
especially its accredited
representatives, abroad, the
,

United States government could
legitimately, and indeed
did, prosecute its right in
China.
Thus, Hamilton's act
was committed in the time of war
because the United States
was pursuing its right as a sovereign
state to protect
Its citizens abroad by force of arms 46
To summarize the reasoning of the
federal court;

.

(1)

a

war exists when the nation pursues its
rights in

international law by force:

(2)

Congress must determine

that a condition of war exists if a court is
to take judi-

cial cognizance of it;

(3)

a formal

declaration of war

is not necessary to constitute such a determination;
(4)

Congress may determine that

and

a

condition of war exists

drawn,

from the above with re-

well after the war has begun.
What inferences may be

gard to Presidential war power?

It would seem that while

Congress may make the political determination that the

United States is at war, it need not make such
^^136

F,

^^Ibid.

,

449, 451
p.

449.

a determina-
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tlon before or during the
outbreak of hostilities.
A
pay raise for the troops long
after the fighting has died
do-vm will suffice.
What the court leaves tantalizingly

unanswered is whether or not the
President may legitimately
prosecute the nation's rights by
force (i.e.. initiate and^

conduct a war) without the prior
consent of Congress.
if so, under what circumstances?

And

For one answer to these questions,
perhaps the answer insofar as the facts of the
Chinese intervenrion are

concerned, one must turn to another episode
some half century earlier:
the American bombardment of Greytown,

Nicaragua.

As a result of this incident a Federal
court

decided the case of Durand

v.

Rollins.

The discussion in the Hamilton case of the
duty of
the state to protect its citizens so reminds
one of the

opinion in Durand

v.

Rollins, that it is hard to believe

that the latter was not cited as a precedent.

The importance of the Durand case and the events

from which it issued justify the exploration of both in
some detail.

Rollins, a United States naval commander,

bombarded and razed by fire the town of Greytown, Nicaragua,
July 13, 1854.

The underlying cause was the Anglo-American

^^8 F. Cas.

Ill (No.

"^^Compare 136 F.

449,

4,

186)

(C C S D N Y

450 with

.

8

,

F.

.

.

.

Cas.

.

1860).

Ill,

112.
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rivalry in Central America
over the territory where
prospective inter-oceanic canal
was to be built.

a

The im-

mediate cause was the avaricious
conflict between the merchants of Greytown and the
American-owned private company
in the profitable business
of transporting people
across
Nicaragua on their way to Calif
ornia ^9
.

While the United States and
England agreed in the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850) to
renounce exclusive control over the canal expected
to be built in Nicaragua,

sovereignty over the coastal region
at the Port of San
Juan, where the canal would
meet the Atlantic, remained
in doubt.

The United States considered
Nicaragua, from

whom an agreement concerning construction
of the canal by
an American firm was obtained
(1849), as
rightful sover-

eign.

Great Britain reasoned that all of
Nicaragua's

Atlantic coast was part of the protectorate
it had established over the Mosquito Indians
(1847).
By 1848, England
had forcefully ousted the Nicaraguan officials
from
the

port

tov.^

of San Juan, replaced them with the Mosquito
fun-

ctionaries, and renamed the place Greytov^n.

The international rivalry took on more commercial

overtones after 1848 when gold was discovered in California

Now it became profitable to transport fortune-seekers across Central America via Nicaragua's rivers ^nd lakes and
^'-^The following account is based upon:
David
Folkman, T]he_NjLcaraj^ua_^ojite (Salt Lake City, Utah:
sity of Utah Press. 1972'), pp. 13-21, 59-68.
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on to the American west
coast by steamer.

Soon an American-owned
transport company was
operating successfully out of
Point Arenas, across San
Juan harbor from Grey town.
The location proved critical,
because
as a result. Greytowi.
merchants did not get to deal
with
the travellers to and from
California.
Friction between
the Greyto.^ authorities
representing the merchants there
and the transport company
steadily mounted in
the 1350'

The desperate Greytowners

.

s.

who declared themselves

an independent city in 1852, first
tried to cajole, then
to coerce the transport company
to conduct its operations
in a manner more profitable to
Greytown,

In 1853.

after

some of the newly constructed transit
company buildings on
Point Arenas were demolished by Greytovmers
and the rest

were threatened with destruction, the U.S.S.
Cyane
commanding, was dispatched to Nicaragua. A

,

Hollins

small party of

marines was landed to protect the business; the
Greytoxs^ers
backed down and the Cyane and marines soon departed.
On April 14,

1853,

the Navy Department took the

opportunity to inform Hollins that his action to protect
the transit company had been founded upon the rights
of

American citizens interested in the business, the charter
of which had been granted by the government of Nicaragua.

San Juan, or Grey tovm

,

the memo went on,

is considered

part of Nicaragua; the United States recognizes no other
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government there. 50
A year later, 1854, the conflict
between Grey town
and the company resumed.
In March, 1854, the company
refused to move its operations from
Point Arenas to Grey town.
In May, company property was
stolen and Greytown officials
refused to return it.
That same month, an American
steamer
captain shot and killed a native in a
dispute over a ship
collision.
The United States Minister to Central
America,
Solon Borland, interceded on the captain's
behalf
and pre-

vented his arrest by brandishing a rifle.

Later that day,

a group of Greytowners tried to
arrest Borland;

someone

tossed a broken bottle and the Minister's face
was cut.

Borland managed to return to Point Arenas the next
day.

He hired fifty men to protect company property

there, and boarded a steamer for the United States.

Grey-

town meanv7hile organized a militia for its defense.
On June 10,

1854,

the following orders.

the Navy Department gave Hollins

He was to return to Greytown, "in

pursuance of the wishes of the President," because
.American-owned property

(i.e.,

was "unlawfully detained,"

transport company property)

Minister Borland had been

"treated with rudeness and disrespect," and "further outrages" were feared.

"Now,

it is very desirable," Hollins

5^U.S., Congress, Senate,
1st sess., 1853-1854, pp. 7-9.

S.

Exec. Doc,

8,

33d Cong.,

15A

was told,

have the power and the
determination'to check then
IS, however, very much
hoped that you can effect The
purposes of your visit without a
resort to violenrP
and destruction of property
and loss of Ufr?!^''''^
'

The Cyane arrived in early July,
1854,

Demands
were presented to Grey town for
$24,000 in reparations, an
apology to Borland, and assurances
of future good behavior.
Wh.en the

demands were not met, Rollins issued
an ultimatum
warning that the town would be bombarded.
The next day,
July 13, the shelling began. Later
that day, when all the

residents had withdrawn, marines burned
GreytowTi to the
ground.
No one was killed.

President Pierce was criticized for exceeding
his

war powers, and Congress overwhelmingly approved
for a full report on the Greytown affair.

a request

The State Depart-

ment never disavowed the action at Greytown; President

Pierce even defended it in his Message to Congress of

December

4,

1854.

Overall, repugnance at the harshness

of the bombardment, and concern over possible excesses of

Presidential authority, were balanced by

a

satisfaction

that the Monroe Doctrine had been reaffirmed against

British encroachments.
Such

Cong.,

V7as

the background to the federal case that

^lu.S., Congress, Senate, S. Exec. Doc.
1st sess., 1853-1854, p. 21.

85,

33d
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arose when one Durand, who owned
property in Greytovm.
sued Rollins for damages
sustained during the bombardment.
In his defense, Hollins argued
that he was bound to obey
the orders of the President
and the Secretary of the Navy.

Supreme Court Justice Nelson, riding
the circuit, ruled
in Hollins
favor.
'

Nelson reasoned that as chief executive,
the President had full power to protect "by
negotiation or... force"
citizens and their property abroad.

Furthermore, the deci-

sion to undertake such an "interposition"
abroad must "rest
in the discretion of the president."
As to the specifics
of the Grey town affair, whether or not
it was the "duty
of the president to interpose for the
protection of the

citizens at Greytown against an irresponsible and
marauding
community..,, was

a

public political question ., .which be-

longed to the executive to determine "^2
.

Arthur

M.

Schlesinger has criticized Nelson's deci-

sion on the ground that the bombardment of Greytown was

more a "calculated retaliation" than an "emergency intervention. "^3

The facts bear out Schlesinger

'

s

contention.

The same historian also points out that the President

never "specifically ordered" the bombing, and that the
action in question was not directed at
52

Durand v. Hollins,
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860),

F.

Cas

.

"sovereign

at 111-112

(No.

4,

136)

Schlesinger Jr.
The Imperial Presidency"
'
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973r;~p. ~5l

-^Arthur M.

(Boston:

8

a

,

,
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state., "54

xhe first point is only true
in tho technical
sense that Pierce did not
explicitly sign Rollins' orders.
This is irrelevant, however,
since the Secretary of the
Navy, an executive officer
responsible to the President'
did sign them; and the orders
were issued,
to use the

phraseology of the memo itself, "in
pursuance of the wishes
of the President "55
.

While Justice Nelson spoke of an
unqualified Presidential right (nay, "duty") to
"interpose ... abroad" to
protect American lives and property,
the Durand case did
involve a "marauding community" as
opposed
to a sovereign

state.

Thus,

the implication that Presidential
war-power

resting upon Durand

v.

Hollins rests upon narrower grounds

than the language of the case suggests, may
be warranted.

Taken at its narrowest, Durand establishes as

a

Presiden-

tial prerogative the authority to intervene to
protect the

lives or property of American citizens abroad
threatened

by a marauding group or comjnunity.

Let us end our long discursus into the Greytown af-

fair by noting the relevance of the holding in Durand

v.

Hollins to the United States intervention in China in
1900,

The United States decision to intervene in China in

the summer of 1900 was solely an executive decision; Con-

5^Ibid.

^^U.S., Congress, Senate, S. Exec. Doc.
Cong., 1st sess., 1853-1854, p. 21.

85,

33d

.

gress was not in session,
nor was it called into
special
session.
Over five thousand troops
were dispatched to
China, half of which actually
fought.
There were plans
to send in thousands .ore
if needed.
Fighting took place
against Chinese government
troops as well as Boxer
"irregulars"-many of whom were led by
regular army officers under orders from the Empress.
Although diplomatic relations
were never broken, and war was
never declared, the United
States and China were, de facto,
at war.

Although not the only motive, and
perhaps not even
the paramount motive, the relief
of the beseiged American
•legation in Peking was a central aim
of the United States
policy.
Thus, the Durand rule, that the
President may interpose at his discretion to protect
American citizens
abroad threatened by a "marauding community",
would seem
apt in this case.

The China intervention is complicated by
First,

there were other motives.

tv/o

factors.

The United States did

not act simply to protect its citizens in China.

There

was concern lest China be carved up and the United
States

denied trading privileges.

missionary movement.

There was also concern for the

Finally, there were even territorial

designs on China; the navalists wanted

a

coaling station.

The Chinese intervention was not solely to protect Americans

abroad
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Secondly, the United States
fought Chinese gove:
ment troops as well as Boxers
organized by the Chine:!se
government.
Thus, what began as an
executive interpositi'on
against an irresponsible and
marauding

community-which the

Boxers surely were before they
were organized and given
official support-ended up as an
undeclared war against a
sovereign state.
(Although, strange as it may seem,
the
American military presence in China
served China's interests:

it was a welcome counterpoise
to the European,

Russian and Japanese powers, who
sought to dismember her.)
In short,

the Chinese intervention lies
on the fron-

tier of Presidential war power, in
that no-man's land between the executive authority to protect
citizens abroad
and the Congressional authority to declare
war.

One other facet of the Chinese intervention
needs to
be discussed.
We have considered it so far as an example

of intervention for the protection of American
citizens
abroad.

But it might be pointed out that the United

States did not fight against Chinese government troops
or

government-organized Boxers until after the old American
gunboat,
,

the Monocacy, was fired upon.

Might it not be argued that the shelling of the

Monocacy was an act of war against which the President
might justifiably order a response?
coniruander

,

The American fleet

Kempff, seemed to suggest this possibility.

The fact is that the Monocacy 's commander did not view the
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stray hit as provocative;
he never returned fire.
It was
Kempffs idea to use the incident
as a cas_us belli 56
The McKinley administration
never took up Kempffs
suggestion, because it never
considered itself at war with
China.
The July 3, 1900 Circular
announced that,
.

"We ad-

here to the policy... of peace
with the Chinese nation."
And in his December 3. 1900
Message to Congress, President
McKinley reaffirmed the July 3 Note,
and added, "Our de-

clared aims involved no war against
the Chinese nation. "57
The Monocacy episode was incidental
as far as Washington
was concerned.
It was neither the motivation
nor the pretext
for the subsequent hostilities in
China.
Con clusion

The Boxer Expedition is the paradigm
case of the

Commander in Chief introducing armed forces into
hostilities in order to protect Americans abroad.

Congress was

not consulted, nor did it give after-the-fact
approval.

The success of the mission insured against public
or legislative criticism.

The President successfully asserted his

power to deploy forces to protect United States citizens
overseas without authority in treaty or law.
-'^^oung,
^^ IJ.S.

pp.

151-1S2.

Foreign Relations. 1900. pp. 299, xiv.

^
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CHAPTERV
UNITED STATES INTERVENTIONS
IN I4EXIC0
1914-1917

Historical Background

When Woodrow Wilson ordered
United States marines to
land and occupy Vera Cruz in
1914, he added' to an already
long record of American military
operations in Mexico.
Most significant was the
unfortunate War of 1846-1848,
which raises some questions about
Presidential war-power
in its own right.

*

The focus of the dispute in 1846
was Texas which
had been Mexico's rebellious
northernmost province. Mexico had in fact claimed as hers
the entire American southwest, but she had never established
control over most of
the territory.
Her fatal mistake was to encourage
American
settlers to come to east Texas in the 1820
's and 1830' s.
In 1835, Texas rebelled and declared
itself independent,
,

and although Santa Anna's army suffered a
setback in 1836,
Mexico refused to recognize an autonomous Lone
Star State.

The independent Texans promptly claimed wildly
in-

flated boundaries.

Whereas the Nueces River had served

as the province's southern and western border,
Texas noy

1969)

,

^Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American
8th ed. (Englewood-CTifliTirjTl
Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
pp. 237-48.

)

claimed all the land up to the
Rio Grande.
this pronunciamento, reasoning
that

Mexico ignored

all of this territory

still belonged to her.

Meanwhile, the United States
did not sit idly by.
Gripped by that land lust known
as "Manifest Destiny,"
Americans dreamed of an empire
extending to. the Pacific,
and including Oregon and Texas,
both of which were in dispute.
There was, however, fierce
opposition to the annexation of Texas by abolitionists who
feared the addition of
slave-holding states to the United
States.

As a result, annexation was postponed
until early
1845, when it was approved by a joint
Congressional resolution.
(There was no precedent for annexing
territory by

such method.

A year earlier, the Senate had refused
to

grant the necessary two-thirds approval to
an annexation
treaty with Texas
.

•

Mexico protested the annexation, and as she had
vowed,

broke off diplomatic relations with the United States.

new American President, James
as an expansionist,

K.

The

Polk, who had campaigned

irnmediately offered to drop long-stand-

ing American claims against Mexico, for which the Latin

nation was long in arrears, if she would sell to the United
States all the land west of Texas,

This only served to fan

the flames of Mexican nationalism, and so Mexico refused

even to negotiate.
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Polk promptly ordered General
Zachary Taylor, who had
been stationed on the southern
bank
of the Neuces River,

to

move his troops south across
the disputed territory
down to
the Rio Grande.
The orders were given January
13, 1846, but
because of delays, Taylor did not
complete the trek until

late March.

Warned by the Mexican army to
retreat to the
Nueces, Taylor refused, and even
built a fort to blockade
the Rio Grande.^
On April 25. a column of American
soldiers was ambushed
by Mexican troops who had crossed
the Rio Grande for that
purpose; eleven Americans were killed.
When Polk received
the news he had already begun work
on a war message to Congress; now he would have a pretext.
'

On May 11, 1846, Polk told the legislature,
somewhat
disingenuously, that "Mexico has passed the
boundary of the

United States, has invaded our territory, and
shed American
blood on the .-American soil." The next day, a

Congress united

in indignation over the American losses,
resolved that "by

the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war
exists be-

tween that government and the United States."^

Many in Congress came to regret that vote.

It was not

long before opposition Whigs (like freshman Congressman

Abraham Lincoln) and abolitionists were condemning "Polk's
2

Robert Leckie, The Wars of America (New York:
& Row, Publishers, Inc.
196S)
p. 326.
,

-^Ibid.

,

p.

327.

,

Harper

^

war.

At one point, i„ early
1848. the House of
Representatives even declared the
war •unnecessarily and
unconstitutxonally begun by the
President/' But when the
Senate refused to go along, the
House rescinded the
amendment.
Although the Constitutional
forms were observed,
there
is little question but
that the President
initiated the Mexican War.
This is a paradig:n case
of the policy-making initiative, in spite of the
Constitution, having passed
into
the hands of the President.
«

As a result of the war,
the Mexican clique that
had promoted the conflict lost prestige
and splintered, thus leaving Mexico divided into two
opposing factions of roughly
equal power., Two decades of
civil strife followed.
During
this period, American loss of
life and property in Mexico
or
near its border was especially
severe.
In December, 1859,
President Buchanan proposed that
Congress authorize military
intervention in Mexico as a means of
"obtaining indemnity
for the past and security for the
future."^

Ironically, the territory gained as a
result of the Mexican War moved the United States closer
to its Civil War as
it found itself unable to resolve the
dispute over slavery
in the newly acquired land.
While the United States was
S., Congress, Congressional Globe
Sess., January 3, 1848, p. 95.

^Quoted in Sailey,

p.

349.

.

30th Cong.

1st

^
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distracted, the French army
invaded Mexico and set up
Maximilian of Hapsburg as the unlikely
Emperor of Mexico. The
United States resented this
monarchical challenge to the
Monroe Doctrine, and doubly so
because Maximilian sympathized
with the South during the Civil
War.

After his defeat of the Confederacy,
General Grant ordered General Sheridan and
50,000 troops to the Texas-Mexican border, and even sent General
Schofield south

of the border to form an army out of former
Union and Confederate soldiers ^
.

When Napolean III withdrew French forces
in 1867, Maximilian was easily toppled, leaving
impoverished Mexico in
a state of anarchy.
Bandits freely rol5bed and killed without much regard for international boundary
lines.
In 1877, President Hayes' administration issued
an or-

der authorizing United States troops to chase
marauders

across the border and pursue them in Mexico.

Mexico stren-

uously objected, and the order was rescinded in 1880.

Never-

theless, between 1875 and 1885, American troops crossed the

Mexican border about 20 times.
The border crossings and the anarchy ended when Mexico

turned to a strongmen, Porfirio Diaz.

Diaz ruled Mexico

without interruption from 1884 to 1911, when he was over-

"This occurred 1865-66.
''ibid.

.

pp.

393-393.

Bailey, pp. 351-55.
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-

^1,

tnrown.

Diaz S
gavee Mexico
Mexirr. a
a long
period of internal
and e-cternal peace, but his
cientifico doctrine,
while encouraging foreign development
of Mexico's resources
and creating
a Middle class, did
little to allevaite the
destitution of
the mass of Indians
and Mestizos.
.

,

Startlingly, when a middle
class reformer, Francicso
I. Madero, challenged
the old despot in
1911, the regime
collapsed like a house of
cards.
During the Di'az years
the
United States had developed
a considerable
co^nercial interest in Mexico; investments
were estimated at about
a billion
dollars.
In addition, approximately
40,000 American nationals resided in the Latin
republic.^
It is interesting that the
"Dolla:;-Diplomacy" adminis-

tration of William H. Taft merely
looked on as the challenges
to the Diaz regime grew
bolder.
Taft did send troops to the
border as a warning to both
Porfiristas and Maderistas that
he intended to safeguard American
interests
But when Diaz
fell, most of the troops were
withdrawn.
.

On the other hand, the American
ambassador to Mexico,
Henry Lane Wilson (no relation to
Woodrow)
repeatedly urged
more aggressive United States action,
and when m.ore vigorous
instructions xvere not forthcoming he acted
on his own. Ambassador Wilson's activities were long a
source of embarrass,

S,

N.

.

Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Fr eedom
^
(Princeton
J.:
Princeton University Press, 1968) ~p 349

—
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ment to the United States.

After Madero was fonnaUy
elected President of
Mexico
in November, 1911,
and the United States
afforded recognitxon. A^nbassador Wilson
did everything he
could to undermine hi™. Madero^s coalition
gradually fell apart, and
Wilson's diplomatic dispatches
always emphasized his
weakness
and the strength of his
enemies,
mile a coup d'etat was under way in the capital in
February, 1913,

Wilson, still act
ing without instructions,
threatened to land marines
if Amer
ican lives were not safeguarded.
In addition, he persuaded
the British and German
ministers to join him in urging
Madero to resign.

Finally, Wilson helped arrange
the ./'truce" between the
rebels and General Victoriano
Huerta, who had been selected
by Madero to crush the revolt.
It soon became apparent
that
Huerta, with Wilson's support, had
betrayed Madero. Huerta
presented himself as the preserver of
order and civil peace.
He announced that he x.ould serve as
Provisional President
until the next elections. Madero and
his Vice President
were arrested and later found shot, although
Huerta always
denied any responsibility.^

Ambassador Wilson urged the Taft administration, in
its
waning days, to grant de jure recognition to Huerta,
but

9

Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 113-34- p
Edward Haley, Revolution and Intervention
The Diplomacy
of Taft and Wils on with MexTEo ri910-1917 ( CambridL.
Mas s.:
M.I.T. Press, 19/0;, pp. 11-73.
:

"
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this was withheld.

Such a decision would
be left to the incoming Democratic administration
of Woodrow Wilson.
The new
President, however, had no
intention of recognizing
Huerta.
He was morally outraged by
the betrayal of what he
considered popular, constitutional
government.
President Wilson
was determined to restore
rightful rule to the Mexican
masses.
His contempt for Huerta s
-government of butcherswas comparable to, though more
noble than. Ambassador Wilson's loathing of Madero.
'

United States Interventions, 1914-19
17
Huerta tried to establish a military
dictatorship in
the face of both internal and externalopposition
.

At home,

Madero had become a martyr, and many Mexicans
rallied to the
cause of the Constitution for which he had
died.

An unstable anti-Huerta coalition formed, with
Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila province
as "First Chief"

of the "Constitutionalist Army."

This coalition had its

power base in the less populous north, west and south
of
Mexico.

Guerrilla chiefs like Emiliano Zapata and Francisco

"Pancho" Villa swore nominal allegiance to Carranza.

But

these rural guerrillas, a cross between romantic revolutionary terrorists and outright bandits, were united with Car-

ranza only by their common desire to oust Huerta, the "Usurper

.
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A more potent source of Carranza's
power was the support, while he had it. of the
well-organized
northwestern

army led by Alvaro Obregon."'-^

From abroad Huerta would face
consistent pressure from,
and ultimately intervention by, the
Wilson, administration.
The last thing President Wilson wanted
was a war with Mexico;
but the first thing he wanted was a
restoration
of constitu-

tional government.

He was tempted by a plan offered
by Amer-

ican commercial interests.

This plan called for 1., recog-'

nition of the Provisional President in
exchange for his promise to hold elections, and 2
mediation by Ambassador Wil.

,

son betvzeen the Constitutionalists and
Huerta.

Wilson was reluctant to act without more information
about affairs in Mexico.

He also began to mistrust Ambas-

sador Wilson, who was now being linked by the press
to

Madero's overthrow.
As a result, the President, who took personal charge of

United States policy toward Mexico, dispatched
special emissaries south of the border.

a series of

The first of these,

sent in late May, 1913, was the President's friend, journalist William Bayard Hale.

Hale's reports from Mexico City

confirmed Wilson's negative opinions of both Huerta and Am•^Cline, pp.
•'•'Link,

136-38.

Wilson:

The New Freedom, pp. 350-53.
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bassador H. L. Wilson.

Following Hale's reports,
.he a.-

bassador was dismissed in July,
1913.
A second observer, Reginald

Del Valle, was sent
to

northern and western Mexico to
report on the Constitutionalists
But Del Valle was so inept
that he was quickly recalled. ^

Without consulting any of the
Mexican factions, President Wilson next sent former
Governor John Lind of Minnesota
to present the United States
plan for settlement of Mexico
^s
problems.
Lind, who was anti-Catholic,
spoke no Spanish
and had no diplomatic experience,
left in
August, 1913.

He was instructed to seek an
immediate cease-fire,

early and free elections in which
Huerta would not be a candidate, and the agreement of all
parties to abide by the

election results.

The Huerta regime resented Lind's
pre-

sence as an unwarranted intrusion in
Mexican internal affeirs
Lind threatened that the United States would
sell
arms to

the Constitutionalists, and even resort
to military inter-

vention.
ment.

He then offered a "loan" to the de facto govern-

But the Huertistas remained adamant.

sion was an abysmal failure.
^^Ibid., p. 354.
13

Link, Wilson:

The Lind mis-

"^"^

Haley, p. 94.

The New Freedom

^^Ibid., pp. 356-60.

,

p.

355.
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During the suiter of
1913, the 63rd Congress,
to the
limited extent that it was
concerned with Mexico,
divided
along partisan lines.
Senator Fall. fro. the
border state
of New Mexico, led the
Republicans in urging .ore
vigorous
Unxted States action to protect
American lives and property
in Mexico.
Resolutions were offered whose
ai™ was
to en-

courage arms sales to the
Constitutionalist faction, to authorise mediation by the United
States and the A. B.C. Powers
(Argentina, Brazil and Chile),
and even to authorize armed"
intervention by the United States.
These resolutions
all

died in the Foreign Affairs or
Foreign Relations Committees
of Congress
On August 27, 1913, Wilson went
before Congress to inform it about the failure of the Lind
mission.
He explained
that although the prospects were
not hopeful, peace would
come to Mexico only after the establishment
of "honest constitutional government." The United States
had offered its
friendly offices, (i.e., the Lind mission),
but they were
declined.
"We can not," the President added
philosophically,
"thrust our good offices upon them."-^^

Wilson then urged all Americans to leave Mexico, but

warned of United States vigilance in behalf of those who
remained.

He announced a renewal of the arms embargo in accor-

^^^^
2222-36, 3567-71. 2627, 3531, 2907,
....
3128, 3133, 3384-87 (1913).
16

Ibid.

,

p.

3803.

.
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dance with a joint Congressional
resolution of March 14.
1912, and closed by proclaiming
the "moral right"
of tolrican policy,

Wilson considered his policy
one of "true neutrality":
selling arms to neither side
while standing ready to
mediate
between them. But he was actually
serving

Euerta's interests,

because the latter received supplied
from Europe via the sea-'
ports in his control, while the
landlocked Constitutionalists
were at a disadvantage. Huerta
tried to prolong his advan-

tage by holding out the (false)
hope that he would not be a
candidate in the upcoming Mexican
^8
elections.

But events in Mexico soon led to
the abandonment of
"true neutrality." Constitutionalist
military successes and
the open hostility of the Mexican
Congress (dominated by
Maderistas) led Huerta to disband the
parliament and jail
over 100 of its deputies in October. Later
that month he

permitted the seating of a new, pro-Huerta legislature,
but
voided the Presidential elections for lack of sufficient
voter turnout,

Huerta declared that he would remain as Pro-

visional President. '^

With all hope of free elections gone, Wilson decided
to do everything he could to unseat the Mexican dictator.
'^'^Ihid,

,

p.

3804,

18

Link, Wilson:
101-3.
pp.

^^Cline, p. 147.

The New Freedom, pp. 361-63: Haley
^'

.
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MeanwhUe Great Britain, who
had heen supporting
Huerta

all

along in exchange for
protection for its
much-needed Mexican
oil holdings, incurred
Wilson's wrath. The day
after the
arrest of the deputies the
new British minister
.ade an ostentatious display of presenting
his credentials to the
de
^acto government
At first Wilson prepared a
stinging rebuke of England
accusing her. in effect, of
subverting America's Mexican
policies.
State Department Counselor
John Bassett Moore convinced Wilson of the unwisdom
of presenting such a
diplomatic note, and the President
turned instead to more subtle
methods. As a result, England
agreed to reduce its support
for Huerta.
•

While awaiting

J.

B.

Moore's comments. Wilson presented

the gist of his position in his
famous Mobile, Alabama address, on October 27, 1913.
Thinly disguising his mistrust
of England in Mexico, the President
warned that foreign commercial interests threatened constitutional
liberty in Latin
America.
The United States, by contrast, will
not be guided
by expedient material interest, but by morality.
Moreover,

Wilson vowed, "the United States will never
again seek one
additional foot of territory by conquest."^-'20

149

Link, Wilson:

The New Freedom

,

pp.

366-77.

Bailey, p. 556; Haley, p. 109; Cline, p.
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John Lind remained in Mexico City
to bargain unsucce ssfully with Huerta. Meanwhile, starting
in mid-October, William Bayard Hale began negotiating
with Carranza. While
threatening possible United States intervention.
Hale promised a resumption of arms shipments if
the Constitutionalists would agree to a neutral interim
government and early
elections.
Carranza was obstinate; under no circumstances

would he negotiate with Huerta, nor would he agree
to any•

thing short of the complete overthrow of his
regime.

By

November 15, 1913, both sides had rejected Wilson's
peace
proposals.

Wilson did not seem to understand that Mexico was in
the throes of revolution or, at least, 'civil war, and that

such a conflict could not be resolved by ballot.

Further-

more, foreign interference in Mexican affairs, generally

associated with foreign investments, of which the United
States had the greatest share, was one of the major issues.

Whether willing or not, no Mexican leader could maintain his
credibility and openly endorse American interference.
But by the new year (1914), Wilson had become less con-

cerned with the obstacles and, rather, obsessed with seeing

Huerta 's demise.
Meanwhile the military contest in Mexico was see -sawing
^^Haley, pp.

111-19.

.

,

.
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back and forth.

In mid-January the President
tried to al-

ter the balance by permitting
arms to "slip through"
customs and into the hands of the
Constitutionalists. And

after communicating with a persuasive
Carranza agent later
in the month, Wilson repealed an
earlier arms embargo on

February

3,

1914.

Nevertheless, the military stalemate
continued, because
of differences between Carranza and
Villa, and because the
Church and propertied elements in Mexico
rallied to Huerta.*

Wilson had told the Congress that his Mexican
policy consisted of "watchful waiting;" waiting presumably

for Huerta

to quit or the Constitutionalists to defeat
him militarily 24
.

By April Wilson could wait no longlr.

stitutionalist

A momentary Con-

advantage and a trivial incident formed the

backdrop to United States intervention.

Congressional Repub-

licans were impatient with the Democratic President's policy

--"deadly drifting," they called it- -and urged intervention
to protect Americans and their interests.

They were, if any-

thing, more "hawkish" than the Administration

Wilson hoped to deprive Huerta of control over the east
23

Ibid., pp. 125-29; United States, Department of State,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States
iyi4 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1922), pp.
447-448
24

Link, Wilson:

The New Freedom

,

p.

392.

^^See, e.g., 51 Cong. Rec 3927-29, 3973-76, 4048-50,
4510-28, 5144, 5495-5496 (1914).
.

,

coast ports of Mexico, especially the valuable port
of Tampico,

site of numerous oil refineries.

He intended to so

weaken Huerta thereby, that a Constitutionalist victory

would be inevitable.
The Constitutionalists had attacked Huertista forces at

Tampico when an American whaleboat, the U.

S.

S.

Dolphin

,

flying its flag, docked without permission behind Government
lines in order to buy gasoline.

Since this area was closed

to all but Mexican government personnel, the paymaster and

the crew of seven were arrested.

morning of April

9,

*

This took place on the

1914.

By that afternoon, the men had been released, and the

local commander had apologized.

But this did not suit Ad-

miral Mayo, commanding the American naval fleet off Tampico.
He demanded a formal apology, punishment of the arresting
officer, and the hoisting of the American flag followed by
a 21-gun salute.

Mayo acted on his own authority.

The next day, Wilson approved Mayo's ultimatum, and the

American charge at Mexico City was instructed to enforce the
demands upon the threat of "the gravest consequences."^

Huerta was in a bind.

If he met the American demands

^ %nited

States Foreign Relations, 1914 pp. 448-50;
The New Freedom pp. 394-96; Robert E. Quirk,
Link, Wilson:
An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of
University ot Kenuucky Press, i9bZ)
Vera Cruz (Lexington:
pp. 19-33.
,

,
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he would discredit himself for having consented to Mexico's

humiliation.

If he refused, he faced the prospect of direct

American military intervention.

Hoping to ride the crest of

anti-foreign sentiment certain to follow an overt American
interference, Huerta chose the latter course.

Wilson already had his course mapped out

.

Robert Lan-

sing, a State Department counselor, searched Department files

for a precedent to serve as a rationalization for American

intervention.

Lansing noted the 1854 shelling of Greytown;

Nicaragua, and suggested that the President had the authority to use force in order to enforce demands or exact repriT
sals.

28

Two other minor and unrelated incidents played into Wilson's hands.

On April 11, an American naval mail orderly

was mistakenly arrested in Vera Cruz, and an ignorant Mexican censor delayed a diplomatic cable from Mexico City to

Washington.

Wilson would later present these petty occur-

rences as part of a general Mexican scheme of effrontery.

29

On April 14, Wilson ordered a large battleship fleet,
troop transports filled with marines, cruisers and destroyers to sail for Tampico.

There were no instructions to land

27Quirk, pp. 41, 53
^^Ibid., pp. 50-51.
29

465
United States Foreign Relations, 1914, pp. 453-55,
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the marines.

That same day the press was informed.

Historians cannot agree over the mood of the
American
public in response to this movement toward war.
Robert E.

Quirk sees "warm and wholehearted support," while
Arthur

Link finds a "tidal wave of denunciation.""^^

S.

While the

fleet prepared to depart, Wilson called the senior members
of the Congressional foreign relations committees to the
VJhite House to inform them,

on April 15.

He told them that

unless all demands were met the fleet would be ordered to

*

block the Tampico and Vera Cruz ports through which Huerta
received supplies from Europe.

Ke added that Congress would

be asked to approve his plans but not to declare war.^^
Meanwhile, Republicans in the House accused the President of exaggerating the Tampico incident in order to create
"an excuse to intervene."

They charged Wilson with acting

on grounds of "personal prejudice and enmity" for Huerta,

while ignoring the depredations against Americans by Constitutionalists in northern Mexico.

33

After a series of diplomatic exchanges in which Huerta

called for a simultaneous salute to both flags, and Wilson
^^Ibid., p. 459; Quirk, p. 53; Link, Wilson:

Freedom

,

p.

The New

396.

The New Freedom

^^Quirk, pp. 58-59; Link, Wilson:
403-5.
^^Link, Wilson, The New Freedom

,

^^51 Cong. Rec. 6751-6752 (1914).

p.

397.

,

pp
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refused to compromise, the American President went
before
Congress on April 20, 1914.

At

3

P.M. Wilson solemnly pre-

sented the facts of the U.S.S. Dolphin incident to a joint
session of Congress.

He insisted that the occurrence was

neither trivial nor isolated:

other events (the arrest of

the mail orderly and the delay of the cable) combined with
it to form a pattern "of slights and affronts in retalia-

tion" for American refusal to recognize Huerta.

"No doubt,"

Wilson declared,
could do what is necessary in the circumstances to enforce respect for our Government
without recourse to the Congress, and yet not
exceed my constitutional powers as President;
but I do not wish to act in a matter possibly
of so grave consequence except. in close conference and cooperation with both' the Senate and
House. -^^
I

This interpretation of Presidential power may have re-

flected Lansing's research, noted above.

It directly pre-

ceded Wilson's request for approval to
use the armed forces of the United
such ways and to such an extent as
sary to obtain from General Huerta
herents the fullest recognition of
and dignity of the United States
.

States in
may be necesand his adthe^rights
.

.

An hour earlier, the Secretary of the Navy instructed
the fleet to head to Vera Cruz prepared to land its marines

-^^

United States Foreign Relations, 1914

35ibid.

,

p.
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.
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Wilson had told Congressional leaders that
he hoped to prevent a German arms shipment already en
route from reaching
Huertistas

Following Wilson's speech. House Joint
Resolution 251
was offered and debate ensued along partisan
lines.
The

Resolution declared,
That the President of the United States is
justified
the employment of armed forces of the
United States to enforce the demands made upon
Victoriano Huerta for unequivocal amends to the
Government of the United States for affronts and
indignities committed against this Government
by General Huerta and his representatives,^'^

m

House Democrats

called upon the Congress to "sustain

the President" in a time of crisis, and insisted that House

Joint Resolution 251 was not a declaration of war.

The Re-

publicans were less confident about its status and what it

might lead to.

They urged amending the Resolution by in-

serting "within the limit of his constitutional powers"

after the word "employment."

They reasoned that such a modi-

fication was necessary "to make sure that this is not a deOQ

claration of war."
But this amendment, a weaker substitute resolution, and
•^^Quirk,

pp.

70,

74.

^^51 Cong. Rec. 6934 (1914)
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

6934-37, 6943.

,

.
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an amencJment explicitly denying that House
Joint Resolution
251 was a declaration of war were all beaten back.

that day, the Resolution was approved, 337 to

Late

37."^^

On the evening of the 20th, the Senate received the

House-approved measure.

But Republican opposition, led by

Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, succeeded in delaying
the Resolution until the next day by having it sent to the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

In the meantime,

late

that evening, President Wilson ordered marines to seize the.

customshouse at Vera Cruz, thus intercepting the German arms
shipment
On April 21, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

offered House Joint Resolution 251 with.^the following amendment
That the United States disclaims any hostility
to the Mexican people or any purpose to make
war upon Mexico. ^1
In addition. Lodge tried to include a broad preamble,

citing the depredations against Americans and the "unre-

strained violence and anarchy" in Mexico, as well as the
insults to the United States, as the rationale for United
States intervention.

The Lodge preamble was rejected,

39ibid., pp. 6939, 6948, 6957.

^^Quirk, pp. 76-77.

^^51 Cong. Rec. 6964 (1914).
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47-36.^2

An amendment declaring that "a state of war exists"
also suffered defeat, as did a proposal to add the
words,

"to

protect American citizens" to the body of the Resolution.
The latter proposal lost by only a three-vote margin.
The Senate then approved the Resolution with the Foreign

Relations Committee amendment, by a 72 to

13 vote.

The fol-

lowing day, April 22, the House agreed to the upper chamber's
version. 44

During the Senate debate of the 21st, Republican Senator Clapp of Minnesota noted with dismay and resignation
that while Congress had the Constitutional authority to de-

clare war, "nevertheless, the power to make war, unfortunately,

is in the hands of the President,

as has been demonstrated

by the activities and events of the last 24 hours

"'^^
.

But

apparently a vast majority of the Congress as well as the

Administration did not agree that war had either begun or
been declared.
House Joint Resolution 251 "justified" the President's

use of force against Huerta, but disclaimed hostility or any
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

6964.

7006.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

7004,

7007.

7014, 7076-78; Joint Resolution Justifying
the employment* by the President of the armed forces of the
United States, 38 Stat. 770 (1914).
'^^Ibid., DD.

^^51 Cong. Rec. 7002 (1914).

.
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intention to make war on Mexico.

In an April 22nd dispatch

from Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to various

American diplomatic missions, the Secretary gave the Administration's interpretation.

"Please note," he said,

that the word 'justified* is used instead of
'authorized.
This was done to emphasize the
fact that the resolution is not a declaration
of war but contemplates only the specific redress of a specific indignity.
'

These words were sincere to the extent that VJilson truly
did not want a military conflict with Mexico.

But he had

underestimated the strength of Mexican nationalism, which re-

vealed itself in the instantaneous outcry by all of Mexico-including the Constitutionalists--against the American intervention.

Wilson was aghast to learn that the Mexicans re-

sisted the landing with the result that casualties were suf'^^
fered by both sides.

Parenthetically, the arms shipment got through to Mexico City anyway.

The captain of the German vessel simply de-

layed for several days, then made his delivery at a port
south of Vera Cruz

48

Perhaps the unexpected fighting in Mexico, along with

Carranza's firm withholding of support--Carranza informed
^^ United States Foreign Relations, 1914

^^Link, Wilson:

^^Quirk. p.

151.

The New Freedom

,

p.

.

402.

pp.

482-483

.

.
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Wilson that the United States -invasion"
at Vera Cruz "may
indeed drag us into an unequal war"-Ied
the President to

restrict American military operations.

At any rate, al-

though he sent reinforcements to hold
occupied Vera Cruz,
he vetoed Army plans to march to Mexico
City, and on April
25, 1914, accepted an offer of the A. B.C.
powers to mediate
An important, and perhaps calculated,
exception

to the

nearly universal Mexican condemnation of the
United States
came from Pancho Villa.
Presaging his split with

Carranza,

Villa told an American agent that the United States
"could
keep Vera Cruz and hold it so tight that not even
water
could get in to Huerta" and he would have no obj ections

Villa was undoubtedly anticipating Huerta 's downfall,
and by widening the rift between the United States and Carranza, he hoped to keep the latter from assuming poxjer.

Wilson, meanwhile, tried to use the A. B.C. mediation

(which began May 20, 1914, in Niagara Falls, Canada) to get

Huerta 's agreement to resign, and the Constitutionalists to
support the establishment of a reform-minded provisional

government acceptable to all parties. Huerta was conciliatory; American control of Vera Cruz and Constitutionalist

military advances had fatally weakened him.
^^ United States Foreign Relations, 1914
Wilson:
The New Freedom pp"^ 401-402

The Constitu-

.

p.

484: Link,

,

^^Special Agent Carothers to the Secretary of State,
United States Foreign Relations, 1914 p. 485.
,

.
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tionalists, on the other hand, sraelled victory and adanantly

refused to negotiate a settlement of Mexico's internal conflict.
In order to force Carranza's hand, and to prevent a pos-

sible clash between the Constitutionalists and American

troops on the Mexican border, Wilson embargoed arms sales
to the Constitutionalists and withheld recognition of them
as belligerents.

Nothing positive came of this, however;

Huerta resigned in July, 1914, and Carranza occupied the
capital the next month.

Washington was jubilant at Huerta 's demise.

But the

Mexican Revolution had only gone through its first phase.
Before long Wilson would intervene again, but this time re-

luctantly

.

Carranza was not in Mexico City long before the shaky

Constitutionalist coalition fell apart completely, plunging

Meixco further into civil war.

A confusion of factions

emerged, but the basic and irreconcilable split was between

Villa and Carranza, with Zapata temporarily allying himself

with the former and Obreg6n siding with the First Chief.

52

With the conflict between Villa and Carranza now open,
5lLink, Wilson:
139-49.

The New Freedom

,

pp. 407-16; Haley, pp.

^^Henry B. Parkes A History of Mexico (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1938) pp. 353-354.
,
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the United States, in November, 1914, withdrew its remaining

troops from Vera Cruz.^"^

Until the Spring of 1915, control

of the capital changed hands a number of times, when, in

April, Obregon's forces dealt the Villistas a crushing defeat, marking the start of their retreat to the northernmost

provinces of Mexico.

A Pan American Conference had been convened in the sum-

mer of 1915 at Wilson's behest to consider what action to
take in regard to the chaos in Mexico since Huerta's decline
But by the Fall, Carrancista military strength left the con-

ferees with little choice.

In October,

1915, the United

States granted de facto recognition to Carranza, and sus-

pended arms exports to all other factions in Mexico.
Wilson would still have liked to control the direction
of the Mexican Revolution, but had learned some lessons

about the dangers of intervention from Vera Cruz.

Moreover,

he became increasingly distracted by the war in Europe, and
since he was never sympathetic to the American capitalists
in Mexico, he did little in response to the murder of an

estimated 76 Americans south of the border between 1913 and
^

United States Foreign Relations, 1914

^Sarkes,

pp.

^^Haley, pp.

353-354.
165-82.

,

pp.

621-622

.

^

1915.

But by year-end. an embittered
Pancho Villa, driven
north by Obregon. and without hope of
regaining power, sought
to punish the United States for
recognizing and permitting
arms sales to Carranza. Villa and his
rag-tag "army" pro-

moted border warfare ultimately issuing
in another American
^'^
intervention.
In the United States Congress, the
persistent Senator

Fall of New Mexico led mounting Republican
pressure in that
Presidential election year of 1916 for more
vigorous protection of American lives and property in Mexico.
On January
5,

Fall offered a resolution which was approved by
the Sen-

ate on the following day.
the House, however.)

(A similar measure did not pass

Senate Resolution 42 requested that

the President, "if not incompatible with the public inter-

ests," transmit to the Senate the following information and

documents
Is there, the Resolution queries, a government in Mexico?

Is it recognized by the United States?
Is the government constitutional?

recognition brought about?

VJho

are its leaders?

By what means was its

What assurance has this govern-

^^United States, Department of State, Papers Relating
to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916 (VJashington
Government Printing Office, 1925), p. 476.
:

^''Parkes, p.

356.
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ment given regarding protection of American lives and property?j regarding claims for damages to same?

right to free exercise of religion?

;

regarding the

What instructions have

been issued to American border officials and armed forces
concerning such protection?

Finally, the Resolution re-

quested a full report on the Vera Cruz occupation and evacuation, and virtually all diplomatic documents of the Wilson

administration concerning Mexico. 58
Before the Wilson administration could respond. Villa

realized that he could embarrass both Wilson and Carranza by
giving credence to the charges that Americans in Mexico or

near her borders were unsafe.

On January 10, 1916, Villa

halted a train at Santa Ysabel, Mexico, and murdered 16 Americans associated with an American-owned mining company.

59

In Congress Wilson was sharply criticized for his lack

Various measures

of concern for American citizens in Mexico.

were introduced (all of which ultimately died in committee)
authorizing armed intervention for the purpose of providing
protection.

60

The Senatorial debate of January 18 throws some light
on contemporary thinking in regard to Presidential war -making
^^53 Cong. Rec. 501, 589-603 (1916).
^^ United States Foreign Relations,

1916

,

^^53 Cong. Rec. 1004, 1060, 1189 (1916).

pp.

652-653
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power.

The exchange was sparked by Senator Lippitt's

(R.

assertion that if he were President he would have
immediately sent troops into Mexico to punish the
perpetrators

I.)

of the Santa Ysabel massacre.

Upon being reminded by Senator Stone (Mo.) that the

President "has no constitutional right to order an invasion"

under such circumstances, Lippitt recalled that the President landed marines at Vera Cruz while the upper chamber

was in the midst of debate over the justifying legislation.

Lippitt suggested that if the President had the authority
to land marines to intercept a cargo of arms, he could also

"send American troops over the border."
Stone insisted that to pursue bandits all over Mexico

would bring the United States army into conflict with the
Mexican government forces and would thus mean war.

Stone

appealed to Senator Brandegee (Conn.) to give his opinion
on the constitutionality of Lippitt's suggestion regarding
the dispatch of troops.

Brandegee replied that

entirely upon the extent to
it depends
I think, of course, it goes
which it is done.
without saying that the President has no authority to make war against a foreign nation withIt is exclusively
out the consent of Congress,
declare
war and
of
Congress
to
in the control
But it has been repeatedly held
to make peace.
.

^•Ibid.

,

pp.

.

.

1189-92.
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that a mere intrusion to rescue
citizens
or to protect the property of citizens
is not
an act of war, and the President has
repeatedly
and unquestionably exercised such authority
by
the landing of marines and then retiring
after
the object has been accomplished. ^2
.

.

.

On February 17, 1916, the

Fall Resolution.

m±te

House responded to the

The President refused on grounds that it

was "incompatible with the public interest to transmit
to
the Senate, at the present time, the voluminous
correspon-

dence called for."

Secretary of State Lansing (Bryan had

resigned in June, 1915), who prepared the response, admitted
that the de facto government of Carranza was "military" and

not constitutional, that it had promised to protect lives

and property and had done a "reasonably adequate" job of it
in the areas under its control, but that due to the diffi-

culty of restoring order after years of lawlessness, "sporadic outrages" could be anticipated.^^
No sooner had interventionist sentiment waned in the

Congress when Villa struck again.

On March

9,

1916, about

500 to 1,000 Villistas attacked and burned Columbus, New

Mexico, killing and wounding several American soldiers and

civilians

.

A small detail of American troops pursued them

^^ibid., p. 1192.
^^

United States Foreign Relations, 1916

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

470-471.

,
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469ff

.
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over the border into Mexico.
The American public was absolutely outraged.
10,

On March

members of both parties made martial speeches in Con-

gress, and submitted resolutions calling for military inter-

vention.

Senator Ashurst of Arizona demanded "grape-shot

instead of grape juice," a reference to Secretary of State

William Jennings Bryan, a teetotaler and

a pacifist.

Wilson knew that he had to act firmly and quickly to
assuage public demands.

He also wished to avoid Congress,

which he feared might force the country into
war with Mexico.
it was felt,

a full-scale

Finally, only a prompt military response,

could prevent Villa from successfully eluding

capture in the vast territory he knew so well.
Unfortunately, Carranza had his own "hawks," or more
precisely, nationalists, who opposed American troops on Mex-

ican soil under any circumstances.

On the other hand, there

had been cooperation in the past between the United States
and Carranza regarding the pursuit of bandits across inter-

national boundaries.

In the Fall of 1915, the United States

had permitted Carrancista troops to be transported across

American territory during the civil war against Villa.

And

during that same period, an informal military agreement was
^^Ibid.
66

,

pp.

480-481.

53 Cong. Rec.

3882-84, 3905ff (1916)
.
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obtained granting reciprocal rights of pursuit of bandits
up to 15 leagues (45 miles) beyond the border.
On the 10th of March, a day after the Columbus raid,

Wilson ordered a military force under the command of Brigadier General John Pershing to pursue Villa into Mexico and

break up his band of marauders.
a bit higher,

He set public expectations

however, by telling the press that the expe-

dition was aimed at capturing Villa.
Thus neither Carranza nor the United States Congress

were informed in advance of the orders to send troops into
Mexico.
vention.

Carranza was in no position to approve the interHe redoubled his own efforts to capture Villa,

hoping to obviate any extensive American effort.

He warned

that war might result, and that only a reciprocal arrange-

ment regarding the entry of forces into each other's terri69
tory would be acceptable.

The Congress, for its part, voiced no objections to

not being consulted.

On the contrary, on March 14, 1916,

the day before Pershing's force crossed the border, the

House approved, 236 to

1,

an Army Emergency Bill.

VJhile not

explicit approval of the President's action, the intent, as
^^Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises 1915Princeton University Press, 1964),
1916 (Princeton, N.J.:
p7n:96.
^^Haley, pp. 189-190; United States Foreign Relations,
1916

,

p.

484!

^^Link Wilson: Confusions and Crises, pp. 209-210;
485-486.
United States Foreign Relations, i9ib, pp7

^
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the following exchange makes clear, was unmistakable.

The

resolution raised the size of the army, "if in the judg-

ment of the President any emergency arises which makes it

necessary "^^
.

Mr. HAY.
As 1 say, the reason for this resolution is that it is immediately necessary that
the border shall be protected while this expedition is going on ...
Mr. DIES.
Do I understand the gentleman from
Virginia to say that these nineteen thousand
odd soldiers would be dropped at the expiration of the Mexican trouble?
Mr. HAY.
At the expiration of the emergency,
yes; the Army vzould be reduced to the strength
now allowed by law.
.

'

The one "nay" vote came from a Congressman

who said

he was motivated by opposition to the Punitive Expedition,
as it came to be called.

72

The Senate approved the Army

Emergency Bill on March 15, 69 to

0.

73

More explicit, if belated, Congressional approval was

granted on March 17, when the Senate unanimously agreed to
Senate Concurrent Resolution 17.
support of the White House.

This measure had the warm

Its preamble indicated Congres-

sional uncertainty about whether or not American troops had

already been ordered to cross the Mexican border, and mis^°53 Cong. Rec. 4097 (1916).
71lbid.

,

p.

4098.

^^53 Cong. Rec. 5020-5021 (1916).
^^Ibid.

.

pp.

4105-8.
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takenly noted the "consent" of the Carranza government.
Its approval of the expedition contained detailed qualifi-

cations

.

RESOLVED.
That the use of the armed forces
of the United States for the sole purpose of
apprehending and punishing the lawless bands
of armed men who entered the United States
from Mexico on the ninth day of I^rch, 1916,
committed outrages on American soil, and
fled into Mexico, is hereby approved; and that
the Congress also extends this assurance to the
de facto Government of Mexico and to the Mexican people that the pursuit of said lawless
band of armed men across the international
boundary line into Mexico is for the single
purpose of arresting and punishing the fugitive band of outlaws; that the Congress
joins with the President in declaring that
such military expedition shall not be permitted to encroach in any degree upon the sovereignty of Mexico or to interfere in any manner
with the domestic affairs of the Mexican people. ''^
.

.

.

In the House, however,

.

.

the Resolution was referred to

the Foreign Affairs Committee, where it expired.''^

Nor was

the Carranza government fully persuaded by the Resolution.

The First Chief stuck to his demand for "strict reciprocity,"
but at first did little to oppose Pershing's force of 4000.
However, when Villa proved elusive, and when the Punitive Expedition, bolstered to 6,675 men by April, plunged

deeper into Mexico--350 miles south of the border--the de

facto government grew restive.
^^Ibid.

,

p.

4274.

^^Ibid.
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The Carranza government called upon the United
States
in late March,

1916,

to sign a protocol regarding "hot pur-

suit" of bandits over international boundaries.

The Mexi-

cans wanted limits (as to places of entry, depth of
penetration,

duration of stay), all of which the United States ac-

cepted, but interpreted prospectively, so as to exclude the

Pershing expedition
As tensions with Germany mounted, Wilson became espe-

cially anxious to avoid a wider conflict with Mexico.
this became increasingly difficult.

But

On April 12, 1916, anti-

American sentiment in Mexico led to an attack upon some American soldiers who had entered the town of Parral.

Carranza

called upon United States troops to withdraw or risk future
incidents
Pershing, meanwhile, frustrated by local opposition

and Carrancista non-cooperation, called for expansion of
his military operation.

Hoping to avoid an open break with

Mexico, and yet escape the humiliation of withdrawal, the

Administration decided to concentrate Pershing's force in
northern Mexico while negotiating with the Carranza government for cooperation on border protection.
The negotiations, between United States General Scott
^^ibid., pp. 218-219; United States Foreign Relations.
1916

,

pp.
78

502,

503,

507.

The following account is based upon Link, Wilson:
Confusions and Crises, pp. 282-317; and- Haley, pp. 198-223.
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and Obregdn, begun at the end of April, 1916,
were a failure.

Meanwhile, Mexican bandits struck at two Texas
towns

in early May,

and were chased 180 miles into Mexico by

American cavalry.

Mexico protested vigorously and insisted

that all American troops withdraw.

VJilson called up the

militia of the states bordering Mexico; Carranza mobilized
his forces to resist any further American intrusion.
In mid-June the situation grew worse.

Mexican irregu-

lars conducted border raids and again were pursued over the

border by United States forces.

The Mexican military in-

formed Pershing that if he moved in any direction other than

north they would attack.

Wilson then mobilized the entire

national guard of over 100,000 men, while Secretary of State

Lansing sent a long note to Mexico justifying the Expedition
and warning of "grave consequences" should the de facto government attempt to resist it by force.

79

On June 22, 1916, an incident occurred which brought

Mexico and the United States to the very brink of war.

A

small American reconnaissance mission, ordered to march

about 90 miles east by General Pershing, clashed with de
facto government troops near Carrizal, resulting in several
deaths on both sides and the capture of 25 Americans.

This

was the first time, since the Vera Cruz landing two years
^^ United States Foreign Relations,

1916

,

pp.

581-92.
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earlier, that American forces engaged troops of the
Mexican

government
On the 25th of June, Washington demanded the release
of the prisoners, and an early statement of Mexican inten-

tions in light of its seemingly "formal avowal of deliber-

ately hostile action. "^^

Wilson then consulted with Congressional leaders, and
set to work on a war message for Congress.

never delivered.

The message was

(It would not have asked for a declara-

tion of war because Mexico lacked, Wilson now reasoned, a

properly constituted authority.

Instead it requested the

power to use the armed forces to protect the border and es-

tablish a constitutional Mexican government which would preserve order.)

American public sentiment was strongly against war with
Mexico.

Thus, there must have been

a

general sigh of relief

when it was learned that the Carrizal prisoners were released.

Wilson made an eloquent speech for peace before

the New York Press Club, June 30, and the United States and

Mexico exchanged conciliatory diplomatic notes.
In early July,

1916, both sides agreed to the estab-

lishment of a Joint High Commission to resolve mutual grievances

.

The upcoming Presidential elections were apparently

^°Ibid.

,

p.

595.

1

.
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foremost in Wilson's mind.

He wished to keep Pershing in

Mexico so it would not look like he was forced
to abandon
his vigorous defense of Americans on or south
of

the border.

At the same time Wilson hoped to avoid an open
break with

Mexico
Thus Wilson was not disturbed at the failure of the

United States and Mexico to agree upon an agenda for the
conference to be held at New London, Connecticut, in the
Fall of 1916.

He had the advantage, and he used it to press

for a broad agenda including Mexican social and economic re-

The Carranza representatives resisted any attempt

forms.

by the United States to meddle in Mexico's domestic affairs;

they wished to limit the discussion to troop evacuation and

border problems.

8

The Commission met from September, 1916, to January,
1917, when it adjourned without agreement.

son was re-elected President.

Meanwhile, Wil-

In January the White House

decided to withdraw the "Perishing" Expedition, and by February, 1917, United States troops had been completely evac-

Wilson even resumed diplomatic relations with Mexico,

uated.

despite the objections of mining and oil interests who feared
that the new Mexican Constitution endangered their holdings.
o

1

CamThis account follows Arthur S. Link, Wilson:
paigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1965), op. 51-55, 120N. jT:
23, 328-38; and Haley, pp. 230-47.
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III.

The Mexican Inter vent ions and the Constitution
I

have said that the Mexican War of 1846 raised con-

stitutional questiona even though Congress had declared that
a state of war existed.

The facts are that President Polk

had already ordered American troops to enter the disputed
territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, that these
forces had established a blockade of the Rio Grande, an act
of war in international law, and that fighting between the

armies of the respective governments had already begun before the Congress was consulted,

Furthermore, Polk misled Congress when he insisted
that the ambushed American troops were killed on "American

soil."

United States claims to the territory were dubious

at best, and Polk would have been more honest had he refer-

red to it as "disputed" territory.
All this having been said, it must be noted that Congress was ignorant of neither the Polk administration's pro-

vocative activities nor of what could be expected from the

Mexican government in response.
approved a resolution of war.

And still it overwhelmingly
Although the legislature was

left with little choice other than to approve or condemn a

Presidential fait accompli

,

it followed through in good con-

stitutional form.
But to the extent that Article

I,

section

8,

clause

the decision
11 looked to the participation of Congress in
to go to war,

surely the spirit of the Constitution, if not

199

its letter, was violated in 1846.

In 1914, President Wilson dispatched a fleet
to Mexi-

can waters allegedly to obtain redress for insults
to the

American flag, but actually to depose

which he disapproved.

a

Mexican regime of

Marines were ordered to land just

moments before the President went before Congress to ask for
its support, and only the House had acted prior to the out-

break of fighting.

Wilson did not reveal his real motives in addressing
Congress, but rather outlined in misleading fashion an al-

leged pattern of indignities.

The Congressional leadership

was informed about the Administration's real intentions;

blocking the arms shipment to Huerta en route to Mexico.
The Republican minority tried to broaden the resolution to

include protection of Americans in Mexico, but were unsuc-

cessful

.

Thus, although Congress knew that the alleged indig-

nities were merely a pretext, it went along with the charade.

The President went on to insist that under the cir-

cumstances he had the constitutional authority to order the
use of armed force "without recourse to the Congress."

Congress seemed to acquiesce in the .Aidministration'

s

The

inter-

pretation of Presidential power, as indicated by the debates
on the Hill, and the use of the word "justified" rather
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than "authorized" in House Joint Resolution 251.^^
On the other hand, Wilson did in fact
request legis-

lative approval, and Congress did feel warranted,
if not

constitutionally obliged, to grant that approval.

Thus,

the Vera Cruz landing does little to clarify the
boundaries
of executive versus legislative war-making power.
It does, however,

establish a clear precedent for the

President to order the occupation of a foreign port with
the support of Congress short of a declaration of war.

House Joint Resolution 251 expressly disclaimed any hostile
or war-like intent on the part of the United States govern-

ment, and therefore could not have been designed to be a

declaration of war.
As to the circumstances under which the President may
so act,

according to the Wilson administration and the 63rd

Congress, affronts and indignities committed against the

United States government are sufficient, although as we
have pointed out, both branches knew this was a mere pretext

.

To summarize:

given certain alleged affronts and in-

dignities to the United States, the President, with the support of Congress, though not necessarily by its authority,

ordered the occupation of a foreign port.
82

See notes 34, 37 and accompanying text, supra.
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Finally, we consider the constitutional implications
of the Punitive Expedition of 1916.

When President Wilson

ordered 4000 American troops to cross the border
co on March 10,

vzith

Mexi-

1916, he acted without informing Congress.

In fact he had intentionally avoided the legislature for

fear that it would force the United States into a fullfledged war with Mexico.

Within a week of the orders, however, both houses of
Congress had indicated some sort of approval of Wilson's
action.

Both chambers ratified the Army Emergency Bill, but

only the Senate gave explicit endorsement to the Mexican
intervention.

The reasons for the refusal of the House to

go along are not clear.

The Senate resolution, as was the case with the Vera

Cruz occupation, did not authorize any Presidential action,

rather it "approved" Wilson's course.

However, unlike the

1914 intervention, this time Wilson did not feel obligated
to go before Congress.

Perhaps in the 1916 intervention,

Presidential authority was less doubtful.
After all, this was not simply a case of intervening
to protect American citizens abroad.

Villa's raids occurred

on the American side of the border; thus they were analogous
to an invasion of United States territory.

And although

Villa represented no official government, the Mexican government was unable to control him.

Under such circumstances

.
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the President's authority to order pursuit of Villa was com-

parable to his power to respond to

a surprise attack on the

country
Yet such power would seem to be qualified by the very

great risk that, as a result of the violation of the other

nation's sovereignty by the pursuing force, war between two
sovereign states will result.

In such a case, the President

will have run afoul of the Constitutional prerogative of the
Congress to declare war.

The Carrizal incident, vzhere Ameri-

can and Mexican government forces clashed, highlights the

dangers involved.

Nineteenth century precedents tend to support the principle that the President may take unilateral action in such

circumstances.

In 1817, President Monroe commissioned An-

drew Jackson to punish the Seminole Indians, runaway slaves
and white bandits who committed sporadic outrages and then

retreated across the international boundary into Florida
(then a Spanish possession).

Jackson's foray across north

Florida and his summary execution of two British subjects

nearly forced the United States into war.

At no time was

Congressional authority requested, but afterwards, in the

wake of tumultuous Congressional debate, motions to condemn
83
Jackson were beaten back.

83Bailey, pp.

168-72.
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By contrast, before responding to border difficulties

with Mexico, President Buchanan went before Congress in
1859
to ask for permission to use force.

1880

's

But in the 1870

's

and

the executive branch reassumed the initiative; troops

crossed the border with Mexico without Congressional auth-

orization at least 20 times.
What Constitutional principle then may be inferred from
these various cases so similar in circumstance to the Punitive Expedition?

It would seem that when marauding bands

based in an adjoining foreign country conduct raids across
the American border, the President may on his own authority

order pursuit by the United States armed forces even across
the international boundary.

Among the historical precedents, the only qualifications upon the President's power would seem to be Buchanan's

circumspect behavior in 1859, and the Senate resolution of
approval in 1916.

I

do not believe that the 1916 resolution

impinges upon the authority of the President to reply force-

fully and spontaneously to border raids.

However, since

this measure enumerated in detail the limited intentions of
the Punitive Expedition, it may serve as a precedent for Con-

gressional, perhaps even Senatorial, restriction of such in-

terventions once they have been initiated by the President.
®^See note

7

and accompanying text, supra.

'
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CHAPTER

VI

EXPEDITIONS TO SIBERIA AND NORTH RUSSIA, 1918
The American interventions in Russia-- two expeditions
to disparate geographical points--comprised one of the

strangest and most complex episodes in American military and

diplomatic history.

It is indicative of the confusion sur-

rounding them that General William

S.

Graves confessed as

follows many years later:
was in command of the United States troops sent
to Siberia and, I must admit, I do not know what
the United States was trying to accomplish by military intervention.

I

To this day historians cannot agree

on the motivation

or the subsequent aims of the interventions, and each hypo-

thesis suffers, it seems to me, some glaring defects.

For

instance, one contends that the primary aim was to further

America's efforts against Germany in the First World

War."^

But then how do we explain the decision to keep troops in

Russia after the Armistice had been signed?
At the other extreme is the contention that this was

^William

S.

1920 (New York:

Graves, America's Siberian A dventure, 1918Peter Smith, 1965) p. 3l)4.
,

Inter^Leonid I. Strakhovsky, The Origins of Americ an
Princeton
N.J.:
(Princeton,
vention in North Russia (1918)
University Press, 1937), passTm.
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primarily an effort to contain communism.^

This claim

must be balanced against the abundance of primary evidence
demonstrating the overriding concern of the major policy-

makers with the German war effort.

It also overlooks or

ignores Washington's repeated refusal to adopt the French

plan to topple the Bolsheviks.

A third factor has been held to be the key to understanding the Siberian (but not the north Russian) expedi-

America's desire to maintain the Open Door in the

tion:

Far East against Japanese imperial designs.^

There is

little documentary evidence to support this claim.
more, Japan was a war-time

Further-

ally who was invited to inter-

vene jointly with the United States and was asked for no assurances regarding its future course in the area when the

United States unilaterally withdrew.

Japan announced its

withdrawal two years later.

My purpose, however,

is not to offer the definitive

historical narrative of these affairs, but to recount the
events with an eye toward assessing the constitutional status of President Wilson's action.

^Frederick L. Schuman, American Policy Toward Russia
International Publishers, 1928), pasSince 1917 (New York:
American Russian Relations, 1781Williams,
sim; William A.
Books,
1971), passim.
Octagon
1947 (New York:

^Betty M. Unterberger America's Siberian Expedition,
1918-1920 (Durham, N.C.. Duke University Press, 19^6), passim; John A. VJhite, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1950), passim.
N.j!
,

:
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To accomplish this we must take
account of the motivations for the expeditions. Were they
the legitimate exercises of a Commander-in-Chief deploying
troops so as to defeat Germany against which Congress had
declared war? Or
was the war with Germany a convenient cover
for a constitu-

tionally questionable undertaking aimed at the
Japanese or
the Bolsheviki?

Furthermore, we must examine the status of Russia visa-vis the United States.

Was Russia at the time of the ex-

peditions still America's war-time ally to which the President might legally send troops against the common enemy?
Or had Russia indeed become neutral, as the Soviet Govern-

ment claimed, but unable to resist American military intervention?
It is these questions in addition to our standard in-

quiries into Presidential and Congressional action which we

must keep in mind as we try to sort out the historical tangle surrounding the Siberian and north Russian expeditions.
I

.

Historical Background and the Decision to Intervene
By the end of 1914 Europe had divided into two armed

camps, and was about to embark upon a struggle of unprece-

dented proportions.
Powers:

On one side were the so-called Central

Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey.

the Entente Powers, or simply the "Allies:"

Opposed were
Russia, France,

.
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Great Britain, Japan, Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro.
Italy joined the Allies in 1915.

Provoked by attacks on American shipping, President

Wilson asked a special session of Congress to declare war
against Germany on April

1917.

2,

Two days later the legis-

lature resolved
That the state of war between the United States
and the Imperial German Government which has
thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared
.5
.

.

Germany calculated that the war in Europe would be over
by the time the United States mobilized and dispatched an

appreciable number of troops.

German calculations were

partly correct; it was not until Autumn 1917 that Americans
began to fight "over there.'

Meanwhile a great war -weariness swept Europe.

An esti-

mated 4,000,000 men had been slain, millions more wounded.
The governments of Europe tottered on the brink of bankruptcy.^

Nowhere was the revulsion greater than in Czarist Rus-

sia.

In March,

1917, army mutinies, bread riots and indus-

The United

trial strikes forced the Czar to abdicate.

^55 Cong. Rec. 200 (1917); Joint Resolution Declaring
that a state of war exists between the Imperial German Government and the Government and the people of the United
40 Stat.
States and making provision to prosecute the same.
1

(1917)

Lee Benns European History Since 1870 4th ed.
Appleton-Century-Crof ts lyi)!?) pp. 364-67.
(New York:
F.

,

,

,

^Ibid., p. 371.

,
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States rejoiced to be allied with a liberal
regime, and

quickly recognized the provisional government.

Provisional

War Minister Alexander Kerensky vowed to continue the
unpopular struggle.
In July 1917, in Galicia, the whole Russian line col-

lapsed before the advancing German columns.

This played di-

rectly into the hands of the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, whose
slogan was "Peace! Land! Bread!"

Only

a

few months earlier

Lenin had been transported back to Russia from Switzerland
by the Germans, who hoped that he would further the disruption in Russia.

The Bolshevik program was nearly irresistible to the

war-sick Russians.

In November,

1917, a successful coup

d'etat toppled the provisional government.

A "Soviet of

the People's Commissars" was established, with Lenin as

chairman and Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Wash-

ington refused to recognize the new regime, believing it

weak and under German influence.
Soon after the Bolsheviks assumed power in Petrograd,

Trotsky circulated a memo calling for an armistice.

The

Allies, of course, ignored the note, but the Germans, eager
to eliminate the eastern front in time to transfer troops

to France for a Spring offensive, responded quickly and

favorably.

On December 15, 1917, an armistice between Rus-

sia and the Central Powers was agreed to at Brest-Litovsk.

20.9

But Germany was not content with an armistice;
it wanted a

treaty ceding much of eastern Europe, including Russia's
Q

grain-rich Ukraine.
The Soviets, hoping to delay their capitulation, stalled and the peace talks dragged on through the Winter.

France and England

xvere

especially bitter as their intelli-

gence reported massive German troop m.ovements from the east
to the west.

They were convinced that the Bolsheviks were

either agents of the Germans or their unwitting dupes.

belief

V7as

This

widespread among the American public, and even

found favor in official Washington.

Q

Notwithstanding the reduction in troops and the Brest negotiations, the Germans resumed their advance upon Russia in

the Ukraine to the south, and through Finland in the north

This was in late February, 1918.

At the same time the Sov-

iets feared imminent Japanese intervention in the east. Aware

of Allied anxieties over the collapse of the eastern front,

Lenin and Trotsky opened informal contacts with Allied representatives in Russia, dangling before them the hope of a

revived eastern front.
^Ibid.

,

pp.

376-377.

^George F. Kennan, Soviet -American Relations, 1917-1920,
PrinceThe Decision to I ntervene (Princeton, N.J.:
Vol. 2:
3-9.
pp.
ton University Press,
,

^^Strakhovsky

,

Origins

^^Kennan, pp. 107-108.

,

pp.

14-17.
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In their desperation the Soviet leaders attempted to

exploit war-time rivalries by playing one international co-

alition off against another.

The peace with Germany was so

fragile, and the threat of Japanese expansion into Soviet

Siberia so great that the "breathing-space" essential to

consolidate the revolution appeared tenuous at best.

In his

"Six Theses concerning the Current Tasks of Soviet Power,"

written in late April, early May, 1918, Lenin describes
their tactics.
The international position of the Soviet republic
is difficult and critical in the extreme, because
the most deeply rooted interests of international
capital and imperialism impel it
not only
toward military pressure on Russia but also toward
mutual agreement concerning the division of Russia
and the strangling of Soviet power.
.

.

.

Only the sharpening of the imperialist slaughter
of the peoples in western Europe and the imperialist rivalry of Japan and America in the Far East
paralyze or restrain these tendencies
.

.

.

For this reason the Soviet republic must
follow a course of maneuver, of retreat, and biding
one's time until the moment when the proletarian
revolution
iif^a number of advanced countries,
comes to fruition.
.

.

On March

3,

.

.

.

.

1918,

in their panic over the renewed Ger-

man advance, Lenin and Trotsky followed the course of "retreat" and agreed to the harsh Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

This

act and the repudiation of Russian state debts on February

Quoted in ibid., pp. 132-133.

8

.

.

served to antagonize the Allies against the
Bolsheviks

"^^
.

Nevertheless, because of a mutual anxiety with
regard
to Germany (France and England were most upset
over the im-

pending German Spring offensive on the western front
which
was launched March 21; Trotsky was convinced that the Brest

peace vjould not end German penetration in Russia), some form
of Allied-Soviet collaboration seemed possible in March and

April
On March 5--two days after the Brest treaty was signed,

but before it was ratif ied--the Soviet leaders handed an in-

formal American representative a note asking "what kind of
support" the United States would give should the war with

Germany be renewed.

It further asked what the United States

would do should Japan "attempt to seize Vladivostok and the
Eastern Siberian Railway.""*"^
The American representative, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond

Robins of the American Red Cross Commission in Russia, was

convinced that the Soviets would accept United States aid in

reconstituting the eastern front.

Ambassador David

R.

Other Americans, such as

Francis, were more skeptical.

had seen documents "whose authenticity

I

Francis

do not doubt," pur-

porting to prove that the Bolsheviki leaders were "in German
pay."

Although Francis was probably sincere, these documents

'^C. K. Gumming and Walter Pettit, R ussian -American
Relations, March 1917-March 1920: Documents and Papers (New
Harcourt, Brace 6c Howe, 1920), p. I
York:
'l

^^Ibid., pp.

81-82.

.
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which were obtained by Edgar Sisson, director of the United
States wartime propaganda program in Petrograd, were undoubt-

edly forgeries 15
The Sis son documents, unearthed in March, 1918, rein-

forced the common though false theory that the Bolsheviks

were German agents.

They helped thwart Robins' attempts to

attain Soviet -American cooperation.

On March 11, the day

before Trotsky's queries to Robins were cabled to Washington,
a message from President Wilson to the Congress of Soviets

was delivered.

The note expressed "sincere sympathy" for

the Russian people in light of the renewed German attack,

but declared that the United States "is unhappily
in a position to render

.

.

.

not now

direct and effective aid."

16

On March 19, Ambassador Francis was informed that Wash-

inton considers the President's message an "adequate answer"
to Trotsky's requests.

Meanwhile, on the 16th the Congress

of Soviets ratified the Brest treaty.

Despite this, infor-

mal contacts between Robins and the Bolshevik leaders continued through the end of April.

In May Robins was recalled,

Washington having given no support to his efforts toward
Soviet -American collaboration.
Undoubtedly, American mistrust of the Bolsheviki in-

^^United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations
(Washington: Govof the United States, 19l"8, Russia 3 vols.
Kennan.
1:371-78;
p. 179.
ernment Prin ting Office, 1931),
,

1:395
^^United States. Foreign Relations. 1918. Russia,

2:3

creased when in late April formal diplomatic relations between Russia and Germany were renewed.

The arrival of the

new German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, so alarmed Francis that
he recommended Allied intervention even without Bolshevik

col-

laboration, because "Mirbach is dominating Soviet government

and is practically dictator in Moscow. "^^
Diplomatically, the Bolsheviki remained personae non

gratae as far as the United States was concerned.

In a memo

to Japan read just after the Brest treaty was signed, the

United States declared that
{i}t does not feel justified in regarding Russia
either as a neutral or as an enemy, but continues
There is, in fact, no
to regard it as an ally.
Russian government to deal with. The so-called
Soviet government upon which Germany has just
peace was never recognized by the
forced
Government of the United States as even a govNone of its acts, therefore,
ernment de facto
need be oFf icially recognized by this Govern.

.

.

.

ment

.

.

.

During the period in vzhich the plans for cooperation

were being considered and rejected events were moving apace
in the northern region of European Russia.

With its Baltic

ports closed by the war, Russia's Arctic coast ports became

her only maritime links to the Atlantic.

Most important of

aid in
these were Murmansk, built principally with British
1915, and Archangel,

^^Ibid.

,

p.

doubly important to the Allies because

520.

l^ibid., p. 397.

.
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of a large cache of arms and supplies stored there for use

by Russia during the war.
The supplies at Archangel added another element to the

growing mistrust between the Allies and the Bolsheviks.

In

February, 1918, as we have noted, the Bolsheviks repudiated
all the debts of pre -Soviet Russia.

At the same time they

began to remove the supplies at Archangel which had been
purchased through the use of credits advanced by the Allies.
One can understand Allied dismay at seeing the Bolsheviki

take the supplies while at the same time disavowing their
debt and announcing Russia's withdrav7al from the war.

This

helped fuel the German-agent theory because it was assumed
that the Soviets would transfer the goods to Germany as part
of the Russo-German peace agreement.

There was no basis in

fact for this belief; the Bolsheviks wanted the supplies for

themselves

19

The second crucial element preceding intervention in
the north was the Allied belief--and this too was false--that
the Germans would lead neighboring Finnish troops in an at-

tack on Murmansk in the Spring of 1918.
not alone in their mis judgments

;

But the Allies were

Trotsky, too, expected an

imminent German attack, and as a result drafted a hasty mesassistance
sage to the Murmansk soviet to "accept any and all

from the Allied missions" to thwart the German advance.
19

Kennan, pp. 19-21

This
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command was later used to justify collaboration by Murmansk
officials with the Allies.

In the 1930 's,

Stalinist histor-

ians cited it to discredit Trotsky.

Allied alarm over the German threat to the north Russian ports led England and France to send warships to Mur-

mansk in late February while requesting that the United
States do the same.

Upon receipt of intelligence reports

that a sizable German naval contingent was moving northward
in the Baltic, the British, after working out an agreement

with the Murmansk Soviet, quietly slipped
rines ashore.

The date was March

On March

5,

6,

1918.

a few hundred ma-

21

the United States refused "for the present"

to send a war ship to the area.

But after informal pleas of

Murmansk officials to balance the British presence (they did
not fully trust the British)

,

Ambassador Francis recommended

to the State Department and American Military Attach^, Colo-

nel James A. Ruggles, advised the War Department that an American vessel was needed.

Accordingly, on April

4,

President

Wilson agreed to send a war ship providing that the commander
be cautioned "not to be drawn in further than the present

action there without first seeking and obtaining instructions

from home.
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

42-43, 46-47

^^Ibid., pp. 44, 48-52.
^^Ibid., pp. 44, 55-56.
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In late April, 1918, an American ship was dispatched

with orders to cooperate with the British Rear Admiral at Mur-

mansk to "further the Allied interests generally, and to assist in recovering the Allied stores at Archangel."

In ad-

dition, although he may not "commit himself to land military

operations away from the port," the commander may utilize
the crew "for the purpose of stiffening the local resistance

against the Germans."

No mention was made about the Presi-

dent's caveat against being "drawn in" without instructions

from Washington.

23

While the war effort against Germany was gradually in-

volving the United States in north Russia in the Spring of
1918, a more complex set of developments was ensnaring

ington in the Russian Far East.

Wash-

Military elements in Japan

were plotting a take-over of the Chinese Eastern Railway

(a

link in the Trans-Siberian rail system) and of Eastern Siberia.

This alarmed the United States which feared a threat

to its "open door" policy of equal commercial opportunities

for all in the Far East.

24

Thus, although the United States and Japan were osten-

sibly allied against Germany, the relationship was an uneasy
one due to the rivalry in eastern Russia.
^^Ibid., pp. 56-57.

^\lnterberger

,

p.

231.

This rivalry pften
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revolved around the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the principal
source of supplies over the vast stretch of eastern Russia,
some 4,700 miles from Vladivostok on the Pacific to the Ural

Mountains.

The rail system was so vital that when it began

to break down during the war the Kerensky government quickly

invited an American commission of railway engineers headed

by John F. Stevens to survey and recommend improvements.
Stevens commission arrived in June 1917.

The

In November of that

year, at the request of the Provisional Government, 300 Amer-

ican engineers were sent to assist operations along the rail
line.

Their work was interrupted by the Bolshevik Revolu-

tion.

The Stevens Commission proved to be the forerunner of

American intervention. 25
Various independent anti-Bolshevik forces contested
Soviet power all along the railway zone.

addition to General Dmitri

L.

Most noteworthy, in

Horvat of the Provisional (Ke-

rensky) government, who still claimed to be in authority,

were conservative naval officer Alexsander
the brutal Cossack chieftains
mikov.

V.

Kolchak, and

Gregorii Semenov and Ivan Kal-

Soon England, France and Japan aided and encouraged

these groups, the European allies trying vainly to revive
the eastern front, Japan attempting to sow discord in the

Far East.

Actually, these White factions were almost as

25ibid., pp. 8-10.

.
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opposed to one another as they were to the Bolsheviki
Throughout 1917 Wilson was urged

to help Russia re-

sist Germany by intervening in Siberia or by asking Japan to

intervene on the Allies' behalf.

Thus the idea of interven-

ing was not simply a response to the Bolshevik Revolution.

Although after the Brest talks and especially after the Ger-

man Spring offensive began, the appeals to intervene grew
There were also pleas to intervene from the var-

stronger.

ious American representatives in the Far East, most of these

men being influenced by their regular contact with the antiBolsheviks.

Wilson steadfastly resisted, his top military

advisers being opposed to it on military grounds, and there

being reluctance to encourage unilateral Japanese action.

27

One of the major Allied concerns in the Far East was
the huge cache of

x^7ar

supplies (four times the amount at Arch-

angel) being stored at Vladivostok.

As in the north this

materiel had been intended for Russia's use against Germany;

now it was feared that the Bolsheviki would transfer it into
German hands.

As Bolshevik power in Vladivostok grew, so did

Allied alarm.

In January, 1918, England and Japan sent war

ships to the port, and on March
U.

S.

S.

Brooklyn

28
.

26xbid., pp. 14-18.

27ibid., pp. 18-27.

^^Kennan, pp. 59, 61.

1

they were joined by the
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It might plausibly be asked how events in the
Far East

could have influenced the fighting on the eastern front many
thousands of miles away.

One answer is that there were an

estimated 1.6 million soldiers and officers of the Central
Powers being held as prisoners of war in Russia at the time
of the November Revolution, half of whom were in eastern Russia.

Actually, less than a tenth of these were Germans, the

bulk belonging to the various nationalities comprising the

Austro -Hungarian Empire.
At the time of the Brest treaty, rumor had it that the
P.

0.

W.'s were being re-armed by the Bolsheviki.

The Sov-

iets did in fact conduct a brief campaign to recruit these

men on the grounds that class solidarity cuts across national boundaries.

ports of a

P.

But this effort was not very successful; re0.

W.

threat were gross exaggerations fed by
Furthermore, there were more

anti-Bolshevik propaganda.

accurate reports of the P.O.W. situation available since two

first-hand investigations of the situation were conducted by
the United States in late March, 1918.

The data of both of these independent reports (although
the conclusions of one of them emphasized the potential

threat) contradicted the alarmist accounts being received by
the State Department.

Nevertheless, on March 24, Secretary

of State Lansing wrote the President that reports of "mili-

tary prisoners in Siberia

.

.

.

being organized under German

22Q

officers" persist, and because of this German
menace to the
Far East the United States should reconsider its
policy re-

garding Allied intervention.^^

Franco-British pressure on Wilson must have been intense, for on March

1,

the day the Brooklyn arrived in Vlad-

ivostok, the President agreed to acquiesce in a Japanese

landing in Siberia.

But only four days later Wilson reversed

himself, fearing that a Japanese intervention would drive

Russia into German hands, while United States approval would
damage America's moral standing.
But this decision did nothing to reduce Allied pressure
on Washington.

On April 5, Japan and England landed small

contingents of armed men in Vladivostok where Bolshevik

strength was growing.

The commander of the Brooklyn refused

to participate and Secretary of State Lansing turned down

another British plea for American involvement.

Meanwhile,

the Soviet leaders in Moscow were alarmed, believing that

the long-rumored full-scale Japanese intervention had begun.
Thus we may summarize the situation as of May, 1918, as
follows.

In the Far East Japan and England landed forces at

Vladivostok while the United States believed it had resisted

Allied pressure to participate.

In the Russian north, the

^^Ibid., pp. 71-81; Unterberger, pp. 45-47; United
States, Department of State, Foreign R elations of ^hp, IMited
The Lansing Papers. 1914-19 2^. 2 vols. (Washington:
States;
Government Printing Office, 1940), pp. 357-358.
30

Unterberger, pp. 30-33.

"
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Bolsheviki had virtual control over Archangel and were

busily moving its stores inland, while British forces had
landed at Murmansk with the approval of the local Soviet.

Allied activity in the north began to alarm Germany, leading her to pressure the Soviets into protesting these al-

leged violations of the Brest treaty.
The Soviets had resumed diplomatic relations with Germany, and as they gained confidence that Germany would not

destroy them, they rejected collaboration with the Entente.
On May 12 or 13, Lenin wrote that "we at the given moment
cannot enter on a military agreement with the Anglo-French
coalition.

32

Ironically, at the same time the United States attitude toward the Bolsheviks had hardened, as evidenced by
the recall of Red Cross chief Raymond Robins.

Despite the

favorable recommendation of his trusted aide, Colonel House,

Wilson rejected the British plan to send troops to Russia

with Soviet approval.

As we have seen, by May 12 or 13,

33
such Soviet agreement could no longer have been obtained.

At this time fighting on the western front was fierce,

the Germans having made considerable progress in their drive

toward Paris, with great losses on both sides.
31
32
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Kennan, pp. 245, 251, 258.
Ibid.

,

pp.

Ibid., pp.

127,

134.

128-129.

This undoubt-

2:2

edly led England to adopt in secret

a

plan to send an expe-

dition to the Russian north which was somehow to
be linked
up with anti-Bolshevik forces in Siberia in order
to recon-

stitute an eastern front,

France was much in favor of top-

pling the Soviets instead of collaborating with them. There
is no evidence that Washington was told of the plan.-^^

Without offering any details of their grand scheme for
fear of alienating the Americans, Great Britain stepped up
the pressure on the United States to intervene.

But when

the British began to speak of the north Russian and Siber-

ian interventions together, Secretary of State Lansing re-

torted that the United States considered them two separate
questions.

Lansing went on to say, as he described his con-

versation in a May 11 note to the President,
that intervention at Murmansk and Archangel would
receive far more favorable consideration on our
part than intervention in Siberia, for the reason
that vze could understand the military advantage
of the former but had been unable, thus far, to <,c
find any advantage in sending troops to Siberia.

On May 20 the President wrote Lansing that the two

questions "must not and cannot be confused and discussed to-

gether," and that his top military advisers thought it best

not to divert any American troops from the western front.
^^Ibid., pp. 263-66.
"^^United States, Foreign Relations,

^^

Lansing Papers

.

2:360-361.

1918, Russia,

2:160

.

In late May Washington was bombarded with
reports of

German encroachment in the Murmansk region coupled
with

British pleas for assistance.

Actually. Germany had step-

ped up its military and naval activity in the area in
response to the Allied buildup (!), but the reports received
by Washington greatly exaggerated the German threat.^''
Nevertheless, the reports must have had their effects,

because Lansing noted in a June

3

memo that President Wilson

was entirely willing to send troops to Murmansk
provided General Foch approved the diversion of
°
troops
.

.

.

French general Foch had recently been placed in command
of all Allied armies, and was actually in favor of interven-

tion against the Bolsheviki.

So when the Allied Supreme War

Council, General Tasker H. Bliss representing the United
States, adopted Joint Note No. 31 on June

3,

calling for an

Allied expedition to north Russia, it seemed that the die
had been cast.
Yet weeks of war-time confusion followed.

England de-

manded of Washington more troops than General Bliss thought
he had agreed to.

Washington was unsure of General Foch's

views on diverting men and ships from the western front
Finally, the senior military advisers opposed the expedition

^^ennan, pp. 269, 370.
^^United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, 2:48^
485.
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"None of us," Secretary of War Newton

D.

Baker confessed,

"can see the military value of the proposal

.

"-^^

Actually, during this period of poor inter-Allied com-

munication, American troops had already been landed on Russian soil.

We have noted the dispatch of an American ship

to Murmansk with instructions to obey the orders of the

British

admiral in promoting Allied interests (see p.

above)

So when English and French troops left the city to

.
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quell a Germane -Finnish threat, 150 United States marines

were put ashore on June 11 to replace them.

Since the local

Russians were collaborating with the Allies the Americans
did no fighting.

Incidentally, this collaboration between the Murmansk

soviet and the Allies had become by mid-June a real thorn
in the side of the Moscow Bolsheviki.

At first, Moscow

issued half-hearted protests against the Allied presence in
order to placate the Germans without alienating the Entente.
But now Murmansk's independence was a challenge to Moscow's

authority, and as suspicions regarding Allied motives grew,

her actions had become downright treasonous.

Thus, while

Washington procrastinated Murmansk had become more hospitable toward the Allies and more hostile toward the Bolshe-

^\ennan, pp. 366-69, 377-378,
^^Strakhovsky

,

Origins

,

p.

51.
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By the end of June the United States had ironed out its

differences with England regarding the Murmansk expedition.

Wilson personally decided to send three battalions --about
4,500 men--despite War Department opposition.

Secretary of

War Baker later wrote that he had convinced the President
"that it was unwise, but he told me," Baker explained,
that he felt obliged to do it anyhow because the
British and French were pressing it upon his attention so hard and he had refused so many of
their requests that they were beginning to feel
that he was not a good associate, much less a
.^^
good ally
.

.

.

Wilson's formal acquiescence did not come until July
17 in an Aide-M^moire to the Allies.

was made on August

3,

Public announcement

and a month later American troops ar-

rived in the freezing Russian north.

The July 17 Aide-M^m-

oire also announced America's decision to participate in a

multi-national Siberian expedition, and it is to the genesis
of this decision that we now turn.

One point seems clear:

the original motive for United States participation in the

.northern expedition was a desire to be a good ally and hope-

fully to combat German encroachment in the area.

Little

thought seems to have been given in Washington to the position of the Bolsheviki.
^•^Kennan, p.

371.

^^Ibid., p. 378.

,
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Recall that as of May, 1S18, the United States believed
it had closed the door on plans for a Siberian intervention,

declaring it unrelated to the north Russian question and of
even less military value.

And yet Washington was convinced

that something ought to be done to meet the threat of the

German P.O.W.'s and Bolsheviki-German collaboration (neither
of which were authentic threats) without encouraging Japanese

imperialism.

The final piece to the puzzle was supplied by the Czech

Legion in Russia in late May, 1918, (although Washington did
not become aware of the situation until mid- June.

Even be-

fore the World War there was a Czech colony in Russia, and a

Czech unit fought in the Czarist army.

When war ensued many

Czechs, ardent nationalists, deserted the Austro -Hungarian

army to fight on the Russian side, dreaming of an independent

Czech nation.

Czarist Russia, a multi-national empire, did

nothing to encourage national self-determination movements,
but the Kerensky government permitted the formation of a

Czech Corps
In February, 1918, when the German army began its ad-

vance in the Ukraine the Czechs resolved to cross Russia via
the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok where Allied .ships

were to transport them to France to fight on the western
front!

Units of this force of 70,000 began to move east with

hastily granted Soviet permission.

1

.

.
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The Czechs were the only stable fighting force loyal
to the Allies on the eastern front.

This fact seems to have

dawned upon the Bolsheviki and the Allies at roughly the
same time.

While England was proposing to the Allies that

the Czechs be used to reconstitute the eastern front (by

splitting the Corps and linking them with the Allies in the

north and the Japanese in the east) mutual animosity was
developing between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks
The Bolsheviks had second thoughts about permitting

such a heavily armed fighting force to traverse Russia and
so they tried to get them to give up some of their arms

The Czechs suspected that this action was German-inspired,

and anyway they still felt a sense of obligation to the Russian Whites who had encouraged their formation.

By the end

of May Czech-Bolshevik antagonism had ripened into armed hos-

tility all along the rail line.

This was the spark that

touched off the Russian Civil War.

43

During the month of June the Czechs seized control of

western Siberia, and the ten to fifteen thousand Czechs who
had already arrived at Vladivostok (where they found no Allied ships- to take them to France)

,

determined to move west-

ward to the aid of their fellow soldiers fighting the Reds.
Anti-Bolshevik Russians and Allied and American agents in
136-65; Unterberger, pp. 54-60; William
1917-192
2 vols.
H. Chamberlin, The Rus s ian Revo lut j-O"
Macmillan Co., 1935), 2:1-Z3.
(New York:
^•^Ibid.,

pp.

>

,

.
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Russia did everyting they could to encourage
the Czechs to
stay in Siberia and fight the Eolsheviki,
When a confused and somewhat distorted picture
of the
Czech situation trickled into Washington in
mid-June,

Presi-

dent Wilson, who was "sweating blood" over the
Siberian question, now moved toward a major decision.

introduced, in Lansing's words,

The Czech struggle

"a sentimental element,"

the perfect justification for intervention.

Three events

then took place around the end of June which clinched Wilson's
decision.

First was a message from Generalissimo Foch urging

United States support for an expedition to Siberia, which he
considered "a very important factor for victory."

This came

on the heels of a Japanese statement that it would not inter-

vene unilaterally in the Far East, but would only act after
agreement with the Allies and the United States.

July

2,

Finally, on

the State Department received a wire reporting the

overthrow of the Vladivostok Soviet by the Czechs and the
landing of armed detachments by Japan and England.

The com-

mander of the U.S.S, Brooklyn landed a small armed guard to
protect the American Consulate
On July

3

.

'^^

the Supreme War Council's lengthy plea for

^\ennan, pp. 381, 395.
^^Ibid., p. 391; Lansing; Papers 2:365; United States
Foreign Rerations, 1918, Russia, 2:235
,
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extensive intervention to "save the Czecho-Slovaks

.

"

insure

Allied control of Siberia "to the
Urals." and to recreate an

eastern front in order to "win the war in
1919{!}," arrived
at the State Department.
Three days later the President presented his plan for Siberia at a conference with Lansing
and
top military leaders
At this conference it was agreed
that

.

the establishment of an eastern front through
a military expedition, even if it was wise to
employ a large Japanese force, is physically
impossible ...

Furthermore, it was decided that the Czechs should be

aided by having Japan furnish small arms, by landing available forces to hold Valdivostok, and by assembling there a

force of 7000 Japanese and 7000 Americans in order to
guard the line of communication of the Czechoslovaks proceeding toward Irkutsk
.

.

.

Irkutsk, scene of clashes between the Czechs and the

Bolsheviks

,

was some 1500 miles west of Vladivostok on the

Trans-Siberian Railway.

Finally, it was agreed that the

United States and Japan would publicly announce their intention to aid the Czechs "against German and Austrian prisoners," and not to interfere in Russia's internal affairs or

impair her political or territorial sovereignty.

"

That same day the U.S.S. Brookl3m was told to hold

Valdivostok as a base of safety for the Czechs and "as

a

^%nited States Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia
46, 262-7^3:

2:241-

.
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means

oJ^

egress for them should the necessity arise.

"^-^

No-

where is there any mention of the Bolsheviki, the real adversaries of the Czechs.

The stated intention was to protect

the Czechs moving westward to help their compatriots

;

but

was this the aim of having them hold Siberia or ultimately
leave via Vladivostok for the western front?

The instruc-

tions to the Brooklyn (quoted above) suggest that they might

not be leaving, or at least not right away.
America's aims in Siberia seem to have been to thwart

both Japanese and alleged German designs in the area,

vzhile

hoping to mollify its interventionist war-time partners.
Little consideration was given to the Bolsheviks as an indigenous independent force in Russia; either they were under-

estimated or passed off as German collaborationists.

It is

clear that the United States had no intention of marching into central Russia to re-establish an eastern front.

On July 17 the United States announced its policy to
the Allies in President Wilson's Aide-M6moire

,

a summary and

paraphrase of which was made public two weeks later (August
3)

.

This document is a rather remarkable combination of Wil-

sonian idealism and misrepresentation of the situation in
Russia.

It begins by reaffirming America's dedication to win

the war against the Central Powers by fighting on the western
front, and rejects full-scale military intervention in Russia

^7ibid., p. 263.
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in order to bring her back into the war.

It goes on to ap-

prove "military action" in Russia, but
only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate
their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady
any efforts at self-government or self-defense
in which the Russians themselves may be willing
to accept assistance.
Whether from Vladivostok
or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American or Allied
troops can be employed ... is to guard military stores which may be subsequently needed
by Russian forces and to render such aid as
may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense.

The note concludes with a solemn pledge to the Russian

people not to interfere with Russia's political sovereignty,
nor intervene in her internal affairs
torial integrity.

,

nor impair her terri-

Finally, it calls upon "all associated

in this course of action" to grant the same assurances.

48

Most remarkable is the degree to which the Aide-Memoire
completely ignores the reality of Bolshevik power in Russia.

The fact is that Wilson could not help the Czechs without
opposing the Bolsheviki, against whom they were locked in

mortal combat.

And he could not "steady any efforts at

self-government" without choosing between communist and anticommunist factions.

There was in fact a flat contradiction

between the President's policy of aiding the Czechs and
"steadying" the Russians, and his pledge of non-interf erIbid., pp. 287-290.
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ence in Russia's internal affairs,

Wilson seems to have chosen this course as a compromise
between Anglo-French demands for large-scale military
inter-

vention to reestablish an eastern front and his own desire
to thwart the Germans without sanctioning unilateral
Japan-

ese action or diverting large numbers of American troops.
II.

Congress, the Bolsheviks and the Japanese

The United States Congress played little role in the

decision to intervene.

Back in March, 1918, when Wilson

first agreed to endorse a Japanese landing one Congressman

filed a resolution of protest, but this proved meaningless

when Wilson reversed himself a few days later.
above.)

(See p. 220,

That Spring the only other Congressional sentiment

regarding Russia, and one destined to grow in popularity,
was that the Bolsheviks were German agents actively betraying the Russian people.

49

By the first week in June, when talk of intervention

and perhaps an economic commission to Russia was in the air.

Republicans began making public speeches favoring intervention.

The Administration feared that Russia would become

a partisan issue.

On June 10, Senator King of Utah, a Icyal

Wilsonian Democrat, offered
49 56 Cong.

Rec.

a

proposal for an anti-German

2590-2591, 3028, 3030 (1918)

.
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propaganda commission and an Allied-Japanese-American
military expedition to go to Russia. The resolution
died
in

the Foreign Relations Committee.
In late June the recalled Red Cross chief, Raymond

Robins, arrived in Washington anxious to warn against inter-

vention and to promote his plan for economic cooperation

with the Bolsheviks.

He found mistrust of the Soviets so

great, however, that he was forced to work through his old

political friends, Progressive Republican Senators William
E.

Borah of Idaho and Hiram Johnson of California.

The lat-

ter tried to soften the increasingly strident anti-Bolshe-

vism of some of their colleagues
There was no further Congressional action on Russia
that Summer and Fall, during which time United States troops

were dispatched.

By September, 1918, when the American

forces landed in Russia (4500 at Archangel, under British
command, and 9000 at Vladivostok under General William

S.

Graves) a number of realities imposed themselves upon Wilson's fanciful plans.

52

First, there were no supplies left to guard at Arch-

angel where the Bolsheviki had been overthrown by the Brit^^Ibid., p.

7557; Kennan, pp. 385-386, note 7, p. 386.

^^Williams, p. 146; 56 Cong. Rec. 9053-58 (1918).

^\ennan, pp. 379, 414; United States Foreign Relations
1918. Russia, 2:346.

,
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ish in early August, because the Soviets had
removed them
to the interior.

Second, there were no Germans to defend

against in north Russia, and so, subject to British
command, the Americans were used to chase the Bolsheviks
south.

Russia was now torn by full-scale civil war, in which the
Allies, Czechs

and various White factions opposed the Reds

who had control over central Russia. '^^
Third, the Japanese, who were pursuing their own in-

terests in the Far East, rapidly escalated their troop

strength (to over 70,000 by November) thus alarming Washington.

Japanese policies, which were designed to promote un-

rest in the region, soon came into conflict with American

plans to insure the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

The American policy, incidentally, worked to the advantage
of the White Russians, who depended upon the rail system for

their supplies.
Fourth, on November 11, 1918, a scant two months after
the Americans landed in Russia, Germany signed an armistice

effectively ending the First World War.

Thus the Expeditions

quickly lost whatever justifications they may have had in
terms of an anti-German effort.

A new sentiment--isolation-

ism, or withdrawal from the world's strif e--arose to com-

pete with anti-Bolshevism.

^\ennan, pp. 419, 424-27.
^\nterberger

,

pp.

105, 231,

117.
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Anti-Bolshevism received a shot in the arm when,
in
the late Summer and Autumn of 1918 the
Soviets officially
sanctioned a terror campaign to be conducted by
the Cheka
against suspicious elements of the Russian population.

(Ac-

tually, the Whites launched an equally bloody reign
of ter-

ror during the Russian Civil War, but anti-communist
propa-

gandists in America

played this down.)

Furthermore, on Sep-

tember 15 the Administration released the Sisson Documents,

purporting
agents.

to prove that the Bolsheviks were really German

(See p.

212,

above.

Anti-Bolshevism was reflected in the Senate resolution
offered by King of Utah, which after condemning the Bolsheviks as pro-German traitors called for recognition of the
(White) Kolchak government at Omsk and an Allied-American

expedition to aid Russia and "overthrow Bolshevist tyranny
and anarchy."

The proposal never got past the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee.

Meanwhile the end of the war was an understandable
blow to American troop morale.

American soldiers in Russia,

who never understood why they were sent there in the first
place, grew especially restive after the Armistice.

But by

this time, the port at Archangel was frozen and the Japanese-

American rivalry in the Far East was at its worst.

In

addi-

tion, Wilson wished to consult with the Allies before making

^^Chamberlin, 2:66-83; Williams, p. 155
^^56 Cong. Rec. 11609 (1918).
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any policy changes.

As a result, the Russian question was

postponed until the Paris Peace Conference was
convened in
January, 1919.^'^

Wilson was inclined to withdraw from north Russia,
balance off the Japanese in Siberia, and leave the
general piob-

lem of Russia to his proposed League of Nations,

But the

European Allies were alarmed by the specter of Bolshevism;
they feared the spread of communism in the Balkans as a result of the power vacuum created by the defeat of the Cen-

tral Powers.

Churchill, Foch, Clemenceau and elements in

the State Department favored crushing the Bolsheviks and

dismembering Russia, or establishing a cordon of non-communco

1st states to surround her.

Wilson, spurred on by the War Department and the rising

tide of isolationism in the Congress, repeatedly opposed en-

larging the intervention, or creating a cordon.

He sup-

ported Lloyd George's proposal for a conference of the Soviets, Whites and Allies.

But the conference, set to be held

on the Prinkipo Islands, never came off because Churchill

and various French anti-communists undermined it by convinc^^Leonid I. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel
Princeton University Press, 1944), pp.
(Princeton, N.J.:
104-105; John M. Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the VerPrinceton University Press,
sailles Peace (Princeton, N J
1966), pp. 49-50, note 39, p. 50.
.
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Thompson, pp. 49-61.
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ing the Whites that they need not attend.

On the other hand, Wilson openly supported the
White
leader, Admiral Kolchak, just short of formal recognition.
In addition, he scuttled a secret mission to the Soviets

conducted by William

C.

Bullitt which might have resulted

in a modus vivendi with the Bolsheviks.

(Lenin was willing

at the start of 1919 to agree to "a second Brest," i.e.,

concessions to buy time.)

These acts, hostile to the Sov-

iets, reflected Washington's distaste for Bolshevik extrem-

the growth of the Red Scare in America, and the desire

ism,

to cooperate with the Allies who were alariaed by the commun-

ist ascension to power in Hungary and the left-wing Sparta-

cist movement in Germany.

On December 12, 1918, a month after the Armistice, Senator Johnson of Calif ornia launched a Congressional effort
to end the American intervention in Russia.

He proposed a

resolution calling for all documents bearing on Russo-American relations "so that the Senate and the Jfation may know

why

.

.

.

Johnson argued that

oursoldiers are in Russia."

"what actually exists is war, and yet

tion of war by the Congress."

I

know of no declara-

61

^^Ibid., pp. 35, 101, 122-24, 145. 375.
^^Ibid., pp. 164, 235, 307.
^^57 Cong. Rec. 342-44 (1918).
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On December 30 Senator Townsend of Michigan reported

hundreds of complaints from relatives and friends of soldiers who had enlisted to fight Germany, but were now being

kept in Russia.

In the House, Lundeen of Minnesota intro-

duced a resolution instructing the President to withdraw
all troops in Russia; this went to the Foreign Affairs Com-

mittee on January

1919,

4,

Three days later, in a Senate

speech, LaFollette of Wisconsin asked why United States

armed forces were "making war upon Russia."

On January 13,

Senator Johnson introduced another measure calling for withdrawal from Russia "as soon as practicable."

When it came

to a floor vote a month later the Senate split evenly and

the Vice-President had to cast the deciding negative vote.

Finally, a February

1

House resolution, also sentenced to

a committee death, warned the President that he was "with-

out authority of law" to dispatch armed forces "except to

protect American lives and property."

62

Although the Republicans were strengthened after the
Congressional elections of November, 1918, a combination of

Democratic partisans and militant anti-Bolsheviks helped
stem the growing anti-Expedition mood.

(The ant i- Bolsheviks,

led by Senator McCumber of North Dakota, made wild speeches

against the "arch-beasts" Lenin and Trotsky who "sold out"
62

Ibid., pp. 864, 1060, 1101, 1313, 2544, 2566, 3342.
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to Germany.

This culminated in the Overman Committee hear-

ings on German and Bolshevik propaganda in the
Spring of
1919.

These hearings gave some legitimacy to even the most

outrageous anti-Bolshevik charges.

)^-^

Although the 65th Congress adopted no anti-Expedition
measures, Senator Johnson's efforts were not without effect.

Wilson considered, then dropped, a plan to fully explain
his Siberian policy to Johnson's committee.
late January, 1919.

This was in

On February 18, a letter to the chair-

man of the Congressional military committees was made public
announcing the withdrawal of Americans from north Russia "at
the earliest possible moment that weather conditions in the

spring will permit."

All American soldiers were evacuated from north Russia
by June 30, 1919.

But the Administration refused to with-

draw from Siberia for fear of the Japanese threat to the
Open Door.

The 66th Congress bottled up various proposals

to force withdrawal from Siberia as well.
27,

However, on June

1919, the day before the formal signing of the Treaty

of Versailles, the Senate approved another Johnson resolu-

tion calling upon the President to "inform tiie Senate of the

^%illiams,

p.

164; Schuman, pp.

123-25.

^^Unterberger, pp. 136-137; United States, Department
of State, Foreig n Relations of th e United States 1919, RusGovernment Printing Ottice, 1361), p. 6i/T
sia (Washington:
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reasons for sending" and maintaining United States
soldiers
in Siberia.

The President sent a message to the Senate a

month later explaining that troops were originally sent to
aid the Czechs against enemy P.O.W.'s and to steady Russian
efforts at self-defense, but were now necessary to maintain
the operation of the Trans-Siberian Railways upon which the

Siberian population and Admiral Kolchak are "entirely dependent" for supplies.

Aside from the fact that the White House reiterated the
false tale of the German P.O.W. threat, the most glaring as-

pect of the message is the absence of even a hint of concern
over Japan's role.

It was not until August 1919 that an

Assistant Secretary of State informed a House committee of
this angle.

By the summer of 1919, isolationist sentiment

had surpassed even anti -Bolshevik feeling in America.

But

more important, Kolchak 's White army had suffered major reverses that Slimmer and autumn.

And in November of 1919,

when Omsk, the Admiral's "capital," fell to the Red Army his
defeat was imminent.

Kolchak 's collapse and the advance of the Red Army into
Siberia where contact with American forces seemed likely was
the main factor in the decision to end the Far Eastern Expe-

^^Thompson, p. 219; 58 Cong. Rec. 1864 (1919).

^%nterberger, pp. 138-40; Chamberlin,

2

:

191-203
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dition.

On December 23, 1919, Secretary of State
Lansing

wrote the President that "if we do not withdraw
we shall
have to wage war against the Bolsheviki." On
January 9,
1920, Japan was informed that the United States intended
to withdraw its men,

and by April

1

the last contingent of

Americans had sailed away from Valdivostok
The Russian Interventions and the Constitution
At the start of this study we noted a need to answer

several questions in order to assess the constitutionality
of President Wilson's actions.

(See p

.

206,

above.)

VJere

the expeditions aimed at defeati-ng Germany, against which

Congress had declared war?

In regard to north Russia the

answer is yes; in Siberia we can offer a qualified yes at
best.

This is because we do not know how sincere the United

States was when it publicly justified its action on the

ground of the German war prisoner threat in Siberia.
On the one hand we know that Washington had contradic-

tory (and more accurate) reports available if the decision-

makers had only wished to consult them.

On the other hand,

war-time confusion and stress was responsible for various
errors in judgment based upon faulty factual accounts.

For

example, the decision on north Russia was predicated upon
^^ Lansing Papers 2:392-393; Unterberger, pp.

178,

183.
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the absolutely false assumptions that the German
threat to

the region was grave and imminent, and that the
Bolsheviki

were transferring the Archangel stores to the Germans.
However, if we look beyond intentions, it is clear that
the Russian expeditions developed into something far removed

from any anti-German effort.

vik and anti-Japanese.

They were in fact anti-Bolshe-

Thus, troops ostensibly mobilized

against the enemy in a declared war ended up being used for
an entirely different purpose.

Actually, they v^ere used to

thwart a professed ally of the United States, Japan, and a

major faction in the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviki.
Hence, even if we grant that the President has the au-

thority to commit troops to a new theater of war pursuant
to a Congressional declaration of war, need we grant as well

his authority to use those troops for an entirely different

purpose, against another enemy once that war ends?

Several

additional facts should be considered.

Regarding the north Russian affair, Wilson was truly
misinformed, and when the Armistice was agreed to in November,

1918, the port was too frozen to evacuate the troops.

The next June (1919)
removed.

,

following the thaw, the Americans were

Nevertheless, while there they did help secure

the region against the Red Army, losing 144 men and taking

over 300 casualties in the fighting.
^^R. Ernest Dupuy and William H. Baumer, The Little Wars
of the United States (New York: Hawthorne Books, 196b) p. i^U.
,
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In Siberia, by contrast, although American troops re-

mained for one and a half years they did little fighting
except for skirmishes against Red bands along the rail line

which they were ordered to protect.

General Graves, the

American commander, was so steadfastly neutral pursuant to
his orders that he became the target of much criticism from

ardent anti-Bolsheviks in the State Department as well as

White Russians.

Afterwards Graves wrote as follows.

The United States never entered into a state of
War with Russia, or any faction of Russia.
It
was equally as unconstitutional to use American
troops in hostile action in Siberia against any
faction of Russia, as it would have been to {use}
them in hostile action against the R.ussians.
.

.

.

The General went on to deny a New York Times report
that his troops were "fighting the Red armies."
If I had permitted American troops to be used
in fighting 'Red armies,' as stated, I would
have taken an immense responsibility upon myself, as no one above me, in authority, had
The fact that I did
given me any such orders
not permit American troops to be so used was
responsible for nine-tenths of the criticism
directed against us, while in Siberia.
.

Thus, we are left with the paradox that troops sent to

north Russia to defend against Germany were used to fight the
Bolsheviki, while the forces sent to aid the Czechs and guard
the rail line in Siberia avoided fighting them.

Therefore it

would seem that the President stood on firm legal ground when
Graves, p. 93.
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he ordered troops to the north, but not when he permitted

them to fight the Reds under British command.

In contrast,

while his authority to send troops to Siberia was doubtful,
it could hardly be said that they were engaged in a "war"

against the Bolsheviks.
The question of Congressional action is more clear-cut.

There is no evidence that Congress participated at all in
the decision to dispatch troops.

Actually Congress was

never told why armed forces were sent to north Russia, and
it was not informed of the real policy in Siberia until a

year after the troops arrived.

Debates in Congress indicate

that up until the time when they were so informed supporters
of the expeditions assumed they were designed to overthrow

the Bolsheviks who were considered to be German agents.

Legislative debates indicate scarcely a challenge to
the President's authority, although there were increasing

attacks on the wisdom of his Russian policy after the Armistice.

The only definitive Congressional action, however,

for
was approval of Hiram Johnson's rather discreet request

information on United States policy in Siberia.

Resolutions

never came
ordering withdrawal were either defeated or else
to a floor vote.

between the
The last question concerns the relationship
As noted
law.
United States and Russia in international
a warthe United States considered Russia
(p. 213,

above),
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ally but refused to recognize the Soviet government.

It

even went so far as to approve a formal agreement with the

renegade regional Soviet at Murmansk on October 14, 1918,
and publicly announced its willingness to assist Admiral Kol-

chak on June 13, 1919.

The former, entered into as it was

with a regional government, had dubious validity in international law; the latter fell short of de facto recognition .70
Thus the United States recognized no government in Russia other than the defunct Kerensky regime, with which it

maintained the fiction of "diplomatic relations" for many
years.

The official American claim of non-interference in

Russia's internal affairs rested upon the corresponding legal

fiction that the Soviet government did not exist.

How then does this episode affect the war -making powers
of the President?

It is a precedent for the use of armed

forces in a manner inconsistent with, and perhaps intended
to be inconsistent with, a prior declaration of war by the

Congress.

This is partially mitigated by the possibility

that the President may have indeed intended to pursue the

policy established by Congress (i.e., war against Germany).
The historical record is ambiguous here.
^Quhit ed States Foreign Relations 1918. Russia 2:556Russia pp. 378,
57; United States roreign Relations. i9iV,
,

,

386.

^•Charles G. Fenwick, International Law
Appleton-Century-Crofts, lyb!); p.
York:
,

p.

192.

,

4th ed. (New
and note 37,

.
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Second, it is a precedent for Presidential
decision to

use the armed forces without the prior approval
of Congress.

Again such approval would not be necessary if these
forces
were intended for use against Germany, the declared enemy.
Finally,

(disregarding the original motives), it is an

example of the Presidential use of American troops to effect
a policy without informing the Congress over an extended

period of time of the true aims of the policy.

Congress, of

course, knew of the ant i -Bolshevik nature of United States

policy, but because they were not fully informed the legis-

lators gave this factor more weight than it deserved.

One

historian observed that "Wilson's supporters in Congress

.

.

.

knew no more about the policy than did the opposition. "^^
In sum, in the Russian interventions, the President

used troops originally deployed pursuant to a Congressional
declaration of war in military operations
tice ending the war has been agreed to,

(1)

(2)

after an armis-

to aid or thwart

various factions of foreign armies involved in the civil war
of a third state,

policy aims, and

without fully informing Congress of the

(3)
(4)

without subsequent formal Congressional

approval
^^Unterberger

,

p.

136,
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CHAPTER VII
THE KOREAN WAR
I.

Background
The mountainous Korean peninsula, which juts out of

tne Manchurian (Chinese) mainland had been annexed by Japan
in 1910 with covert American agreement obtained five years

earlier.

The fiercely independent Koreans remained part of

the Japanese Empire until the end of World War Two.

During

the War the Allies vowed to liberate them and grant inde-

pendence "in due course" (Cairo, 1943).

Privately, Presi-

dent Roosevelt favored a period of Allied trusteeship.'^

Actually little thought had been given to tiny Korea,
and when Japan capitulated in August 1945, the United States
and its ally, the Soviet Union, immediately agreed to divide
the peninsula in order to facilitate acceptance of the

Japanese surrender.
north,

The Russians would operate in the

the Americans in the south.

At the suggestion of a

young military officer named Dean Rusk, the 38th parallel.

Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A Military-Political
University of Pennsylvania Press,
Soon Sung Cho Korea in World
31-37;
26-27,
1957)
pp. 15,
of American Responsibil Evaluation
An
1940-1950:
Politics
University of California Press, 1967), pp.
ity (Berkley:
Ii-23.

History (Philadelphia:
,

,

^

2^:S

running across the middle of the country was adopted as a
dividing line.

2

Although unprepared for occupation, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge landed the first 72,000 Americans in the

south Korean zone in September 1943.

Hodge received orders

from General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo, Commander in Chief
Far East and Supreme Commander Allied Powers.

The Russians

had already placed an estimated 125,000 men north of the
38th parallel.-^
The Americans almost immediately alienated the

Koreans by keeping on the hated Japanese civil servants and
by insisting that the United States military was the sole

governing authority in its zone.

By contrast, the better-

informed Russians expropriated the Japanese and let indigenous administrative organizations function, while placing

Soviet-trained Korean communists returning from the Russian
Far East into positions of power.

Realizing that the division of the country was unnatural, unpopular and economically disastrous, the United

States sought Soviet cooperation in replacing the zonal

arrangement with a trusteeship.

An agreement was worked out

^Cho, pp. 53-55; Dean Acheson, Present at the Crea My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W.
tion:
Norton and Company, A Signet Book, 1969), p. 581.
^Cho, pp.

62-63, note

^Ibid., pp.

61-62,

5,

68-70,

p.

63.

79,

81-82. 88.

^

in Moscow in late December 1945 calling for a four-power

trusteeship of five years' duration and a provisional Korean
government, all to be implemented by a joint Soviet-American
Commission.

Meeting on and off from January 1946 through the
summer of 1947, the Joint Commission accomplished next to

nothing principally because the Americans and the Russians

were unable to agree on the Korean groups to be consulted.
The Russians were of course partial to communists and leftists,

the Americans to moderates.

It was gradually becom-

ing clear that both sides preferred two Koreas rather than

one wholly communist or anti- communis t nation.

Throughout 1946-1947, the situation in the south
Long-time nationalist Syngman Rhee organized

deteriorated.

right-wing factions against trusteeship, favoring instead
immediate independence.

Leftists staged frequent revolts

which Hodge openly suppressed.

Inflation raged.

The United

States sought a way out without compromising its newly

adopted (spring 1947) policy of containing Communism.'^
After a fact-icinding mission in the summer of 1947,
General Albert

C.

Wedemeyer recommended building up a south

Korean army and arranging with the Union of Soviet
100-103.

^Ibid.

,

pp.

92-95,

^Ibid.

,

pp.

119.

1Z3,

146-50.

^Ibid., pp.

106.

133,

152,

165.

193.

.
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Socialist Republics for mutual troop withdrawals.

In

September 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised
President

Truman that from a "military security" standpoint the

United States has "little strategic interest" in maintaining ground troops in Korea, unless as a consequence of

withdrawal, "the Soviets establish military strength in
south Korea capable of mounting an assault on Japan. "^
The United States therefore undertook to establish

an independent south Korea with United Nations support.

In

the north the pro-Soviet conununists, led by Kim Il-sung had

already solidified their power in 1946 with the aid of

Russian advisors.

They undertook popular land reform, and

thus laid the groundwork for a stable communist state.

The

contrast with the chaotic southern zone embarrassed the

United States

9

In the fall of 1947, the United States brought the

Korean question to the United Nations, which America dominated.

Over Soviet objections and refusal to participate,

the United Nations General Assembly approved establishing
a Temporary Commission (UNTCOK)

elections (November 1947)

.

to oversee nationwide

The Soviets countered (unsuc-

cessfully) with a proposal for simultaneous withdrawal of

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs vol. 2: Years of Trial
Doubleday and Company, 19:36), pp.
and Hope (New York:
325-326.
,

9

Cho, pp.

12/-31,

166.
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all foreign troops.

It was embarrassing for the United

States to reject the popular Russian resolution, but there

was reluctance to withdraw until a native army was developed
in the south.

''"^

Barred from the north, UNTCOK's thirty observers

watched over elections in the American zone, May

10,

1948.

Rhee's party gained a plurality; a constitution was adopted
in July, and in that month the Assembly chose Rhee Presi-

dent of the Republic of Korea (ROK)

Koreans conducted a purge, prepared

Meanwhile the north

.

a

constitution and held

elections of their own, thus establishing the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

.

As of September 1948,

there were two Koreas.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea then in-

vited all foreign troops to leave the peninsula.

The Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics accepted, withdrawing by the

end of December 1948, though leaving behind advisors and

pro-Soviet Koreans in all major positions of power.

In

March 1949, the National Security Council recommended complete United States evacuation by the end of June of that
year, except for a five hundred-man military advisory

'^Ibid.

,

pp.

180-181.

^^Ibid.
pp. 208-12; Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko,
The World and United States Foreign
Power:
The Limits of
Harper and Row Pub 1 i s her s
Policy, 1945-1954 (Nev; York:
Inc., 1^72), pp. 297-298.
,

,
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group, and military aid for the Republic of Korea for fiscal 1950.

President Truman approved.

''^

The Republic of Korea army was built up, although

inadequately supplied, from 18-20,000 men in the spring of
1948 to 98,000 at the outbreak of the war two years later.

Offensive weapons, i.e., tanks, heavy artillery, fighter
planes, were withheld.

In response to the President's re-

quest in June 1949, $150 million in economic aid was
granted.

But in January 1950 the House defeated by a nar-

row margin a request for a $60 million supplement.

How-

ever, Congress passed the measure a month later when it was

tied in with aid to Formosa.

Finally, as part of the

United States communist containment policy, Korea was
granted over $10.9 million in March 1950, almost none of

which had arrived when the war broke out. 13
Congressional reluctance to aid Korea could be
traced to:

(1)

dissatisfaction with the Administration's

China policy, i.e., refusal to help Chiang Kai-shek regain

mainland China where he had lost all power by 1949;
(2)

partisan politics, viz., the bulk of the opposition

was Republican;

(3)

^^Cho, pp.

fiscal conservatism; and (4) fear that

213-214,

233-234.

^"^Ibid., pp. 249, 251, 253-254; Kolko, p. 558;
Truman, p. 329; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New
The Free Press, 1968), pp. 35, 70.
York:

.
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the aid would end up in conmunist hands anyway
when the

shaky Republic of Korea collapsed '^
.

Less is known about Russian aid to the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea.

By June 1950,

their army had

been built up to over 135,000, including 16,000 veterans
of Chinese Communist or Soviet campaigns.

They had had a

large number of Soviet military advisors, and were supplied

with planes, tanks and heavy artillery.

Thus,

they were

both better trained and better equipped than the South
Koreans.

In his memoirs, Nikita Krushchev declares that

Kim II- sung initiated the idea of attacking South Korea at
a meeting with Stalin in Moscow in late 1949.

Although

Stalin reportedly "had his doubts," he encouraged Kim,
hoping a swift victory would preclude United States intervention.

At the last minute, Stalin withdrew the Soviet

advisors, fearing that their capture would provide evidence
of Russian participation.'^^

Meanwhile, the Cold

VJar

received new impetus as

Americans were shocked to learn that the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics exploded an atom bomb in August 1949.

^^Cho, pp.
p.

241-242; Paige, pp.

35-36,

68;

Kolko,

569.

255-57; Edward Crankshaw, Krushchev
Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970) pp
The
367-70; Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu:
The
York:
(New
Decision to Enter the Korean War
Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 38.
'"^Cho,

pp.

,
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Two months later the Chinese communists proclaimed
their

People's Republic.

In a speech to the National Press Club

on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson tried
to explain Chiang Kai-shek's collapse and the United

States' refusal to alienate China by aiding the Nationalists

.

Acheson went on to describe the United States
"defensive perimeter" in the Pacific, including the

Philippines and Japan, but excluding both Formosa and
Korea.

This was a reiteration of a position taken by

General MacArthur in 1949.

Pacific areas outside the

defense perimeter, Acheson said, cannot be guaranteed
against attack; if invaded they must rely first upon their
1

own ability to resist, and then upon the United Nations.
The sense of United States ambivalence regarding

South Korea's defense was heightened by the comment of

Senator Tom Connally (D-Tex.), chairman of the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee and an unofficial spokesman
for the Truman administration.

Connally told an inter-

viewer in May 1950 he was afraid that the United States

would have to seriously consider abandoning Korea because
Russia was in a position to "overrun" her and Formosa
"when she gets ready to do

pp.

^^Paige, pp.
259-260.
17

Paige, p.

57,

68.

it."''"^

67;

Acheson, pp. 463-66; Cho,

c

.

The Democrats' Far East Policy and the people who

made it came under increasingly emotional attack in early
Former State Department employee Alger Hiss was

1950.

convicted for perjuring himself when he denied passing

government papers to the Soviet Union.

Hiss'

conviction

in late January was followed by Senator Joseph R.

McCarthy's (R-Wis

.

)

employed communists.

charge that the State Department

Later McCarthy added that the

Department's "softness" on communism caused the "loss" of
China.

"^^

While the Administration publicly defended itself
against McCarthy and the "China lobby," it was privately

developing a major new defense policy, NSC- 68, which was

premised upon global threat presented by the Soviet Union.
NSC-68 would require defense budget increases three to
four times current levels

19

It was in this atmosphere of intensifying Soviet-

American hostility, and increasing polarization between
Congressional Republicans and the Democratic administration
that North Korea attacked across the 38th parallel, June
24,

II.

1950, Washington time.

The Korean War

United States Ambassador John

J.

Mmccio's cable,

which concluded that an "all-out offensive against the
^^Acheson, pp. 469-74; Paige, pp. 37-41.
^^Acheson, pp. 488-92; Paige, pp. 58-61.

1
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Republic of Korea" had been launched, caught Washington
by
surprise.

Spring intelligence reports of a possible

invasion had been discounted either because they were con-

tradictory or because they had heretofore cried wolf too
often.

Furthermore, the State Department, which immediately

viewed the attack as an example of "Soviet probing," had
expected the challenge to come first in areas other than
Korea. 20
It was immediately decided to work through the

United Nations by requesting an emergency session of the
Security Council.

The Soviet Union had been boycotting the

Council since January 1950, condemning its actions as
illegal as long as the Nationalists rather than the Com-

munists occupied China's seat there.

Without a Soviet veto,

the Council was to become a weapon of American diplomacy--

leading some historians to view the boycott as a major

Russian blunder, others to see proof that the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea acted rather independently.

2

Following President Truman's approval, the United
Nations Security Council resolved on June 25 that "forces
20

Paige, pp.

91,

97-98; John W.

Spanier, The

Truman -Mac Arthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge,
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
Mass.:
1959), pp. 21-22; Acheson, p. 527.
21

Paige, pp. 92-93; Acheson, pp. 466, 525; Whiting,
note
10, p. 182, I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of
p. 39,
the Ko rean War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1^59;,

.

from North Korea" had committed a "breach of the peace"
against the Republic of Korea.

It called for a "cessation

of hostilities," a withdrawal of northern forces to the
38th, and the assistance of all members in executing the

above while refraining from aiding the North.
That evening,

(June 25), President Truman met at

Blair House with State and Defense Department officials
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The "common conviction"

was that this was aggression analogous to pre-World War
Two instances.

Truman later recalled thinking on the

plane to Washington earlier that day that "Communism was
acting in Korea just as Hitler, Mussolini and the Japanese

had acted

.

.

.

,"

and if unchallenged. Communist leaders

"would be emboldened. "^^
At the conference most of Secretary Acheson's

proposals were adopted.

A crash program of military aid

over and above Congressional authorization, air cover for
the evacuation of American civilians, and the despatch of

the Seventh Fleet toward the region were approved.

The

conferees "had no doubt whatever" that the Soviet Union was
9L

behind this whole affair.
^^Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of United
Council on
States Policy in the United Nations (New York:
Krauss'
York:
New
ed.
reprint
Foreign Relations, 1956;
Reprint Co., 1972), pp. 221-222.
,

23

Truman, p. 333; Paige,

^Saige,

pp.

127.

132,

p.

137.

137-40.

"
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The next morning, Monday, June 26, the Defense and

State Department Secretaries, scheduled to testify before
a Senate committee regarding the Far East, did so, but

refused to discuss possible courses of action in Korea.
At the same time Senator Tom Connally was assuring

President Truman, at the White House, that he had the
authority to commit American forces in Korea without prior

Congressional consent.

Connally recalled comparing the

situation to that of a burglar entering your house; you
can shoot him, he claims to have told the President, without going to the police station for permission.

He then

added that a '"long debate in Congress'" might "'tie your
hands completely.

You have the right to do it as Commander-

in-Chief and under the United Nat ions Charter

.

'

25

Shortly before noon the President issued his first

public statement.

It promised vigorous support of the

United Nations resolution and a step-up in aid to Korea,
and closed by warning "those responsible for this act of

aggression" that the United States views such threats to

world peace "seriously."

26

In the Congress that Monday afternoon,

the

Republicans continued their attacks against the State
Department, adding a warning against indecisiveness in

.

pp.

146-147, 149

'^^Ibid.,

pp.

149-150.

^^Ibid.

"

25"^

Korea.

In the evening, at a second Blair House meeting,
an

alarming cable from General MacArthur was read.

It said

that North Korean tanks were entering the suburbs of Seoul,
the Republic of Korea capital, that the situation was

"rapidly deteriorating," and that "a complete collapse is
imminent

.

27

Once again the Blair group adopted Acheson's
proposals.

This time there would be full naval and air

support for the South Koreans limited to the area south
of the 38th parallel.

The Seventh Fleet would be inter-

posed between Formosa and mainland China to prevent a new

outbreak of fighting between the Nationalists and Communists.

This was intended to confine the area of conflict

to Korea, but it meant the end of United States noninvolve-

ment in the Chinese civil war.

It also

al

ted Mao

Tse-tung's plans to conquer the island in 1950.

Finally,

United States forces on the Philippines were to be
strengthened, a military mission was to go to Indochina,
28
and both areas would receive increased aid.

General MacArthur received orders to commit United
States air and naval forces to Korea at his headquarters in
Tokyo.

The President telephoned Senator Connally to inform

him, but it was not until the following morning (June 27)
27

Ibid., pp.

^^Paige, pp.

151-54; Truman, p.
161-79; Whiting, p.

337.
22.
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that Truman met with fourteen Congressmen, including five

Republicans, whom he had selected.

Upon Acheson's advice,

it was decided not to seek a joint resolution of support

from the Congress in order to avoid partisan criticism or
general discussion of the costs or consequences of intervention. 29

Truman read the Congressmen his soon- to-be-released
public statement, told them there were no plans to commit

ground troops, and received their support.

His statement

noted the Security Council resolution, condemned "Communism"
for going beyond subversion to armed force in order to conquer, and declared:

have ordered United States air and sea forces
to give the Korean Government troops cover and
support 30
I

.

In the Congress that day there was general support

for Truman's action, although Republican Senators Kem

(Missouri) and Watkins (Utah) questioned his authority to
act without Congressional approval.

Senator Morse (R-Ore.)

defended the "broad powers" of the President as Commanderin-Chief.

On the House side, only Representative

Marcantonio of New York,

a

member of the left-wing American

Labor Party, accused the President of usurping the war-

making power with Congressional acquiescence; he denied
^"^Faige,

pp.

^^Paige, pp.

181-182,

187.

188-91; Truman, pp. 338-339.

"
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that the United Nations Charter provided adequate
author-

The House then approved the controversial peace-time

ity.

extension of the draft.

-^^

Finally, in the afternoon (of June 27), with the

Soviets still absent, the Security Council approved a
second resolution on Korea.

Noting non-compliance with its

earlier request, the Council then recommended:
that Members of the United Nations furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea
as may be necessary to repel the armed
attack and to restore international peace
and security in the area. 32

Of course the United States, as the Russians later

took pains to point out, had already begun its "assistance

.

On Wednesday, June 28, response to the Administration's action continued to be, as one analyst concludes,

"overwhelmingly favorable."
time,

That same day, Washington

General MacArthur, on his own initiative, authorized

air strikes against military targets north of the 38th

parallel.

In the Senate,

the leader of the conservative

wing of the Republican Party, Robert Taft of Ohio, attacked
the Administration on constitutional grounds.

196-200;
9268 (1950).

-^•^Paige,

9231,

9233,

pp.

^^Paige, pp.

96 Cong.

204-205.

^^Ibid., pp. 212-213, 230, 216.

Rec.

33

9228-9229,

26'!

Taft said he supported intervention in Korea,
and

would vote for a joint resolution to that effect if
offered.
But, he charged,

there has been "no pretense" of consulting

Congress, and so the President lacks legal authority.

The

President has brought about "a de facto war with the

Government of northern Korea

.

without consulting

.

.

Congress and without congressional approval."

"Presidents have

.

.

intervened with

American lives or interests
claimed that

.

.

.

.

.

I

.

.

Although

forces to protect

do not think it has been

the President has any right to precipi-

tate any open warfare."

As for the United Nations Charter, a special agree-

ment, subject to legislative approval must be negotiated

with the Security Council before the United States could be
obligated to supply troops, Taft reasoned.

Therefore the

Charter could not provide the President with authority.
Thus, he concluded,

if the legislature does not protest

Truman's action it will have "finally terminated for all
time the right of Congress to declare war

."-'^
.

.

Majority leader Lucas of Illinois then rose to
defend the President's right to act as Commander-in-Chief

given the threat of Communism to United States security.
His action, said Lucas, "was within the traditions and

•^^96 Cong.

Rec.

9320,

9322,

9323 (1950).
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precedents

.

.

established more than

United States history.

a

hundred times" in

But Lucas went on to agree "whole-

heartedly" with Senator Flanders of Vermont who suggested
lack of authority to pursue the war north of the 38th.
No one in Washington knew that MacArthur had

already ordered air strikes on North Korea.

While the

Senate went on to extend the draft, 76-0, MacArthur was

completing a personal tour of Korea convinced that American
combat troops were needed.
One June 29, while Democratic Senators Humphrey of

Minnesota and Gillette of Iowa defended the President
during the day, the National Security Council, which includes the President, secretly moved the United States

closer to full intervention that evening.

Defense Secretary Louis

A.

was prepared for MacArthur.

Working from

Johnson's proposals, a directive
The instructions called for

the use of American ground forces in the rear to establish
a beachhead at Pusan, on the southeast tip of the peninsula

Second, "fullest possible" naval and air support for

Republic of Korea forces, including air strikes against

military targets in the north were authorized.

Finally,

MacArthur was cautioned to "stay well clear" of the

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

9328-9239.

^^Paige, pp. 219, 236-38
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Democratic People's Republic of Korea's northern
borders

with Manchuria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In the wee hours of the morning of the 30th,

MacArthur's urgent request for American combat troops
arrived at the Pentagon.

He wanted a regimental combat

team at the front line, with an eventual build-up to two
army divisions.

Truman approved the combat regiment from

his bedside telephone.

But after a morning conference

with his advisors, the President gave MacArthur authority
to use whatever troops were available to him at his
oo

discretion.
That same morning the Administration held a briefing for fifteen Congressional leaders, including seven

Republicans.

After the President told of his decision to

commit ground troops, one legislator. Senator Wherry
(R-Neb.), minority floor leader, objected to the lack of

consultation with Congress.
tor to voice criticism.

But he was the only legisla-

Before the briefing ended a press

statement was released, announcing the meeting with the
Congressmen, and the decision to use air and naval forces

against North Korea.

The statement concluded:

^^96 Cong. Rec.

9455,

9462 (1950); Paige, pp.

244-51.
38

Paige, pp.

253-56, 260.
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General MacArthur has been authorized to
use
certain supporting ground units.
Neither the legislators nor the public was
informed
of plans to use the Army in combat in Korea.

On Capitol Hill that afternoon (June
30), Senators

Wherry and Cain (R-Wash.) complained about inadequate
consultation with Congress.

Wherry suggested that the Presi-

dent address a joint session of Congress.

He denied that

the United Nations Charter modified the legislative power
to declare war,

and disputed that this action was analogous

to past Presidential efforts to protect American lives and

property abroad.

Nevertheless, Wherry called for "unani-

mous support" for Truman's decision.
Senator Knowland (R-Cal.) argued that Presidential

authority "to take the necessary police action" was undisputed, and a Congressional declaration of war was neither

"required" nor "desirable."
Senator Flanders (R-Vt.) announced he now doubted
the wisdom of his statement of June 28, in which he denied

that United States forces could be given authority to pursue the enemy or conduct air strikes in North Korea.

How-

ever, while the President's authority "to initiate mili-

tary action

and

.

.

tioned,

.

.

.

has been tacitly recognized for generations

has been exercised more than once," Flanders cauthe world is now much too "inflammable" for the

"^^Ibid.

,

pp.

262-64
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Chief Executive to take that responsibility
upon himself.
Nevertheless, it was necessary to resist
aggression in
order to preserve the United Nations.
The Senate then approved, 66-30, over
$1.2 billion
for mutual defense aid for United States
allies, including
$16 million for Korea and the Philippines.

Senator Taft

voted for the measure which had provisions allowing
the
President to divert $100 million to Korea if he so
desired.

In September 1950,

this defense aid would be

supplemented by an additional $4 billion.
By the end of June 1950, the North Korean army had

overrun all but the southeastern tip of the country,
destroying half the Republic of Korea army in the process.

A rapid American troop buildup at Pusan

(to 65,000 men by

August) enabled the United Nations Command, as it was

formally known, to hold on to
sula.

a small

piece of the penin-

But with their supply lines stretched to the break-

ing point the Communist offensive was halted.
15,

On September

MacArthur launched an amphibious landing at Inchon, on

the west coast near Seoul, well behind enemy lines.

96 Cong.

41

Rec.

9526,

This

9537-41 (1950).

Paige, p. 267; Acheson, p. 547; Joint Resolution
making temporary appropriation. 64 Stat. 302 (1950); an
act making supplemental appropriations.
64 Stat. 1044
(1950).
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maneuver ended in

a

complete rout of the North

Koreans
The Inchon landing was

a

turning point in the

conflict in a number of respects.

It shattered Kim II-

sung's effort to unite Korea, and began
Syngman Rhee

drive to do the same.

'

It strengthened the hand of Gen-

eral MacArthur who was increasingly at odds
with the

Administration's policy of limiting the conflict to
Korea.
Finally, it alarmed Communist China, which saw a unified
anti-communist Korea as a threat to its interests
In fact, both the Administration and the communist

Chinese were perturbed by MacArthur, who made public
statements urging United States efforts to promote Chiang

Kai-shek's reconquest of the mainland.
General was a force in his own right:

The charismatic

virtual dictator

of post-war Japan, popular at home, in charge of all

United States-United Nations military operations in the
Far East, and now lending his prestige to the Republican

policy position on Asia.
The Congress in the summer of 1950 probably

reflected an August Roper poll which showed 73% approval
^^David Rees, Korea:

The Limited War (Nevz York:
1964), p. 36; Truman, p. 358;
Robert Leckie, Conflict:
The History of the Korean War'
1950-53 (New Yorkl
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), pp. 105106, 125-53.
St. Martin's Press,

^"^Spanier,

p.

83;

Whiting,

p.

88.
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of Truman's decision to intervene;
15% disapproved.

had no opinion.

On July

5,

12%

Senator Douglas (D-Ill.)

defended the President's action on
constitutional grounds.
Douglas reasoned that the Framers of the
Constitution
"did not want to tie our country's hands by
requiring

congressional assent for all employment of armed
force."
Furthermore, Douglas contended, the speed of
con-

temporary warfare and the delays permitted by
Congressional

procedure make it "unwise to insist that the President
cannot use armed force in advance of formal congressional

approval."

In the case of Korea,

the Congress "overwhelm-

ingly approved" the President's action when it extended
the draft and increased military aid.
Third, Douglas cited fifteen leading instances

where armed force was used without

a

declaration of war,

and although he admitted that "the vast majority" were

unlike Korea in that they involved protection against
"direct" threats to American lives and property, the

"indirect" threat to United States security from unhindered

Communist aggression makes the President's decision consistent with constitutional theory and practice.
Fourth, Douglas noted situations where the "whole-

sale and widespread use of force" implied by a declaration
of war would be inappropriate.

On such occasions, as with

Korea, the President should be able to use force without
a formal congressional declaration of war.

.
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Finally, although such discretionary
Presidential
powers may be abused, the "sobering and
terrible responsibilities of the office" and the threat of
impeachment
should serve as deterrents

On July 10, Senator Wiley (R-Wis.) entered
into
the Record a statement urging that the
Administration

sub-

mit for approval by both Houses a resolution "drawing
a
defense line beyond which we will not permit Russian

and

Red satellite aggression."

Wiley argued that prior

instances of troop use without Congressional approval do
not apply in the Korean situation, where the conflict

could spread to other areas.

Given such a possibility

"it is ridiculous" for Congress to take no action.

Wiley noted the erosion of Congressional power and
the growth in the executive, and suggested that if the

Congress did not act on Korea it would increase public concern over legislative "strength and validity."

The Senator

found Presidential consultations with a few members of
Congress inadequate, and although he admitted approving
the President's actions, he felt the whole Congress should

approve "for the sake of history

.

.

and for

.

.

.

the

integrity of the legislative branch."
Finally, Wiley urged that a resolution was neither
too late nor "a precedent for the executive to initiate

^^Paige,
(1950)

p.

270,

note 65; 96 Cong. Rec. 9647-49

.
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action, getting congressional agreement
later."

Where the

President acts alone as Commander-in-Chief,
or under the
jurisdiction of the United Nations, and the
action is
"more than the mere utilization of police
force

...

the

Congress should also authorize" the use of
the military.
Even if Korea were the only battlefield, Wiley
concluded,
"I don't want the American people to feel
that our men

will be dying

man

.

.

merely at the order of one single

..45

Needless to say, the Administration's supporters
in Congress had no intention of submitting such a resolution.

During July there were a few other timid suggestions

that the President acted unconstitutionally in bypassing
the Congress, but Republican Congressman Hugh Scott of

Pennsylvania spoke in opposition to this contention.

The

Eighty-first Congress passed into oblivion in silent
approval

After the success at Inchon on September 15, the

United States would have to decide how far to pursue the
war, i.e., whether or not to cross the 38th parallel.

Actually, the National Security Council had decided on

September 1- -before Inchon- -that MacArthur should conduct
45
96 Cong.

Rec.

^^Ibid., pp.

9737 (1950).

9960, A4986, A4901.
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military operations in North Korea.

Counsellor George

Kennan of the State Department opposed.
On September 15, the day of the Inchon
landing,

MacArthur was told that while final decisions
could not
yet be made, the United Nations had "a legal
basis
for

conducting operations north of the thirty-eight
parallel."
On the 27th, he was instructed to destroy the
North

Korean army by conducting operations north of the
38th,
"provided that at the time of such operations" the Soviets
or Chinese Communists have not entered or threatened to

enter North Korea in force.

MacArthur was then cautioned

to permit only Korean ground troops to near the northern

border with Manchuria and the Union of Soviet Socialists
Republics.

He was also prohibited from taking air or naval

action against China and the Soviet Union.
The Communist Chinese increased their armed forces
on the Manchurian-Korea border from 180,000 in mid- July
to 320,000 in October.

On October

3,

Chou En-lai warned

Washington via India's ambassador in Peking, that if
United States troops entered the Democratic People's
47

Acheson, pp. 584-585.

Congress, Senate, Military Situauion in
Hearings Before the Committee on Armed
Committee on Foreign Pv.elations to Conduct an
the Military Situation in the Far East and the
Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Doufilas
MacArthur from His Assignments in That Area 82d Cong.
1st Sess., 1951, p. 718; Acheson, p. 586.
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Republic of Korea. China would intervene.

This was dis-

counted by the State Department as part of
a diplomatic
effort to save the North rather than a
military threat.
In short,

in the wake of Inchon. Washington
sensed

complete victory throughout Korea, and would
not be
deterred by anything less than a forceful Soviet

response.

This attitude was reflected in America's United
Nations
posture.

On September 20. Secretary of State Acheson

presented his "Uniting for Peace" speech, designed to bypass the Security Council to which the Soviet Union with
its veto power had returned in August.

On September 30,

Washington's Ambassador to the United Nations called the
38th parallel an "artificial barrier," without basis

"either in law or in reason."

And on October

7.

1950,

the

General Assembly recommended that:
(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure
conditions of stability throughout Korea; (b)
All constituent acts be taken
under the
auspices of the United Nations, for the
establishment of a unified, independent and
democratic government in the sovereign State
.50
of Korea.
.

.

On October

.

.

.

9,

MacArthur was told that if the Chinese

intervened "anywhere in Korea," he was to continue operations as long as they offered "a reasonable chance of suc-

cess."

Within a week the first Chinese troops secretly
49

Whiting,
585-586
pp.
50

p.

Ill;

Truman, pp. 361-362; Acheson,

Acheson, p. 583; Goodrich, pp. 131, 224,

.

crossed the Yalu River, boundary between
Korea and China.
United States troops had crossed the Parallel

the day the

General Assembly recommendation was passed.

Although United Nations forces surged north,
taking Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic
People's

Republic of Korea on October 19, and Chinese forces
crept
south of the Yalu, there was no major battle contact
until
late November.

During the lull the President met MacArthur

on Wake Island, October 15, where he insists the General

assured him that the fighting would be over by

Thanksgiving

52

On his drive to the Yalu, MacArthur was determined
to carry out the United Nations recommendations

("a united,

independent and democratic," i.e., a unified, anticommunist, Korea) by force, despite the risks of wider
war.

The Administration did not reject the goal, but it

was unwilling to risk as much as the General in order to

attain it.

Underlying this strategic dispute was the

broader foreign policy question of whether or not the
United States had greater interests in Asia or in Europe.
The Administration, influenced by Acheson's State Department, and the General, backed by the Republicans in

Congress, never could agree on this issue.

^'"Truman,

52
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During the fighting lull, from October
to late

November 1950. an indecisive Washington allowed
MacArthur
to bomb bridges across the Yalu and begin an
"end

the war"

offensive to gain control of all Korea up to that
river
boundary
On November 25.

1950.

the Communist Chinese

launched a major counterof f ensive that would prove the

second crucial turning point in the war.

After suffering

heavy losses the United Nations forces began a retreat

which resulted in communist control of all of North
Korea to the 38th parallel by Christmas.

announced on November 28:

MacArthur

"We face an entirely new war."^^

Chinese entry into the war compelled Washington to
either escalate its efforts to obtain a unified, non-

communist Korea, or abandon this as a war aim.

The Far

Eastern Commander did everything he could to convince the

Administration to carry the war to China.

He repeatedly

urged bombing, blockading and permitting Nationalist
attacks on the mainland.

Washington rejected all these

suggestions for fear of war with the Soviet Union and of

undermining its commitment to the defense of Europe.
MacArthur carried on his campaign to widen the war
throughout the winter of 1950-1951, even issuing public

^"^Acheson,

^^Rees, pp.

pp.

597-604.

155-66.

.
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statements designed to alter Administration
policy.
culminated in the General's dismissal on April
11,

This
1950.

Shortly after the Chinese intervened
President

Truman considered then rejected the idea of
addressing a
special session of Congress, presumably to get

support for

his Korean policy in the wake of changed
circumstances of

the war.

Instead Truman issued a public statement calling

for an increase in the size of the armed forces.

He then

met with twenty-one Congressmen, briefed them on Korean

developments and urged them to pass supplementary defense

appropriations
Twelve days later, December

13,

he met another

group of Congressmen and told them he was going to pro-

claim a state of emergency which would enable the President
to rapidly mobilize the armed forces.

Senator Taft ques-

tioned the need for such a declaration, as did Senator
Wherry, who suggested that Truman ask the Congress for

whatever authority he thinks he needs.

Representatives

McCormack and Vinson and Senator Connally supported the
idea, and in Truman's account,

the others present either

gave qualified support or were silent.

On

December 15,

^^Spanier, chaps. 8-10; Truman, chaps. 26-27;
Acheson, chaps. 49, 53-54; MacArthur Hearings passim,
,

56

Truman, pp. 388-91.
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the President announced on the air that
he would declare a
national emergency the following morning.

The emergency was not only in response
to Chinese

intervention in Korea, but to what the Administration

perceived as an increased global threat from the
Soviet
Union.

Korea was considered a Soviet diversionary effort,

designed to "dissipate" American strength and "divide
us

from our [European] allies."

Accordingly, on December 19,

1950, Truman announced that more United States ground

troops would be sent to Europe for NATO.^^
This touched off a "Great Debate" in the Senate in

which the Asia-firs ters

,

led by Senator Taft, challenged

both the wisdom and the constitutionality of the President's troops- to-Europe order.

We will concentrate only

on the constitutional challenge as it pertains to Korea, or
to the more general question of the President's authority
to despatch troops to engage in hostilities.

Bolstered by Republican gains in the November 1950

Congressional elections, the Eighty-second Congress
launched its attack against the Truman -Ache son foreign

policies on January

5,

1951, with a speech by Senator Taft.

Taft declared that the President "had no authority whatever

^^Ibid.
58

,

pp.

420-28.

Truman, pp. 419-21; Rees,

p.

172.
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to commit American troops to Korea
without consulting

Congress and without Congressional approval."

The Senator

then added:

The President simply usurped authority in
violation of the laws and the Constitution
when he sent troops to Korea to carry out
the resolution of the United Nations in an
undeclared war.
It may now be argued, of
course, that Congress by appropriating money
for additional Korean action has ratified
the act, but the war was on, and we had no
choice but to back up wholeheartedly the
boys who were fighting in Korea. 59
On January 11, Senator Connally defended the Presi-

dent's constitutional authority to send troops to Korea
and Europe, or, in fact, "to any part of the world if the

security and safety of the United States are involved."

Connally noted the view of President Taft, the Senator's
father, and the over "100 occasions" when the Commander-in-

Chief had sent troops without prior Congressional

approvalT 60
Five days later a Walter Lippmann article was

inserted into the Record by Senator Ives of New York.

Lippmann urged the President to consult with Congress
before sending troops to Europe, and noted that while

Truman "had a right to intervene [in Korea] without the
prior approval of Congress," he should have sought subsequent legislative support.
^^Rees, p.

197;

^^96 Cong. Rec.
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

97 Cong.
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Rec.

(1951).

313-314.

57
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On January 19, 1951. the House resolved
that it was
the "sense" of that chamber "that the
United Nations should
immediately
declare the Chinese Communist authorities
.

.

an aggressor in Korea."

measure on the 23rd.

The Senate passed a parallel

62

On January 22. Senator Kem (R-Mo.) referred
to the

"undeclared war in Korea, one of the most tragic episodes
in American history," as an example "of the President

arrogating to himself powers that are not constitutionally
his" because he did not consult with Congress.

Congress

still "has not recognized what must be apparent to every-

one--that a state of war exists.

This is government by a

man," insisted Kem, "not by the Constitutioti.

"^"^

Senator Ferguson (R-Mich.) then rose to read a pre-

pared statement on the constitutional authority of the
President.

He concluded that while the Framers of the

Constitution never intended to allow the President to send
troops overseas, in light of historical precedent and

judicial decisions, the power of the President to so act

without Congressional authority "must remain open in
64

1951."^

But Senator Watkins (R-Utah) found the historical

precedents "clearly distinguishable" from the Korean
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

457-64, 558.

^-^Ibid.

,

pp.

486-487.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

524-27.
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intervention, since the former were intended
to protect

American citizens and their property abroad,
or to pursue
lawless elements, or to defend the national
honor by

sending marines ashore.

Taft seconded Watkins

the precedents on February

8.

'

view of

adding that "in no case had

it been maintained that the President can
even involve

this country in war unless it is attacked. "^^

Taft went on to note that while it was difficult
to stop the President from sending the Army where
he

will, "[t]his argument only goes to his power, not to his
"^^
right.

On February 28, 1951, the Senate Foreign Relations

and Armed Services Committees jointly published a pamphlet
entitled, "Powers of the President to Send the Armed Forces

Outside the United States."

The analysis, which was pre-

pared by the Executive Branch, justified the President's
actions in Korea on the basis of Article 39 of the United

Nations Charter, but added that the President had authority
to use troops "irrespective of the Charter," under his

general constitutional authority "to carry out the foreign

policy of the United States. "^^
65

Ibid.

,

pp.

^^Ibid.

,

p.

515,

1118-1119

1120

Congress, Senate, Powers cf the President
U. S.
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One month later, Taft attacked this document
in a
lengthy Senate speech. Ke charged that it made
"the most
\mbridled claims" for Presidential authority he had
ever

seen in print, and that it presented "an utterly
false

view of the Constitution."
to Korea,

With regard to sending troops

this was clearly a "usurpation of authority."

One limitation on the President's power to send troops

abroad "admitted by every responsible authority," insisted
Taft, is that he cannot do so if the sending "amounts to

the making of war."

Korea was a clear violation of this principle,
Taft contended, "because the war had actually begun, and
the sending of troops

real war."

.

.

was the distinct entrance into a

Taft then denied that there was any treaty

obligation to Korea, and added that without Congressional
assent, "nothing in the United Nations Charter authorized
the intervention."

A statement of Professor Edward

S.

Corwin in support of this latter contention was then
inserted.
I agree with Senator Taft that our invocation
of the United Nations Charter in support of
the Korean business is totally phony ... As
the Korean operation took on the dimensions of
war from the beginning, the Constitution required that Congress should be consulted. 68

On March 22, Taft had said on the Senate floor that
the President could not send troops "to a country such as
^^97 Cong. Rec.

2988-93 (1951).

.
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Korea when that country is under attack,
and when, therefore, the sending of troops clearly
involves us in a war."
To which Senator Benton (D-Conn.) retorted
that the armed
forces "are an instrument of our foreign
policy" and he
thought it strange that the President could
dispatch them
to "friendly countries such as France and
England"
but

lacked the power to use them in riskier circumstances
when

decisive action might avoid war.

Benton said that the

Korean action was taken for the "common defense," words of
the Preamble to the Constitution.

Senator Knowland (R-Cal.) then rose to attack

Benton's argument as establishing "unlimited Presidential
power to involve the country in war."

But Senator Humphrey

(D-Minn.) pointed out that the President has certain in-

herent powers in foreign affairs that stem not only from
the Constitution.

Senator Case (R-S. Dak.) wanted to know

if the President intervened in Korea under his authority as

Connnander- in -Chief,

Nations.

Kern

or under the authority of the United

of Missouri pointed out that Truman acted

before the Security Council had, but Benton said he was

merely anticipating by

a

few hours

As the Great Debate continued, so did the comments

on Korea.

On March 30, Senator Hickenlooper (R-Iowa)

criticized the State Department for hampering MacArthur in

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

2852-56
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Korea, which he considered a war and
not a "police action."
Senator McMahon (D-Conn.) challenged
Hickenlooper to intro-

duce a joint resolution declaring war.

Long of Louisiana

suggested that the despatch of troops to Korea
illustrated
the need for the kind of decisions Congress
could not make,
and Hickenlooper questioned the legality of
the despatch in
the first place, although he admitted that
Congress later

approved the action.

McMahon then rose to present a lengthy defense of
Presidential power to send troops abroad.

With regard to

Korea, the Boxer incident of 1900 provided the "most
out-

standing" precedent.

He then said he believed, and thought

the "great majority of people" believed, that Truman was

justified in sending troops to Korea because of the
President's "inherent constitutional authority" to promote

United States foreign policy which was to uphold the United
Nations Charter.
The upshot of all this debating came on April

4,

1951, when the Senate approved Truman's plans to send four

divisions to Europe, but called for congressional approval
of any additional ground troops for NATO.

Of course the

war in Korea continued.
Late in January 1951, United Nations forces had

been pushed south of Seoul, but by April they had inched
^°Ibid., pp. 3032, 3036-3037, 3042 ff., 3045.
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

3282-3283.
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their way back to the 38th parallel.

The Communists then

launched their spring offensives, forcing
the Americans
below the parallel-only to have them surge
back again by
June.
It was now evident that the war
had stalemated,

although the fighting went on.

In June both sides sig-

nalled their willingness to negotiate an
armistice.

American and Chinese military representatives
met
near the 38th parallel on July 10, 1951, for
the first
round of talks.

These protracted, often bitter negotia-

tions would go on for two years, as would the
bloodshed.

The major points of disagreement were over the truce
line
and the repatriation of prisoners.

An added complication

was the opposition of Republic of Korea President Rhee to
any agreement leaving Korea divided.

The Communists yielded on the truce line issue

shortly after the talks were moved to their permanent site
at Panmunjom in October 1951.

The front line at the time

of the signing of the armistice would serve, rather than
the 38th parallel.

The prisoner issue proved more diffi-

cult.

The United States demanded voluntary repatriation

since many of its prisoners did not want

to go

back to

North Korea or China; indeed, many were from the South.
The Communists wanted a straight non- voluntary exchange.

^^Rees, pp.

192,

243-63
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In the spring of 1953. when agreement
on chis issue was

finally reached, Rhee tried to sabotage
it by simply
releasing thousands of non- communists held
and counted
among the war prisoners.

Nevertheless an armistice was signed, July
27, 1953
Rhee would not sign, but he had promised
mot to obstruct
it in exchange for United States military
and economic aid

and a mutual defense treaty.''-^

Even before the interminable negotiations had

begun public frustration with the war started to
surface.
Back in April of 1951, Senator Cain of Washington offered
two resolutions, one declaring a state of war, the other

calling for an "orderly withdrawal."

Neither came to the

floor of the legislature.
In May 1951,

Senator Mundt of South Dakota ques-

tioned the legal basis for the war, noting that past military ventures ordered by the President were to defend

American lives and property or to fulfill treaty obligations.

These justifications did not apply, Mundt said, to

"the most costly and the bloodiest undeclared war in our

American history.
In 1952,

"^'^

there were suggestions from the floor of

both chambers that Truman be impeached, for among other
^^Kolko, pp. 611-14, Rees, pp. 289-327, 420-32;
Acheson, pp. 688-689, 831-37.
^"^97

Cong. Rec. 3981, 5078, 5080 (1951).
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things, the decision to intervene in
Korea.

drastic measures proved satisfactory.

But less

Truman declined to

run again, and the voters turned the
Democrats out of the
White House, electing the smiling general
who had vowed,
"I shall go to Korea. "^^

Eisenhower visited a devastated peninsula.

The

United States, which at one point had 350,000 men
in Korea,
suffered 33,600 fatalities, over 5.000 missing,
and more
than 100,000 wounded.

It is estimated that one and one-half

million Communist soldiers were killed, while the Republic
of Korea had 300,000 military casualties.

civilian population was also great.

The toll on the

Approximately a million

North Koreans were killed or wounded, with equal carnage

below the 38th.

Millions more were refugees or on relief .^^

The Korean Conflict and the Constitution

III.

A.

Effect of the United Nations Charter
The Executive Branch asserted that "[tjhe power to

send troops abroad is certainly one of the powers which the

President may exercise in carrying out such a treaty as
.

.

.

the United Nations Charter."

Furthermore, "the

President can act under article 39" of the Charter and "is
under a duty as Chief Executive" to see that the objectives
^^98 Cong. Rec.
Rees. pp. 385-401.
^^Rees, pp.

33,

725,

4325. 4518-4519, 4539 (1952);

450-451; Kolko. p. 615.

.

.
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of the Charter are carried out.

This follows, it is

argued, from his powers to interpret and
execute

treaties
In a State Department memorandum of
July

1950,

3,

it was asserted that article 39 of the
United Nations

Charter and the Security Council resolution of
June 27,
1950, pursuant thereto authorized United States action
in

Korea.

It was also contended that the United States
has a

paramount interest in the United Nations and its peace-

keeping measures which the President can promote by armed
force without a Congressional declaration of war.^^
The Administration position rests on the general

propositions that treaties are "the supreme Law of the
Land," 79 and the President, who is obligated to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed, "^° therefore has the

duty and the authority to enforce treaty provisions.
Finally,

since he is "Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
77

See text accompanying note 67, supra; U,
Cong., Senate, Powers of the President pp. 20, 25.

S.

,

,

78

United States Department of State, Memorandum on
the Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea
U. S., Congress, House, Background Inforniation on the
Use of United States Armed Forces
Foreign Countries
H. Rept. 127, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1951, pp. 50, 54.

m

m

Const, art. VI, sec.
199 (1796)

S.

Dall.

(U.

S.)

80
U.

S.

Const, art.

II,

sec.

,

2;

3.

Ware v. Hylton,

3

,

1

.
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Navy,"

8

he may authorize armed force if
necessary to carry

out such provisions

One difficulty with this reasoning is
that not all
treaties are "self-executing." Some pacts
or provisions
may require positive Congressional action
before
they can

be enforced.

As early as 1829, Chief Justice John
Marshall

declared that in the absence of such implementation,
where
required, the treaty was not the law of the land.^^
Senator Taft contended that certain provisions of
the United Nations Charter, which had been approved
by the

Senate and ratified by the President, had never been implemented.

Pursuant to article 43 of the Charter, Congress

authorized the President in the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 84 to negotiate special agreements with
the Security Council to supply it with American troops for
its use.

These special agreements had to be approved by

the Congress, but subsequent use of these troops under

article 42 of the Charter did not.
81
U.

Const, art.

S.

II,

sec.

The Act denied the

2.

82

Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
(Mineola, N. Y.
The Foundation Press, 1972), pp. 54-55,
156-157.
:

83

Ibid.
pp.
253 (1829).
,

(U.

S.)

^^59 Stat.

156-60; Foster v. Neilson,

619 (1945).

2

Pet.

,

283

President authority to increase the size
of these troop
connnitments

As a result of Soviet-American hostility,
these
agreements were never negotiated, and therefore
article 43
never attained domestic legal validity. It is
also pos-

sible that article 42, which looked to the use of
these
forces by the Security Council in order to impose
military

sanctions may also be unenforceable in American domestic
law.

Furthermore, that portion of article 39, which

authorizes the Security Council to "decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42," may
be similarly affected.

However, another clause of article 39 authorizes
the Council to "make recommendations," and it is pursuant
to this section that the resolution respecting Korea of

June 27, 1950, was adopted.

A Security Council recommen-

dation is not legally binding upon United Nations members.
Thus, Taft's argument is beside the point; but any claim

that the resolution of June 27 imposed a legal obligation

upon the United States and the President

A second objection

is

erroneous.

to the conclusions drawn by the

Administration from the general propositions above,
^^96 Cong. Rec. 9323 (1950);

H.

^^Goodrich,

127, pp.

Rept.

127,

is

pp.

4-7.

87

p.

114;

H.

Rept.

31-32.

See notes 78-81, supra, and accompanying text.
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that the President's powers to execute
treaties and to command the armed forces is limited by the
power of Congress
"To declare War/'^^ ^^^^^^^
international rights and
obligations of the United States, whatever
the President's
duties and authority to order the fulfillment
of these

rights and obligations by force, the war -making
powers

granted Congress by the Constitution remain
intact.

As one

commentator notes,
the United Nations Charter does not deprive
the Congress or the President of constitutional
power:
both the Congress and the President
continue to have their powers-- though not the
right under international law--to declare war,
use force or otherwise act in violation of the
United Nations Charter, as they can disregard
other international obligations 89
.

In summation, while the United Nations action may

have provided moral and legal justification for the United
States intervention from the standpoint of international
law,

it did not cancel the limitations on the power of the

President from the standpoint of constitutional law.^^
The Constitutionality of the President's Action

B.

If President Truman's action in respect to Korea

was constitutional, it must rely on domestic law and precedent, not merely international law and treaty.

88

U.

S.

Const,

^^Henkin, p.

chap.

art.

I,

sec.

par.

11.

191.

^^See Reid v. Covert, 354
infra.

11,

8,

The Supreme

U.

S.

1

(1957), and my

.
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Court considered the conflict only obliquely,
in the famous
Steel Seizure Case.^-^

Justice Jackson's concurring opinion is
of particular interest.
Jackson considered and rejected the
Govern-

ment's contention that the President could seize
the steel
mills under his authority as Connnander- in-Chief
He

under-

.

stood the Government's position to be "that the
President
having, on his own responsibility, sent American
troops

abroad derives from that act 'affirmative power' to seize
the means of producing a supply of steel for them."^^

Jackson viewed this reasoning with alarm.

"Nothing

in our Constitution is plainer," he insisted,

than that declaration of war is entrusted only
Of course, a state of war may in
fact exist without a formal declaration.
But
no doctrine that the Court could promulgate would
seem to be more sinister and alarming than that a
President v/hose conduct of foreign affairs is so
largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown,
can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal
affairs of the country by his own commitment of
the Nation's armed forces to some foreign
venture
to Congress.

At this point Jackson inserted a footnote comparing
the modest view of presidential power expressed in

Jefferson's message to Congress respecting the first naval
91

343 U. S.
92
93

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co.
579 (1952).
Ibid., p.
Ibid.

642.

,

et al. v.

Sawyer,
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battle with Tripoli. 94

Although the Justice's dicta casts

doubt on Truman's theory of Presidential
war-powers, he
did not "consider the legal status of
the Korean conflict,"
which he assumed to be a "war de facto
whether
it is or

,

is not a war de jure "^^
.

The dissenters, led by Chief Justice Vinson,
felt
that in the context of the global threat and
the consequent

need to step up national defense programs, the
seizure was
justified.
Vinson noted that the United States acted
in

Korea in response to a United Nations request, and
that
Congress supported the effort "by provisions for increased

military manpower and equipment and for economic stabilization. "^^

One area of difference between Jackson and Vinson
is in regard to the role of Congress.

While Jackson empha-

sized the unilateral aspects of Truman's actions, Vinson

noted United Nations and legislative support.

Our analysis

reveals the following:
(1)

The Air Force was ordered to provide cover for

the evacuation of Americans in Korea, and the Seventh Fleet
was dispatched to the region without any Congressional con-

sultation on June 25, 1950.
94

chapt.

3,

95
U.

S.

579,

96
97

For a discussion of Jefferson's message, see my
supra.

Youngs town Sheet and Tube Co.
643
Ibid.

v.

Sawyer, 343

(1952).
,

p.

668.

See text accompanying note 23, supra.
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The President ordered full naval
and air support for the South Koreans on June 26
without any prior
Congressional consent. One Senator was
informed of the
(2)

decision inmediately; a f ourteen-man
Congressional delegation was advised the following day.^^
(3)

Congress approved an extension of the draft on

June 27 and 28.

Immediate Congressional reaction was

highly favorable, but Senators Taft,

Kern

and Watkins ques-

tioned the President's authority.
(4)

The President ordered ground troops to Korea

and air attacks on the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea on June 29 and 30 without prior Congressional consultation.

Fifteen Congressional leaders were briefed,

June 30, but not informed of plans to use American forces
on the front lines.
able.

Congressional response continued favor-

The Senate passed mutual defense aid which would per-

mit diverting $100 million for Korea.

'''^^

Congress increased defense appropriations consider-

ably and on several occasions after the Korean intervention, but not all these increases were directly attribut-

able to Korea.

They were part of an overall defense buildup

in anticipation of other Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggres-

sive acts.

Thus,

it may be concluded that Congress gave

^^See text accompanying note 27, supra.
99

See text accompanying notes 30, 32, 33 and 35,

supra.

See notes 36-40, supra.
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tacit and indirect support to the Korean
conflict, but never
explicitly either approved or condemned
the President's
action.

Given the size of the troop commitment,
the intensity of the fighting, and the duration
of the
hostilities,

there is little doubt that this was in fact
"war" in the
full meaning of the word as used in the
Constitution.
Thus the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief
and chief
executor of treaties should have been limited by
Congress'

power to declare war.

Although President Trimian's initial decision might
have been justified on the grounds that he was acting to

protect United States citizens in Korea,

"^^^

this rationale

could hardly justify his orders from June 26, 1950, on.
In its July 3,

1950, Memorandum,

the State Department urged

that as Commander-in-Chief the President could unilaterally

employ the armed forces to promote the security and foreign

policy interests of the United States, including among those
interests the maintenance of the United Nations as an

effective peace-keeping instrumentality.
In short,

103

the State Department relied upon neither

treaty nor statute as warrant for Truman's action,

^^^U.

102
103

S.

Const, art.

1,

sec.

8,

par.

See e.g., Henkin, p. 345, note 27.
H.

Kept.

127,

p.

54.

11.

emphasizing instead the President's
powers as Command.lerin-Chief.
Given the magnitude of the Korean
conflict,

I

doubt that any more extreme claim for
Presidential warcommencing power has been tendered in
American history.
Even in the Vietnam War the President
relied, at least
initially, on a joint resolution of Congress,
the Tonkin

Resolution.

"'^^

The State Department did not claim that the
United

Nations Charter and the Security Council Resolution
of
June 27, 1950, authorized the President's action.

claim could hardly withstand scrutiny.

First,

Such a

the Resolu-

tion was a non-binding recommendation and therefore
created
no legal obligations upon the United States in interna-

tional

law.-'-^^

Second, whatever the American obligation in inter-

national law, the President is not thereby authorized in
domestic law to commence war without Congressional approval
In Truman's defense it must be noted that Congress would

undoubtedly have approved a resolution of support had the
administration so urged, and it did appropriate funds and

renew the draft with full knowledge that the troops and
funds would be used in Korea.

''"^^

^^^78 Stat. 384 (1964).

^^^See note 85 and accompanying text, supra
106

Henkin, p. 346, note 27.
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The courts never resolved the
question of the constitutionality of the Korean War. nor do
they appear to
have been asked to do so nearly as often
as they were during the Vietnam War years.
The federal courts had an

opportunity when one Bolton refused induction,
alleging
that the Selective Service Act as applied
was unconstitutional because Congress gave no consent to
the war in
Korea.
The Court disposed of Bolton's claim without
reaching the merits, declaring:

Any question as to the legality of an order
sending men to Korea to fight in an "undeclared war" should be raised by someone to
whom such an order is directed
.108
.

In summation,

.

the legal justification for the Presi-

dent's action in Korea was that as Commander-in-Chief he

had the authority to deploy the armed forces into combat in
order to promote the interests of the United States, par-

ticularly its interest in supporting United Nations Charter
strictures against aggression.

Relying only upon subsequent

and non-explicit Congressional support, Truman thus

stretched Presidential war- commencing powers to the extreme.

107

1951)

United States

.

lOSibid.

v.

Bolton, 192 F.2d 805 (2d Cir.

CHAPTER VIII
THE VIETNAM WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION
I.

Historical Background
The United States was neutral during the first
three

years of the war between the communist -dominated Vietminh
led by Ho Chi Minh, and the French Union Forces trying
to

maintain colonial rule over Indochina.

It was only after

the success of the communist revolutionaries on mainland

China and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that the

United States became concerned with southeast

Asia,-'-

Thus it was a desire to contain communism, which was
asstimed to be a monolithic movement, not an intention to

abet colonialism that motivated the United States.

This is

further demonstrated by the unsuccessful attempts to pressure France into granting more independence to the quasi-

sovereign State of Vietnam, led by Bao Dai, as a native

alternative to the Vietminh.
Nonetheless, from 1950 to 1954, United States policy
was to give increasing financial and arms aid to France,

while France obstructed attempts to aid Bao Dai directly.
^George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United
States in Vietnam (Nevj York: The Dial Press, 1967) pp 30The
3T]
The Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers
Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking
Beacon Press, inc., j.y/Z),
(Boston:
on Vietnam, 5 vols
.

,

;

.

TTJ^T-,

^
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The policy failed miserably
because the Vietminh were
de^
f eating France on the battlefield,
and

the Bao Dai regime,

because of its association with the
colonial power, was un.
able to generate much Vietnamese
support,

As the French military position
deteriorated the
United States markedly stepped up
aid in 1954, to the point
of shouldering nearly 80% of the
war costs that year. Faced
with a rout at Dienbienphu in April,
1954. France urged the
United States to intervene. The Eisenhower
Administration

seriously considered an air attack on the
Vietminh, but
backed off when Congressional leaders
refused to

support uni-

lateral American action.

Fears of "another Korea" led the

United States to choose diplomatic rather than
military
methods.
Although the United States attended the Geneva Conference of 1954, which produced a cease-fire agreement
between

France and the Vietminh and divided Vietnam at the 17th parallel into two zones, both Washington and the State of Viet-

nam declined to approve the Final Declaration of the Conference.

While the Accords clearly anticipated

2

Kahin and Lewis, pp. 31-35, Dean Acheson, Present
At The Creation;
My Years in the State Department (New York:
W. W. Norton & Co
mc Signet Books, 1969), pp. 856-63;
Pentagon Papers 1:53-55, 61-75, 81; Bernard Fall, The Two
Viet-Nams: A Political and Hilitary Analysis 2d rev. ed.
(New York:
Praeger Publishers, 196/), p. 219.
.

,

.

,

.

,

-'Kahin and Lewis, pp. 32, 35-40; Pent agon Papers,
1:54-55, 77, 100-101; Fall, pp. 226-28.
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one unified Vietnam— they expressly denied that
the dividing line was a political boundary and called
for "general

elections" two years hence--loopholes enabled the consolidation of two regimes.^

Around the time of the Geneva Conference in mid-1954,
Bao Dai brought into his government (which had no real power)
an authoritarian, anti-French and ant i- communist Catholic

named Ngo Dinh Diem.

Despite near anarchy in southern Viet-

nam in the wake of the French withdrawal and

a large influx

(nearly 900,000, some 85% of whom were Catholics) of refugees

from the north. Diem managed, with American encouragement,
to establish a measure of control.

He eased Bao Dai out of

power and placed himself and his family- -most conspicuously
his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and his sister-in-law, Madame Nhu
--in.^

Again with American support (on the grounds that neither we nor South Vietnam had assented to the Geneva Accords)

Diem refused all northern demands that nation-wide elections

be held.

Instead,

in October,

1955, he proclaimed

^See Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in
Vietnam, arts. 1, 10, 14, and the Final Declaration of the
Geneva Conference, pars. 6, 7, 8, in Further Documents Relating to the Discussion of Indochina at the Geneva Conterence (Miscellaneous No. ZU 119541, Command Paper,
Great Britain Parliamentary Sessional Papers, XXXI
London
(1953/54), pp. 9-11, 27-38; Pentagon Papers 1:244
.

:

,

^Fall, pp. 234-53; Robert Shaplen, The Lost RevoluThe U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966 rev. ed. (New York:
tion;
Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., A Colophon Book, 1966), pp.
100-139.

.
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The Republic of Vietnam (GVN)

promptly recognized,

wUch

,

the United States

(Ho's Democratic Republic of Vietnam,

or DRV, had been recognized by Communist China and the
Soviet Union back in 1950).^

By 1957 it was clear that, whatever the intent of

the Geneva Agreements, Vietnam was de facto partitioned.

Even the Soviet Union recognized this when it proposed, in

January 1957, that the United Nations admit both the DRV
and the GVN.^
In the wake of Geneva, which the United States pri-

vately considered a Communist victory, Washington sought to
guarantee that communist gains in southeast Asia would be

contained to Vietnam north of 17°.

On September 8, 1954,

the United States entered into a Southeast Asia Collective

Defense Treaty with the United Kingdom, France, Australia,

New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan.

Q

A Protocol to the pact, signed the same day, extended
the defensive measures provisions to Cambodia, Laos and

"the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State
^ Pentagon

Papers

^Pentagon Papers

1:4, 245-246; Kahin and Lewis, p.

,

,

1

:

72.

247

^U.S., Department of State, United States Treaties and
Other Int ernational Agreements vol. 6, pt. i, "Southeast
Asia Collective Detense Treaty," TIAS 3170, 8 September 1954;
Kahin and Lewis, pp. 58-63.
,
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of Vietnam. "9

SEATO, as the Treaty and Protocol were
styled,

was more important as a statement of United
States containment policy in Asia, and later as legal justification
for

American intervention in Vietnam, than as the
establishment
of a truly collective defense organization.

The crucial provision is Article IV, wherein

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of
armed attack in the treaty area
would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that
it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
.

.

.

This article further provides that if any party believes that "the inviolability or integrity of the territory
or the sovereignty or political independence" of any signa-

tory or state named in the Protocol "is threatened in any

way other than by armed attack

.

.

,

,

sult immediately in order to agree on

for the common def ense

the Parties shall con.

,

.

measures

.

.

,

""^'^
.

In speaking of threats other than airmed attack, this

latter paragraph is generally understood to refer to subverThe Senate approved SEATO by a vote of 82 to

sion.

ruary

1,

1955.

1,

Feb-

Cambodia withdrew from coverage under the

^

United States Treaties and Other International Agree"Protocol to the Southeast Asia Colments vol. b, pt. T.
lective Defense Treaty," p. 87,
,

^°Ibid., p. 83.
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Protocol in 1956; Laos did the same in 1962.^^
Having placed South Vietnam under the United
States
defensive umbrella, the Eisenhower Administration
proceeded
to aid Diem in establishing an independent (of
France, but

not of America) non-communist state in southeast Asia.

In

a letter to Diem, President Eisenhower promised
that the

United States would aid the GVN in order to develop "a strong,
viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or

aggression through military means. "'-^

From 1954 to 1961, the United States provided lavish
financial aid to the Diem regime, 80% of which went to security, despite the fact that most of it was nominally economic

American military advisers began training the South

aid.

Vietnamese army during this period, although United States

military personnel never numbered over 700 men.

At the same

time, consistent with the Cold War pattern, both Moscow and

Peking generously aided North Vietnam.
In sum, it was the policy of both the Truman and

Eisenhower administrations to promote a non-communist Viet-

nam short of committing American troops to

a land war on the

^^United States. Congress Senate, Hearing before the
Foreign Relations Committee on E xecutive K pt. I, 83rd Cong.,
2d sess., 1954, pp. 20. 28; 101 Cong. Rec. 1060 (1955) Roger
H. Hull and John C. Novogrod, Law and Vietnam (Dobbs Ferry,
1968)
Oceana Publications, Inc.
N.Y.
p. 137, note 69.
,

,

;

:

of

1

,

,

^^Letter from President Eisenhower to President Diem
October 1954, in Kahin and Lewis, p. 383.
^^ Pentagon Papers

,

1:268, 2:433; Kahin and Lewis, p. 88

30:2

Asian continent.
It was the Administration of John F.
Kennedy (1961-

1962) which took a major (but not the decisive)
step in al-

tering the latter half of that policy.

Under Kennedy there

was a significant build-up in the number of American
"advi-

sers," to the point where the United States military
role

was substantially altered.

The change came in response to

the disintegration of the anti -communist Saigon government;

what caused that disintegration is quite controversial.

Analysts do agree that in 1958 a systematic rebellion against the Diem regime broke out in South Vietnam, and
that Hanoi openly called for the overthrow of Diem in May,
1959.

They

do not agree on Washington's allegation that

the DRV planned and organized the insurrection from the
start.

The evidence supporting this contention is scanty.

But if the charge were true. Diem certainly made things easy

by thoroughly alienating the South Vietnamese peasant who

constitutes 90% of the population.
By the time the National Liberation Front was formed,
a month before Kennedy's January,

1961, inauguration,

it is

said that support for Diem was "weak and waning," and that
the Saigon regime was "manifestly out of touch with the peo-

ple."

The Front (NLF) was the political arm of the Viet
^

1:242-65; Kahin and Lewis, pp. 99120; Fall, pp. 356-59; United States, Department of State, Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer South Viet -Nam (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1965), passim.

^entagon Papers

,
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Cong, or Vietnamese CoB^unists.
a term Diem applied
loosely
to more than just the
anti-Saigon insurrectionists .^5

Thus, while the NLF's structural
links with Hanoi

are undeniable, it is also clear
that the Viet Cong had popular support in South Vietnam.
Unlike Korea, there was no
regular army of the North attacking
the South.
(American
intelligence did not detect regular
North Vietnamese army
units in the South until late
1964.)
There was instead a
wave of terror aimed at Saigon officials
in the countryside
starting in 1958 and manned almost entirely
by South Vietnamese.
In fact, in 1966, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk estimated that "80 percent of those who are called
Vietcong
are or have been southerners."^^

By 1960, the guerrillas, who were outnumbered 7-1
by

Diem's forces, claimed control of half of South
Vietnam.

Although Kennedy approved

a Counter- Insurgency Plan shortly

after assuming office (more United States aid plus demands
for GVN reforms)

,

Vietnam was only an intermittent focus of

Washington's concern in 1961.-^^
Following the Bay of Pigs debacle in late April 1961,
^^

Pentagon Papers

,

1:250-251; Kahin and Lewis, p. 118

^^Shaplen, p. 141; Pentagon Papers

,

2:1, 18, 23-25,
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and the prospect that the United
States^backed faction in
Laos would completely collapse,
the Kennedy Administration
decided to renew its commitment
to South Vietnam.
Vice-Pres.
ident Lyndon B, Johnson was sent
to southeast Asia to
boost
morale, and returned convinced
that the United States must
"battle against Communism ...
in Southeast Asia ... or
surrender the Pacif ic "'^
.

.

,

.

But more significant to this
narrative was Kennedy's
approval on May 11, 1961. of a program
for South Vietnam

which included a 100-man increase in
regular Army advisers
to a total of 785, and 400 Special
Forces (Green Berets) as
part of a covert CIA program. The Green
Berets were sent

"to accelerate G.V.N. Special Forces training,"
not to en-

gage in combat.

This was not made public, but J. W. Ful-

bright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee,

announced after conferring with the President on May

4,

that

he would support an Administration decision to send combat
forces to Vietnam.

'•^

While the May 1961 decisions were made more in response to the Laos situation, in October 1961 Washington res-

ponded directly to developments in South Vietnam.

A sharp

upsurge in Viet Cong attacks in September seriously eroded
the morale of the Saigon government.
^8 penta^on Papers

,

President Kennedy sent

2:22, 33, 57.

^^Ibid., pp. 50-51; Lester A. Sobel, ed. South Vietnam:
U. S. -Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, Volume I. 1961-65 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1966), p. 19,
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his military adviser, General Maxwell
Taylor, and White
House Staff member, Walt W, Rostov to Vietnam
on October 11
to assess various military options, including
the introduc-

tion of American combat forces.

Taylor -Rostov recommended that 6-8,000 combat troops
be dispatched on the pretext of providing flood relief,
but
the Administration scotched videspread rumors of a United

States ground troops commitm.ent by leaking a contradictory

story to the Nev York Times.

In fact, Kennedy deferred de-

cision on the combat troop proposal vhile authorizing the

Defense Department to prepare plans for the large-scale use
of such forces should such a strategy be adopted.

Taylor-

Rostov also noted North Vietnam's vulnerability to air attack,
thus presaging by several years what vas to become a pillar
of United States policy.

Following the Taylor-Rostow Mission, President Ken-

nedy approved in November 1961:

the expansion of the Army

advisory group (from 785 to over 2000 by January 1962)
increase in Special Forces (from 400 to over 800)

,

,

an

the pro-

vision of helicopter companies to transport the South Vietnamese army into battle, tactical air and artillery support,
as well as provision of small arms, light craft and air

20

Pentagon Papers

,

2:4, 447.

^^Ibid., pp. 82, 86, 88, 92, 114, 116-18.

.
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reconnaissance equipment and personnel.
The decisions following the Taylor-Rostow
report established the pattern for United States policy
in Vietnam for
the next two years
During this period Washington and Diem
.

agreed to what was known as the Strategic Hamlet Program,
designed to obtain peasant support via relocation into
villages
fortified against the Viet Cong.

Both the French and Diem

had tried this before, and as before, it was an utter failure 23
The Viet Cong meanwhile, stepped up their wave of

terror in the countryside simultaneous with the introduction
of United States firepower. United States military personnel

increased to 11,000 by the end of 1962, and the number of
Viet Cong kidnappings and assassinations increased to 11,407.
(The latter figure was 2,100 in 1960.)

Use of American-man-

ned machine gun crews on the helicopters ferrying the GVN
army into combat, and United States bombing and strafing missions against suspected Viet Cong locations (850 a month as
of February 1963) were clearly taking their toll on the in-

surgents

.

As a result of unduly optimistic intelligence reports
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

114, 454-455.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

128-31.

^^ahin and Lewis,

p.

138; Pentagon Papers

,

2:703, 722

.
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Washington even planned to withdraw troops as of
the summer
of 1962,
These plans were never implemented, and were

aban-

doned after the Diem government collapsed in Autiimn,
1963.
At that time United States military personnel reached

a Ken-

nedy Administration high of 16,700.
While new information is currently coming to light,
it is clear from the Pentagon Papers that the United States
at least encouraged and tacitly supported the overthrow of

the Diem regime.

The surface cause was the conflict between

the Buddhist monks and the Catholic Diem-Nhu family; but

underlying this was the smoldering discontent caused by
Diem's autocratic rule.

After the violent suppression of a Buddhist protest
in Hu6 in May, 1963, widespread demonstrations took place

for most of the summer.

Washington's pleas for conciliation

went unheeded, and following a government raid on Buddhist
pagodas in August, the State Department encouraged dissident

military men to overthrow the brothers
The August plot fizzled.

After reviewing its Viet-

nam policy Washington sent Secretary of Defense Mcnamara and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Taylor to Vietnam in
September.

McNamara and Taylor urged various diplomatic and

economic pressures be imposed on Diem.

Once again anti-Diem

generals felt they were given a green light to conduct a coup
^^ Pentagon Papers

,

2:160-65.
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This time, on November

1,

1963, they succeeded; Diem and Nhu

escaped, but were quickly captured and murdered.
In his memoirs. President Johnson, with the
benefit

of hindsight, and having been plagued by nearly
two years

with virtually no leadership in Saigon, would condemn
the
coup as "a serious blunder."

If so. Johnson was the immed-

iate "beneficiary," for only three weeks after the coup.
Ken-

nedy was himself assassinated.^^
II-

Expansion of the War in Vietnam
One could credibly argue that when Lyndon Johnson

took the oath of office on the 22nd of November, 1963, the

United States was already at war, although on
small scale, in Vietnam.

a

relatively

Over 16,000 military men were

there; nearly 200 Americans had died there, half in combat

situations; and the United States was providing combat air

support as well as armed air transport for the army of the

GVN (ARVN)

.^^

Nevertheless, the United States was not providing
troops for ground combat

.

Nor was it yet bombing North Viet-

nam, which was openly aiding the southern revolutionaries.

^^Ibid.
^

,

pp.

201-7,

^Johnson, p. 61,

^^Sobel, p.

78.

734,

738.

.

.
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although short of sending down uniformed
regular for(:ces
Furthermore, United States involvement
was small considering
its capabilities.
And the Congress approved the
large-scale
aid programs for South Vietnam, while
only a handful

of legis.

lators, most notably Senator Mansfield,
voiced disapproval
of the military policy.

The instability of the Saigon government
was one of
the major concerns of the Johnson Administration
throughout
1964.

The GVN suffered six major changes of government
from

1964 to mid-1965.

All of these governments assumed power

illegitimately, ruled undemocratically

,

and were unable or

unwilling to obtain the loyalty of the Vietnamese peasant.

And yet the United States backed them, principally because
these military cliques appeared to provide the only anticommunist alternative."^^
The ineffectiveness of Saigon served to deepen American involvement on the grounds that only the United States

could do what was needed to maintain an anti-communist South

A second factor was the realization in early 1964

Vietnam.

that United States intelligence and assumptions about Vieto

nam had been overly optimistic.

1

On March 8, 1964, the President sent General Taylor

2^Ibid., pp. 55-56; 109 Cong, Rec. 7308-7309, 21061
(1963)
30
•^^

Pentagon Papers

,

2:277-79.

Pentagon Papers

,

3:2,

22-24.
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and secretary of Defense McNamara to Vietnam
on a "fact-finding mission." In reality, the purpose
was a major reassessment of United States policy, and the result
was a detailed
policy paper (NSAM 288) establishing a deeper
American com-

mitment to Vietnam. "^^
The background to this paper is significant.

French

President De Gaulle had proposed first on August
29, 1963,
then again on January 31, 1964, the neutralization of southeast Asia.

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson voiced criticism,

while Senator Mansfield

(D-Mont,)

urged its consideration.^^

Meanwhile the Joint Chiefs of Staff began pressuring
the Administration from late January 1964, on to bomb North
,

Vietnam. And in April, after NSAM 288 was approved, the Sai-

gon government launched a campaign to get Washington to ap-

prove overt attacks on the DRV.

A program of covert actions

against the North had been begun February

1,

1964.

These

sabotage and psychological warfare missions were directed

by the United States military and CIA, but were to be carried
out by Vietnamese or other nationals.
In the Congress, in March, Senators Morse (D-Ore,)

and Gruening (D-Alas) launched a two-man protest against the
^^Ibid.

,

pp.

8,

46-50.

^^Sobel, pp. 86, 97; 110 Cong. Rec. 3114-3115 (1964).
^

496-99.

^entagon Papers

,

3:8,

44-45, 64-67, 81, 149-52,

3U
increasing Americanization of the Vietnam
conflict.

Their

criticisms went unheeded, and were said to
have cleared the
Senate chamber as they repeatedly presented
them in the

months ahead.

NSAM 288, which was approved by the President
on the
17th of March, 1964, declared the American objective
to be
"an independent non-Communist South Vietnam."

But now the

"stakes" were considered to be "high" because of a belief
in the domino effect on "almost all of Southeast Asia,"
the

increased United States involvement since 1961, and the
sense that Vietnam was seen by the world as "a test case
of United States capacity to help a nation meet a Communist
'war of liberation.

'

""^^

The Memorandum went on to reject bombing the DRV
"at this time," while "preparations for such a capability"

were recommended.

Two bombing programs were to be developed,

one called for "{r}etaliatory strikes

.

.

.

on a tit-for-tat

basis," the other entitled "Graduated Overt Military Pressure. "^^

De Gaulle's neutralization plan was also rejected as

^^See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 4831-35, 6574-6604 (1964);

Anthony Austin, The President's War: The Story of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution and How the Nation was Trapped in Vietnam
(Philadelphia:
J. B. Lippincott Co., A New York Times Book,
1971), p. 66.
^

Sentagon Papers

,

3:499-500.

^^Ibid., pp. 503-504, 508.
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leading to "a CommuRist take-over,"

Instead, more United

States aid and advisers were to be sent, and the GVN was ex-

pected to mobilize the entire country to stem what Washington

now knew were significant Viet Cong advances.
In short, the United States was now firmly committed
to defeating the Viet Cong by military means; political ap-

proaches (making the GVN more popular

V7ith the peasantry)

and diplomacy (h la De Gaulle) were considered secondary.
For this reason Roger Hilsman, who championed the "political"

approach resigned his post as Assistant Secretary of State
for Far Eastern Affairs.
On April 25,

1964, General William C. Westmoreland

was named head of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and
a month later General Maxx^ell Taylor replaced Henry Cabot

Lodge as Ambassador to South Vietnam.

By mid- June a south-

east Asia resolution had already been prepared in secret by

Administration planners, who met on the 15th to consider the
foreign policy and political implications of going to Congress.

In June it was revealed that the United States had

constructed a new air base at Da Nang, part of a network of

new military facilities in South Vietnam and Thailand.
38 Ibid.

,

pp.

503,

505-7.

^^Ibid., p. 43.
40 Ibid,,

pp.

10,

11,

77,

180,

182.

,
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Thus, all the elements for escalation
were in place

when the Gulf of Tonkin incidents occurred the
first week of
August, 1964.
On August 2, an American destroyer, the USS Maddox,

was fired on while 28 miles off the North Vietnamese coast.

The attackers apparently believed that the Maddox had parti-

cipated in a raid on an offshore island three days before.
The raid was part of the covert activities planned by the

United States and carried out by the South Vietnamese.
Maddox

\<ras

The

not in fact a participant but was in the Gulf to

conduct reconnaissance patrols to within

8

miles of the DRV

coast 41

The Maddox returned fire, disabling one of the three

attacking vessels, and United States jets coming to the rescue of the Maddox damaged the other two.

The next day the

Maddox continued its reconnaissance patrol along with another
ship, the C. Turner Joy

raid took place.

That night, August

.

3,

another GVN

The following evening the destroyers re-

ported another attack, but since nothing could be seen in
the darkness and the American ships were never struck, the

entire incident was based upon sonar readings and intercepted

DRV radio communications.

42

^^Ibid., pp. 182-84.
^^ Pentagon Papers

,

5:324-26.

.
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The second incident remains controversial;
even more
so because President Johnson ordered
retaliatory air attacks
on DRV naval facilities on August 4th, before
all the confusing details were passed on to Washington.
More important
still, these incidents offered the Administration
the oppor-

tunity to go to Congress and get support for its
Vietnam

policies

Early that same evening, August

4,

President Johnson

obtained support from 16 Congressmen who conferred with him
at the White House,

including majority and minority party

leaders and key committee chairmen.

The next day, Senator

Fulbright introduced what has come to be known as the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, asking that it be sent to the Committees
on Foreign Relations and Armed Services sitting jointly.

Senator Morse immediately condemned it as "a predated declaration of war."^^
The major components of the Resolution are as follows.
It is entitled,

"A Joint Resolution to Promote the Mainte-

nance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia."
The Preamble condemns "the Communist regime in Vietnam" for

attacking American vessels as "part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression

.

.

.

against its neighbors

^^Ibid., pp. 326-327: Austin, d. 309: United States
Congress, Senate, The Gulf of Tonkin: The 1964 Incidents
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations 9Qth
Cong., 2d sess., 1968; Johnson, pp. 114-lii>.
,

,

^^Johnson, pp. 115-18; 110 Cong. Rec. 18132-18133
(1964).

.
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and the nations joined with them in the
collective defense
of their freedom."
In Section 1,

Congress approves and supports the determination
of the President, as Commander in Chief to
take
all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack
against the forces of the United States and to
prevent further aggression.
The second section declares that southeast Asian

peace and security are "vital" to the United States, and
that
"in accordance with its obligations under" SEATO,
the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the
President determines, to take all necessary steps,
including the use of armed force, to assist any
member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance
in defense of its freedom.

The last section provides for expiration "when the

President shall determine that the peace and security of the
area is reasonably assured," or by concurrent resolution of
Congress 45
On the sixth, brief hearings were held, at which

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Chair-

man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, testified.
Only Senator Morse opposed favorably recommending the Resolution, which was reported that day along with the following

statement:

The basic purpose of this resolution is to make it
^578 Stat. 384 (1964).

316

clear that the Congress approves the action taken
by the President to meet the attack on United
States
forces
Full support by the Congress is also
declared for the resolute policy enunciated by the
President in order to prevent further aggression
or to retaliate with suitable measures should such
aggression take place.

....

The brief Senate debate that followed was not espe-

cially instructive.

Senator Brewster asked floor manager

Fulbright if the resolution "would authorize or recommend or
approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or
China," and was told:

There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it,
that contemplates it ...
However, the language
of the resolution would not prevent it.
It would
authorize whatever the Commander in Chief feels is
necessary.
It does not restrain the Executive from
doing it. ^7
.

Senator Miller asked whether the phrase "further ag-

gression" applied to aggression against South Vietnam as well
as the United States,

to which Senator Fulbright responded,

"I believe that both are included in that phrase.

"'^^

In a rather tortured colloquy. Senator Fulbright tried
to allay the fears of Senator Nelson that the Congress was

authorizing the President to commit an American land army to

United States, Congress Senate, Southeast Asia Resolution, Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services 68th Cong., 2d
sess., 1964; United States Congress Senate, Promoting the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast
Asia S. Rept. 1329 to Accompany H. J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong.,
:2TTess., 1964.
,

,

,

,

,

^^110 Cong. Rec. 18403 (1964).
^^Ibid., p. 18405.
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war against North Vietnam.

In essence, the response was

that the proposal neither authorized nor prohibited
such action, that the President could continue to use
"whatever

means seemed appropriate" in order to maintain South Viet-

namese independence, and that if the action "were too inappropriate" Congress could terminate the measure.
The exchange with Senator Cooper was the most re-

vealing of all.

The Kentuckian wanted to know if section

two of the Resolution was triggering the SEATO pact in accor

dance with our "constitutional processes."

"In other words,

he queried,
are we now giving the President advance authority
to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting South Vietnam and its defense
.?
.

MR. FULBRIGHT.

I

.

think that is correct.

Then looking ahead, if the President
MR. COOPER.
decided that it was necessary to use such force
as could lead into war, will we give that authority
by this resolution?
MR. FULBRIGHT.

That is the way

I

would interpret

it.

And when Cooper asked if section two authorized the

President to attack "cities and ports in North Vietnam

.

.

,

to prevent any further aggression against South Vietnam,"

the Chairman responded with a generalization about the inap-

propriateness of formal declarations of war to current day
^9ibid., pp. 18406-18407.

.
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conditions

7.

A few more hours of debate
were set aside for
August
during which both Senators
Morse and Gruening
condemned

the measure.

section

8,

Morse contended that it
violated Article
paragraph 11 of the Constitution

I,

by giving thl

President "warmaking power."

And Gruening thought it "the

equivalent of a declaration of war
by the Congress. "51
Senator Nelson then offered an

amendment limiting

United States activities to aiding,
training and given military advice to the GVN, and declaring
it to be the sense of

Congress that

^^^^ Provoked to a greater response, we
should continue to attempt to avoid
a
military involvement in the southeast direct
Asian conSenator Fulbright said he agreed with the
policy
enunciated by the amendment, but rejected it

in order to

expedite final approval of the resolution.
The Senate then approved by an 88-2 vote, Morse
and

Gruening dissenting.

The House had already assented with

scanty debate, 416-0, Congressman Powell of Harlem voting
"Present. "^^
SOibid., pp. 18409-18410.

^^Ibid., pp. 18443-48.
^^Ibid.

,

p.

18459.

^^Ibid., pp. 18470-18471, 18555.
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On the 10th of August, 1964, the
day a Presidential
signature converted the Tonkin Resolution
into Public Law
88-408, Ambassador Taylor reported that
the latest Saigon
govemment was in danger of collapsing. This
news, added to
signs of increased communist infiltration
into South Vietnam
led to a general agreement among policy-makers
in early September that the United States should bomb North
Vietnam.

Following a meeting with his advisers on September
9,

President Johnson ordered the Air Force to be prepared
to

carry out retaliatory strikes against the DRV.

It will be

recalled that a program of retaliatory strikes was called
for in March, in NSAM 288.^^

Bombing was deferred, however, primarily for political reasons; and this despite a daring Viet Cong raid on

November

1 at

Bien Hoa air base.

The President was in the

midst of an election campaign in which he was portraying himself as restrained and his opponent, Senator Goldwater, as

trigger-happy, and these circumstances undoubtedly stayed
his hand.^^
But electoral politics was not the only consideration,

because even after his stunning victory. President Johnson
^^78 Stat. 384 (1964); Pentagon Papers

.

3:191-192.

^^Johnson, pp. 120-121; see note 37 and accompanying
text, supra.

^^Johnson, p. 121; Pentagon Papers

,

3:111.
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refused to permit reprisals for

^

a Christinas attack on a

United States army officers' billet in Saigon,

This time it

was feared that the Saigon government was
"too shaky" to withstand any major DRV counter-retaliation.^^
1965, then, was to usher in momentous decisions for

the United States role in Vietnam.

In January of the new

year there were 22,755 American military personnel there.

The GVN was going through the throes of yet another political crisis.

And members of Congress began to publicly ques-

tion United States policy, joining the already-critical New

York Times and St. Louis Post-Dispatch .^^
Senator Morse criticized the United States for taking

unilateral action in Vietnam, while Senators Cooper and Monroney called for full Senate debate.

Senator Mansfield

urged support of colleague Church's neutralization proposal.

An Associated Press survey of Senators of

6

January, 1965,

revealed that of the 63 legislators polled, 31 favored

a

negotiated settlement after the United States-GVN bargaining
position improved; 10 favored immediate negotiations;

wanted a United States attack on North Vietnam;
mediate United States withdrawal
do beyond strengthening the GVN.

,

Pentagon Papers

S^ibid., p. 263.

,

urged im-

and 11 didn't know what to

59

^^Johnson, p. 121.
^^

3

8

3:90, 259-62, 263.
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In mid- January, following
reports of two American
jets downed over Laos, and a
wire-service story revealing
that the United States had regularly
been flying missions
over Laos, Senator McGovern condemned
plans to extend the
war to the North.
(The Pentagon Papers reveal
that the
United States had been conducting
reconnaissance flights and

providing armed escorts for Royal Laotian
Air Force strike
missions since May, 1964.
Starting in mid-December, 1964,
the United States began bombing Pathet
Lao/North Vietnamese

concentrations in northern Laos.

Laotian Premier Souvanna

Phouma, approved the policies.
In fact, of course, Washington had already
decided
to bomb the North on a retaliatory basis back in
September,
1964, a decision reconfirmed December

1,

at which time Presi-

dent Johnson also authorized, at least in principle, a pro-

gram of gradually increasing air strikes.

Execution, how-

ever, was contingent upon improvement in GVN performance, a

development which never occurred. ^-^
In January, 1965, the USSR publicly announced support
for the DRV if the United States were to launch open hostil-

Washington was further alarmed by what it perceived

ities.

as signs of a new alliance among communist Asian nations,

including Sukarno's Indonesia.

All of this reinforced the

^^Ibid., pp. 263-264, 253-254.

Papers

,

^^See note 55 and accompanying text, supra; Pentagon
3:115.
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American tendency to view Vietnam in terms of
a global struggle. ^2

The decision to begin the bombing
came on February
6. 1965, following a spectacular attack
upon American military installations in and around Pleiku.
Word of the attack
was received that afternoon, and the
decision to launch the
air strikes was made at a National Security
Council meeting
in the evening.
House Speaker McCormack, and Senate
Majority
Leader Mansfield attended the conference, and
Johnson des'>

cribed Mansfield as being "strongly opposed" to
the bombing .^^
On February 13, President Johnson approved the pro-

gram of sustained, steadily intensifying air attacks on
selected North Vietnamese military targets.

The program,

code-named ROLLING THUNDER, was delayed until March

2,

1965.

Thereafter, North Vietnam^ was bombed regularly for the next
three and a half years of the Johnson administration, except
for nine complete halts, six of which lasted less than a

week.

Congress was never asked to give, and never volun-

teered any additional express approval of these overt acts
of war against a sovereign nation.

ROLLING THUNDER'S prin-

cipal aim was to discourage the DRV from supporting the com62

Pentagon Papers

,

3:266-267; Johnson, pp. 135-136.

^^Johnson, pp. 124-125.
^

Sentagon Papers

.

3:271-272; Johnson, p. 578.
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nunist revolution in the South,

To the extent that thii-s was

dependent upon breaking the will of the
DRV leaders the
bombing failed. For, in the words of the
Pentagon Papers
analyst, the air attacks "seemed to stiffen
rather than
soften Hanoi's backbone. "^^

On March

6,

1965, the Pentagon announced that 3,500

United States Marines were being deployed to Da Nang
air
base to provide base security and free South Vietnamese
offensive action.

for

These were the first American ground

troops to enter the Vietnam War, and although their initial

mission was base security and not combat, pressure immediately

developed to expand the American ground effort.
Once again. Congress was not asked to approve the

decision.

In fact, throughout the Spring of 1965, the de-

bate between proponents of enlarged United States ground combat operations, most notable of which was General Westmoreland, and those who had misgivings about such an expansion,

went on largely in secret.

67

In mid-March, 1965, President Johnson approved plans
to intensify the air war, and near the end of the month,

press speculation was rife with reports of imminent decisions
The President declared that he

respecting ground troops.
^^

Pentagon Papers

,

3:269.

^^Ibid., p. 423.
^^Ibid., pp. 430, 445.

.
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knew "of no far reaching strategy that
or promulgated."

But on April

1,

is being suggested

the very day after this

statement was made, Johnson approved
deployment of two additional Marine combat battalions and
18-20,000 more non-combat military personnel. Of equal
significance
was the al-

teration in the mission of the marines from
base security
exclusively to security plus limited offensive
operations
The April, 1965, decisions not only raised
United
States military totals to a new high of 40,200 men,
but for
the first time American forces were to engage in
ground combat.

In the formal memorandum recording these decisions

(NSAM 328, dated April

6,

1965) the attitude of the Adminis-

tration toward public debate on the commitment of ground
forces is easily inferred.

The President desires that with respect to the
actions in paragraphs 5 through 7 {concerning
ground troops} premature publicity be avoided
by all possible precautions. The actions themselves should be taken as rapidly as practicable,
but in ways that should minimize any appearance
of sudden changes in policy ....
The President's desire is that these movements and changes
should be understood as being gradual and wholly
consistent with existent policy.
,

The changes were not announced publicly until June

by which time the President had already approved increasing
troop strength to 70,000.

In late June, 1965, the strategy

^^Ibid., pp. 338, 348, 447, 449.

^^Ibid., pp. 456, 703.

8,
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of limited offensive forays from
coastal enclaves was altered
at the urging of General Westmoreland,
who also had called
for the immediate dispatch of nearly
125,000 combat troops.
United States troops would now take
the war to the Viet Cong
under a policy dubbed "Search and
Destroy." The President
granted Westmoreland's 125,000 troop
request on July 17. 1965,
delaying public announcement until the
28th.

Thus the Vietnam War had been thoroughly
Americanized

during the spring and summer of 1965.

Congressional involve-

ment in the decision-making was minimal, since
most of the
decisions were shrouded in secrecy. Congressional
support

over and above the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution would
have to
be inferred from the following.
On May 4, 1965, President Johnson asked Congress to

approve a supplemental defense budget appropriation of 700,
000,000 dollars, "to meet increasing costs in Vietnam."

In

his message to Congress, the President suggested that "each

member of Congress who supports this request is also voting
to halt Communist aggression in South Vietnam."

debates several Senators expressed reservations.

During the

Morse urged

that this request "for additional warmaking funds" be pre-

ceded by a request for

a Congressional declaration of war.^^

Senator Javits favored the appropriation but did not
^^Ibid., pp. 415, 438-40, 445, 476-477,

^^Johnson, p.
(1965).

142;

111 Cong. Rec. 9282, 9315-9316
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think it a substitute for a
resolution supporting a
ground
war in Vietnam. Javits did not
think the Tonkin Resolution
to be adequate support for such
a war.
But Senator Salt onstall thought that a failure to
approve the appropriat ion
would be a "repudiation" of the
August.
1964, measure.

To

which Senator Gore responded that he
"did not intend by
voting for that joint resolution to

approve an escalation

of the war or

.

.

.

the sending of combat units.

"''^

Senator Aiken declared that his support
of the appro
priation should not be construed as an
intention to grant
"authority to wage war." Senator Church asked
the bill's
sponsor, Mr. Stennis if Congress would be
conferring Con,

gressional approval on future unanticipated acts of
war in
Vietnam.

Stennis replied that the language of the resolu-

tion does not set policy, and while it does not restrict
the
President, neither is it a declaration of war.

"It is not,"

Stennis added,

.... We are backing up our men
and also backing up the present policy of the
President.
If he substantially enlarges or changes
it, I would assume he would come back to us in one
way or another.'^
a blank check

On the House side, debates reveal that the Republicans also conceived of the appropriation as support for the

President's Vietnam policy.

There the measure was speedily

^^111 Cong. Rec. 9453, 9495, 9497 (1965).
^^Ibid., pp. 9499, 9500.
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approved by a 408 to

7

vote on May

5.

The Senate assented

the following day, 88 to 3. Morse.
Gruening and Nelson the
only "nays."^^
It must be remembered that
decisions involving the
United States in ground combat in
Vietnam

vere closely

guarded by the Administration during the
time period in which
the appropriation was passed.
Public announcements
of troop

buildups were not made until June.

Just before the Presi-

dent announced his decision to commit
125,000 combat soldiers
(but ten days after the decision had been
made) Mr. Johnson

conferred with several Congressmen.^^
At this July 27 meeting, the President informed
the

eleven legislators of his plans to widen the ground
war. According to Johnson's account, he told the Congressmen
that
he did not want "'to go the full congressional route now,'"
and that the United States' "fundamental policy was un-

changed."

The President records Congressmen Carl Albert and

Hale Boggs as favoring the buildup without going to Congress,
Senator Bourke Hickenlooper as undecided on the issue of

going to Congress, and Senator Mike Mansfield as the only
one expressing "serious doubt and opposition" to the expan-

sion of the war.

76

^^Xbid., pp.
75

9518-41, 9772.

Pentagon Papers

,

3:445, 4:299.

^^Johnson, pp. 150-151.

3?8

And so, no additional supporting
legislation
quested, and none was approved. The
decisions

wa.
IS re-

to connnit

ground combat forces to South Vietnam and
launch an air war
over the North, plans made secretly and
revealed piecemeal
over the first half of 1965, won the silent
approval and

financial support of Congress.

Furthermore, public opposi-

tion to the war at this time, while not
insignificant, was
not nearly as widespread or vociferous as it
would
become.

An August, 1965, public opinion survey revealed 61%
in support of the war, 24% opposed, and 15% without an opinion.
Since this essay is concerned with the initiation of
the conflict it will not detail the course of the war with
its terrible destructiveness and its tumultuous consequences

for American domestic politics.

The following figures should

convey a sense of the magnitude and intensity of the conflict
If we date the start of the war at spring,

1965, \hen

North Vietnam was first attacked regularly from the air and

American combat troops were dispatched, then the conflict
lasted 7% years, ending with the Paris peace agreement in
January, 1973.

During these years, the United States ground

troop commitment went as high as 549,500 men, authorized in
April, 1968.^^

^^John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), pp. 54-55.
(New York:
78

Pentagon Papers

,

4:602.
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According to Defense Department
figures released in
early 1975, 46,370 Americans
were killed in

Vietnam, 153,000

were seriously wounded.

The Pentagon reports
that the South

Vietnamese suffered over a million
casualties, while it is
estimated that an equal number of
enemy forces were killed 79
The intensity of the air war
is revealed by the tonnage statistics. By the end of
1967, with the war not three
years old. the United States had,
according to the Defense
Department's data, already dropped greater
tonnage on
Viet-

nam than it had loosed upon the whole
European theatre in
World War II; nearly half the tonnage was

dropped upon South

Vietnam.

A number of significant legislative actions are
worth noting as well, especially

as they pertain to the con-

stitutionality of the conflict.

As a direct outgrowth of

the Vietnam War the upper chamber approved on
June 25, 1969,
a "sense of the Senate" resolution on "national
commitments."

The measure, which is not legally binding, states that the

United States can have a commitment to aid in the defense
of a foreign country only as a result of

affirmative action taken by the legislative and
executive branches ... by means of a treaty.
Statute, or concurrent resolution
.specifically
.

26,

—

.

79see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports 33 (April
1975) :843:
80

Pentagon Papers, 4:216.

.
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providing for such commitment
Following the controversial
Cambodian incursion in
late April. 1970, the Senate
passed the Cooper-Church

amend-

ment to a foreign aid authorization
act. ultimately cleared
on December 22. 1970.
The amendment,

approved by the Senate

on June 30. prohibited the
expenditure of funds to introduce
ground troops or advisers into Cambodia.
An earlier act,

approved December 29. 1969, applied
similar restrictions to
funds for Laos and Thailand.
During the summer of 1970. the Senate
twice voted

repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
once after the Nixon
Administration announced that the law was no longer
appro-

priate to its policies.

But the necessary House approval

did not come until December 31, 1970. in the form of
an amenct

ment to a foreign military sales bill as opposed to
rent resolution as provided for in section
tion itself.

3

a concur-

of the Resolu-

Furthermore. House approval of the repeal

rested upon the Administration's argument that the Tonkin

resolution was "unnecessary."

The Senate then passed the

81

Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the
Nation-Volume III 1969-1972 (Washington: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1973), pp. 856-857; S. Res. 85, 91st Cong.,
1st sess.,

115 Cong. Rec.

17245 (1969).

82

Congress and The Nation pp. 910-911, 913-914;
Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Pub. L. 91-652, sec.
7(a), 84 Stat. 1942 (1971); Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1970, Pub. L. 91-171, sec. 643, 83 Stat. 469 (1969).
,
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military sales bill (thus voting
repeal of Tonkin Gulf for
a third time:), whereupon
President

Nixon's signature laid

tne once controversial measure
to rest 83
By 1970, a number of resolutions
to "end the warwere proposed, of which perhaps the
best known is the Hat-

field-McGovern amendment, cutting off
military expenditures
in Indochina after a set date.
The full Congress never approved Hatfield-McGovem. but did adopt
Senator Mansfield's
amendment to a draft extension bill,
passed
September 21,

This Mansfield amendment declared it to
be the "sense
of Congress" that the United States end
military operations
1971.

in Indochina "at the earliest practicable
date," with a

"date certain" to be set for troop withdrawals.^^
In a bolder assertion of Congressional authority,

the Mansfield amendment was passed again,

defense procurement measure)

,

(now as part of a

only this time it declared it-

self to be the "policy of the United States," rather than

merely the "sense of Congress."

The Administration was not

oblivious to the change in wording, and when the President

signed the procurement bill in November, 1971, he pointed
83

Congress and The Nation pp. 910-911; United States
Congress, House, Foreign Military Sales Act Amendments H.
Rept. 1805 to Accompany H. R. 15628, 9^1st Cong., 2d sess.,
1970; Foreign Military Sales Act, amendments. Pub. L. 91-672,
sec. 12, 84 Stat. 2053 (1971).
,

,

^^H. R.

(1970); Military
L. 92~129,
Nation
and
The
ongress
348 (1971); C
p. 916

17123, 91st Cong., 2d sess.

Selective Service Act of 1967, amendments. Pub.
sec. 401,

85 Stat.

,
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out that the Mend^ent
did not enunciate the
policy of the
Administration and was "without
binding force or effect.
Direct American military
activities in Vietnam had
ended by late March, 1973, but air
strikes continued over
Cambodia.
In June, 1973, Congress
approved, and Nixon successfully vetoed, an immediate cutoff
of funds for combat
activities in Cambodia and Laos. In
a compromise with the
Administration, funds were cut off for
all American combat
activities in Indochina as of August
15, 1973.
Four other
combat expenditure restrictions were enacted
after the com-

promise measure cleared on June 29.
From a constitutional standpoint, however, the
most
important legislation to come out of the Vietnam
conflict

was the War Powers Act, passed over a Presidential
veto,

November

7,

The measure, which was designed to limit

1973.

Presidential authority to commit armed forces in the absence
of Congressional approval, will be discussed in detail in a
o

-1

separate chapter.
III.

The Courts and the Indochina Conflict
In no case did the United States Supreme Court conge

Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 1972,
92-156, sec. 601, 85 Stat. 423 (1971); Congress and
The Nation pp. 916,919.
Pub. L.

,

86

Congressional Quarterly Almanac 29 (1973): 95, 861;
Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973, Pub. L. 93-50,
sec.

p.

1.

307, 87 Stat. 99 (1973).
07
87 Stat. 555 (1973); New York Times, 8 November 1973,
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sider on the merits the legality
of the southeast Asian
war.
It repeatedly denied petitions
for the writ of certiorari,
and even suirnnarily refused a
State's motion for leave to
file
a bill of complaint in an
original proceeding 88
.

In Atlee v. Richardson, the
high Court gave us the
strongest hint as to how it would
handle legal challenges
to the war, when it affirmed
without connnent the lower court
decision. Atlee had asked a United
States District Court
in Pennsylvania to declare the
southeast Asian war illegal

by virtue of conflict with various
Constitutional and treaty
provisions, and to enjoin further expenditures
for it.^^

The District Court granted the Government's
motion
to dismiss on the ground that the suit
was non-justiciable.

The Court noted several difficulties in deciding
cases in-

volving foreign affairs:

in getting and managing the facts,

in foreseeing the legal consequences of its ruling, and
in

developing standards to apply.
Furthermore, the judges found a decision on the

merits in this case to involve some unanswerable questions.

They would have to resolve whether or not the hostilities
88

Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constituti on
(Mineola, N.Y.:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1972), pp. 210,
214; Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).
89

°^Atlee V. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 911 (1973).
90

^^347 F. Supp. 689, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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amounted to "war," and this, they
said,
question.
Secondly, they would

is a "political-

have to determine whether

or not Congress authorized the
conflict, which would require
divining the intent of the
legislators.
Finally, they would
have to decide whether or not the
President has the authority to maintain troops in combat,
a question so linked to
a determination of the "security
interests" of the United

States that it should not be decided
by a court. ^1
One judge dissented, thinking the
issue justiciable.
And when Atlee was affirmed by the
Supreme Court without
explanation. Justices Douglas. Brennan and
Stewart averred
that they would note probable jurisdiction
and set
the case

for oral argument.

But the majority of the high court

thought otherwise, and the clear inference is
that they too

believed the legal challenges to the Vietnam war to be
nonjusticiable.

Certainly they were offered sufficient opportunity
to make use of another legal vehicle to resolve the issue,

and yet the Court consistently declined to grant certiorari.
The Justices even went so far as to agree over the telephone
during

their summer recess to overrule a colleague whose

order would have left standing a successful lower court chal9^Ibid., pp. 703-7.
^^Ibid., pp. 709-13; 411 U.

S.

911 (1973).
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lenge to the bombing in Cambodia
following the Vietnam ceasefire.

Lower federal courts were also
reluctant to tackle
head on challenges to the legality
of the war.
Availing themselves of the doctrines of "political
questions."
non- justiciability, lack of standing to sue,
and sovereign imunity.
lower courts avoided decisions on the
merits.

When, however, lower federal courts
did reach the
merits they invariably ruled in behalf of
the government and
against those challenging the conduct of
the war.
In the
93

Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1321 (1973)
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the
following
tutional challenges to the southeast Asia conflict: constiAshton
Costa
V.
Laird,
Ins
U S. 979 (1972); Hart v. United States, 391 U.S
405 ni^^Q7Q^^?o4o?^V-^956
(1968); Holmes v. United States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968)- Holtzrru

o

(1974); Luftig V. McNamara,
?Q7
U.S. 945 (1967); McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002
387 n'c^^'Sf^^V^f^^
(1968); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970)- Mitchell V. United States, 386 U.S. 972 (1967); Mora v! McNamara,
399 U. S. 934 (1967); Orlando v. Laird, 404 U.S. 869 (1971)Samoff V. Shultz, 409 U.S. 929 (1972); Velvel v. Nixon, 396
U.S. 1042 (1970).

94

See Ashton v. United States, 404 F. 2d 95 (8th Cir.
1968); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp 689 CE.D.Pa. 1972); Bernath V. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Campen v.
Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal 1972); Da Costa v. Laird, 471
F. 2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478
(W.D. Va. 1970); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass.
1973), aff'd, 502 F. 2d 1158 (1st Cir. 1973); Gravel v. Laird,
347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972); Head v. Nixon, 342 F. Supp.
521 (E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 468 F. 2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972);
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Luftig V. McNamara, 373 F. 2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Mora v. McNamara, 387 F. 2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Hottola v. Nixon,
464 F. 2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972); Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.
2d 809 (9th Cir. 1972); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F. 2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1969).
.

.
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Mottola and Holtz.an cases,
where anti-war litigants
were
xnitlally successful, circuit
courts reversed the
judgnents,"
Typical of the lower courts
decisions on the merits

is Orlando v.

Laird, decided by the
Second Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1971. Orlando, an
enlistee, sued to keep
from
being sent to Vietnam. He
argued that the Executive
branch
lacked authority to compel him
to participate in a
conflict

not expressly authorized by
Congress, which alone has the
power to declare war, United States
Constitution. Article
section 8, paragraph 11.56
The court held that

I.

8,

I.

11 requires "mutual parti-

cipation" by the Congress "in the
prosecution of the war."
and in the case of Vietnam such
participation was initially

evidenced by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
and thereafter by
appropriations for military operations and by
extensions of

95 Lower
^

federal courts reached the merits in the fol-

(2d Cir. 1970), 443 F.
Laird,
448 F. 2d 1368
Lir. ^lo^^^'^'^V^^'
Ua r19/1); Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp 544 (E
D.N.Y. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp
553 CE
D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973)McArthur
^^^^
1968); Meyers v. Nixon,
QQQ^i^^c"'''^' tSoo^;
^^^o^-.^'^PP- 1^88 (S. D.N.Y. 1972); Mitchell V. Laird, 488
^1^- l^''^); Mottola V. Nixon, 318 F. Supp.
!;n^^(N.D.
538
Cal. 1970), rev'd, 464 F. 2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972)Orlando v. Laird, 443 F. 2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971); United
States V. Hart, 382 F. 2d 1020 (3d Cir. 1967); United States
V. Holmes, 387 F. 2d 781 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Kronke, 459 F. 2d 697 (2d Cir. 1972); United States V. Mitchell, 369 F. 2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Sisson,
294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).

^d'^nfq

nV^'^'

96

^^07??'

n^V-

443 F. 2d 1039, 1040-1041 (2d Cir. 1971).

:
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the draft.

Orlando contended that military
appropriations were
inadequate as ratification of the war
because they were made
in response to a Presidential fait
accompli
Furthermore,
Congress had already repealed the
Tonkin
.

Resolution.

court noted that

The

the Tonkin repeal came when
the Resolution

"was no longer necessary and amounted
to no more than a gesture on the part of the Congress
"^^
.

.

.

The court X7ent on to reject the assertion
that Congressional authorization for a war could not be
inferred from
appropriations

The framers' intent to vest the war power in
Congress IS in no way defeated by permitting an inference of authorization from legislative action
furnishing the manpower and materials of war
.

.

Thus Orlando lost his suit, and the Vietnam War

found judicial sanction, at least in the second circuit.
Senator Fulbright denoimced the Orlando rule as "utterly in-

consistent" with attempts to preserve Congressional warmaking
power.

And Senator Stennis added that military appropriations

have too many "ingredients" to be considered "an endorsement
^^Ibid.

,

p.

1042.

^^Ibid., pp. 1040-1041, note
^^Ibid., p. 1043.

1,

p.

1041,

.

338

of the war.^O^

Orlando petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of
certiorari, but was denied, Justices
Douglas and Brennan dissenting,
Meanwhile the second circuit
stuck by its Orlando rule, reaffirming it in the
similar case of Da Costa v.
Laird.
The Supreme Court again refused
certiorari over the
disagreement of Brennan and Douglas.
The latter commented
that "the constitutional questions
raised by conscription
for a presidential war are both
substantial and justiciable "102
The Orlando rule was applied a bit
differently (by
Judge Judd, one of its creators) in
Congresswoman Holtzman's
suit to enjoin military operations in Cambodia
in the summer
of 1973. Applying Orlando, the district court
held that Con.

gressional authorization was necessary for the bombing
of
Cambodia, only this time the court held that "appropriations

bills do not necessarily indicate

.

.

.

approval

/'^^^
.

.

The district court ruled in favor of Holtzman only
to have its orders stayed by the circuit court pending ap-

peal.

Supreme Court Justice Marshall refused to vacate the

stay, but Douglas agreed a few days later and was promptly
'•OOAnthony A. D'Amato and Robert M. O'Neil, The Judici ary and Vietnam (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1972),

p. ~77

IOI404

u.

S.

869 (1971).

^^^448 F. 2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405
U.S. 979 (1972).

D.

N. Y.

"^Holtzman V.
1973)

Schlesinger,

361' F.

Supp.

553,

562 (E.
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countermanded the same afternoon
following
change among the justices.

a telephc
ionic ex-

Following this byplay the
second

circuit reversed the lower court's
orders on the grounds
that determining if the operations
in Cambodia represented
a new conflict requiring
Congressional approval or a tactical decision within the authority
of the commander-in-chief
was a "political question. ""^^^
In summation, the federal courts
were for the most

part unwilling to adjudicate challenges
to the legality of
the southeast Asia conflict.
Only lower federal courts were
willing to reach the merits, in 13 cases, all
of which were
favorable to the government at the circuit level.
The Su-

preme Court consistently denied certiorari, breaking
stride
only to affirm a district court decision that the
anti-war
suit in question was non-justiciable

"'"^^
.

Not all the Supreme Court justices were content to

duck the issue of the war's legality.

from his colleagues

'

Douglas dissented

refusals to grant certiorari about a

dozen times, occasionally joined by Justices Stewart and/or
Brennan.

In the case of Mora v. McNamara, Stewart's protest

against the Court's unwillingness to take the case provides
^^^Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1316,
1321 (1973); 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).
^^^See notes
U.S. 911 (1973).

93-'95»

supra; At lee v. Richardson, 411
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us with a suggestive formula for
examining the constitutionality of the conflict. '^^
Mora, an army private, sought an
injunction to prevent his transfer to Vietnam on the
grounds that the war was

being conducted illegally.

The District of Columbia Court

of Appeals dismissed his suit

resolution.

-as

inappropriate for judicial

Mora's petition for a writ of certiorari
was

denied, Douglas and Stewart dissenting.

Stewart urged the

Court to answer the following questions.
(1)

Is the Vietnam conflict a "war" within the
mean-

ing of Article
(2)

I,

section

8,

clause 11 of the Constitution?

If so, may soldiers be compelled to participate
des-

pite the absence of a Congressional declaration of war?

(3)

Of what relevance are United States treaty obligations?

(4)

Of what relevance is the Tonkin Gulf Resolution?

sent military operations fall within its terms?

Do preIs the Reso-

lution an unlawful delegation of Congressional power to the
President?-^^''

IV.

The Vietnam War and The Constitution
The questions raised by Justice Stewart in the Mora

case provide a suggestive basis for analyzing the constitu10^387 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389
U.S.

934 (1967).

^^^389 U. S. 934-935 (1967).
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tionaUty of the conflict.

One might also wish to
take into

account the effect of military
appropriations and
of the draft, the relevance of
historical

ext,
:ensions

precedent, and the

extent of sole Presidential authority
under Article II.
We will consider several of these
questions,

all with

an eye toward assessing the effect of
the Vietnam war upon
Presidential war -making powers.
Was the conflict a "war" within the meaning
of Article
I, section 8. clause 11?
Certainly it was not an all-out

conflict in terms of American military potential.

Further-

more, hostilities were confined to a small geographical
area,

and Congress had never formally declared war.
Nevertheless, the sustained bombing of the D.R.V.

did constitute an attack upon a de facto international entity,

even if one that lacked some of the attributes of sovereignty.

And a conflict so protracted (lasting over 7% years)

,

of such

magnitude (involving over one-half million American ground
combat troops at one point)
States

(

,

and so damaging to the United

over 46,000 killed, 153,000 wounded), would seem to

defy exclusion from the category of "wars."
A.

Effect of the SEATO Treaty
Under Article IV, paragraph

1

of the SEATO pact, the

United States agreed that "aggression by means of armed attack" against any of the parties to the Treaty or any state
or territory designated in the accompanying Protocol, "would

,
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endanger its own peace and safety,"
and that in such an
event the United States would "act
to meet the

comon dan-

ger in accordance with its constitutional
processes "^^^
.

In the view of the United States
governm.ent, the infiltration of armed men from North to
South Vietnam consti-

tuted aggression by armed attack, and
thus justified American action under Article IV, paragraph
1,

of SEATO.

(The

claim that an "armed attack" occurred is
controversial in
the absence of a Korean style invasion across
the

17th paral-

lel.

Article IV, paragraph

2,

of SEATO provides for imme-

diate consultation among signatories in order to agree
upon

defense measures in the event of threats "other than by
armed

attack," and this provision may Inve been more appropriately
invoked.

The United States Congress supported the claim

that North Vietnam was guilty of "aggression

.

.

.

against

its neighbors" in the Preamble to the Tonkin Resolution.

)

'"^^

In a Memorandum of Law, the State Department asserted
that SEATO served in part as authorization for Presidential

decisions with respect to Vietnam.
lows.

The reasoning is as fol-

Under Article VI of the Constitution, treaties are
^^^SEATO, Art. IV, par.

1.

109

U. S., Department of State
Office of the Legal
Adviser, Memorandum of Law, "The Legality of United States
Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam," in Richard A.
Falk, ed.
The Vietnam War and International Law 4 vols.
(Princeton, N. J
Princeton University Press, 1968-1976)
1 (1968) :583; 78 Stat. 384; see Richard A. Falk, "International Law and the United States Role in the Viet Nam War," in
Falk, 1 (1968):391; Hull and Novogrod, pp. 139-47.
,

,

.

:

'
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the supreme law of the land.

Article IV, paragraph

1

Thus it is asserted that

of the SEATO treaty

establishes as a matter nf Istt
amed attack again^r^L^h iTet'tl
nSS^S^'
the peace and safety of the
United States UO
r>

Should such an attack occur, it
is argued, the United
States "has undertaken a commitment"
in Article IV, paragraph
1 of SEATO to "act" to meet the danger.
"Under our Constitution," the Memorandum declares,
President who must decide when an armed
attack has occurred. He has also the
constitutional
responsibility for determining what measures
fense are required when the peace and safety of deof
United States are endangered. If he considers the
that deployment of U. S. forces to South
Viet-Nam
IS required, and that military measures
against
the source of Communist aggression in North VietNam are necessary, he is constitutionally empowered
to take those measures
.

In sum, the position of the State Department is that

SEATO empowers the President to send ground troops to South

Vietnam and bomb North Vietnam, provided only that he recognize the occurrence of an armed attack on the GVN.
While it is doubtless true that SEATO obligated the

United States to act in some manner to aid in the defense of
South Vietnam in the event of an armed attack, and while it
is the President's responsibility to recognize the circum-

stances under which treaty provisions are triggered, it is
ll^Falk,

1

(1968) :597.

^^^Ibid.. pp. 597-593.

344

not at all clear that the President
may unilaterally execute
that treaty, especially where the
execution involves placing
the country at war.
In fact, Article IV, paragraph

the United States to "act

stitutional processes,"

.

.

.

1

of SEATO calls for

in accordance with

it:
:s

con-

and the Congressional debates
pre-

ceding approval of the treaty make it
clear that SEATO did
not commit the United States to military
action without
prior approval by Congress. This being
the original understanding of the treaty, it could hardly be
said to empower
the President to unilaterally order air
attacks
on the al-

leged aggressor state (North Vietnam) and large
numbers of
combat troops into the area designated by Protocol
(South
Vietnam) .^^^

A more reasonable interpretation

is that SEATO ob-

ligated the United States to act in the defense of South
Vietnam, and the President was authorized to implement the

treaty short of placing the United States at war without Con-

gressional approval.

This would be more consistent with

both the "constitutional processes" stipulation of SEATO and

Article

I,

section

8,

clause 11 of the Constitution.

But as the Legal Memorandum points out. Congress did

approve Presidential use of armed forces for Vietnam when it

^^^Hull and Novogrod, pp. 147-148.

.
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passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in
August, 1964.
must determine whether or not this act
authorized

We

the exten-

sive hostilities that followed, and, if
so, was it an unwarranted delegation of Congressional war
power.

Effect of the Tonkin Resolution

Much controversy surrounds the meaning of the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution.
In Senate testimony, then Under

Sec-

retary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach asserted that in
terms of the constitutional requirement of legislative ap-

proval the Resolution was the "functional equivalent" of

a

declaration of war
Several legislators reacted sharply to Katzenbach 's

testimony, insisting that in voting for the Resolution they

never intended to authorize the extensive and prolonged mili'
tary operations that ensued.

(For example, Senator Gore

(D-Tenn.) replied to Katzenbach:

"I did not vote for the

resolution with any understanding that it was tantamount to
a declaration of war.")

^^^Falk,

1

115

(1968) :598.

^^^U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Commitments
to Foreign Powers Hearings before the Committee on Foreign
Relations
90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 82, 88.
,

;

^^^Ibid., pp. 83, 87, 88, 89, 131, 145, 209.^ But
contrast the views of Senators Ervin and Cooper, ibid., pp.
165.

197-198.

213.
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Later the Senate Foreign Relations
Conmiittee confessed that "there was a discrepancy
between the language
of

the {Tonkin} resolution and the
intent of Congress," that
the wording "lends itself to the
interpretation that Congress was consenting in advance to a
full-scale war."^^^
In section

1

of the Resolution. Congress stated
that

it "approves and supports the determination
of the President
•

•

•

^° ^^^^ all necess ary measures to repel any armed
at-

tack against the forces of the United States
and to prevent

further aggression

""'""^^
.

In the floor debates, Senator Fulbright, the
bill's

manager, explained that the phrase "further aggression"
ap-

plied to future aggression against either the United States
or South Vietnam.

Thus, the resolution provided advance

support for measures, including presumably armed force,

taken by the President in order to prevent further aggression against the GVN.

118

The second section announced that the United States
is "prepared,

as_

the President determines

,

to take all neces-

sary steps, including the use of armed force

,

to assist"

any SEATO member or Protocol state requesting "assistance
S.
'-^^U. S. Congress, Senate, National Commitments
797 to Accompany S. Res, 85, 90th Cong. 1st sess.,1967,
.

Rept.
p.

21.

^^^78 Stat. 384, emphasis added.

^^^110 Cong. Rec. 18405 (1964).
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in defense of ic$ freadom/'^l^

A colloquy between Senators
Fulbright and Cooper sug.
gests that this section
triggered the defense provisions
of
SEATO. Article IV.
It is also clear that
the President was
thereby authorized (or perhaps
only recognized as having the
power) to unilaterally dispatch
armed forces to aid South
Vietnam.
In short,

the protesting Senators were
probably sin-

cere when they said that they never
intended to approve military operations of the magnitude of those
in Vietnam.
Apparently they simply never anticipated what
would develop.
At the same time the Johnson Administration
was on firm

ground when it claimed that the Resolution authorized
the
use of the armed forces in South Vietnam and
against North
Vietnam.
If the Tonkin Resolution empowers the President to

dispatch combat troops to Vietnam, does it do so in violation
of the Constitution?

Does it delegate to the Executive the

war-making power which is reserved to the legislature under
Article

I,

section

8,

clause 11?

If so,

it has been asserted

that the act is null and void for having violated the princi•''•^78

Stat.

120
^

384,

""llO Cong.

Rec.

emphasis added.

18409-18410 (1964); see text accom-

panying note 50, supra.
^^^Falk,

1

(1968) :598.

;
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pie of the Separation of Powers

.

'^'^

The standards used by the Supreme
Court in determining excessive delegation are rather
vague, and since United
States V. Curtiss-Wright (1936), have
been much less stringent in foreign than in domestic affairs.
Even in domestic
affairs, although the doctrines enunciated
in Panama Refining v. Ryan (1935) and Schechter Poultry
v. United States
(1935), are probably still vital, no domestic
delegation
has been struck down since. '^^

Furthermore, the Tonkin Resolution is not unprecedented; Presidents had been similarly authorized
to use the

armed forces at their discretion by the Formosa Resolution
of 1955, the Middle East Resolution of 1957, and the Cuba

Resolution of 1962.

Thus, given contemporary legal stan-

dards and practice, it is doubtful that the Tonkin Resolu-

tion would be considered unconstitutional on these grounds
The Southeast Asia Resolution is assailable on an-

.-^"^

other ground; that it was obtained through misrepresentation

by the Administration of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents.

It

100

^^^Francis D. Wormuth, "The Vietnam War? The President versus the Constitution," in Falk, 2 (1969) 781-99
Lawrence R. Velvel, "The War in Viet Nam: Unconstitutional,
Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attackable," in Falk 2
(1969) :680.
:

'^^Henkin, pp. 119-120, note 95,

p.

366.

10/

Southeast Asia Resolution Hearing p. 3; Falk 1
(1968) 580-82; John Norton Moore, "The National Executive
and the Use of the Armed Forces Abroad," in Falk 2 (1969):
,

:

817.

.
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is true that prior to consideration
of the Resolution Con-

gress was never fully informed that
the United States destroyers were on reconnaissance
missions, or that the United
States secretly directed South
Vietnamese coastal raids on
the days preceding each of the attacks,
or that there was
confusion in the reports on the second
incident
in the

Gulf

.-'^^

Nevertheless, Congress knew a great deal,
could have
been expected to investigate to learn more,
and in any case

need not have approved

a measure as broad as the one adopted.

Administrations invariably present facts in a way
designed
to marshal support for their policies; this does
not affect

the constitutionality of the legislative end-product.
In short, although the Administration may have been

deceptive, and the Congress hasty in approving it, the Ton-

kin Gulf Resolution did provide authority for the hostilities that followed.

And if such a resolution were requested

at the start of the sustained air bombardment of North Viet-

nam in February, 1965, or in the summer of 1965, with the
introduction of large numbers of American ground forces,

I

have little doubt that it too would have received legislative
approval
125

Compare Southeast Asia Resolution Hearing (1964)
and The Gulf of TonHn: The 1964 Incidents Hearing (1968)
See also Austin, pp. 182" 183 and passim.
;

.
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C.

Other Sources of Authority

Did Congress manifest approval of
the Vietnam conflict in other ways, viz., by military
appropriations and
extensions of the draft? A positive
answer was given by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
the Orlando and Da
Costa cases, where it was contended that
such legislation
is evidence of "mutual participation" by
Congress in the de-

cisions to prosecute the war."^^^
In opposition it is argued that such legislation
is

not a good indicator of Congressional support for
a war

policy because

(1)

it provides for national defense in gen-

eral and is not just related to the war; and

(2)

Congress

has no choice but to supply and protect troops already sent
into battle by the President

.

''"^^

We saw that when President Johnson requested a

special appropriation of $700 million in May, 1965, specifically earmarked for the growing Vietnam conflict, Congress

approved overwhelmingly while

a number of legislators denied

that their votes were to be construed as assent to a war.

And similar scenes recurred in successive years, with Congressmen voting the money while condemning the war. 128
^^^See notes

96-102 and accompanying text, supra.

•^^Velvel, in Falk, 2 (1969) :667; D'Amatoand O'Neil,
pp. 77-78; compare Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F. 2d 611 (D.C. Cir,
1973)

^^^See notes 71-75 and accompanying text, supra; Hull
and Novogrod, pp. 180-83.

.
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Nevertheless, if Congress
has not specified its
policy intentions, and the legislative
history is ambiguous in
this respect, it is difficult
to see how such laws can
be
equated with an express declaration
of war.
This is especially true where the legislation
establishes
or pays for

programs not necessarily related to
the war. e.g., the draft,
which the United States conducted in
peacetime as well as
during the Vietnam War.
The willingness of Congress to appropriate
the billions of dollars used to conduct the Vietnam
War must, however, be considered at least indirect
legislative approval
of the confict, just as the laws to cut off
military expen-

ditures in Cambodia display Congressional disapproval.

Be-

yond providing evidence of indirect support, the constitutional relevance of such legislation to war making is in

doubt

D.

Effect of Vietnam Upon Presidential War Power
In terms of the President's constitutional authority

to initiate major armed conflicts, what kind of precedent
is established by the Vietnam hostilities?

Assuming that

it was a "war" in the Article I, section

clause 11 sense

8,

of the word, then it was fought without a formal declaration
of war by Congress.

The only express Congressional authorization came
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by joint resolution vesting in the
President the power to
determine what "steps, including the use
of

armed force" the

United States would take in defense of
any SEATO member or
Protocol state. The resolution was approved

one^half a year

before sustained air attacks on North
Vietnam began, and
about nine months before large numbers of
American

ground

combat troops were dispatched to South Vietnam.
Thus, the Vietnam hostilities set a precedent
for a

war being fought after a joint resolution recognized
Presidential discretion in using armed force to uphold
provisions
of a collective security

treaty.

about the role of SEATO.

Consider the statement of Secre-

(There is some confusion

tary of State Dean Rusk, that the SEATO pact is "the sub-

stantiating basis for our presence" in Vietnam, but that
"we are not acting specifically under the SEATO Treaty."

But the Secretary may have been trying to justify the fail-

ure of the United States to undertake collective action with

respect to Southeast Asia, as anticipated by the Treaty. )'^^^
At times both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations

made more extreme claims for Presidential power, claims that
the President had the authority to make the Vietnam decisions

without relying on the Tonkin Resolution.
•^^^ Southeast

Asia Resolution Hearing

The Nixon Admin-

,

p.

23.
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istration went so far as to
disavow the Tonkin
Resolution
altogether, which in part led
to its

abrogation, effective

January 12, 1971.

"'"^^

In the absence of the Tonkin
Resolution did the
President, acting on his own
constitutional authority have
the power to order attacks
upon North Vietna. and the
connnitment of large numbers of ground
troops to hostilities in

South Vietnam?

While the answer must be based
in part upon
historical precedent, and while the
Korean conflict would
seem analogous, it is doubtful that
the President can place
the country at war without Congressional
approval.

(The

Constitutional standards may differ in the
case of a President who inherits on-going hostilities,
as
did Nixon, as

opposed to one who initiates those hostilities.)
But if the Vietnam conflict led to extreme
claims in

behalf of Presidential war-making power, it also,
ironically,
spawned the first legislative attempt in United States
history to explicitly curtail that power;

the 1973 War Powers

Act.
130 See text
of President Johnson's Press Conference
of 18 August 1967 in United States Commitments Hearings p.
126; see Department of State Letter of 12 March 1970, in U.
S. Congress, Senate, Vietnam Policy Proposals. Hearings before the Committee on^^reign Relations 91st Cong.. 2d
sess., i9/u, p. 311; 84 Stat. 2053 (1971).
,

,

,

«
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CHAPTER

IX

THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION OF
1973
I.

Background:

Other Attempt, to Limit

th^,

P....-^...

Out of dissatisfaction over the
conflict in Southeast
Asia came a number of Congressional
attempts to restrict the

war-making powers of the President.

While the War Powers

Resolution of 1973 has attracted the most
attention and will
be the focus of this essay at least
three other approaches
to limiting the Executive are worthy of
note.-^

The three other types of restrictions are,
first, the

National Commitments Resolution. ^ second, the various
amendments to appropriation and authorizations measures
prohibiting expenditures for military operations in Southeast
Asia,^

^War Powers Resolution, Pub, L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555

(1973)

2

17245 (1969^^^'

^''"^^

sess., 115 Cong. Rec.

-"I have found eleven measures
Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1970, Pub. L. 91-171, sec. 643, 83 Stat.
469 (1969); Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Publ L.
:

91-652, sec. 7(a), 84 Stat. 1942 (1971); Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1971, Pub, L, 91-668, sec. 843, 84
Stat, 2020 (1971); Second Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1973, Pub.L. 93-50, sec. 307, 87 Stat. 99 (1973); Continuing
appropriations, 1974, Pub, L. 93-52, sec. 108, 87 Stat. 130
Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act
(1973)
of 1973, Pub. L. 93-126, sec. 13, 87 Stat. 451 (1973); Department of Defense Appropriation Auchorization Act, 1974,
Fub, L. 93-155, sec. 806, '87 Stat. 605 (1973); Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub, L, 93-189, sec. 30, 87 Stat. 714
Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1974, Pub.
C1973)
L
;

}

.

.
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and third, the Mansfield Amendirient
The Commitments Resolution was a
sense-of-the-Senate
measure, approved June 25, 1970. Since
it was a simple (onehouse) resolution it had no legally binding
effect, and was
therefore more of an expression of Senate
dissatisfaction
with the foreign policy making process. Its
key passage
declared it to be the sense of the Senate
that a national commitment by the United States
results only from affirmative action taken by
the legislative and executive branches
by
means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress specifically
providing for such commitment
"

A national commitment was defined

as the "use of the

armed forces" abroad or "a promise" of foreign assistance,
either military or financial.
aging

From the standpoint of encour-

Congressional participation in use-of -force decisions,

the Resolution had some obvious weaknesses.

was its lack of binding force.

First, of course,

The Senate Foreign Relations

Committee which prepared the measure called it "an invitation

93-238, sec. 741, 87 Stat. 1026 (1974); Continuing Appropriations, 1975, Pub. L. 93-324, sec. 110, 88 Stat. 281 (1974);
Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1975, Pub. L. 93-437,
L.

sec.

839,
4

L.

88 Stat.

1212 (1974).

Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 1972, Pub.

92-156, sec. 601, 85 Stat. 423 (1971).
-^S.

Res.

17245 (1969).

85,

91st Cong., 1st sess,, 115 Cong. Rec.
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to the executive to
reconsider its excesses."
and although
the tone of this statement
is tough, the fact
that it was an

"invitation" rather than a
directive says a great
deal.^
Second is the fact that only
one chamber of Congress
approved the measure, and it
is doubtful that the
House of
Representatives would have approved
such a resolution at that
time.
The implication, of course,
is that the other house
was not as dissatisfied with
foreign policy making procedure.
Third, the language of the
Resolution is vague in
that it does not say just what
kind of Congressional "affirmative action" is required before
a commitment is made.
Since
it calls for a "treaty, statute,
or concurrent resolution"
without designating which is
appropriate, and without establishing a procedure for implementation
(who decides whether
the requirements of the measure have
been met?) much is
left tmclear.
,

For example, the language could be
interpreted to
mean that a mutual defense treaty alone is
adequate Congressional authorization for American participation
in hostilities in defense of the treaty partner although a
treaty

"U.S., Congress, Senate. National Commitments S.
^^st Cong., 1st sess..
^'
1969' p^^0°
.

.

^
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involves no House action at all.

7

it eould also be read
to

say that a non-binding concurrent
resolution approved after
a troop comitment has been
made by the President is
sufficient to authorize his action,
despite the absence of any
prior consultation.
Fourth, the measure did not alter
already existing
commitments, either to Vietnam or to
American treaty partners
In short. Senate Resolution 85 did
not influence the
division of war-making power between
Congress and the President.
It served as a warning that there
was growing dissatisfaction with this division amongst Senators
at least,

as

well as increased skepticism regarding the
extent of such
commitments.

In reviewing the background leading up to
one

of the War Powers proposals, the Senate Foreign
Relations

Committee acknowledged the failure of the National Commitments

Resolution as a factor encouraging additional Congressional
action.

The requirement of specificity would seem to
strengthen the Resolution here, except that no standard is
offered for judging the degree of specificity required. Was,
e.g., SEATO specific enough to warrant the commitment of
American troops to South Vietnam? In article IV, section 1
of SEATO the United States pledged to "act to meet the common danger" in the event of aggression by means of armed attack against the parties or those named in an accompanying
Protocol.
U.S., Department of State, United States Treatie s
and Other International Agreements vol. 6, pt, 1, "Southeast Asia Collective Defense," TIAS No. siyO.'s September 1954
,

g

U.S., Congress, Senate, War Powers S. Rept. 220 to
S. 440, 93d Cong. 1st sess., 1973, pp. 4-5.
.

Accompany
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The second approach to restricting
Presidential war
power^-cutting off funds-^was more
effective and therefore
more significant. The first two
measures of this nature had
no effect upon actual combat,
The rider to the Defense
Appropriations Act of 1970 prohibited
expenditures from that
measure for the introduction of United
States ground combat
troops in Laos and Thailand. ^ Since
the United States had
no ground troops in either of those
countries, the United
States air war could continue without
running
afoul of this

provision.
Furthermore, the measure did not prohibit the
introduction of ground troops into Cambodia, thus
making it inap-

plicable to the 1970 Cambodian incursion.

This latter event

prompted the second funds cut-off measure, contained in the
Special Foreign Assistance Act of 1971.

•'•^

While this provision cut off all funds for ground
forces or even advisers in Cambodia, Congress delayed appro^83 Stat. 469 (1969).
Section 643 of the Act reads as
follows:
"In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds appropriated by
the Act shall be used to finance the introduction of American
ground troops into Laos or Thailand.

^°84 Stat. 1942 (1971).
Section 7(a) of the Act says:
"In line with the expressed intention of the President of
the United States, none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other Act may be used to
finance the introduction of United States ground combat
troops into Cambodia, or to provide United States advisers
to or for Cambodian military forces in Cambodia."
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val of the cut-off provision
until June 30, 1970,
the day
President Nixon had said the
Cambodian operation would
end
In addition, by the time
Congress cleared the entire
measure,
in December, 1970, and the
President signed it into
law on
January 5, 1971, it was one
half year since the United
States had had ground troops
in Cambodia.
The third and fourth measures
were much more significant, since they appear to be
the

first acts ever to termi-

nate completely all expenditures
for United States combat
forces while they were conducting
a military operation.
The
background was the air bombardment
of Cambodia which continued after United States military
involvement in Vietnam had
ended in March 1973.

After much debate Congress cleared on
June 26, 1973,
an appropriations measure containing a
rider which

called

for an immediate cut-off of all funds for
combat activities
in or over Cambodia and Laos.
The next day President Nixon vetoed the measure,
de-

claring that "the 'Cambodian rider' to this bill would
cripple or destroy the chances for an effective negotiated settlement in Cambodia

.

.

.

"^^ congress sustained
the veto,

but it was essential to the continued smooth functioning of
^^H. R.
12
12.

7447,

93d Cong., 1st sess.

(1973).

Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Quarterly Almanac vol. XXIX, 1973
^^.^ (Washington,
^..^^i^j.^,^
D.C: Congressional
Quarterly,
erlv. Inc. 1974V
n.
1974), p. 6fi-A.
66-A.
,.

''
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a number of governmental
agencies that this and
another
funding measure go into effect
on July
1.

The dramatic deadlock was
broken when key legislators
and administrative
representatives agreed to a
compromise
The President would sign
measures containing a
complete
funds cut-off which would not
take effect until August
15,
1973.
The key provision, section
307 of Public Law 93-50
reads as follows.

None of the funds herein
appropriated under thi.,
be expended to suppLt* directly
rtrrT^
rectly combat activities in n-r o^7^>. rJu or^- inSir
^
North Vietnam and
LutrvJetnL°^rUn?fed'stater
^""^ ^^'^^ ^^S^^^
no other lunds
tllt'f
heretofore appropriated under 1973:
any other act mav be
expended for such purpose.

^

Note that this provision terminates
immediately all
expenditures based upon Public Law 93-50,
and prohibits as
of August 15 expenditures based upon any
other existing ap-

propriations measure.

The immediate cut-off was academic

because none of the funds in Public Law 93-50
could be used
for military operations in Cambodia.
Public Law 93-50, the second Supplementary Appropriations Act, was cleared on June 29.

The following day, the

other appropriations bill. Public Law 93-52, was approved.

Section 108 of Public Law 93-52 stipulated the following.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or
after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore
appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance
directly or indirectly combat activitiees by the
United States military forces in or over or from
off the shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam. Laos
or Cambodia.
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Most

Significantly, in a letter of
August

3.

1973, to the

Speaker of the House and Senate
Majority Leader, the President, while complaining about
the policy

effects of the cut-

off,

seemed to accept Congress's
authority over the matter.
"By legislative action," Nixon
wrote,

form^gf law and the Administration
wJll obey ?hat
Thus did the Congress use its
appropriations power
to restrict the authority of the
Commander-in-Chief,
To

drive home the point Congress passed at
least six other measures in 1973 and 1974 with funds cut-off
provisions similar
to those in Public Law 93-50 and Public
Law
93-52, above.

None of these six acts cleared Congress while
United States
forces were engaged in hostilities in Southeast
Asia.

However, seven of these fund cut-off laws were in

force and seemed applicable to the United States efforts
to

evacuate American and Asian nationals when the communists
took control in South Vietnam and Cambodia in the Spring of
^^Ibid.

,

p.

862.

J-^Public Law 93-126, section 13 (1973) was broader
in that it forbade use of any future appropriations for
Indochina combat operations without Congressional consent.
The five other acts were: Pub. L. 93-155, sec. 806 (1973),
Pub. L. 93-189, sec. 30 (1973), Pub. L. 93-238, sec, 741
(1974), Pub. L. 93-324, sec. 110 (1974), and Pub. L. 93-437,
sec. 839 (1974).

.

,

382

1975,15

Initially, the Ford administration
requested that
Congress "clarify" these restrictions

When no clarification was
forthcoming, the President
went ahead with the various rescue
operations anyway-despite
the fact that they involved combat
troops and even
some com-

bat in Southeast Asia. Later, the
State Department's legal
adviser told a Congressional subcommittee
that

limitation statutes were not intended
to
and could not limit the President's
constitu^° ''^'^''''^ ^' ^' ^^-^^^^^^ from places

'''''^5

??^-f
limitf

of^danger?^

To say that the statutes were not intended
to prohibit rescue of Americans in Indochina by
combat troops is to

make a plausible although debatable assertion about
legislative intent. 18

•'^The

But to say that Congress could not by its

seven laws said to be pertinent are:

Pub. L
(1973), Pub. L. 93-52, sec. 108 (1973), Pub.
L. 90-126, sec. 13 (1973), Pub. L. 93-155, sec. 806
(1973)
Pub. L. 93-189, sec. 30 (1973), Pub. L. 93-238, sec. 741 (1974), Pub. L.
93-437, sec. 839 (1974).
Congressional Quarterly Congressional Quarterly Almanac, voLXXXI, 1975 (Washington, DTCTI
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1976), p. 15.
16
U.S., President, Address, "State of the World,"
April 10, 1975, in CQ Almanac, 1975 p. 14-A.
^^'^

»

.

^^U.S., Congress, House, War Powers
A Test of ComHearings before the Subcommittee on International
and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on InterRelations 94th Cong.. 1st sess.. 1975. p. 11. {HereCompliance Hearings }
:

pliance,
Security
national
inafter,

,

18

Congressman Bingham (D-N.Y.) disputed the preferred
interpretation. He declared that "those {cut-off} provisions
were put into the law to curtail what President Nixon at the
time said was his authority as Commander in Chief to protect
and safeguard the evacuation of American troops which was the
reason he gave, for example, for going into Cambodia." Ibid.,
p.

17.
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appropriations power^^ Umit the
President acting on hi.
-S own
authority as Connnander-in-Chief 20 ,3
xnake a controversial
constitutional argument entailing
consideration
of Congress'

authority in general to limit the
President when he is acting
under constitutional warrant. This
is the issue at the very
heart of the War Powers Resolution
controversy.
Purely in terms of legal precedent,
the Vietnam War
era presents one clear victory for
Congressional appropriations power over the Commander-in-Chief and
one probable defeat.

The 1973 victory was dramatic, coming
as it did while

military operations were ongoing.

That these same triumphant

provisions were probably violated less than two

-ears later

is often overlooked.

The third approach to limiting the President was the

Mansfield Amendment, or rather Mansfield Amendments, for there
were two such efforts.
of the draft,

"

The first, attached to an extension

was written as a "sense of the Congress" re-

solution, and therefore was without legally binding effect.

The second Mansfield Amendment was nearly identical,

except that it attempted to declare the "policy of the United

^%.S. Const., art.
I,

sec.

9,

cl.

2^Ibid.

I,

sec.

8,

cl.

1;

U.S. Const,

art,

7,
,

art.

II,

sec.

2.

^Ij^ichael J, Glennon, "Strengthening the War Powers
Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions," Minnesota Law Review 60 (November 1975): 21-22.

^^Military Selective Service Act of 1967, amendments,
Pub, L.

92-129. sec. 401, 85 Stat. 348 (1971),
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States," not merely the "sense
of the Congress."
""^'e^
States''to1lr^?ni?e1t'?he^''^?-P°'^=>- °'
all mlitar^^perations'ol
the' ^^^^^^ States
Indochina, and to SrovidP fnr^\-^2 Snitefsta^""^
drawai of aU Sn?Ie1%t'°aLf
^iHt^?;

mf

ToLlTll'l

^-ican
^^^"^
prison:rs'o?war'^^"
^"°-""|
Ler^c^nl mLring-in act?oV"
^e-by urges and\equests°?he
President%o°?girP"^"^
initialing immeSiatelv'thrf"??"""""^
meaiateiy the following actions:
'°

Establishing a final date for the
withmilitary forces of
°'
the
t£^Uniter.^"^°''^'""
United States contingent upon the
release of all
American prisoners of war
'
and an a^count^ng
^
for all Americans missing in action
Negotiate with the Government of North
^
TM«^
Vietnam for an immediate cease-fire
Negotiate with the Government of North
„. ^
Vietnam for an agreement which would
series of phased and rapid withdrawalsprovide for a
of United
States military forces from Indochina
in exchange
for a corresponding series of phased
releases of
American prisoners of war
.-^^
(1)

.

.

K

.

.

The implementation sections, including the
setting of
a final date for troop withdrawal, were clearly
left to Pres-

idential discretion; Congress only urged and requested
that
they be undertaken.

The first part is more controversial:

can Congress mandate United States policy respecting the

termination of hostilities and is the President obligated
to follow the legislative prescription?

Before signing on November 17, 1971, the Defense Pro-

curement Authorization within which the Mansfield Amendment
was contained, President Nixon made known his views on Con23 See note
4,

supra.
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gress' policy declaration.

tion 601) IS without binding
force or Pffa.;

Mv

siPTiincr

nf

^-P

^^

^° ^ conclusion.

Chalk up another victory for
the Executive branch;
Nixon refused to alter his policies
to conform with the Mansfield guidelines. The end result
was that the Congressional
declaration of policy on terminating
hostilities, although
part of an act signed into law, was
totally ineffectual as
a limitation on the President,
It should be noted, however, that
there were two sig-

nificant weaknesses in the Mansfield approach.

First, al-

though Congress declared to be United States
policy withdra^l
of troops by a "date certain," it declined
to name the date,

instead urging the President to do so.

Second, the Amendment

did not direct the President to do anything; it simply
made
a policy declaration and requested the President to
implement
it.

As a result, the second Mansfield approach was no

more successful than would have been any other legally non^^Congressional Quarterly Service, Congress and the
Nation, Volume III, 1969-1972 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly, Inc., 1973), p. 919.

.

—
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binding measure (such as
the first Mansfield
A.endn.ent)

Legislative

BUrnry

^h^y^r^Po^^^^^^^^^^

'^l

Contemporaneous with these
various attempts to end
United States military
involvement in Southeast
Asia was the
effort to write a more
permanent limitation upon
Presidential
power into law. I„ the wake
of the Cambodian
incursion announced by President Nixon on
April 29. 1970. several
war
power bills were introduced
in both houses
^5
of Congress.

On the House side. Clement
Zablocki (D-Wis.). chairman of a Foreign Affairs
subcommittee, held hearings
starting
in mid-June 1970. focusing
much of the time on a bill.
House
Resolution 17598, introduced by
Representative Fascell (DFla.).
The subcommittee also gave careful
consideration to
a measure introduced by a member
of the other chamber. Senator
Javits (R-N.Y.) (Senate Bill 3964).
The Fascell and Javits
proposals both attempted to specify the
circumstances under
which the President could introduce forces
into hostilities

without Congressional approval.
Significantly, chairman Zablocki announced in late

July that he found such an approach to be unacceptable.
25

"I

A number of these early proposals are conveniently
reproduced in U.S.. Congress, House, Congress, the President
and the War Powers, Hearings before the iJub eommittee on .National a ecurity foiicy and Scientitic Uevelopnents omTe
Committee on Foreign Attairs 9ist Cong.. 2d se.q.s., H7n,
,

pp. 435-95.

tHereinatter, House Hearings. 1970).
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believe," Zablocki declared,
it is simply impossible
to spell out all
Presidpr;^ o uZ
-^^""^^^^
to move quickly without t-^« o

tmgencies in which the

of the Congress.

th.

.

.

^^^^
specific authorization

The Nixon administration
had taken the same position
in testimony offered a few
weeks earlier,27 3,,
^^^^ ^.^^
nificant thing about Zablocki 's
stand is that he never reversed it, and as a result the
House and Senate adopted
divergent approaches to war powers
measures.

Following the close of hearings in
early August 1970,
the House subcommiteee met in
executive sessions and drafted
a relatively mild proposal. House
Joint Resolution 1355. which
was recommended to the full chamber.
The measure reaffirms
Congress' power to declare war. recognizes
the President's
authority to defend the United States and
its citizens in

certain emergency circumstances, and states
that it is "the
sense of Congress that whenever feasible the
President should
seek appropriate consultation with the Congress"
before making

use-of -force decisions.
The most significant part of House Joint Resolution
1355 is the requirement that the President report "promptly"
^^Ibid., p. 266.
^''ibid., p.

See also p. 267.

208.

28

U.S., Congress, House, Concerning the Vlar Powers of
Congress and the President H, Rejpt. 1547 to Accompany H. J.
Res, 1355, yist Cong., 2d sess., 1970.
.
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S

to the Speaker of the House
and President of the
Senate whenever he makes certain commitments
of United States armed

forces without specific prior
Congressional authorization. 29
Unlike the provision calling for
consultation with Congress,
the section requiring a report
to Congressional officers
is'
mandatory. And. unlike the Fascell
and Javits bills (discussed above) there is no attempt to
delineate the respective
war-initiating powers of Congress and
the President.
On November 16, 1970. the House
overwhelmingly approved House Joint Resolution 1355, by a
289-39 vote.^^ But

when the Senate failed to act the measure
died with the adjournment of the 91st Congress.
The House measure was reintroduced in the
92d Congress as House Joint Resolution

1

with only one modification:

the sense of Congress provision calling for
consultation now
29 A

report is required whenever the President "(1)
commits United States military forces to armed conflict(2)
commits military forces equipped for combat to the territory
airspace or waters of a foreign nation, except for deployments
which relate solely to supply, repair, or training of United
States forces, or for humanitarian or other peaceful purposes;
or (3) substantially enlarges military forces already located'
in a foreign nation." Ibid., pp. 5-8.
30

The Javits measure. S. 3964, differed in another
significant respect.
It provided for an automatic thirty day
cut-off of hostilities conducted without a declaration of war
unless Congress vzere to authorize an extension by "affirmative
legislative action." Ibid., pp. 474-76.
^"116 Cong. Rec. 37407-37408.

36

omitted the modifying
phrase "whenever
feasible "32
brief House hearings
Administration

9

i„

spokesmen said that the

resolution was "acceptable, "33
and the House approved
it on
of Senate action.
However, the upper chamber
was far from inactive
on
the war powers question.
On the contrary, Senator
Fulbrighfs
(D-Ark.) Foreign Relations
Co^ittee held well-publicized
hearings on various war powers
proposals (most notably, a
revised Javits measure, an Eagleton
(D-Mo.) bill, and Iven
offerings from conservative
Senators Taft (R-Oh.) and Stennis (D-Miss.)-all of which
delineated in some fashion the
general circumstances under which
presidents could deploy
troops in the absence of Congressional
35
sanction.

Secretary of State William

P.

Rogers testified in op-

position that the Senate bills attempted
"to fix in detail,
and to freeze, the allocation of the
war power between the
President and Congress," and he complained
that they would
32 U.S.,

Congress, House, Concerning the War Powers
of Congress and the President. H.-Rept.
to A ccompany
Res. 1, yzd Cong., 1st sess., 1971,
pp. 1-2.
- ^

33 U.S.,

M

'

Congress, House, War Powers Legisl ation Hear^
ings befo re the Subcominittee on National Security
Policy an J~
gc^entific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
yzd Cong
ist sess., iy/1, p. 64.
iHereinafter. House Hearings 1971}.

34ii7 Cong. Rec. 28878,

,
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"narrow the power given the
President by the
Constitution -36
Specifically Rogers thought
the measures unconstitutional to the extent that they
(1)
.

restrict the President's

authority to deploy forces abroad
short of hostitilites
and
(2) provide for congressional
limitation or termination of
military actions taken under the
President's constitutional
authority. 37 Constitutional
authorities Alexander
.

Bickel and

Moore supported Rogers' second
point but differed
amongst themselves on his first
contention. 38
J.

N.

In 1972 the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee distilled the various m.easures before
it and favorably reported
a modified Javits bill, Senate
Bill 2956.^^ The key element
of the bill was contained in section
3, which codified the

war-making powers of the President.

The Senate report de-

scribed these powers as "emergency authorities,"
and added
that they are
recognized to be authority which the President
enjoys in his independent Constitutional office
as President/Commander-in-Chief
Senate Bill 2956 provided for unilateral Presidential
36ibid., p. 498.
^^Ibid., p. 499.
38

mony)

Ibid., pp. 557 (Bickel testimony), 470 (Moore testi-

.

39

U.S., Congress, Senate, War Powers
S. 2956, 92d Cong., 2d sess.
1972.

.

Accompany

^^Ibid., p. 4.

,

S.

Rept. 606 to

.
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action in three sets of
circumstancestacU upon the United States

first in
iirst,
In .
case of at-

or its possessions,
second, in

the event of attack upon
United States armed
forces abroad;
and third, in instances U4.
of thre^fc;
tnreats t-^
to the lives of
United
states citizens and nationals
abroad.
was recognized
that the President could
forestall, repel and
retaliate in
case of attack upon the United
States or Its
oi-aLes
if= possessions--in
r,„
effect, reaffirming the doctrine
of the Prize
.

u

Cases,

Attacks on armed forces abroad
could be forestalled
and repelled, but there was no
provision for retaliation.
And threatened nationals abroad
could be protected while being evacuated as rapidly as
possible.
The bill provided that the Armed
Forces could be introduced into hostilities or "situations
where innninent in-

volvement in hostilities

is

clearly indicated by the circum-

stances," onl^ in the three circumstances
discussed above,
plus, of course, when Congress declares
war or provides "specific statutory authorization" for hostilities.
The measure
expressly denies that such authorization can be
inferred from
general military appropriations,^^ or from mutual
defense

treaties without further implementation by Congress.
^^Ibid., p.
42
^
2 Bl.

2.

(U.S.) 635 (1863)

43

This was aimed at the holding to the contrary o^
Orlando v. Laird, 443 F, 2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971),
^^S.

Rec.

2956,

12611 (1972).

sec. 4(d),

92d Cong.,'2d sess,, 118 Cong,

372

The other major features of the
Senate bill are the
automatic termination of hostilities
after 30
days in the

absence of a declaration of war or an
explicit extension by
Congress. ^5 and the possibility of
earlier termination
by

statute or joint resolution.

^^^.^^^

^^^^^

features reappear in the War Powers Resolution
ultimately enacted by Congress in 1973.
In April,

for a week.^^

1972, the Senate debated Senate Bill 2956

Among rejected amendments was a Fulbright pro-

posal to substitute for the codification of Presidential
powers a simple recognition of Presidential power to
respond
to national emergencies and to prohibit Presidential
first

use of nuclear weapons.
that section

Fulbright had expressed the fear

might inadvertently enhance Presidential war

3

power. 49 andJ his proposal to eliminate the codification would
t

.

have brought the Senate more into line with House thinking on
this matter.

Also rejected were two Dominick (R-Colo.) amendments,
one of which weakened the bill's attempt to circumscribe Pres^^Ibid., sec.

5.

^^Ibid., sec.

6.

^^118 Cong. Rec. 11583ff.
^^Ibid.

,

p.

^^S. Kept.

12456.

92-606, pp. 24-25.

373

idential use of force pursuant to treaties, 5°
and another expressly permitting retaliation
in case of attacks
on the
Amred Forces.
senators Dominick and Goldwater
(R-Ariz.)
led the fight against the bill,
joined by liberal Senator
McGee (D-Wyo.).52 senator Ervin
(D-N.C.) opposed on constitutional grounds, 53 and even dovish
Senator
Cooper (D-Ky.)

expressed reservations based upon his
understanding of the
Constitution.^^
On April 13, 1972, the Senate
approved Senate Bill
2956, along with three perfecting amendments
offered by Senator Javits.^^ At this point both
houses had passed war
powers legislation; but the House and
Senate measures differ-

ed considerably.

In order to get the two bills to a
confer-

ence committee, the House repassed its bill
with the same
designation. Senate Bill 2956, used in the upper
chamber.

A conference committee did meet--once, in October, 1972.

But

the differences between the bills were so great, and the
at50 118 Cong. Rec.
51.

Ibid.

,

p.

12458.

12588.

52

York:

Thomas F. Eagleton, War and Presidential Power (New
Liveright Publishing Corporation, 1974), p. 131.
^•^118 Cong.

54

Rec.

12138-41.

Ibid., p. 12578.

See also S. Kept, 92-606, pp. 28-33.

^^The vote was 68-16.

118 Cong. Rec.

12611.

^^U.S., Congress, House, Concerning the War Powers of
Congress and the President H. Rept. 1302 to Accompany S. 2956,
i^2d Cong., 2d sess., 1972, p. 2,
S. 2956, amended, was passed
by the House on August 14, 1972. 118 Cong. Rec. 28083.
,

.
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mosphere was so dominated by the
1972 elections, that
the
war powers question was deferred
until 1973.^7
1973 was to be the pivotal year
for war powers legislation.
In March of that year
Representative Zablocki's subcommittee held further hearings
much of which were devoted
to consideration of Senator
Javits proposal.
May, the

m

'

Subcommittee drafted House Joint
Resolution 542. which was
reported by the full Foreign Affairs
Connnittee, four members
opposing.
House Joint Resolution 542 was
the toughest measure to gain House committee approval
to date.
Its most notable features as as
follows.

First, it

directs the President to consult in every
possible instance
with the leadership and appropriations
committees of Congress
before making use-of -force decisions. Second,
it requires a

report whenever the President takes certain actions
committing the Armed Forces.

Third, it calls for an automatic

termination of certain commitments after 120 days unless
ex-

tended by Congress, or termination by concurrent resolution
(not subject to Presidential veto) before the 120 day period

ends .^^

^^U.S.. Congress, House, War Powers Resolution of
1973 H. Rept. 287 to Accompany H.J. Res. S42, 93d Cong.
1st
sess., 1973, p. 2; Eagleton, p. 142.
.

.

58

U.S., Congress, House, War Powers, Hearings before
the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientiiic
Developments o± the Committee on i'oreign Altairs y3d Cong.,
isc sess
ly /J
i^.ereinatter uouse Hearings
1973}
,

.

,

.

,

59 H. Rept. 93-287,
pp. 5-11.

.

.
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The differences
between House
^^^^ Joint Resolution
t
542
and the Javits bill
were apparent.
While
^'^'•^^ the Senate
.
.
approach
^ ^
d Uneated
.n advance the
circ^stances under which
the President would unilaterally
con.it forces, the
House hill simply
provided that certain
Presidential actions
trigger a report
and the termination
procedures. And while
the .avits measure
called for automatic 30-day
termination, or earlier by
Joint
resolution, the Zablocki
bill allowed 120 days
before automatic cut-off, with the
possibility
f asj.Diiity nf
ot »=^T
earlier termination
by concurrent (veto-proof)
resolution.
•

,

.

As the House Foreign Affairs
Co«ittee report indicated, the most controversial
provisions of House Joint Resolution 542 would be the
termination proposals.
Seven Committee members expressed
reservations about these provisions
and four other members refused
to sign the report mainly
because of these provisions

The principle objections to the
120-day automatic
termination were:
that it did not require affirmative
(1)
action by the Congress, (2) that it
could rob opponents of
any incentive to negotiate, and
that it was unconstitu(3)
tional when applied to actions taken under
the Presidential

independent constitutional authority.

The concurrent reso-

lution provision was opposed by some because there
is doubt

whether any act of Congress not subject to Presidential
60 Ibid.,

pp.

15-20.

,
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approval or disapproval can
have the force of
law. 61
With the Cambodian bombing
controversy as backdrop
House debate began on June
25-27, 1973.
House Democrats ere
fairly united in support and
while Republicans opposed
their
Policy Committee was unable
to agree upon alternative
amendments

J

The Nixon administration also
opposed House Joint Resolution 542. threatening a veto
because of the bill's allegedly dangerous and unconstitutional
restrictions ^3 A vote
was scheduled for July 18. On that
day a number of substitute measures and amendments were
considered.
Representative
Dennis (R-Ind.) offered a substitute
providing Congressional
approval or disapproval within 90 days
of the President's
action by "a bill or resolution appropriate
to the purpose."
This would have replaced the automatic
120^ay termination
and would have made the appropriateness of
earlier cut-off
by mere concurrent resolution unclear. The
Dennis substitute
.

was rejected, 166-250.^^

A substitute by Congressman Eckhardt (D-Tex.) might
have eliminated some of the constitutional difficulties of
House Joint Resolution 542.

It provided that Congress could

^^Ibid.
^^

CQ Almanac 1973, p. 910.

^^119 Cong. Rec. 24663 (1973).
^^Ibid., pp. 24654-24655, 24678 (1973).

.
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direct disengagement
by iolnt resolution,
or declare that
the President was trenching
on Congressional
authority
through use of concurrent
resolution. There would
be no automatic termination provision.
Other language suggested
impeachment for failure to faithfully
execute this law. The
House did not see its merits,
however, voting it down 153262.^5

Also rejected were amendments
to

(1) require a vote
of Congressional approval or
disapproval within 120 days,
form not specified,66 (2) require
disengagement only if Congress enacts "appropriate legislation"
within 120 days,^^
(3) substitute an appropriate bill or
resolution for the concurrent resolution clause,
(4) require a report and trigger the withdrawal mechanisms for all troop
deployments, not
just certain placements
and (5) committee amendments to
,

apply the bill to ongoing (i.e., Cambodian)
hostilities

Having beaten back proposals to either weaken or
strengthen the measure, the House then passed House Joint

Resolution 542 by a 244-170

vote.''-'"

^^Ibid., pp. 24678-24679, 24681.
^^Ibid., p. 24694.
^^Ibid., p. 24693,
68.

Ibid.

,

p.

24695,

^^Ibid., p. 24677.
'^^Ibid., p.

24684,

'^^Ibid.,

24707.
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Two days later, the Senate
adopted once again its
version of the War Powers Resolution
by a 72^18 vote, 72 ^he
Senate measure, now designated
Senate Bill 440, was virtually
identical with the 1972 Javits
bill (Senate Bill 2956). 73
Administration spokesmen had already
made clear that the Senate measure was opposed^^ and
the expectation of a veto
seemed
to obviate the need for a
substantial opposition effort.^S
Before Senate Bill 440 had been approved,
two amendents of note were rejected.

Senator Fulbright wished to add

a clause empowering Congress to
restrict or prohibit all

major troop deployments by concurrent
resolution.

And Sena-

tor Eagleton tried unsuccessfully to
extend the bill's coverage to all persons employed by or under
contract with the

United States government engaging in hostilities
or advising
foreign forces.

A House-Senate conference committee first convened
late in July, 1973,
72$.
73

^^^^ Fulbright, Mansfield, Symington,

440, adopted July 20, 1973, 119 Cong. Rec. 25119.

U.S., Congress, Senate, War Powers
S. Reot. 220 to
S. 440, 93d Cong., 1st sess.
1973, p. 1.
.

Accompany

,

7^U.S., Congress, Senate, War Powers Legislation 1973,
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relation?
(Jong., ist sess., ly/J, p. 52.
jhereinatter Senate Hearing s
1973}.
See also. House Hearings 1973 p. 129.
";

,

,

75 cQ Almanac 1973

,

914.

Fulbright amendment is at 119 Cong. Rec. 25091
Eagleton's is at ibid., p. 25092.

76'j.he

(1973).

p.

^^Eagleton, p. 199.
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Muskle. Aiken. Case and
Javits fro. the upper
chamber, and
Representatives ZablocU. Morgan.
Hays. Fraser,

MaiUiard

Fascell. Findley. Broomfield
and Frelinghuysen
serving as
House conferees. Major
concessions having been
.ade by the
senators the Conference
Co^ittee issued its report
October
A,

1973/^

The most significant changes
(the table below enables
comparison of the July 1973 House
and Senate measures and
the Conference Committee bill)
are as follows.
The Senate
language codifying Presidential
war powers was trinnned considerably and reduced in importance.
The House approach,
designating certain troops commitments
as the triggering
mechanism for a Presidential report and
termination procedires.
was, with modifications, adopted
instead.
The automatic termination feature
was maintained, but
a 60 day period was adopted, with
provision for 30 additional
days in case of military necessity.
Finally, the designated
troop commitments could be terminated during
the initial 60day period by concurrent resolution not subject
to Presidential veto.^°
78 U.S.,

Congress. House, War Powers

.

H.

Kept. 547 to

,

Mail-

Accompany H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong. 1st sess. 1973.
liard and Frelinghuysen refused to sign the Report.
,

"ibid.
SOlbid.
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When the Conference bill
was returned to the
House
and Senate in October.
1973, it ran into
opposition both
from those who felt the measure
too restrictive of Presidential^power, and those who
viewed it as not restrictive
enough.
The latter group reasoned
that the virtual elimination of the codifiction of
Presidential powers contained
in the Senate bill had the
effect of eliminating any
prior
restraint upon Presidential power
to connnit troops
to hos-

tilities.

From their standpoint, the
Conference bill per-

mits 60 to 90 days of Presidentially-initiated
war.^^
However, in addition to the fact that
Javits, Fulbright and Zablocki all urged passage,
the Conference bill
had other factors working in its behalf.
President Nixon
was becoming increasingly enveloped in the
Watergate scandal
and related matters, and his ability to defend
Presidential

prerogative against Congressional challenge was weakening.
On October 10, 1973, the day the Senate voted
upon
the Conference bill, Vice-President Agnew resigned his
office.

The Senate approved House Joint Resolution 542, 75

to 20. "Two days later the House approved the measure, 238123, and it was sent to Nixon for an almost certain veto 84

^^119 Ceng, Rec. 33548-69, 33858-73,
82

See Eagleton's argument, ibid., pp. 33555-33556,

®^Ibid., p. 33569.
®^Ibid., p. 33873,

.
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On October 20, President
Nb.on dismissed the Special

Prosecutor investigating the Watergate
affair,
torney General resigned rather
than carry

(Nixon's At-

out the dismissal,

and when the task fell to the
reluctant Deputy Attorney General he too was removed from office, )85

^nd four days later

President Nixon vetoed the War Powers
Resolution
Nixon's veto message criticized the
Resolution for
restrictions on Presidential authority that
"are both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests
of our Na-

tion."

Specifically, he contended that the 60-day
automat-

ic termination provisions (section 5(b)) and
the provision

for earlier termination of hostilities by concurrent
resolu-

tion (section 5(c)) are unconstitutional.

He further argued

that the bill would undermine American capacity to respond
to international crisis, erode the confidence of allies and

the respect of adversaries.^^
He suggested that such a bill might have impeded

responses in the Berlin crisis of 1961, the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962, the Congo rescue of 1964, the Jordanian crisis of 1970, as well as recent actions in the middle east.

The point here seems to be that troop deployments for diplo-

matic purposes would be affected.
^^ New York Times

.

OQ

21 October 1973, p.

^^119 Cong. Rec, 34990-34991.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.

1,
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Finally, the 60.day cut-off
was attacked on a number of grounds. First, it was
not clear just when the
provision would be triggered. Second,
it permits Congress to
assert its authority through
inaction:
a "yes or no votewould not be required. Third, Nixon
argued that an automatic cut-off could rob an adversary
of any incentive to

negotiate or, encourage a rapid escalation
by the United
States in order to successfully end
the operation. ^9
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Chairman Morgan CDPa.) and subcommittee chairman Zablocki
prepared a reply to
the veto message, defending House Joint
Resolution 542.^°
In effect, the reply simply denied or attempted
to refute

each of the points made by the White House,

That Zablocki

was successful cannot be attributed to sheer force
of argu-

ment alone.
Congress and especially the Democrats in Congress

were restive.

They had been unable to override any of the

eight Nixon vetoes that year.

And now with all American

troops home from Indochina and scandal tainting the administration, the legislature saw a chance to strike.
In a dramatic November 7th session, following intense

lobbying by both sides,

the House voted 284 to 135 to ap-

^

^^Ibid.

^^119 Cong, Rec, 33868-33869 (1973),
^•^

CQ Almanac 1973

^^Ibid,

.

pp,

905-906,
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prove the act over the President's
veto," ^our hours later
the Senate, as expected,
completed the override,
75 to 18,
and the War Powers R esolution
became Public Law 93-148.5^'
93

94

119 Cong, Rec. 36221-36222.

Ibid., p. 36198; CQ Almanac
1973, pp. 905-906.
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Public Law 93-148
93rd Congress, H, J, Res.
542

November

7,

1973

JOINT RESOLUTION
Concerning the war powers of
Congress and the President
Resolved by the Senat
House

^d

o f the

of Rep r.....^...,...

United States of Mer.r. in
Congress assemhI.H
SHORT TITLE

SECTION

This joint resolution may be
cited as
the "War Powers Resolution".
1.

PURPOSE AND POLICY
Sec,

2.

(a)

It is the purpose of this joint
resolu-

tion to fulfill the intent of the framers
of the Constitution
of the United States and insure that
the collective judgment
of both the Congress and the President
will apply
to the in-

troduction of United States Armed Forces into
hostilities,
or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities
is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and to the con-

tinued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations

.

(b)

Under article

I,

section

8,

of the Constitution,

it is specifically provided that the Congress shall have the

power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers

vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United

291

States, or in any department
or officer thereof,
(c)
The constitutional
powers of the President
as
Connnander-in-Chief to introduce
United States Anned
Forces
xnto hostilities, or into
situations where i^^^inent
involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circumstances
are exercised only pursuant
to (1) a declaration
of war,
(2) specific statutory authorization,
or
(3)

a

national

emergency created by attack upon
the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its
armed forces,
CONSULTATION
SEC, 3,

The President in every possible
instance

shall consult with Congress before
introducing United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by
the circumstances, and after every such
introduction shall

consult regularly with the Congress until United
States

Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities
or have
been removed from such situations.
REPORTING
SEC. 4.

(a)

In the absence of a declaration of war,

in any case in which United States Armed Forces are intro-

duced-(1)

into hostilities or into situation where im-

minent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
by the circumstances;

-
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into the territory,
airspace or waters of
a
foreign nation, while equipped
for combat, except
for
deployments which relate solely
to supply, replacement,
repair, or training of such
forces; or
C2)

(3)

in number which substantially
enlarge United

States Armed Forces equipped
for combat already located
in a foreign nation; the
President shall submit within
48 hours to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives
and to the President pro tempore
of the Senate a report,
in writing, setting forth(A)

the circumstances necessitating
the introduc-

tion of United States Armed Forces;
(B)

the constitutional and legislative
authority

under which such introduction took place;
and
(C)

the estimated scope and duration
of the hos-

tilities or involvement.
(b)

The President shall provide such other
information

as the Congress may request in the fulfillment
of its con-

stitutional responsibilities with respect to commiting the

Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces
abroad.
(c)

Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced

into hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of this section, the President shall, so long as

such armed forces continue to be engaged in such hostilities
or situation, report to the Congress periodically on the
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stacus of such ho3tiUties
o. situation, as
well as on the
scope and duration of such
hostilities or situation,
but in
no event shall he report
to the Congress less
often than once
every six months.

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Sec.

5(a)

Each report submitted
pursuant to section
4(a)(1) shall be transmitted
to the Speaker of the
House of
Representatives and to the President
pro

tempore of the Sen-

ate on the same calendar day.

Each report so transmitted

shall be referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives and the
Connnittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate
Action.
If, when the
report is transmitted, the Congress
haa adjourned
sine die

or has adjourned for any period in
excess of three calendar
days, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the

President pro tempore of the Senate, if
they deem it advisable (of if petitioned by at least 30
percent of the membership of their respective Houses) shall
jointly request
the

President to convene Congress in order that it may
consider
the report and take appropriate action pursuant
to this section.
(b)

Within sixty calendar days after a report is sub-

mitted or is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4
(a)(1), which ever is earlier, the President shall terminate

any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which

such report is submitted (or required to be submitted)

,

un-

.
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less the Congress (1) has
declared war or has enacted
a specific authorization for such
use of United States
Armed
Forces, (2) has extended by law
such sixty-day period, or
(3) is physically unable to meet as
a result of an armed attack upon the United States.
Such sixty-day period shall
be
extended for not more than an
additional thirty
days if the

President determines and certifies
to the Congress in writing
that unavoidable military necessity
respecting the safety of
United States Armed Forces requires
the continued use of such
armed forces in the course of bringing
about a prompt removal
of such forces
Cc)

Notwithstanding subsection

(b)

,

at any time that

United States Armed Forces are engaged in
hostilities outside
the territory of the United States, its possessions
and

terri-

tories without a declaration of war or specific statutory

authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President
if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution,

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES FOR
JOINT RESOLUTION OR BILL
SEC.

6.

(a)

Any joint resolution or bill introduced pur-

suant to section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before
the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in such sec-

tion shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign Rela-

tions of the Senate, as the case may be, and such committee

.
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shall report one such
Joint resolution or bill,
together
with its reco^endations,
not later than
twenty-four calendar days before the
expiration of the sixty-day
period
specified in such section,
unless such House shall
otherwise determine by the yeas
and nays.

Any joint resolution or
bill so reported shall become the pending business of
the House
(b)

in question (in the

case of the Senate the time
for debate shall be equally
divided between the proponents
and the opponents)
and shall
be voted on within three calendar
days thereafter, unless
such House shall otherwise determine
by yeas and
,

nays.

Such a joint resolution or bill
passed by one House
shall be referred to the committee
of the other House named
in subsection (a) and shall be
reported out not later than
fourteen calendar days before the
expiration of the sixty(c)

day period specified in section 5(b).

The joint resolution

or bill so reported shall become the
pending business of the

House in question and shall be voted on within
three calendar
days after it has been reported, unless such
House
shall

otherwise determine by yeas and nays
(d)

In the case of any

disagreement between the two

Houses of Congress with respect to a joint resolution or bill

passed by both Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed
and the committee of conference shall make and file a report

with respect to such resolution or bill not later than four
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period

3)6

specified

in section 5Cb).

In tKe even. .Ke
conferees are

their respective
ve Hou<?pq
„
P
Houses ^r,
in disagreement.
Notwithstanding
any rule in either
concerning the printing
of conference reports in the Record or
concerning any delay in
the consideratxon of such reports, such
report shall be acted
on by both
Houses not later than the
expiration of such sixty-day
period.

CONGRESSIONAL PRIORITY PROCEDURES
FOR
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
SEC.

7,

(a)

Any concurrent resolution
introduced pur-

suant to section 5(c) shall be
referred to the Conmiittee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives or the Com-

mittee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate, as the case may
be, and one such concurrent
resolution shall be reported
out by such committee together
with its recommendations

within fifteen calendar days, unless
such House shall otherwise

determine by the yeas and nays.
Any concurrent resolution so reported
shall become
the pending business of the House in question
(b)

(in the case

of the Senate the time for debate shall be
equally divided

between the proponents and the opponents) and shall
be voted
on within three calendar days thereafter, unless
such House

shall otherwise determine by yeas and nays.
(c)

Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House

shall be referred to the committee of the other House named
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in subsection (a) and shall
be reported
i-eporcea nut
out by such committee
•together with its recon^endations
within fifteen calendar
days and shall thereupon
become the pending business
of such
House and shall be voted upon
within three calendar days,
unless such House shall otherwise
determine by yeas and nays,
(d)
In the case of any disagreement
between the two
Houses of Congress with respect to
a concurrent resolution
passed by both Houses, conferees shall
be promptly appointed
and the committee of conference shall
make and file a report
with respect to such concurrent resolution
within six calendar days after the legislation is
referred to the committee
of conference.
Notwithstanding any rule in either House con-

cerning the printing of conference reports in
the Record or
concerning any delay in the consideration of such
reports,

such report shall be acted on by both Houses not
later than
six calendar days after the conference report has been
filed.
In the event the conferees are unable to agree within
48 hours,

they shall report back to their respective Houses in disagree-

ment

.

INTERPRETATION OF JOINT RESOLUTION
SEC.

8.

(a)

Authority to introduce United States Armed

Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involve-

ment in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances
shall not be inferred--
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from any provision of law
(whether or not in
effect before the date of the
enactment of this Joint
resolution)
including any provision
contained in any
appropriation Act. unless such
provision specifically
authorizes the introduction of
United States Armed
Forces into hostilities or into
such situations and
states that it is intended to
constitute specific statutory authorization within the
meaning of this Joint
resolution; or
(1)

.

from any treaty heretofore or hereafter
ratified unless such treaty is implemented
by legislation
specifically authorizing the introduction
of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into such sit(2)

uations and stating that it is intended to
constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning
of
this joint resolution.
(b)

Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed

to require any further specific statutory authorization
to

permit members of United States Armed Forces to participate
jointly with members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the headquarters operations of high-level

military commands vzhich were established prior to the date
of enactment of this joint resolution and pursuant to the

United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified by the United
States prior to such date.
(c)

For purposes of this joint re'solution, the term

-
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"introduction of United States Armed
Forces" includes the
assignment of members of such armed

forces to command, coor-

dinate, participate in the movement
of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any
foreign country or
government when such military forces are
engaged, or there
exists an imminent threat that such forces
will become en-

gaged, in hostilities.
(d)

Nothing in the joint resolution(1)

is intended to alter the constitutional
auth-

ority of the Congress or of the President, or the pro-

visions of existing treaties; or
(2)

shall be construed as granting any authority

to the President with respect to the introduction of

United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly
indicated by the circimistances which authority he would

not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.
SEPARABILITY CLAUSE
SEC,

9.

If any provision of this joint resoltuion or the

application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the joint resolution and the applica-

tion of such provision to any other person or circumstances
shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC,

10.

This joint resolution shall take effect on the

date of its enactment,
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Analysis of the War

PowP.r..

Poo^^^Hl^

We now turn to a detailed
analysis of the meaning
and intent of the War Powers
Resolution.
Section 2, designated the "Purpose and Policy"
section, indicates in subsec
tion (a) that the joint
resolution is intended "to
fulfill
the intent of the framers of
the Constitution ... and
insure that the collective judgment
of both the Congress and
the President will apply to"
use-of -force
decisions.

Subsection

(b)

of that same section asserts
as con-

stitutional warrant for the Resolution.
Article I. section
Of the Constitution, especially the
"necessary and proper"
clause.
In Article I, section 8, Congress
is given the
power to "declare war" (clause 11) "make

8.

rules for the gov-

,

ernment and regulation of the land and naval
forces (clause
14)," and make "all laws which shall be necessary
and proper
for carrying into execution" not only these and
other
legis-

lative powers, but also
all other powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States or in any
department or officer thereof.

The theory

here is that the President, being an "of-

ficer" of the United States, may be subjected to a legislative procedure in the exercise of his powers.

More specifi-

cally, the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief and chief
^^U.S. Const., Art. I, sec.

8,

cl.

18.

,

i02

executive

be clarified b. Congress
and implemented in
accordance with acts of
Congress,
A major legal issue
surrounding war powers legislation
is whether such an
act merely
clarifies and provides
implementation procedures
for Presidential powers, or whether
it in fact alters and
trenches
upon them. ^

Subsection

(c)

of Section

2

is one of the most
contro-

versial provisions in the Resolution.

It was the product of

compromise between the elaborate
codification of Presidential
powers in the Senate bill and the
absence
of any codifica^

tion in the House version. ^7

^he Senate measure the

President's authority to commit forces
to hostilities was
defined and circumscribed as a matter
of law.
The effect of
Section 2(c) is not nearly so clear.
It states that the constitutional
powers of the Com-

mander-in-Chief to make use-of-force decisions
are exercised only pursuant to (1) a
declaration
of war, (2) specific statutory authorization,
or
a national emergency created by attack
upon
the United States, its territories or possessions.
However, its location in the "Purpose and Policy"

portion of the Act suggests that it might not have the
binding force that the codification in the Senate bill would

have had,^^

On the other hand, a Purpose and Policy section

See, e.g., House Hearings 1973

ings 1973
97
98

.

p.

.

p,

130/ Senate Hear-

19,

Sen. Fulbright so contended at 119 Cong, Rec. 33548,

See ibid., p. 33555 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton)

.
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is not a Preamble, and Section
2(c) does follow the
"Resolved
by the Congress" clause. 59

Secondly, unlike the Senate bill,
this delineation
of Presidential power no longer
serves as the triggering
mechanism for the rest of the Act. The
Conference Report
makes this quite clear.

Subsequent sections of the joint resolution
are not
dependent upon the language of the subsection,
as
was the case with
similar
provision
of
the
Senate
g
Dili (section 3)
Thirdly, there is no "enforcing language.

Instead

of directing the President to exercise his
powers in a cer-

tain manner, the clause merely states that they
are so exercised, a peculiar use of tense.

'"^^

Finally, there seem to have been some serious omis-

sions in this catalogue of Presidential powers.

bill

The Senate

440) said that the President had "recognized powers"

(S.

to respond

not just to attacks upon the United States, but

also to (1) the "imminent threat" of attack on the United
States,

(2)

the imminent threat of attack on the United States

Armed Forces, and
nationals abroad.

(3)

threats to United States citizens and

None of these are included among 2(c)s

QQ

^^William B. Spong, Jr., "The War Powers Resolution
Revisited: Historic Accomplisliment or Surrender?," William
and Mary Law Review 16 (1975) :837, 840.
IOOr. Rept.

93-547; p.

8.

^°^Spong, p. 838.
102
Gerhard Casper, "Constitutional Restraints on the
Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model,"
University of Chicago Law Review 43 (Srping 1976) :484.

.

enumeration of the President.,
constitutional powers,
Section 2(c) may thus be
inconsistent with Section
8Cd) which
States that
Nothing in this joint resolut-i'nn

senator Eagleton

*

.

not have been going too
far when

xnay

ha declared the provision "no
more hinding than
clause in a Kiwanis Club resolution. "103

a

'whereas'

3^^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^

as prljne sponsor in the Senate
spoke more authoritatively

regarding the legislative intent,
characterized Section 2 CO
as "by no means valueless or
inoperative, "^^^ It is, he
went on, "a declaration of the meaning
(of the) Constitution
.

or, we might add,

.

Congress' understanding of that

meaning
In short, Section 2(c) is advisory,

may or may not heed its advice.

and Presidents

In fact. President Ford pro-

ceeded to ignore 2(c) in the spring, 1975,
rescues of Ameri^
can and Indochinese nationals from Southeast
Asia,-"-^^
By contrast. Section

gations upon the President
"•^^119 Cong.

imposes non-discretionary obli-

3

j^.

.

directs that the President

Rec, 33555 (1973),

^^^Ibid., p. 33557.

^°^Ibid., p. 33558,
^^^Spong, p. 840.

Compliance Hearings

.

pp,

10-11,

^^^119 Cong, Rec. 33550 (1973),

^05

m

ever, possible Instance
shall consult with
Congress before mtroductlng" forces
into hostilities
or situations indxcatlng i::.inent involvement.
(M, emphasis).
The phrase
"in every possible Instance"
had been carried over
fro. the
House bin unmodified and
so ve .ay turn to
the report accompanying that bill for
Interpretation.
The use of the word "every"
was Intended to make
prior
consultation "Inclusive." i.e..
applicable even to emergency
Circumstances where there is no
time for formal Congressional
authorlzation.109
consultation requirement is
modified by the use of the word
"possible," by which Congress
recognizes
That a situation may be so dire,
e,g.{ } hostile
require 'such ins
tinelus Action th'^
P'^'-^'^ consultation will be
possible

Clearly some ambiguity or uncertainty
is evident here.
The difference between an emergency
requiring prior consultation and an emergency so dire that
none is possible is a matter of judgment. President Ford complained
that

in the inter-

national crises of his Presidency it was
"literally impossible"
to meaningfully consult with Congress.
It is clear from Section 3 that not all
troop deploy-

ments require prior consultation;
109

^H.

Kept. 93-287, p.

only commitments to hostil-

6.

llOlbid.
^^^

New York Times

.

12 April 1977, p.

14,

406

ities or imminent hostilities
are covered. Although
Presidential reports are required
for foreign deployments
of combat troops (section 4(a)(2) and
4(a)(3) ), no prior consultation is mandated in these instances
unless hostilities are ongoing or imminent -^-'^
.

"Hostilities" is defined broadly to
include both
"actual fighting" and "a state of
confrontation" with a "clear
and present danger of armed conflict "^^^
While this presents some problems, the phrase "imminent
hostilities" is
even more troublesome. This is defined
as a situation with
a "clear potential" for either fighting
or a state of
,

con-

frontation ''^
.

Consider, however, the difficulties that arise
when

we try to apply this standard to a real-life event.

When

President Kennedy sent 20,000 military advisers to Vietnam,
was this a commitment to hostilities or imminent hostilities T-'--'-^

If so,

consultation would have been required had

the War Powers Resolution been in force.

There is also some ambiguity surrounding the parties
to consultation.

The Conference Committee substituted con-

sultation with Congress for consultation with the leadership
^•^^

Compliance Hearings

^^^H, Kept.

93-287, p.

,

p.

3.

7,

ll^lbid.

^^^The Congressmen favoring war powers legislation
could not agree on this question. See House Hearings 1973
pp. 16-17, 73-74,

,
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and appropriate comittees as
designated in the House
bill.
This change suggests that
the President and Congress were intended to have
greater flexibility in selecting members of Congress to consult
with the executive branch.
Section 3 does not require a
minimum number of legislative
consultants, nor does it stipulate
that certain Congressional
officers, or committees, or committee
chairmen participate,
nor that representatives of the opposing
political party be
in on discussions.
Furthermore. Section

directs the President to con-

3

sult, and the report accompanying the
House bill says that

"for consultation to be meaningful, the President
himself
"^^^
must participate.
However, following the Mayaguez incident of 1975, the State Department noted four
separate sets

of executive-legislative communications --only one of which

apparently involved President Ford personally- -and claimed
that these constituted fulfillment of the consultation re-

quirements of section

3.-^-'-^

Another issue raised by Section

3

involved the quality

of the executive-legislative communication; i.e., what con-

stitutes consultation?

The earlier House report is, once

Kept. 93-547, p.

8,

^"^H. Kept. 93-287, p.

7.

•^•^^

Compliance Hearings pp. 78-79, Several Congressmen disputed the claim that the requirements of Section 3
were fulfilled, but not on the basis of che absence of personal Presidential communication.
,
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again, authoritative here.

It declared that

A considerable amount of attention
was given to the
definition of consultation

tion that consultation should Rejected was tL no
he
merely beging informed. Rather. s^on^ous witS"
cS^sul^atLn in
this provision means that a
decision is pending on
a problem and that Members
of Congress a?ebe?n.
asked by the President for
theiridvice and opinions
and, in appropriate circumstances,
their approval
of action contemplated. 119
.

Again the first tests of compliance
(the southeast

Asian evacuations and Mayaguez incident
of 1975), some legislators contended that Congress was merely
advised

or informed,

as opposed to having been consulted, -^^^

More recently, former President Ford, citing
time factors, security leak risks, and the President's
ability
to

stay abreast of fast-breaking developments, declared
that
it is impossible to draw the Congress into the
dec is ion -making process in an effective way. 121

This seems all but a confession that Congress did not

consult as mandated by Section

Ford's point, of course,

3.

was that the Resolution should be re-examined with regard to

loosening the consultation requirement, "^^^
The last clause of Section

3

requires consultation

after troops are committed to hostilities or imminent hostil''•^H.

Rept. 93-287, pp. 6-7.

120

See Compliance Hearings
note 182, 856, 856, note 187,
-^^^

New York Times

l^^iMd.

.

,

p,

82;

Spong, pp,

12 April 1977, p.

14,

855,

.

^09

ities.

This consultation must take place
"regularly" until
American forces "are no longer engaged
in hostilities or
have been removed" from situations
of imminent hostilities.
The term "regularly" is left undefined,
but Congress made
clear its intention that "consultation
take place during
hostilities even when advance consultation
is not possible. "123
Finally, Senator Javits made this point
for the
record:

consultation is not intended by Congress to serve

as authorization for executive action; it
"is not a substi-

tute for specific statutory authorization.

We turn then to Section

4,

""^24

entitled "Reporting," and

thus to the triggering mechanism for the report and termi-

nation procedure.

As we have noted, this section, unlike

the Senate bill (S.440), does not attempt to set out in ad-

vance the circum.stances under which the President may commit forces to hostilities.

Instead it makes reporting and

the termination of hostilities mechanisms contingent upon

certain kinds of troop commitments
There are three types of circumstances, all occurring
in the absence of a declaration of war, in which the intro-

duction of United States Armed Forces serves as a triggering
device.

The first entails their introduction into hostil123h. Kept. 93-547, p. 8.

124ii9 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973).

.
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itles or situatipng of imminent
hostilities ,^^5
This makes an interesting change
in the House bill
(Section 3(1)), which specified that
the forces had to be

committed to actual (not just potential)
hostilities taking
place outside United States territory
exclusively ^26
.

This

does not mean that the introduction of
forces into hostilities or potential hostilities on United
States soil without
a declaration of war is prohibited.

But it does mean that

the reporting, and more significantly, the
termination pro-

cedures are thereby triggered, and therefore the
introduction of forces into hostilities on American soil in
response
to attacks on the United States are, for example,
subject to

the automatic 60-day termination rule specified in Section
5(b).

Congress' legal authority to provide for termination

of such conflicts is in doubt.

A more compelling problem perhaps

is raised by the am-

biguity surrounding the meaning of the terms "hostilities,"
or worse still, "imminent hostilities

""^^^
.

We might ask at

this point, who or what agency decides when troops have been

committed to hostilities or imminent hostilities?

Is this

a matter for Presidential or Congressional determination?

^2%ar Powers Resolution,
87 Stat.

555

Pub. L.

93-148, sec. 4(a)(1),

(1973)

For emphasis on the latter point see H. Kept, 93287. p.

7.

^^^See note 110, supra, and accompanying text.

At bottom this is a political question,
to be determined by
the relative power of the two
branches; for while the
President may initially withhold
a report, Congress
may insist
that the unreported activities
cease nevertheless 128
In short, 4(a)(1) provides
that whenever the armed
forces are introduced into
combat, or a state of confrontation presenting a clear and
present danger of combat, or a
situation of clear potential for
either combat or confrontation, a report is required and
the 60-day termination countdown goes into effect.^^^
.

Section 4(a)(2), the second of the
three triggers involves the introduction of combat troops
abroad, even without the existence of hostilities or
imminent hostilities.
Congress intended this trigger to be
operative even if
there were only "some risk, however small,
of the forces

being involved in hostilities

"'"^^
.

Note that the troops would have to be "equipped for
combat," and introduced into the "territory, airspace
or

waters of a foreign nation."

So for example, war ship de-

ployments to international waters would not be included; nor

would deployments to foreign shores of military advisers who

plicat:

for automata.*-

L.t.a.uiJ,i.ia.uj,wi.i

oj-A.i__y

uayo

ctj.

ui

mitted "or is required to be submitted."
-"^^See H.

Kept.

93-287, p.

^^°Ibid,, pp, 7-8.

7.

.
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are not equipped

foz:

combat.

Also excluded are combat
deployments related solely
to "supply, replacement,
repair, or training" of
United
States forces. The legislative
intent here was to waive
the reporting requirement in
cases of "routine
port supply

calls, emergency aid measures,
normal training exercises,
and other noncombat military
activities "^31 The meaning
of the phrase "emergency aid
measures" is not
,

clear,

The report accompanying the House
bill, which was
virtually identical with the final act
respecting this pro.
Vision, clarifies the Congress' intentions.
It read as
follows

A report would be required any time combat
military forces

were sent to another nation to alter
or preserve the existing political status
quo or
to make the United States presence felt
Thus
for example, the dispatch of Marines to ThailaAd
1962 and the quarantine of Cuba in the same
year would have required Presidential reports.

m

The requirement that such activities be formally
re-

ported to Congress is non-controversial and it should
be

noted that such reported activities are not subject to the
automatic 60 -day termination rule.
Section 4(a)(3) describes the third of the triggering
events.

It calls for a report whenever forces are intro-

duced in numbers which "substantially enlarge" a United
States combat troop commitment abroad.
^^^Ibid., p.
132
Ibid.

8,

The key word here

"

.
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is "substantially," and
once again the House
report is in-

structive

While the word subs^an^^ an,r» j
.^"^S'?"^^ ^ flexIble criterion, il is
po"ss?b^e
^
sense understaAding of the n,'^™hn
percent increase il numbe?s^
* 1°°M^^,"frine guards at
an
embassy-say from 5 to in
^°
""^^ "^'^^'^
occasion fo? a Report
A'r'h™?
•^"'^ additional men
sent to Europe Snder^reln^
significantly en?frge^tbe ?otaiT"f'r"
-^^^^
patch
tlttTt
of 1,000 men to Guantanamo Ho^ev^r:°?hr5!s?''
Bay Cuba th^rh
would'iean'an
Increase
WO. Z.J percent, which
oraS^pe^cen^'S
is substantial
Undp-r rhi
circumstance {sic?} President
Kennedy woSd have
been required to report to
Congress in 1962 when
he raised the number of tt q ^-.i-i^j T
Vietnam from ySSto lefoOO.J^a"^'^''"^^ advisers in
'

i'ir ^'hP

Thus, substantiality involves
consideration of both
the size of the original combat
force commitments as well
as the size of the proportion of
the increment.
While this
clarifies the term "substantially." it
still leaves a great
deal uncertain. There is no strict
numerical standard for

determining when a substantial enlargement has
been made.
We have described each of the three triggering
events
in some detail.

If any one of them were to occur, section

4(a) stipulates that the President submit a written
report

within 48 hours to the Speaker of the House and President
pro tempore of the Senate.

This report is mandatory, not

optional, and is required "within 48 hours of the causal

event

.

,,^34

Ibid.

134

119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973)

(remarks of Sen. Javits)

.

,
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m

1975, President Ford sub„,itted
four reports pursuant to 4(a) respecting
the southeast Asian
evacuations

and the Ma^aguez incident.

"5

These were the first
reports
ever submitted under the
Resolution.
Section 4(a) requires
that the reports set forth
the circumstances
necessitating
the introduction of forces,
the constitutional and
legislative authority for the
cne
actinn and
^r,^ ^t,
action,
/
the estimated scope and
duration of the hostilities or
involvement.

Section 4(b) provides that the
President shall provide such other information as
the Congress may request
i e
over and above what was supplied
in the
.

report.

.

,

This

creates another area of potential
legislative-executive conflict, especially if a President
were to refuse information
requested on grounds of national security.

Section 4(c) requires additional
Presidential reports
subsequent to any of the troop introductions
described
in

4(a).

These reports on the status as well as the
scope and
duration of the military operations are required
"periodi-

cally," but at a minimum "once every six months,"
for as
135 U.S., Congress,
House, Committee on Intemation Relations, The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents. Corresponden ce, Reports January 1976 Kdir-inn m^<.h^^rri-^^
Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 40-46.
{Hereinafter.
.

.

War Powers Documents }
136

119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973)

137

(remarks of Sen. Javits)

For judicial views on executive attempts to maintain
secrecy, see. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971), and United States v. Nixon, 418. U.S. 683 (1974).

,
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long as United States forces
are involved in hostilities
or
situations described in 4(a) .-'•^^

Section 5(a) requires that reports
submitted pursuant
to 4(a)(1) (introduction into
hostilities or potential hostilities) be transmitted to the
Speaker of the House and
the President pro tempore of the
Senate "on the same calendar
day," thereupon to be referred to
the respective foreign
relations committees.
If Congress is not in session
when
the report is submitted, 5(a)
provides that the Speaker and
President pro tempore "jointly request"
the President
to con-

vene Congress should they "deem it advisable,"
or should 30
percent or more of the members of the
respective chambers

so petition.

Section 5(b), the automatic 60-day termination
clause,
is one of the most controversial provisions
of the law.

Thereunder, the President is required to terminate any use
of the armed forces introduced pursuant to Section 4(a)(1)

sixty calendar days after the initial report regarding these

operations was submitted or required.

require emphasis.

A number of points

It is clear that the termination rule

only applies to forces introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities; all other troop deployments, even those

requiring reports pursuant to Sections 4(a)(2) and 4(a)(3)
^^^87 Stat. 556.
-"^^Ibid.

See also H. Rept, 93-^87, p.

9.

.

616

are not covered. -'^^
This can create some confusion,
because if the President does not report or does not
specify under which subsection of 4(a) he is reporting it
will be left to Congress to
make clear that the "60-day clock" is
running.
However, termination was intended to
take place

whether or not a report was submitted, the
60 days to be
reckoned starting 48 hours after the

introduction of forces

into hostilities or imminent hostilities.

Thus a failure

to report, or a late submission would not
extend the 60-day

limit.

T / 9

(Actually, if we include the 48-hour period
set

aside for Presidential reporting, the termination
period
runs 62 days from the start of hostilities.)
It is also clear that 4(a) CI) commitments are auto-

matically terminated without any further Congressional action; in fact, operations are terminated even if Conges s is

not in session. -^^^
1^^119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen, Javits); H. Kept. 93-547, p. 9.
141
President Ford's Report of April 30, 1975, was nonspecific, but the operation ended long before the two-month
deadline. War Powers Documents p. 43. Note Javits remarks at 119 Cong. Rec. 33551 (1973)
A similar point was
raised by Gerald L. Jenkins, "The War Powers Resolution:
Statutory Limitation on the Commander-in-Chief," Harvard
Journal on Legislation 11 (February 1974): 196.
.

'

,

.

^^^119 Cong. Rec. 33551 (1973)
vits)

(remarks of Sen. Ja-

.

143

Ibid., p. 33859 (remarks of Mr. Zablocki)

.
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object to the 60.day cut-off
as an implied authorization to the President to
conduct
Soine

"war" for two

months.1^^

Others see the rule as encouraging
escalation
by Presidents (to beat the
deadline) or negotiating
balkiness
by adversaries (to take advantage
of an assured United States
retreat.
gtiU others criticize the derogation
from Pres
idential power created by mandating
a deadline without requiring any additional legislative
action.
There is also
the constitutional question raised by
claiming that Congress
may compel withdrawal of American forces
which the President
committed, presumably on the basis of his
constitutional authority.

The strength of these objections notwithstanding,
the
intention of Congress to automatically terminate

section 4(a)

(1)

operaticns after two months is clear.

More problematic

is the standard for determining within 48 hours of
a troop

deployment whether or not it is a 4(a)(1) (hostilities or
imminent hostilities) operation.
Section 5(b) also provides for extension or waiving
the 60-day deadline by Congress.

Waiver would occur if Con-

gress has declared war, or enacted a "specific authorization"
'•^^Eagleton, pp. v-vi,

^^^119 Cong. Rec. 34991 (1973) (War Powers Resolution
Veto Message of President Nixon)
146

"^For

33861 (1973).

example, Rep. Dennis (R-Xnd.) at 119 Cong. Rec.

^18

for this use of the anned
forces, or is
"physically unable
to meet" because of an
attack on the United
States.
Congress may also extend "by
law" the sixty-day
period.
Finally. 5(b) provides that
the 60-day period shall
be extended for an additional
30 days upon written
Presidential notification to Congress
that "unavoidable military
necessity respecting the safety
of United States forces"
requires their continued deployment.
This continued use.
however, only applies "in the
course of bringing about a
prompt removal of such f orces "'^^
.

The tightly

dram

criteria of 5(b) require that the

30-day extension apply only when
safe extrication of United
States forces on the 60th day (the
automatic deadline) is
impossible.

Furthermore, the extension cannot be
justi-

fied by any policy objectives other than
safeguarding the
physical safety of the United States forces
involved,

Nevertheless, the language clearly permits
the President to
gain an additional 30 days for the conduct of
hostilities

simply upon proper certification to Congress,
We turn then to Section 5(c), another lightning rod
for criticism of the Resolution.
-•^^87 Stat.

The clause is brief.

It

556,

^^«ibid.

149

119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973)

ISOxbid.

(remarks of Sen.Javits),
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states that Congress ™ay
compel the President
to remove
United States forces engaged
hostilities abroad by
passing a concurrent
resolution. First, It
should be noted
that It only applies to
forces outside the
United States
proper, or Its territories
and possessions ,^51

m

Second, these forces must
actually be "engaged in
hostilities," presumably this
would not Include forces
Introduced into situations
where l™,inent involvement
in hostilities Is clearly Indicated.

Third, It takes a mere
concurrent resolution to compel withdrawal. A concurrent
resolution amounts to a legislative veto,153 b,,,„3^ ,^ ^3
^^^^^^^
^

of both houses of Congress
without PresiHential

signature or disapproval.

rpvi.,.,

for

The legal status of such mea-

sures is in doubt because Article

I,

section

7,

clause 3,

of the Constitution stipulates that
"Every Order, Resolution,
or Vote to which the Concurrence of
the Senate and House of
Representatives may be necessary (except
on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the
President of the

United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall
15187 Stat. 556.

152ibid.
53
'/t/°?^P*" ^- K^r^is,

1

^.

chap^^S

^^^^^^^'^S^^"'

Congressional Control of AdminisBrookings Institut ion, 1964);

Tiie

'

—
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be approved by him

..."

Nevertheless, there is a long,

and since World War II. a growing
list of enactments containing such provisions -'-^^
.

The effect here is to permit a
simple majority of
both houses of Congress to "veto"
troop commitments to hostilities by the President.
However, hostilities cannot be
"vetoed" during the 30-day extention
for military necessity,
nor if Congress extends the 60-day
deadline by law.^^^ In
addition, as the statute specifies,
hostilities authorized
by declaration of war or specific statutory
authorization
^"^^
are excluded from the 5(c) termination
procedure
.

"In effect," the report accompanying an
earlier House

measure incorporating this same procedure said,
the joint resolution 'endows' this concurrent resolution with the binding force of statute.
Since
the language applies to a situation where there
is no congressional authorization for the President's action it thereby avoids the possibility
of a Presidential veto--and resulting impasse-which would be possible on a bill or joint resolution. 157

Sections

procedures for

6

and

(1)

7,

respectively, establish priority

bills or joint resolutions (provided for

"'^^H. Lee Watson, "Congress Steps Out:
A Look at
Congressional Control of the Executive," California Law Review 63 (July 1975) 983-1094.

—

:

1 s s
-^^^119
Cong.

""•^^87

Stat,

^^^H. Rept.

Rec. 33550 (1973)

556-557.
93-287, p. 11,

(remarks of Sen. Jarits)
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in 5(b)) to waive or extend
the automatic
60-day cut-off;
and (2) concurrent resolutions
(provided for

in 5(c)) to

terminate hostilities abroad, 158
The procedures are
self-explanatory; just a few
points require emphasis.
Sections 6 and 7 require
all measures introduced pursuant to
Section 5 to be referred to
the
respective foreign affairs/relations
comittees of the
chamber of introduction.
It is the responsibility
of these
comittees to report out one bill for
a vote, whereupon that
measure becomes the pending business
of the chamber. 1^9
On the Senate side, debate time
must be divided
equally between proponents and
opponents of the measure,
thus eliminating the possibility of
filibuster. Although
there are specific deadlines for
committee and house action,
each chamber is free to modify these by
a simple majority
vote.
Furthermore, even if all deadlines are met,
a bill
or joint resolution need not, under Section
6, clear both

houses of Congress before 48 days of the
60-day cut-off period are consumed.
(This does not include time for conference
committee.

If this is necessary the Resolution allots up to

59 days for the measure to clear.)

could, under Section

7,

take as much as 51 days to clear,

^^®87 Stat. 557-558.

^^^ibid., p. 557.

A concurrent resolution

.

422

exclusive of conference work, ^60
These procedures do not guarantee
that Congress will
act speedily, or at all. While
they do eliminate or shorten
various time -consuming hurdles in
the legislative process,
a simple majority vote in one
chamber can defer action on
any proposal indefinitely '^^
.

Section

8,

the last major provision of the
Resolution,

is entitled "Interpretation of Joint
Resolution,"

Subsec-

tion (a) denies that the President derives
authority to introduce troops into hostilities or imminent
hostilities from
either statutes or treaties that do not
specifically authorize such introductions.
8(a) relies upon language
in the

Senate bill

440)."^^^

(S,

The intent of 8(a)(1) is to deny that "area resolutions" such as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution of 1964 or defense

appropriations (as alleged to the contrary in Orlando v.
Laird) may serve to authorize the introduction of forces into

hostilities.

(At the time the War Powers Resolution was ap-

proved three area resolutions remained on the statute books;
the "Formosa Resolution" (1955)
(1957)

,

,

the "Middle East Resolution"

and the "Cuban Resolution" (1962)
160ibid,

,

pp.

.

The Tonkin Reso-

557-558.

^^•See Jenkins, pp. 197-198,
^62ii9 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits)

.
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lution had been repealed by
Congress, effective January
12
1971.)
8(a)(1) requires that such area
resolutions or appro,
specifically atithorizp, the
introduction of forces
into hostilities, and that they
do so with reference to the
War Powers Resolution. While the
Senate bill (8.440) made
this requirement prospective and
upheld the validity of the
three area resolutions in force,163
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^.^^
retroactively and therefore probably
modifies the resolutions to the extent that they cannot,
unamended, authorize
troop introductions into hostilities .^^^
8(a)(1) also aims to strike down the
doctrine of

Orlando v. Laird, viz., that appropriations
to the military
may provide authority for hostilities. To the
extent
that

Orlando is grounded in the Constitution, it
is unassailable

by simple legislation.

To the extent that it relies upon

the Court's powers of statutory construction, Congress
may

have the final word on the subject.

-^^^

As a result, the

effect of this provision is yet unclear.

Subsection
^^^S. Rept.

(a) (2)

concerns the domestic effect of

93-220, p. 24,

164

The legislative intent is not clear on this, Cf
Jenkins, pp. 199-200.
165
Orlando did not receive much wider application,
The U, S, Supreme Court denied certiorari, 443 F. 2d 1039
(2d Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 404 U,S, 869 01971),

.

.

all treaties "heretofore or
hereafter ratified," and thus
would be applicable, e.g., to the
NATO pact.^^e
.^^^^^
of 8(a)(2) is to require that all
United States treaties be
interpreted as non-self-executing with
respect to the authorization of hostilities or imminent
hostilities

Despite the United States agreement
in article

5

of

NATO to view an attack on any one signatory
as an attack on
all, the President would not be able
to introduce

troops in-

to hostilities on the authority of the
Treaty without imple-

menting legislation.

(It is possible that article 4 of NATO,

the "constitutional processes" provision,
requires implementing legislation anyhow.)

Under 8(a)

C2)

no treaty standing alone could be inter-

preted as warranting hostilities; Congress would have to enact "specific statutory authorization" within the meaning of

the War Powers Resolution,

There is a serious constitutional

question as to whether Congress may prohibit the chief executor of treaties-^^^ and the Commander-in-Chief ''^^ from en^^^63 Stat. 2341, "North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April 1949

^^^119 Cong. Rec. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
^^^U.S. Const., art. II, sec.

1,

^^^Ibid., art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.

cl.

1.

.

forcing an international agreement by
the use of force short
^rj,^^
of_war,^70
Powers Resolution speaks of "hostilities," a term considerably broader than
"war.")

In order to assure allies that this
Resolution does
not affect United States treaty obligations,
section 8(d)(1)

expressly declares the following.
Nothing in this joint resolution ... is intended
to alter ... the provisions of existing
treaties
However, insofar as implementing legislation was not

intended by existing treaties, 8(d)(1) may be inconsistent

with 8(a)

(2)

Turning to section 8(b), we note Congress' intent to
avoid disrupting the NATO command structure

"'^^
.

This provi-

sion is understood to apply to the "high-level military com-

mands" of NATO, the North American Air Defense command
(NORAD) and the United Nations command in Korea (UNC)."'-^^

The language makes clear that nothing in the Resolution is

intended to
prevent members of the United States Armed Forces
from participating in certain joint military exercises with ailed or friendly organizations or

Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1972), p. 407,
note ICQ.
^71h. Rept.

93-287, p. 12.

^^^119 Cong. Rec, 33550 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Javits)
^^^H. Rept. 93-547, p. 10.

.
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coimtries .^^^

Subsection

(c)

is designed to broaden the
meaning of

the phrase "introduction of United
States a:^ed forces" to
include members of the armed forces
serving as military advisers assigned to foreign forces,
This would not include non-armed forces personnel, such
as CIA advisers ."^76
and it only applies when the foreign
forces are engaged in
or face imminent hostilities.

Section 8(d)(1) uses the language of the House
bill
"to disclaim any intention of altering the
constitutional

grants of war powers to the legislative and executive

branches."

17 7

This provision, while high-sounding, has very

little significance.

The other part of 8(d)(1), denying any

intent to alter treaty provisions, has already been noted.
(See above)

Section 8(d)(2) declares that nothing in the Resolution may be interpreted as granting the President any auth-

ority respecting the introduction of forces into hostilities
that he did not already possess.
8(d)(2) seems clearly inconsistent with sections 4
(a)(1) and 5(b), which assinne the introduction by the Presi-

^•^^S.

Rept.

93-220, p. 27.

^'^^The Senate expressly rejected such a proposal.
Cong. Rec. 25092 (1973).

^^^H. Rept. 93-287, p. 12.

119
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dent of forces into hostilities
for up to

Congressional approval.

2

months without

Although Senator Javits, responding

to Senator Eagleton's charge,
denied it was so.^^S sections
4(a)(1) and 5(b) do imply that the
President has the author^
ity to conduct hostilities for 60
days, unqualified by any
standards for the exercise of that
power.
It is doubtful

that before this Resolution the President
could have claimed
the unqualified authority to conduct
hostilities for two

months without legislative approval.
The last sections

(9

and 10) consist of a standard

"separability clause," declaring Congress' intent
that the
invalidation of one provision by a court not affect

the re-

mainder, and that the Resolution take effect upon day
of

enactment 179
,

This completes my analysis of the meaning of the War

Powers Resolution.

In the last section of this chapter

I

explore some Constitutional problems raised by the law.
IV.

The War Powers Resolution and the Constitution
The War Powers Resolution relies upon Congress' Con-

stitutional authority to declare

war,''-^^ to

make rules for

•'-^^Eagleton's remarks are at 119 Cong. Rec. 33556
Javits' are at ibid,, 33558.

^^^87 Stat. 559.

^^%.S. Const, art,

I,

sec,

8,

cl,

11.

0-973).
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the armed forces. 181 and make
all laws necessary and proper
to carry out the powers vested by the
Constitution in the
Congress and in the departments or officers
of the United
States.

The President has, under the Constitution,
the execuTOO
tive power,
the duty (and power) to faithfully execute
the laws (including treaties)!^^ and those
powers associated
with the office of Commander-in-Chief ^85
.

The Resolution has three constitutionally controversial sections.

Section 2(c) attempts to define the para-

meters of the emergency powers of the Commander in Chief.
Section

5

establishes two procedures for legislative termi-

nation of hostilities begun by the President.

And Section

8(a)(2) prohibits the President from using force to execute

treaties without specific legislative action.

Section 2(c) relies upon the "necessary and proper"
clause, especially the last portion, in order to define the

powers of the Commander-in-Chief.

QC

1

Without Congressional

authorization or declaration of war, 2(c) recognizes PresiISlibid.. art.

I,

sec.

8,

cl.

14.

^°^Ibid., art.

I,

sec.

8,

cl.

18.

183ibid.. art II, sec.

1,

cl.

1.

18^Ibid., art. II, sec.

1,

185ibid., art. II, sec.

2,

cl.
cl.

1.
1.

186yithout Congressional authorization or declaration
of war, 2(c) recognizes Presidential authority to introduce
troops into hostilities or imminent hostilities only in "a
national emergency created by attack upon the United States,
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."

.
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tial authority to introduce troops
into hostilities or imminent hostilities onl^ in
a national emergency created
by
attack upon the United States, its
territories or possesions, or its armed forces." While
there is little doubt that
Congress may define these powers in
order to promote their
exercise in accordance with law. the
separation of powers
principle forbids Congress from taking the
opportunity to
^^^^^ these powers to its own advantage "'^^
.

A simple test for 2(c) is to note whether
or not its
enumeration of Presidential powers is complete
by

contempo-

rary constitutional standards.

One measure of contemporary

standards is the Senate's version of the war powers
bill,
viz., the measure delineating Presidential power.

•'^^

The

Senate measure, approved in an atmosphere hostile to Presidential power, lists at least three "recognized powers" of
the President not to be found in 2(c).
They are the powers of the President to respond to

imminent threats to the nation,

armed forces, and

(3)

(2)

(1)

imminent threats to its

imminent or actual threats to the

lives of its citizens or nationals abroad.

Not only were

these included in the Senate bill, but judicial authority

and long-standing practice would seem to have firmly estabIS^see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926),' Cf.
Bickel testimony at pp. 19-20, and Brower testimony at p. 56,
Senate Hearings 1973
.

1885^ 4^Q^ l^^^ approved July 20, 1973.
The House of
Representatives rejected this approach because it felt Congress could not develop an enumeration hoth complete and not
over-generous

,

,

^30

lishad executive claims to them, 189

To the extent that 2(c)

vas intended to be a complete list
of Presidential emergency
power (and the use of the word "only"
suggests this intent;

see note 186 above)

,

it is woefully under^inclusive
and

thus unconstitutional.
5(b) is subject to criticism
respecting its constitu-

tionality on the following grounds:
(1)

It represents an implied grant of
war-making

authority for 62 days and therefore unduly
delegates legislative power to the President.
(2)

By providing for automatic

termination of hos-

tilities short of war it trenches upon Presidential
authority.

Criticism number one evokes the following defense.
First, there is no intent to grant any power to the Presi-

dent that he does not already have; this is explicit in sec-

tion 8Cd) (2).

Second, Section 2(c) narrowly defines the

parameters of the emergency powers of the Comm.andp.r- in-Chief
and therefore there is no excessive delegation.
The trouble with this defense is that

(a)

although

Congress may not have intended to amplify Presidential powers,
the statute may in fact extend them, rendering 8(d)(2) mere

surplusage; and (b) Congress intended that subsequent sec^•8^5. 440, sec. 2.
See J, Terry Emerson, "The War
Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power," Notre Dame Lawyer 51 (December 1975) 187-216
:

.

.
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tlons of the Resolution operate
independent ly of
sect;:ion
2(c), so that Section 5 Is
not limited by 2(c). ^^O

The provision can be saved by
reading the term "hostilities" to mean armed conflict
short of "war." as understood by the Constitution.
In the area of armed

conflict
short of war, the President
can make a substantial claim
to
independent authority 191 therefore
Congress cannot be said
to be giving away its powers
wholesale, but rather imposing
time limitatiors on the exercise
of powers shared by both
branches
,

The trouble with this line of reasonirg.
however, is
that such a reading of the term
"hostilities"
throws us di-

rectly into the arms of the second
criticism.

That is, 5(b)

must now be read to impose an automatic
two-month deadline
all hostilities short of war: an area where
Congress

can-

not claim exclusive authority.

There might be occasions

where the President would introduce troops into
hostilities
pursuant to his constitutional authority (say in defense
of
Guam, a United States territory) and in the absence of
any

legislative action his authority would be terminated by law
Rept.

93-547, p, 8,

191

1971

,

p.

See John Norton Moore testim.ony, Senate Hearings
479

192

Hostilities short of war may be considered a "twilight zone" of the Constitution under Justice Jackson's analysis, where both Congress and the President can claim some
authority.
Youngs town Sheet and Tube Cp, v. Sawyer, 343 U,S,
579, 635-37 (1952) (concurring opinion)
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on the 62nd da,y,^^^
But could the provision not be
saved by another line
of defense, perhaps simply on the grounds
that Congress may
regulate all hostilities because the
power to declare war
includes the power to regulate those
events which might precipitate war?-^^^

This defense must fail, too, however.

It does not

take into account what the legislature recognizes
in Section
2(c):

Congress does not have authority to regulate all

hostilities.

Section 2(c) (which is itself deficient) con-

cedes presidential authority over hostilities issuing
out
of certain national emergencies.

Congress may mandate an end

Can it be claimed that

to such hostilities upon the

62nd day of conflict?
If the above reasoning is correct, 5(b) suffers

serious constitutional infirmities

.

We next examine Section

5(c) which provides for termination of hostilities by con-

current resolution.
5(c) would appear to exhibit the same defect as 5(b),

namely, that it presupposes Congressional power over all hos-

tilities without regard to the President's independent power,
1

go

^Actually, the conflict could

be extended thirty
additional days if the President were to certify unavoidable

military necessity,
^^^As "Helvidius," Madison relied upon the same rationale to assert Congressional predominance in foreign affairs
generally. James Madison, Letters and. Other Writings of
James Madison 4 vols. (Philadelphia: J, B, Lippincott and
1:607-54,
Co,
1865)
.

,

.
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In addition, it is burdened
by its reliance upon
the concurrent resolution, or legislative
veto, which has constitutional problems of its own.

However, there is a difference
between 5(b) and 5Cc) that
is
I believe, crucial:
5(b) is automatic and
5(c) is not.
5(c)
may be invoked s electively
it n,ay be applied to
unlawful assertions of Presidential
authority alone. That the
framers
of the Resolution intended
it to be so applied is
made clear
by the following colloquy on
the House floor.
,

"^^h''-"
may
2y negative
neSI-the'p'°"?5^"-"'?^
the Presidential authority -^^ority or
by virtue of
^^P^^^^ thit thf

P?eSden? d'fSof

^^^/^^^i one must infer, it seems to
me ILl^tL'-lPresident
is acting within
.1
empted for Congress by the Constitution an area Dreexcept f^r
the passage of this resolution.
^! ? understand the gentleman to answer me,
hp
he Hn°'''
does not intend
to give the President additional
authority, but the gentleman concedes that
the President may act beyond his authority, and we
only include
this section as a means by which Congress
can reaffirm
the fact that the Presidential action was
wrongful in
the first place.
MR. ZABLOCKI.
Mr. Speaker, that is exactly right.
'

^

Because it applies selectively (unlike 5(b)), section
5(c) is capable of distinguishing lawful and unlawful
execu-

tive actions.

Thus it avoids the pitfalls of the section

that precedes it.

However, a different problem is raised by the use of

the legislative veto.

Article

I,

section

7,

clause

"Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the

3

requires

Concur-

^9^119 Cong. Rec. 33860 (1973), emph, added.
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currence'' of both chambers
is necessary, except
adjournment
to get either Presidential
approval, or. failing that,
twothirds of both houses. A
concurrent resolution, such
as is
called for in 5(c). is intended
to take

effect without either

Presidential approval or two-thirds
vote,^96
Despite the seeming contradition
with Article X. section 7. clause 3. the legislative
veto has been used with increasing frequency since World
War XI. most notably in legislation authorizing the President
to reorganize the Executive
branch. 197 ^he standard justification
for it had been that
Congress was singly reserving to itself
the power to approve
or disapprove the exercise of power
delegated
to the Presi-

dent in the first place, ^^8
However, as Congressman Eckhardt's (D-Tex,)
comments
(above) and section 8(d)(1) of the act make
clear, the War

Powers Resolution "does not intend to give the
President ad-

ditional authority. "199

If we accept this assertion as ac-

curate then we cannot justify section 5(c) as simply a
device
to register (dis) approval of the exercise of delegated
powers.
196h. Kept.

93-287, p.

11.

197 See

Harris, chap. 8; Watson, passim; Robert W. Ginnane, "The Control of Federal Administrationby Congressional
Resolutions and Committees," Harvard Law Review 66 (February
^
1953) :569-611.
1

QQ

^^°See, e.g., Congressional Research Service. Memorandum, "Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto Amendment to
the Military Sales and Assistance Act," 120 Cong. Rec. 17950
(1973).
199 See note 193 and
accompanying text, supra

435

Tha concurrent resolution in
5Ccl is not attached to a grant
of power. 200 use of the concurrent
resolution had been defended on other grounds. For eicample,
it is
contended that

to compel Congress to pass a bill
or joint resolution-both
of which may be vetoed by the
President-is to require a two-

thirds vote to override unilateral
executive commitments to
hostilities. 201 This assumes a bill or
joint resolution

directing withdrawal is vetoed, thus requiring
a two-thirds
vote to be enacted into law.

Watson develops this point, noting that while delegated power may be withdrawn by concurrent resolution,
assertions of inherent power would go virtually unchecked
if
con-

trol by statute were required; one-third of either house could

block any limitation of the President.
Relying upon Jackson's opinion in Youngstown

v.

Saw-

yer, 203 Watson contends that where the President asserts in-

herent authority to act in an area
vhere Congress would possess power to control executive actions by statute, Youngstown as well as
the analysis of the Comment, leads to the conclusion that a (concurrent resolution under an act
such as the War Powers Resolution is a valid exer,

200see Representative Dupont's (R-Del.) remarks at 119
Cong. Rec. 33862 (1973).
p.

But see, contra., H. Rept. 93-287,

14.

Representative Thomas E. Morgan and Representative
Clement J, Zablocki, "Reply to the President's Veto Message
on the War Powers Resolution," 119 Cong. Rec, 35868 (1973).
202yatson, p. 1085.
203343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (concurring opinion).

,
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cise of congressional power,

Watson reasons that enactment
of a concurrent resolution under 5(c) would be
analogous to Congress'
refusal to
act in a "twilight zone"
area. 205
(Congress'

refusal to
approve a measure granting the
President seizure power was
considered relevant to a
determination of the validity
of

President Truman's assertion of
that power,

When combined wxth the Eckhardt
qualification, viz.,
that Congress may only "veto"
unlawful assertions

of Presi^

dential authority, the Watson
rationale seems persuasive.
It should be kept in mind, however,
that the Supreme Court
has not determined on the constitutionality
of the legislative veto, although repeated practice
and acceptance by both
Congress and President would appear to have
established its
legitimacy.
'-V

To briefly summarize the analysis so far,
Section 5(c),
the legislative veto clause, has a better
claim on constitu-

tional validity than either the 60-day automatic
termination
provision, 5(b), or the rather impoverished delimitation
of
^Q^Watson, p. 1085.
^°^Ibid.
206

579 (1952)
207

,

p.

1086.

Youngs town Sheet and Tube Co.

v.

Sawyer, 343 U.S.

The Supreme Court touched the issue only obliquely
in Sibbach V. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1940).
For
a compilation of statutes making use of a legislative veto
see Watson, pp. 1089-94.

.
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Presidential powers in Section
2Cc)
Finally, we examine section
8(a) C2) which interprets
all treaties heretofore or
hereafter ratified as non-self,
executing insofar as the
introduction of United States
forces
is concerned. 208
provision is reminiscent of the
pro.
posed Bricker Amendments to the
Constitution which would
have required Congressional
implementation before any treaty
could become effective as internal
law, 209 The War Powers
Resolution also includes a denial of
intent to alter the provisions of existing treaties (section
8(d)(1)).

The possibility that

8 (a) (2)

and 8(d)(1) may be in-

consistent notwithstanding, the legal question
is whether or
not Congress may require the legislative
implementation of
all treaty provisions respecting hostilities.

Normally, the

President decides whether or not a treaty or
provisions

thereof are self -executing; this is based upon his
executive

power (Article II, section

1)

and the powers needed to "take

care" that the laws be faithfully executed (Article II, sec-

tion 2). 210
In addition, where troops are needed to enforce a

treaty, the President may rely upon his powers as Commander208 See note 167, supra.
Res.

209
''^Representative of the Bricker proposals was S.J.
1, 83d Cong., 1st sess., 99 Cong, Rec. 6777 (1953).

210see Henkin, p, 158.
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in-Chief (Article 11, section
1),
The Senate however,
as
part of Its power to give
"advice and consent" to trelt
:ies
(Article XI, section 2) has
frequently required that
treaties be considered non-self
-executing, 211

m

the case of 8(a)(2), Congress
is apparently assert
ing its authority under the
declaration of war (Article
1,

section

8. clause 11) and the "necessary and
proper" clauses
(Article I, section 8, clause
18); undoubtedly the grounds
are that the legislature may regulate
hostilities resulting
from the enforcement of treaties because
they may lead to
212
war.
If Congress were simply saying that the
President
may not rely upon a treaty provision alone as
justification

for initiating a "war," as the term is used in
Article

section

I,

clause 11 of the Constitution, they would be
on

8,

very solid ground, ^-^^
However, once again the reference is to "hostilities"
(and even situations of potential hostilities), a term much

2^^Ibid., p. 159,
212
See note 192 and accompanying text, supra.

Reid V. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957), the Supreme Court said that ".
.no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of
the Constitution." At one point the Johnson administration
tried to justify the Vietnam War on the basis of the SEATO
pact and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, to the dismay of
some Congressm.en.
See U.S., Department of State, "The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of VietNam," in Richard A. Falk, The Vietnam War and International
Law, 4 vols. (Princeton, N.J,: Princeton University press,
.

TMS-ie),

1

(1968) :597-601.
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broader than "war," and as
we pointed out i„ .egard
to section 5(b) of the Resolution,

Congressional authority does
not extend to all instances
of hostilities short
of war
In sum, 8(a)(2) suffers
the same defects of
overbreadth as
5(b): it was intended to
assert Congressional control
over
areas reserved to the Executive
branch. 215

In conclusion, of the three
elements of the War Powers

Resolution whose constitutionality
we considered. Sections
5(b), 5(c). and 8(a)(2), only
Section 5(c) could, under this
analysis, withstand legal challenge.
V.

Conclusion
We have explored the background, history,
meaning,

and constitutionality of the War Powers
Resolution.
In its
only practical test to date, the evacuations
of Southeast
Asia and the Mayaguez incident of Spring
1975, one of the

principal drafters of the measure gave the executive
branch
"mixed marks" on compliance
And only recently
.

former

President Ford suggested that some of the provisions
were in

need of re -examination because they are too restrictive in
214see notes 189-92 and accompanying text, supra.
215
Cf. Henkin, p. 407, note 100, regarding a similar
provision in S. 2956:
"Insofar as this bill, if it becomes
law, applies to hostilities 'short of war' the President might
feel free to disregard it."
216
Representative Zablocki's introduction to the Compliance Hearings p. vi.
.
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a crisis.

Although the n,easure is an
attempt to prevent another
Vietnam-type war. one con^entator
speculates that had it been
in force at the time it
would not have prevented the
Indochina conflict, but it would
have sharpened
domestic con-

flict over it.^^^

Whatever the merits of this
retrospective application,
the future effect of the
Resolution remains

unclear. As
long as there is mistrust of
the Presidency and presidentially inspired foreign policy
the Resolution could be used
to make the executive more
accountable to the legislature.
However, there are enough ambiguities219
^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^.^^^
provisions in the measure to encourage,
given the proper public mood and political balance of power,
lax enforcement.
The true test of the War Powers Resolution
will come when

memories of the divisive Vietnam "era" have
begun to fade.
217Quoted in New York Times

.

12 April 1977, p.

14.

218 Graham T.
Allison, "Making War: The President and
Congress,
Thomas E. Cronin and Rexford G. Tugwell The
Presidency Reappraised 2d ed. (New York: Praeger PublTiKers,
Inc.
iy/V)
pp. 228, 241-44.

m

.

,

.

^l^E.g.. the start of "hostilities," or
the meaning of
'imminent hostilities,"
.
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CHAPTER

X

THE JUDICIARY AND PRESIDENTIAL
WAR-HAKING POWER
We have already discussed a number
of court cases
dealing with Presidential war power,
cases which arose out
of the "undeclared wars" we have
analyzed.
Here we wish to
analyze the pertinent cases not yet
reviewed, and draw some
generalizations respecting the role of the judiciary.
Our question remains:

\7hat is

the scope of the Pres-

ident's power to initiate hostilities in the
absence of a

Congressional declaration of war?

One line of reasoning has

been predicated upon the distinction between defensive
war,
that is, war thrust upon the country, and war initiated
by
the United States.

This theory of defensive war ultimately

became the basis of the Supreme Court's ruling in the famous
Prize Cases.

A United States circuit court relied upon
United States v. Smith as early as 1806.

it in

Smith was accused

of violating a Federal neutrality act by m.aking preparations
to launch an expedition into territory held by Spain, a

country with which the United States was at peace.

In his

defense, Smith contended that whatever he did was done with
the "knov/ledge and approbation" of the President and some of

^Prize Cases,

2 Bl,

(U.S.) 635 (1863).

^
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his cabinet officers, and
he urged the court
to subpoena
Secretary of State James
Madison and other executive
officers so they could so testify.

The court refused for the
reasons which follow

president knew and approved of
'f^^l
the military
expedition set forth in ?he
indictment against a prince with
whom we are at peace
It would not justify the
defendant in a coSrt
of law nor discharge him from
the bindinr
force of the act of congress;
because the^resident does not possess a dispensing
power.

*

"

'

In short,

the testim.ony requested would
be irrele-

vant because the President could not
exempt anyone from the
obligation imposed by the statute to observe
neutrality.
Could the President disregard the statute
himself and lead
the country into war?
Does he possess the power of making war?
That
power is exclusively vested in Congress
by the eighth section of the 1st article 'of
the
constitution
.

.

The court admits that Congress authorized the President to call forth the militia to repel invasions and
sup-

press insurrections by its act of February 28, 1795.

But it

goes on to distinguish repelling invasion from initiating a
2

342)

United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
"^Ibid.

^Ibid.

,

p.

1230.

.

1192 (No

16

war.

people!

-anS^p^^^f^S-l^^SnLlLc'lJ^Lfmagistrate, who is at their head
commander- inchief
pZ
'^^t
invadin: foe
B^t'tn^ 5^^^^ aggressions ^^P^l an
and invas
sions
ions IS
if oneVhfn
one thing, and to commit
them
aeainst
a friendly power is another
There is^
manifest distinction betx^een
our goini to war wit-h
a nation at peace, and a
war being made aglinst
^^^^^^ invasion, or a folmal
declaration
In tL^?
the former case, it is the
exclusive
province
of congress to change a state
of peace iSto'a ^tate
^

.

.

•

.

In short, the President may wage
defensive war, but

only Congress may authorize the
initiation of hostilities
on the part of the United States.
Were this

not dicta, and

were it not a circuit court as opposed
to the United States
Supreme Court speaking. United States v.
Smith would no
doubt be an oft-cited landmark.

As it turns out, the act of 1795 came under direct

Supreme Court scrutiny in the case of Martin

v.

Mott.

That

act provided
that whenever the United States shall be invaded,
or be in imminent danger of invasion ... it shall
be lawful for the president of the United States
to call forth such number of the militia ... as
he may judge necessary to repel such invasion
.

.

^Ibid.

Wheat.

""l Stat. 424 (1795), quoted in Martin v. Mott, 12
(U.S.) 19, 29 (1827).
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The law had been passed
pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 15 of the
Constitution which empowers
Congress
'

Ixlcu?rthp%

^^'^

^i^S

?ect?ons and
rections,
^ni^""'
""f
repel
invasions.

militia to
suppress insur-

We wish to call attention to
two aspects of this
legislation.
First, one of the earliest of
the Congresses
interpreted the phrase "and repel
invasions" in Article I.
section 8. clause 15. as including
the " imminent danger of
invasion," thus lending its authority
to a somewhat loose:ir
understanding of the idea of defensive war.
For under thi^-S
understanding a war would be defensive if
the other side
were about to attack but had not yet done
so.

This suggests that the doctrine of defensive
war

adopted by the Supreme Court in the Prize Cases
may legitimately be given a more expansive reading.
Secondly, the phrase, "as he may judge necessary,"
suggests, again with some authority, that the President
must
be accorded a measure of discretion, at least in the deter-

mination of the number of militia necessary, but also, as
will be apparent from Martin, in the determination of whether
or not there is sufficient danger to compel the call-up of

any militia at all.
This discretionary element has, as will be seen, its

analogue in the Prize Cases ruling that the courts must be

bound by a Presidential finding of belligerence.
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Martin v. Mott arose when,
during the War of 1812
the governor of New York
called forth the state
militia
upon the requisition of
President Madison. One
Mott. who
was liable for service,
failed to show, and was

'

tried and

convicted by a court-martial
several years later.
Justice Story wrote for the
United States Supreme
Court upholding Mott's conviction.

Story had no doubt that

the law was valid, or that
Congress could provide for innninent danger as well as actual
invasion,
"m our opinion,"

said Story in behalf of a unanimous
tribunal,
there is no ground for a doubt on
this point
Vrovide for repelling invasions
inclndP.^^^''
includes
the power to provide against the
attempt
invasion, as the necessary and proper
^ol.o
means to effectuate the object. One
of
means to repel invasions is to provide the best
the
site force for action before the invader requihimself
has reached the soil.'
'

But Mott was not challenging the act of
Congress,

he was questioning the authority of the President
and the

chief executive of New York.

In respect to the President,

Story responded as follows.
The power thus confided by congress to the president, is, doubtless, of a very high and delicate
nature. A free people are naturally jealous of
the exercise of military power; and the power to
call the militia into actual service, is certainly
felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude
But it
is not a power which can be executed without a correspondent responsibility.
It is, in its terms, a
limited power, confided to cases of actual invasion, or of imminent danger of invasion.
If it
.

^12 Wheat.

(U.S.) 19, 29 (1827).

be a limited power thp
is the exigent, to'bf

mi^o-H-

Ug:f ora^5^^:ii,^^,I>^-

Story's answer was
unambiguous, and did not
rest upon statutory construction
alone.

whe^LVthre'S^e^^^^L'\??Lr=^"=^^^J"'^S^
addressed, may decide for h?!^?! president are

elusive upon
construction
of the power
contemplated

aTT otEer-pefsons

/ wi^m

neceiii?Il^Tii^ts from

?L

natur^

itself, and from the manifest
obi^ect
by the act of congress §

^

To be sure, Martin v. Mott
concentrates in large measure upon the exercise of
Presidential power pursuant to an

express delegation of power from the
legislature.

And Pres-

idential power to punish persons under
martial law was subsequently trimmed in the Milligan and Endo
cases.
Nevertheless, the case provides authority for
a loose construction
of the power to repel invasions as including
the power to

provide for imminent danger of invasion.

And it also sug-

gests that the determination of whether or not the
country
is in such jeopardy is a matter of Presidential
discretion,

not subject to judicial review.
^Ibid.

^Ibid., pp. 29-30, emphasis added.
^^

Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall.
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).

(U.S.) 2

(1866); Ex parte
^

.
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Now we turn to the renowned
Prize Cases, which arose
when, after the firing upon Fort
Sumter,
President Lincoln

proclaimed a blockade of the Confederacy
in April, 1861.
At this time Congress was not in
session;

subsequently, the

legislature expressly validated all
of Lincoln's acts.
As
a result of the blockade, and
before Congress acted, four
ships, two of them foreign-owned,
were captured by United
States naval vessels off the shores
of various southern
states

Under the internation law of the period,
neutral

third parties were bound to respect a blockade,
which was
an act of war.
And so the foreign ship owners argued that

without a Congressional declaration the United States
was
not at war in the legal sense, and therefore could
not have

established a blockade which foreign vessels were legally

obligated to observe.

A scant 5-4 majority rejected this line of reasoning
Speaking through Justice Crier, they contended that declaration or no, the United States was at war.
This greatest of civil wars
sprung forth
suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva in the
full panoply of war
The President was bound to
meet it in the shape it presented itself, without
.

.

.

.

^Iprize Cases, 2 Bl. (U.S.) 635, 670 (1863); Clinton
Rossiter, The Supreme Court and the Conima nder in Chief (Ithaca, N.Y.
Cornell University Press, 1^51; reprint ed. New
York:
Da Capo Press, 1970), p. 69.
,

:

^^2 Bl.

(U.S.) 635,

649 (1863); Rossiter, p.

73.
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waiting for Congress to baptize
it with
?he

-

TaclJ^

a name-

could

Sge

And while admitting that, "{b}y
the Constitution,
Congress alone has the power to
declare

a national or for-

eign war," and that the President
"has no power to initiate
or declare a war either against
a foreign nation or a
domestic State," Grier went on to
uphold Lincoln's action. To
do so he relied upon the theory
of defensive war, and ex-

panded Presidential power thereunder

"'•^
.

invasion of a foreign nation,
IL%'^^'''^/
the President is not only authorized
but bound
to resist force by force.
He does not initiate
the war, but is bound to accept the
challenge
without waiting for any special legislative
authority.
And whether the hostile party be a
foreign invader, or States organized in
rebellion
It is none the less a war, although the
declaration of It be " unilateral "J-5

'

.

But more, not only may the President unilaterally

recognize that the United States is at war, but his decision, once tendered,

is binding upon the courts.

Whether the President in fulfilling his duties,
as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them the
character of belligerents, is a question to be
decided b^ him and this Court must be governed
by the decisions and acts of the political depart,

^^2 Bl.

(U.S.) 635, 668-69 (1863).

^^Ibid., p. 668.
^^Ibid.

,
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"trusted

"hI

™:"

'° ^'-"^

of the blockade is ?tself
off lei ^r''^^"""?

iSt:7^^""is° ^He'?:i^.i^^-f3?-,-=^This, of course, sounds very
much like the "political

questions" doctrine espoused in
Luther

v.

Borden, where the

Court refused to review the President's
decision to support
the Charter government of Rhode
Island as against Thomas
Dorr's rebel government

The dissenters, led by Justice Nelson,
held that
while war existed in "the material sense,"
it did not exist
"in a legal sense" because it was not
"recognized

or declared

by the sovereign power of the State, and which
sovereign
power by our Constitution is lodged in the Congress ..."
The minority insisted that the President
does not possess the power under the Constitution
to declare war or recognize its existence within
the meaning of the law of nations, which carries
with it belligerent rights, and thus change the
country and all its citizens from a state of peace
to a state of war; that this power belongs exclusively to the Congress
and, consequently,
that the President has no power to set on foot a
blockade under the law of nations
.^^
.

.

.

.

.

The dissenting rationale is not without problems.

First off, the distinction between war in the "material" and
^^Ibid., p. 670.

"•^uther V. Borden,
•^Prize Cases,

2

Bl.

7

How.

(U.S.)

(U,S,)

635,

1

(1849),

690,

698 (1863),
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war in the ..le.al" sense

is difficult to
sustain upon anal-

ysxs.

Secondly, it is hardly
credible that the United
States could have been
denied belligerent status
with its
attendant rights in
international law for want
of a fonnal
Congressional declaration of
war.
As a rule a nation's
internal political arrangements
are irrelevant to a determination of its international
rights; and anyway the
President is the sole agent of
coimnunication for the United
States in its external relations. ^0
But it is the majority's
argument, that the President is "bound to resist force
by force
without waiting for any special legislative
authority," that most interests us. The Court refers to
two contingencies, the existence of either of which would
justify the President in
.

conducting a war.

.

.

The contingencies are insurrection
or

civil war and "invasion of a foreign
nation. "^^

Only the category of "invasion" involves
foreign
affairs, and it alone concerns us.
enters.

Here is where difficulty

The Court intended, undoubtedly, to establish
the

legality of unilateral Presidential action in the face
of
a foreign attack.

While actual invasion of United States

19

Haven:

Fritz Grob, The Relativity of War and Peace (New
Yale University Press, iy4y) passim.
,

20
20]
Louis

(Mineola,
I.
N.Y.
I

:

Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1^72), p, 188.

^^Prize Cases,

2 Bl.

(U.S.)

635-,

668 (1863).
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territory is clearly included,
™ay the President
lawfully
respond to other threats
as well?
Authorities are in disagreement
on this.
early work. Corwin thought
he could

In his

so respond.

Wright contended that "the fact of
war" would have to be
"so patent
as to leave no doubt."
Among contemporaries,
aware of the
possibility of rapid attack by
missiles and long-range bombers, there still seems to
be dispute.
R. Berger appears to
adhere to the invasion-of
-United -States-soil
requirement,

while Henkin suggests that the
President "probably
authority ... to anticipate by
a

...

has

preemptive strike an at-

tack he believes imminent "^^
.

Interestingly enough, the Supreme
Court in the Prize
Cases cited as precedent for
Lincoln's blockade the two battles fought just prior to the
Congressional recognition of
the existence of a state of war between
the United States
and Mexico in 1846.
But as our study
revealed, these bat-

tles were fought upon disputed territory
(although President

Polk claimed it was "American soil") and were
provoked by
the American President.

By offering the Mexican War--scarce-

ly an instance of defense against invasion--as a
precedent,

^Edward S. Corwin, The Presi dent's Control of Foreign Relations (1917; reprint ed7, New York: Johnson Reprint Co., 1970), pp. 141-142; Quincy Wright, The Control of
American Foreign Relations (New York: The Mac millan Co.
1922), p. 289; Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege A Constitutional Myth (New York: Bantam Books, Inc. 1975) v
and note 107; Henkin, p. 52.

—W
,

.

,

.

452

the Court bolster the
position of those who
contend ^hat
the President .ay respond
to threats short
of actual inva-

This points up another
problem, and that is the
tendency of American presidents,
like all national leaders,
to
justify on grounds of
self-defense their resort to
force
against other states. Polk's
claim at the start of the
Mexican War is a perfect example.
Should the Executive make
such a claim, is it, under
the authority of the Prize
Cases,
reviewable in court? Recall Justice
Grier's contention that
the Court would have to be
governed by the President's determination that a state of war existed.
Thus not only is a Presidentially
authorized defensive war legal, but the President's
judgment that such a war
was necessary is not justiciable.
The ineluctable conclu-

sion is that the determination of whether
or not there is a
direct threat to the United States and what
degree of force,
if any, is necessary to meet that threat
is a matter of Exe-

cutive discretion.
This discretion would no doubt extend to the deci-

sion to launch a preemptive strike in order to abort an
attack believed imminent.

Would it also cover attacks, conven-

tional or nuclear, upon another country

,

say,

mutual defense treaty with the United States?
23
5

,

a party to a

Article

5

of

See my study on Mexican -American conflicts, chap.

supra
2^2 Bl.

(U.S.) 635, 670 (1863).

NATO, for example, stipulates
"that an ar^ed attack
against
one or More" of the Parties
"shall be considered an
attack
against them all."
If an attack upon western
Europe is tantamount to
an attack upon the United
States, is the

President empowered

to respond to the former
as he would to the latter
by the
authority of the Prize Cases?
A brief answer (we consider
the effect of treaties upon
Presidential war-making power
in detail at another point) is
that insofar as such an at-

tack is considered evidence of an
imminent invasion of the
United States, the President may use
such force as is necessary to forestall the latter.

Which is to say that such treaties, while
creating
international obligations upon the United States,
do not

alter the internal "constitutional processes"
of the signatories, in accordance with which they are all
pledged to
act. 25

In summary, the doctrine of the Prize Cases, which

rests upon the theory of defensive war, opens the door to

broad claims for Presidential war -making power in four ways:
first, as a result of inflated claims of attacks upon or

threats to the nation; second, because a challenge to a Pres-

idential claim of self-defense raises a non-justiciable pol2^63 Stat. 2341, "North Atlantic Treaty," 4 April
1949, art.

11.
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itical question; third,
because technological
changes have
made possible widespread
destruction with such speed
that
a preemptive (first!)
strike might be considered
an act of

self-defense; and fourth, because
an attack upon another
country may justifiably be
considered evidence of an innni-

nent threat to the United States.

While the concept of self-defense
is quite broad
and subject to abuse, it is not
unlimited. The Prize Cases
doctrine could not justify, for example,
either the Korean
or Vietnam wars, because neither
the attack on the ROK nor
the systematic subversion of the GVN
was evidence of an imminent attack upon the United States (By
Article IV, section
1, each of the parties to SEATO agreed that an
attack in the
treaty area "would endanger its own peace and
safety,"

Con-

trast with NATO, Article V, where an attack on
one party

"shall be considered an attack against them all.")
The essence of the Prize Cases doctrine is that the

President may recognize that the United States is at war,
either as a result of an attack upon the United States proper or compelling evidence that such an attack is imminent.

Not only may the President recognize war or the immi-

nent threat of attack, we have seen in Durand v. Hollins,

decided by the same Justice Nelson who led the dissenters in
the Prize Cases, that he may also authorize the use of force

^55

for the protection of
American nationals abroad. 26
This view was supported by
the Supreme Court in
the
Neagle case, which involved
the use of force
domestically
upon Presidential authority,
in this instance by a
United
States marshal assigned to
protect Supreme Court Justice
^
Field.
To defend the marshal the
Court adopted an expansive
view of Presidential power under
Article II, section 3, wMch
states that "he shall take care
that the laws be faithfully
executed." "is this duty," the
bench asked rhetorically,

limited to the enforcement of acts
of Congress
or of treaties of the United States
according
terms or does it include the
^^^^^/^P^^^^
^?
rights, duties, and obligations growing
out
the Constitution itself, our international of
relations, and all the protection implied
by the
nature of the government under the Constitution?^^
,

The answer came by way of example, and the
example,

the Martin Koszta incident, involved foreign
affairs.

It

seems that the Hungarian -born Koszta, who had begun
the process of becoming a naturalized citizen, was seized by
the

Austrian military while in Smyrna, and not released until
an American war ship turned its guns on the Austrian vessel

^"Durand v. Hollins, 4 Blatch. 451 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860)
See my study on the Boxer incident, chap. 4, supra.
^^In re Neagle, 135 U.S.
^^Ibid., p. 64.

1

(1890).

.
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in which he was being held
captive. 29

"Upon what act of Congress
then existing." queried
the Court after relating the
incident, "can any one lay
his
finger in support of the action
of our government in this
matter?" There was none, of
course, the point being that
none is necessary when the President
authorizes force for
the protection of United States
citizens, or even inchoate
citizens
The dissenters complained that
Koszta's rescue was
a bad example because it involved
foreign nations,
and in our intercourse with
state governments, and even
ment of federal power, with
of checks and balances, are

them, states and
the internal adjustits complex system

unknown

That authority the Constitution vests expressly
and conclusively in the treaty -making power--the
President and the Senate
.31
'

.

.

Having thus distinguished Presidential power in foreign and domestic affairs, thereby anticipating the rationale
in the famed Curt iss -Wright case, the dissenters conceded as

much power to the President in the conduct of international
relations as did the majority.

Thus no member of the Supreme

Court would have denied the President's authority to act as

he did in defense of Koszta, and by inference, other Ameri29lbid.

^hhid.

,

p.

85.

.

.
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cans in peril abroad.

***

The doctrine of the double
standard in the exercise
of Presidential power, i.e..
greater restrictions in domestic as opposed to foreign
policy, only briefly treated
by
the Neagle dissenters, received
full-blown elaboration in
the 20th century.
In United States v. Curtis s
-Wright Export
Corporation, seven of the eight
participating Supreme
Court

justices upheld the President's authority
to embargo arms
sales to the Chaco pursuant to a
joint resolution of Congress 32
Of course, we may not equate the power to
embargo

arms with the power to initiate hostilities,
and Curtiss-

Wright did involve an act of Congress.

Nonetheless. Justice

Sutherland wrote about Presidential power in such sweeping
terms, and the theory upon which the decision rests is
so

extraordinary that the case has become of general significance to all analyses of executive authority in international

affairs

Sutherland reasoned that there was a "fundamental"
difference between Federal powers in foreign as opposed to
domestic affairs, that the latter were "carved from the mass
of state powers" by the Constitution, while the former passed

U.S.

^^United States v. Curt is s -Wright Export Corp., 299
304 (1936).

"
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from the British Crown to the
colonies collectively to the
Continental Congress and finally
to the Federal government
under the Constitution.
"It results." the

Court contended,

that the investment of the Federal
the powers of external sovereignty government with
did not depend
upon the atfirmative grants of
the ConsUtut?on^3
Thus, the Federal government
possesses those for-

eign affairs powers that are "inherently
inseparable from
the concept of nationality" whether
or not they are granted
by the Constitution. Furthermore, notes
Sutherland, "the

exercise of the {foreign affairs} power is
significantly
limited.
In this vast external realm, with its im.portant
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen
as a representative of the nation ....
It is important to bear in mind that we are
here dealing not alone with an authority vested
in the President by an exertion of legislative
power, but with such an authority plus the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive pov7er of the
President as the sole organ of the Federal government in the field of international relations --a
power which does not require as a basis for its
exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course,
like every other governmental power, must be
exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. It is quite apparent
that if, in the maintenance of our international
relations, embarrassment--perhaps serious embarrassment--is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be
made effective through negotiation and inquiry
within the international field must often accord

^^ibid.

,

pp.

315-18

.
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admissible were domestic affairs
alone irivo?ved ?4
In sum, the Federal government
possesses foreign affairs powers independent of
Constitutional warrant, the exercise of these powers must often
be restricted to the President, and Congress may delegate
its foreign affairs powers
to the President in accordance
with standards less stringent
than those applied to delegations
respecting internal affairs,

How this affects Presidential war -making
authority
not entirely clear, especially since
Article
I.

section

is

I,

clause 11 expressly delegates to Congress
the power to declare war. At a minimum it would seem that
our earlier state-

ment that there is a double standard for gauging
Presidential
power is correct: when it comes to foreign affairs
Congress

may more freely delegate its powers to the Executive.

I

have

argued elsewhere that resolutions authorizing the President
to use force at his discretion,

(e.g., Tonkin Gulf,

1964),

are valid delegations under the Curt iss -Wright doctrine.

Beyond that, the contours of that "very delicate, ple-

nary and exclusive power of the President

as the sole

organ

of the Federal government in the field of international rela-

tions" are left to practice and case-by-case determination.
^^Ibid., pp. 318, 319-320.
"^^See

supra

my chap.

8,

text accompanying notes 122-123,
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On other occasions, in
cases dealing with
foreign affairs, notably the
power to make and give
domestic effect to international
agreements, the High Court
has suggested that Federal
power is free of some of
the
usual constitutional restraints.

Missouri

Holland is the most famous of
these,
and here Justice Holmes swept
aside a state challenge to
a treaty and the law effectuating
it, declaring that
they could not be held "forbidden
by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the
Tenth Amendment."
This despite the fact that similar
legislation
V.

(regulat-

ing migratory birds) enacted prior to
the treaty had been
found bad in Federal court.
In short, the treaty-makers, viz., the
President

and the Senate, could do that which the whole
Congress
acting without them could not.

But if the treaty power

is not limited by the Tenth Amendment, is it also
free

of other constitutional restrictions?

A nineteenth cen-

tury judge, Mr. Justice Field, thought not.
In Geofroy v. Riggs, Field declared that the

treaty power delineated in the Constitution
is in terms unlimited except by those restraints
which are found in that instrument against the
action of the government or of its departments,
and those arising from the nature of the governor
"^"^Missouri v.

Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).

^•51

ment itself and of that- of <-v,«
be contended that
Ltfnds^o
what the Constitution
forbids or

U

tory of the

f
f .h'

It would not
'° authorize

latt^rSiteC^^i^^l

And more recently it has
been suggested that the
Bill of Rights protects
citizens abroad, any

international
agreements regulating their
treatment to the contrary
notwithstanding. Justice Black
spoke for himself and three
other judges when he so declared
in Reid v. Covert.
The
case dealt with a Congressional
act providing for trial by
courts-martial of the civilian
dependents of servicemen

stationed overseas.

Under certain international
agreements

between the United States and the
host countries, American
soldiers accused of a crime could be
so tried.
Note Black's implicit rejection of the
Curtiss-

Wright doctrine of extra-constitutional
Federal powers.
At the beginning we reject the idea that
when the
United States acts against citizens abroad
it can
do so free of the Bill of Rights.
The United
States IS entirely a creature of the
Constitution
its power and authority have no other
source
It
can only act in accordance with all the
limitations
imposed by the Constitution

....

Even though a court-martial does not give an accused
trial by jury and other Bill of Rights protections
the Government contends that {the law being challenged}.
can be sustained as legislation which
'

.

.

^^Geofroy v., Riggs

,

133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890).

^^Reid V. Covert, 354 U.S.

1

(1957).

is necessary and proper to car-rv o,,t- +-u
tt
states obligations Snder
the f^eSatiL^?"^^
ments made with those
countries
S= £ ? ^S""^^"
^""^
decisive answer to this? of
course is°th^?"'
"°
agreement with a forei^A natini^^^^
confer power
on the Conaress ni^ ori
'^f'^
°f Government which^iflree f?o™
'^'"^ 'restraints
of the Constitution
.

•

.

2^
;>^I^T7
the Executive

nullified by the Executive or bv
and the Senate combined. 39

^

Thus, while the Migratory Birds
Case establishes

that the Tenth Amendment is no
limitation upon the treaty
power, Reid makes clear that other
restrictions, such as the

Jury Trial clause of the Sixth Amendment,
do apply
When the President makes "executive agreements"
with
foreign nations solely on his own authority,
is the
Tenth

Amendment equally inapplicable?

Apparently so. for in United

States V. Belmont, the Court stated that
{i}n respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations
generally, state lines disappear '^^
.

The implication of all of the above cases for Presi-

dential war -making is, once again, unclear.

But the general

thrust is that the Federal government, quite often the President alone or in conjunction with the Senate, may exercise
OQ

-•^Ibid.,

5-6,

16-17, footnotes omitted.

40
''United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937);
see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.- 203 (1942).

.
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powers in foreign affairs
free of .any of the
limitations derived from Federalism or
the Separation of Powers.

The Curtiss-Wright and
Missouri v. Holland cases,
which take an expansive view
of Presidential power,
also 'involve authorizing acts of
Congress. What if this
legislat ive
support were absent?; or what if
the President acted contrary
to the will of Congress? Two
landmark cases, only one of
which concerned foreign affairs
even obliquely, considered
the scope of Presidential power under
just these circum-

stances-and arrived at somewhat conflicting
conclusions.
The first, Myers v. United States,
involved the Pres-

ident's power to fire an executive officer
without obtaining
the advice and consent of the Senate as
expressly stipulated

by an act of Congress.

The President ignored the law, claim-

ing in effect that he was not bound by the will of
Congress

when that body encroached upon the constitutional powers of
the Executive

The Court upheld the President on the grounds that

removal power was indeed part of the general executive power

vested in the President by Article

II,

section

1,

was neces-

sary if he were to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-

cuted," as required by Article II, section

3,

and could not

therefore be exercised by Congress without violating the
^^Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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Separation of Powers principle. ^2
Chief Justice Taft, who
wrote for the majority,
considered the "executive power"
and "take Care" clauses
to be
positive grants of authority
rather than conMands to work
the will of Congress. Thus,
when Congress declared that
the
removal of postmasters first
class required Senate consent,
it was encroaching upon this
Presidential authority, and he
could rightfully ignore the law.
To which Justice Holmes, dissenting,
retorted:

The duty of the President to see
that the laws be
executed is a duty that does not go
beyond the
laws or require him to achieve more
than ^^^g^^ss
Congress
sees fit to leave within his power. 43

Taft's sweeping claims for Presidential
removal
power, and much of the constitutional theory
upon which they

were based were later disavowed by
brated Humphrey's Executor case.

the Court in the celeBut Myers was never re-

versed, and the notion that the President may defy Congress

when that body trespasses upon the Executive realm
vital.

is still

The Myers Court clung to this position even in the

face of the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson for defying a law similar to the one at issue in 1926.'^^
The Separation of Powers principle may, however, cut
^^ibid.
43.

'Ibid., p.

44
(1935).

177.

Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602

«

two ways:

it can be invoked

, p,,3,,,„^

incorrectl/. about the scope
of his authority.
actly what happened in

„^^^^^^^

This is ex-

the famous Steel Seizure
Case. ^5

Here the Supreme Court
upheld an injunction
against
the Secretary of Commerce,
who had been directed by
the President to temporarily
seize the steel mills
in order to avert
a strike.
The executive order
cited no statutory
authority
but noted the threat to
the national defense
posed by a work
stoppage during the Korean
War,
The President dxd not
invoke
the Taft-Hartley Act,
which provided for a
"cooling-offperiod. When this Act was
passed
t'aacKu in 1948
i^HB, Congress rejected
an amendment authorizing
emergency seizures.

m

Two judges, Black and
Douglas, adopted the
narrow
view of Presidential authority
rejected in Myers.
Said Black-

^"^^"^-^'^
pow2%o''^::e%\1t\'he°"LS"I^:'^:J^
faithfully
refutes the idea th^t

?

executed

I

Constitution^'i^itslis^i^euon^:

W thrf

process to the recormnendS
of
and the vetoing of
laws he'thinks

he

^^Y-""^
T'''"^

baS>7

Since providing for
seizures is a legislative
no^
an executive act,
the President violated
the Separation
,

of

the court seemed to
agree with Justice

(1952).

'lir:rsT2.f:r,

lit.'.

-

^^-y^^-

3«

u.s.
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(1952).

Sheet & Tube Co, v, Sawyer,
343 U,S, 579
^^ibid., p. 587.

A66

Frankfurter's comment that
the considerations relevant- tn
i
'^S^^ enforcement or
of zne
the principle
nrinn-iT^i^^?
of separation of powers
more complicated and flexible th^n^!!,. seem
from what Mr. Justice Black
^^i^^^^
has written
.

.

,

.

Frankfurter considered the President
in conflict
with the legislature because Congress
withheld

the seizure

power from him when it passed the
Taft-Hartley Act. Justices Clark and Burton condemned the
President for failing
to adopt measures short of seizure
as provided
by Congress

in Taft-Hartley in case of industrial
disputes.

Justice

Jackson provided a formula for gauging
Presidential power,
and found President Truman's action in the
instant

case to

fall in the least defensible category because it
was under-

taken without regard for the methods which Congress
pre-

cribed for conducting seizures.
But none of the above-named judges rejected outright

the concept of inherent Presidential powers to meet emergencies, upon which the three dissenters relied.

(Actually,

five of the judges approved the doctrine, two were non-com-

mittal, and two rejected it.)

Thus, the essence of the

Youngstown rule is not that the President is limited to executing statutory law, but rather, that where Congress has

laid down policy guidelines the President may not simply dis-

regard them.
^Sibid., p. 589.

^^Ibid., pp. 602-603, 663, 657^59, 639.

467

The corollary

-

also true, i.e.

where Cong,
;ress
has not established
guidelines. Presidents
.ay, under ....
certain circumstances
not easily
ac^ixy aermed
.-^
defin^ri
a

m

void on their own authorifv
authority.

tu^
This

two of Jackson's formula

sional inertia

,

advance, fill the

corresponds with category

indif fprA^.^^

Therefore, congres-

tLrrespInsibiTi^^SS^ °" independent

pr4si<le1^^'

The importance of Youngstown
for Presidential warmaking power is difficult to assess.
The initiation of hostilities short of "war," as the term
is used in Article I.
section 8, clause 11, is probably one
of those twilight zone

powers-or at least had been until the War
Powers Act of
1973.
It has been argued that because Federal
courts were

willing to decide the merits of the Steel Seizure
controversy,
they should also have taken jurisdiction in cases
challenging
the legality of the Vietnam War.

Consider Justice Douglas'

statement in one of his several dissents.
Ibid., p.

637.
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In the Steel Seizure Case
members of

the issue

relaLd

to Jhe PresJden^'^

th-ic

^f"'

r^,

^

"^"^^

extreme emergency should be
instructive 51
Perhaps so. but the required
four Justices necessary
to grant appeals were never
persuaded. Furthermore, unlike
the Vietnam War cases, Youngs
town did not directly involve
foreign affairs, traditionally
(as we shall demonstrate further) an area of judicial abstinence.
That Justice Jackson
recognized the distinction is indicated
by his
.

comment.

We should not use this occasion to
circumscribe
much less to contract, the lawful role of
the
President as Commander-in-Chief. I should
indulge the widest latitude of interpretation
to
sustain his exclusive function to command the
instruments of national force, at least when
turned against the outside world for the security
of our society.
But, when it is turned inward,
not because of rebellion but because of a lawful
economic struggle between industry and labor, it
should have no such indulgence ^2
'

.

Jackson's reference to the power of the Commander-in-

Chief in the event of "rebellion" suggests also that he did

not want his opinion to be construed as a refutation of the
doctrine enunciated in the Prize Cases.

Justice Burton's

concurring opinion made a similar distinction.
The present situation is not comparable to that of

^^Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 898 (1970).
579,

^^Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
(concurring opinion)..

645 (1952).

,
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an imminent invasion or
threat ^npri attack.
ot-f.
r,
We do
not face the issue nf
=^
? ?
ot what
might
be the Prp<?Tri«r.
i

,

•

i^resident
as Commander-in-Chief,
toamobiliLd
natxgg waging, or in^inently
threatened w^t" total

The Steel Seizure Case, then,
leaves matters just as
inconclusive as they had been. It
not only does not demolish
the idea of inherent Presidential
power in foreign af f iars
it probably does not even do
so for domestic affairs.^^

Writing in 1917, Professor Corwin
observed
the lack
of definite legal criteria for determining the scope of the President's
powers
field of foreign relations and for deciding in the
those
contests for power in this field which have
frequently occurred between the President and
Congress
or the President and the Senate.
Such criteria
lack because the courts have never had occasion
to
.-'-^
develop them
.

.

.

.

This is not to say that opportunities were not available, but rather that the courts have been reluctant to
step
in when cases involving foreign affairs have arisen.

The

refusal of the Supreme Court to grant certiorari to thirteen
legal challenges to the Vietnam War is consistent with past
practice,

Judicial non- involvement has been rationalized
^^Ibid., p. 659.
54

C. Herman Pritchett, The Am e rican Constitution
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pp. 340-341.
(New York:
,

2d ed.

55

56

Corwin, President's Control

See my chap.

8,

note 93,

,

pp.

suplra.

166-167.

,
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through the use of the
-political questionsdoctrine.
observer notes, however,
that the Supreme

One

Court did not in-

voke this doctrine with
the Vietnam War cases,
and attribute
this fact to a desire on
the part of the justices
to avoid

foreclosing the option of ruling
upon the War's constitution
ality should the political
climate have permitted. ^7
As early as 1829, Chief
Justice John Marshall invoked the political questions
doctrine in a case involving

the interpretation

of an international agreement.

Foster
Neilson presented a dispute of
title to land said by
one party to have been ceded by
Spain

V.

to France and ulti-

mately to the United States as part
of the Louisiana Purchase.

The other party, relying upon the
Spanish understand
ing, denied that the disputed territory
had been ceded.

Justice Marshall announced that it would be
odd for

American courts to reject an interpretation given
a treaty
by the United States government. He continued
as
follows.

If those departments which are entrusted with the
foreign intercourse of the nation, which assert
and maintain its interests against foreign powers,
have unequivocally asserted its rights of dominion
over a country of which it is in possession, and
which it claims under a treaty; if the Legislature
has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is
not in its own courts that this construction is to
be denied.
A question like this respecting the

57philiipa Strum., "The Supreme Court and the Viet-

nam War." in Richard A. Falk, ed. The Vietnam War and Inter
national Law 4 vols. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
,

,

Press, 1968-1976), 4 (197^): 561-562

^^Foster v. Neilson,

2

Pet.

(U.'s,)

253 (1829).

-

,

bounda ries of nations

is

u.. u

spect the Pronoun^^f
^?nf^L^^^^^^L?;:?e\5?'

Thus did the Marshall
Court refuse to decide
the controversy. We already noted
that while the Court
reached
the constitutional issues
in the Prize Cases, it
invoked the
political questions doctrine
and denied authority to
judge
a Presidential decision
that war had been thrust
upon the
country. And in the case of
The Protector the Court
found
it "necessary to refer to
some public act of the
political
departments," namely Lincoln's
proclamations, in order to
determine the dates of the coimnencement
and termination of
the Civil War.^°
,

There are numerous other statements
of judicial deference to the "political" branches, including
one noted in
an earlier chapter in a case stemming from
the Pancho Villa
episode. The statement, which follows, was
described in

Baker v. Carr, the most elaborate Supreme Court
discussion
of the political questions doctrine, as a "sweeping"
one,
"to the effect that all questions touching foreign relations

are political questions

"^'•
.

^^Ibid., p. 309, emphasis added.
See also Williams
Suffolk Insurance Co., 13 Pet. (U.S.) 415, 420 (1839);
and cases cited in Henkin, p. 451, note 27.

v.

V.

^^See text accompanying notes 16-17, supra. Freeborn
The Ship Protector, 12 Wall (U.S.) 700, 20 L. Ed. 463,

464 (1871).
^^Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
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The conduct of the
foreign rel=,^^„„o r
Government is conimitted h^^ relations of our
the Executive anTuo^slativ^ ?°"=titution to
Departments of the
of what may be done G^v^J^menr'and't^^''""''"
in the exercise ol
?^

-tject

decis?^r?2-

to

Judi^^af i^^iLro""

Oetjen involved the
determination of the international
status of the Carranza regime
insofar as the United
States was
concerned, and it was this
very determination that
the Court
dubbed "political." But Oetjen
broke no new ground since
Chief Justice Marshall asserted
back in 1818 that questions
of the international status
of rebel governments "are
generally rather political than legal
in their character.""
The Supreme Court has also held
the vitality of international agreements to be a question
for the other branches
to decide.

And it has left to the Executive branch
the determination of whether or not the vessels of a

foreign govern-

ment are immune from American judicial processes. ^5
The Court has also shied away from interfering
with
^-

(1917)

Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302

^%nited States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 610, 634
But see United States v. The Three Friends. 166 U
(1818).
S. 1, 63-65 (1896).
64

John Doe ex dem Clark, et al. v. Braden, 16 How.
(U.S.) 635, 657 (1^3TT~Terlinden~v."XTnes
184 U.S. 270, 288
and cases cited in Henkin, p, 451, note 28.
(1901)
.

,

i

^^Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1942);
Republic oT Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. -30 (1944).
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Presidential control over C.A.B.
decisions to grant overseas
axr routes, on the grounds
that Presidential
determinations
are based upon information
in
foreign affairs available
to

him.

Regarding the revelation of
such information the

Court said:
But even if courts could
require full discloosure,
the very nature of executive
decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not
jidicial.^§

There is also dictum to the effect
that challenges
to the dispatch of American
troops abroad by the Commander-

in-Chief are not adjudicable.

The statement, quoted below,

came in a case involving the trial by
military commission
of German nationals accused of spying
on behalf of Japan before the latter surrendered in World War
II.
The Commission
was convened in China and the defense challenged
its authority in the face of Sino-American agreements that
United
States troops would not be stationed in China.

Certainly it is not the function of the Jucidiary
to entertain private litigation--even by a citizen--which challenges the legality, the wisdom,
or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in
sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region .... The issue
involves
a challenge to the conduct of diplomatic and
foreign affairs, for which the President is exclusively responsible.
.

Finally,

I

.

.

have found ten cases challenging the con-

66

Chicago 6c Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1947).

^^Johnson v. Eisenstrager
(1949).

,

et al., 339 U.S. 763, 789
~"
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stitutionality of the Vietnam
War where lower federal
courts
invoked the political questions
doctrine.
It should be noted
that the Supreme Court
refused to review any of
these cases

where asked, with the sole
exception of the Atlee decision
which it affirmed without
comment.

We must also point out, however,
that lower federal
courts reached the merits in
fourteen legal challenges to
the Vietnam conflict, and the
Supreme Court did not review
any of these either.

What may be concluded from this survey
of judicial
statements on foreign affairs and "political
questions?"
With respect to our chief concern, the power
of the President
to initiate hostilities without a
Congressional declaration
of war,
the Supreme Court has neither reached the merits
nor

invoked the political questions doctrine with finality.

While one scholar concludes that
{w}ar power issues are essentially and inherently
political and not legal^,^
the Supreme Court, in Baker v. Carr, warns us that

^^Atlee V. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.Pa. 1972),
aff'd, 411 U.S. 911 (1973): Da Costa v. Laird, 471 F. 2d
1146 (2d Cir. 1973); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.
Va. 1970); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854 (D. Mass. 1973),
aff'd, 502 F. 2d 1158 (1st Cir. 1973); Gravel v. Laird, 347
F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972); Head v. Nixon, 342 F. Supp. 521
(E.D. La. 1972), aff'd, 468 F. 2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973); Luftig
V. McNamara, 373 F. 2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Mora v. McNamara,
387 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Samoff v. Connally, 457 F.
2d 809 (CD. Cal 1972).

^^Cited in chap.

8,

note 95, supra.
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Professor Henkin suggests that
the Court has never
established a doctrine of
"extraordinary judicial abs^^on

from constitutional review" in
anv foreign affairs case.
Rather, he contends, where the
Court has declared some issue
to be appropriate for the
"political branches." it was in
fact deciding that the Constitution
gave those institut ions
authority over the issue.
But even if this were so, the results
to date are
still the same:
there is no authoritative High Court
ruling
on Presidential war -making. And this
is true because, as

Professor Henkin admits, when it comes to foreign
affairs,
the Supreme Court

intervenes only infrequently and its
are few and haphazard.'^

.

.

.

cases

If the Supreme Court resisted the temptations and

challenges of the Vietnam era it is likely to do so again

when the issue of Presidential war -making power
in the future.

is

raised

On the other hand, in a less emotional polit

ical climate than that of the Vietnam War period, the Jus^^Don Wallace, Jr., "The War-Making Powers: A Constitutional Flaw?" in Richard A.Falk, ed. The Vietnam War
and International Law 4 vols, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1968-1976), 4 (1976) :670; Baker v. Carr,
,

,

369 U.S.

186,

211 (1962).

''^Henkin, pp.

72 Ibid.,

p.

213-214.

224.
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tices might choose to assert
themselves.
It seems safe to conclude
that while past practice
in
the broad area of foreign
affairs

suggests Judicial inaction

in the future, there is no
authoritative ruling precluding
such action.
Insofar as the Constitution
means what the
judges say it means, then it is
still, as Corwin described
it. "an invitation to
struggle"-not only for the privilege
of directing foreign policy, but
for the awesome responsibility of initiating hostilities. And.
in the absence of any

ahthoritative Supreme Court ruling on the
matter, this is
truly in the hands of the "nolitical
"^^
branches.

73

Corwin, President's Control

,

p.

171.
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CHAPTER

XI

CONCLUSION

we are dealing in an area
where the Constitution is
the
Constitution of practice.
Alexander M. Bickel

When the late Professor Bickel
made this comment,
he was encouraging a House
subconnnittee to draft war powers
legislation.^ He meant that
legislation respecting war
powers, like Presidential statements
and legislative
de-

bates on this issue, were akin to
Supreme Court opinions in
giving authoritative meaning to the
Constitution.^
Thus if a constitutional theory of
Presidential war

powers is to be developed, it must rely not
only upon the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution,
but upon the
views of Congress, the President and the Courts
over the
sweep of American history.

In the course of this study we

have examined these views in detail as well as the events
that prompted them.

Now we attempt to develop

a theory of

Presidential war- commencing power.
^U. S., Congress, House, War Powers, Hearings Before
the Subconmiittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments of the Corrjiiittee on F orei;:;n Affairs 93d Con^i
1st sess.
1973, p. iSl.
'

,

^Ibid., p.

198.
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The Intenr of tbf

F,-.n,^,-„

The United States Constitution
unambiguously vests
the power to declare war in
the Congress, not the
President.
By this phraseology it was
intended that Congress
participate in all non-emergency
decisions to go
to war.

Even Hamilton, defender of
Presidential primacy in foreign
affairs, conceded this.
The legislature alone can interrupt
those
blessings [ot peace], by placing
the Nation
in a state of War.
The phrase "non- emergency decisions"
is designed to
permit exclusion of Congress from
necessarily instantaneous
determinations to defend the country against
attack or

imminent threat thereof.

Thus,

the theory of the Constitu-

tion is that in cases of grave threat to the
nation's
security, where the need for rapid response
precludes
3
_U.

S.

Const., art.

I,

sec.

8,

cl.

11.

If the

declaration is made by bill or joint resolution, the
President has to sign it, or if he wishes, veto 'it. Cf
Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola,
N. Y.
The Foundation Press, Inc., 1972), pp. 5, 295,
note 5. This has never happened, but President Cleveland
once threatened to disregard a declaration of war. Edward
S. Corwin, The President:
Office and Powers (New York:
New York University Press, 1948), p. 476, note 93.
:

4

,
Alexander
Hamilton, The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton ed. Harold C. Syrett (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961--), 15 (1969) :42.
,

.
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executive-legislative consultation,
the President may act
on his own authority.^
Logically, such a theory of
emergency Presidential
power would seem to extend to
the defense of American
citizens, soldiers and properties
(including territorial possessions) overseas.
However, there is no mention of
these
powers in the writings of the Framers
or in coimentaries of
that period.
Perhaps, given America's circumstances
in
1789,

the Founders simply did not
anticipate permanent army

bases overseas, or foreign policy
interests of a global
nature

There is a second omission in the original
under-

standing of the war powers:

there is no distinction between

"war" and hostilities short of war.^

This may have been

intentional, in which case all hostilities are subsumed

under the term "war."

Under such an interpretation, the

Congress and not the President rightfully controls all but

emergency-motivated hostilities.
5

This was one of the purposes of changing the
phrase "make War" to "declare War" in art. I, sec. 8, cl.
11 of the Constitution.
Max Farrand, ed. The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787 3 vols. (New Haven:
YaTe
University Press, 1927), 2:318. The Supreme Court affirmed
this doctrine in Prize Cases, 2 Bl. (U. S.) 635 (1863).
,

.

6

War.

This was pointed out during debate on the Quasi
See Gallatin s comments, chap. 2, note 47, supra.
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If this be so,

then the President's
power to commence hostilities was intended
to be narrow
indeed.

But

there is yet another issue
remaining unclarified, viz
«ho
was meant to conduct the
foreign policy of the United
States
on a day-to-day basis? More
particularly, who was intended
to have control over the
armed forces, including the
authority to employ them as a
threat in order to obtain
diplomatic objectives?
The President has the "executive
Power"^ and is the
Coimnander- in-Chief of the armed
forces.^ but
has he the

power to deploy the armed forces and
threaten to use them
in pursuit of American foreign
policy objectives? If the

President need not obtain prior Congressional
approval for
such deployments, then the legislative
monopoly
over the

commencement of hostilities is easily broken.

Forces de-

ployed as a threat are easily drawn into actual
hostilities,
thus presenting Congress with a fait accompli

.

While this might lead one to conclude that the
Framers must have intended that Congress approve any deploy-

ments of this nature, such a conclusion would be premature.
First, there is no evidence that this was intended.

Second,

its implications for the conduct of foreign relations today

might be revolutionary indeed:

the President might be

7

U.

S.

Const, art.

II,

sec.

1,

8

Ibid., art.

II,

sec.

2,

cl.

1.

cl.

1.
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denied the power "to make
a credible threat

to use

force.

For example, before responding
to the Soviet emplacement of nuclear missiles
in Cuba with a naval
quarantine of the island. President
Kennedy would, under this
theory, have had to obtain
Congressional permission, thus
increasing the chances of a breach
in security, and perhaps altering irrevocably the
delicate diplomacy so essential to success.
The failure of the Framers to clarify
the respective roles of Congress and the
President in the conduct of
foreign relations leaves a great deal
of the war-making

issue to be resolved by inter-branch power
struggle.
ever,

How-

even if hostilities do issue out of a
Presidential

deployment in the conduct of foreign relations,
there is

nothing to prevent Congress from being asked to give
approval once it appears that the incident is developing
into "war" in the Constitutional sense.
In fact. Article

I,

section

8,

clause 11 requires

that Congress authorize all protracted and large-scale

hostilities regardless of how they were initiated.

This,

9

Eugene V. Rostow, "Great Cases Make Bad Law:
The War Powers Act," Texas Law Review 50 (May 1972): 833.
896.
10

See Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little,
Brown 6c Co.
Inc
passim.
1971)
,

.

,

,

:
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xt see.s to .e,

is the essence of
that provision.

In short

While the Fran^ers allowed
for unilateral Presidential
response in case of national
emergency, and while they
did

not make clear which branch
was to control the
conduct of
foreign relations, thus paving
the way for Presidential
predominance, they did require

that "war," defined as pro-

tracted and large-scale hostilities,
be authorized by the
legislature.

The Effects of Practice

I

It was left for actual practice
to clarify many of

the ambiguities of the Constitution.

This is not to say

that all actions are self-legitimating;
we must also take
into account the critical comments of
legislators and the

commentaries of scholars.

Nor do we accept as conclusive

of Presidential authority the long list of
hostilities

abroad without a declaration of

war.''"^

11

See my chap.

1,

supra.

12

An aide to Senator Goldwater listed 199 such
events.
House War Powers Hearin.^s 1973 pp. 328-66.
Other
compilations have been made by Milton Offutt, Protection
of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United
States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, ly2a)~
J. Reuben Clark, The Right to Protect Citizens in Forei,^n
Countries by Landing Forces 2d Rev. Ld. (Washington.
D. C.
Government Printing Office, 1929); and James
Grafton Rogers, World Policing and the Constitution
(Baltimore:
World Peace Foundation, 1945).
.

.

:
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However, there have been
some practices which
were
repeated so often, and which
gained such acceptance
in
executive, legislative and
scholarly circles, that
they
have of necessity become a part
of the corpus of Presidential war power.

The first ambiguity clarified
involved the matter
of hostilities short of war.
The Framers of the Constitution did not distinguish between
hostilities and war power.
However, in the earliest years of
the Republic, President
John Adams ordered, without a full-fledge
declaration of
war, but with prior Congressional
authorization, naval
action against France.

Adams nearly approached Congress to ask
for a fullblown declaration of war on more than one
occasion,
but

changed his mind.

Congress too was aware of the distinc-

tion between the quasi-war they authorized and
all-out war.

And in two distinct cases arising out of the conflict,
the
Supreme Court clearly distinguished between "perfect" or
"imperfect" war. and "general" or "partial" hostilities,
saying that Congress could authorize either.

•'^

As a result of the Quasi War with France, 17971801,

the distinction between war and hostilities short of

war was firmly established.
13

37

See my chap.

2,

However, it was not established

supra.

^^Ibid.
The cases are Bas v. Tingy, 4 Ball. (U. S.)
(1800), and Talbot v. Seeman, 1 Cr. (U. S.) 1 (1801).
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that the President could
authorize these hostilities
on his
own authority. Although there
were in fact naval operations in the Quasi-War that
exceeded the limits established
by Congress, the Supreme Court
later held that the President had no authority to exceed
Congressionally imposed
limitations on the conduct of
hostilities."^^
Thus, with the Quasi War,

the legitimacy of hostili

ties short of war was established.

However,

the respective

powers of Congress and President in
this area were not yet
fixed, as the bulk of this study clearly
indicates.

A second issue not clarified by the Framers.
the
threat of force in diplomacy, also received
early clarification in practice.
The whole question of control over

foreign relations in general was debated by Madison
and

Hamilton following Washington's Proclamation of American
neutrality in the war between Britain and France.

Ironic

ally, Jefferson, who had urged Madison to defend Congres-

sional power, came to assert Presidential control over the
threat of force for diplomatic purposes.
In May 1801, while Congress was not in session.

President Jefferson dispatched a naval force to the

Mediterranean as a show of force against the Barbary coast

•

^^Little v. Barreme,

2

Cir.

(U.

S.)

169 (1804).'

^^The Proclamation was issued in 1793.
The debate
was conducted that same year in the press under the pseudonyms Helvidius and Pacif icus
See chap. 1, supra.
.

r
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states.

Months later. Jefferson
informed Congress and
Justified the operation on the
grounds that it was defensive
in nature.
To add to the irony,
fourteen
years later

Madison himself ordered a show
of force off the Barbary
coast in excess of Congressional
authorization.

While these events by no means
settle the dispute
over control of foreign relations,
they
do serve as early

examples of Presidential assertion
of authority.
In fact.
American diplomatic history is replete
with such assertions,
many of which I did not discuss in
this study because the
episode did not lead to large-scale,
protracted hostilities
or because Congress declared war.
Consider the following
description of the period in American history
dating from
1809 to 1829.

Although Presidents during this period claimed
no inherent authority to initiate military
actions. Madison and particularly Monroe
secretly used their power in ways that could
have been justified only by some sweeping and
vague claim- -such as the right to use the
armed forces to advance the interests of the
United States. 19
The author goes on to note the seizure of Baton

Rouge and parts of West Florida in 1810. and Andrew Jackson's raid on East Florida in 1818. with the indulgence, if

^^See chap. 3. supra.
18

Ibid.
19

Abraham D. Sofaer, War. Foreign Affairs and Con stitutional Power:
The Origins (Cambridge, Mass.:
Balling e
Publishing Co.. 1976). p. 378.
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not the approval of President
Honroe.^O

other significant

deployments in the 19th century
include the movement of
troops to Texas in 1844 to
insure her independence
from
Mexico, 21 and the dispatch of
50.000 men to the TexasMexico border by President Grant
in 1865-1866.22
In the 20th century there
have been these additional
mobilizations and deployments. In
1903. Theodore Roosevelt
sent marines to Panama to insure
her successful revolt

against Columbia. 2^
In 1914, President Wilson ordered
the occupation of
Vera Cruz, Mexico, in order to topple
the military govern-

ment there.

Congress resolved that the President
was "jus-

tified," but it was not asked to authorize
his actions. 2^
In fact,

throughout the first decades of the 20th

century, the United States was notorious for
its "gunboat

diplomacy," especially in the Caribbean.

Perhaps the most

blatant example of this was the occupation of Nicaragua

from 1926 to 1933, initiated solely under President
Coolidge's authority.
20
21

22

25

Ibid.

House War Powers Hearings 1973

.

p.

333.

Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the
9th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:
Pren-

American People

.

tice-Hall, Inc., 1974),
^^Ibid.

,

p.

p.

353.

493.

2^cSee my chap.
U

c

5,

supra.

^^Bailey, pp. 678-79.

A.37

And,

since the Second World
War there have been the
following significant forceful
demonstrations.
President
Eisenhower sent 5,000 marines
to Lebanon in
1958.

dent Kennedy placed a naval
quarantine around Cuba in
1962.
Marines were sent to tne
Dominican Republic in
1965 by President Johnson. ^8 And
during conflict in the
middle east in 1973, President
Nixon put all American
forces on alert as a warning to
the Soviet Union.

Each of the military actions
cited was undertaken
without specific legislative approval,
and although other
justifications were often advanced, the
principal motivation was to promote United States foreign
policy.

In addi-

tion, before each of the following wars,
eventually declared
26

^J^^wPE;.^^^"^^^- ^^^h additional units troop
1
totals
reached
14,000.
President Eisenhower did not
upon the Resolution of March 9, 1957, which declared relv
that
the United States
... is prepared to use armed forces
to assist
those Middle Eastern states requesting aid
against armed aggression from any country controlled by
institutional communism
consonant with the treaty
obligations
and the Constitution of the United States."
71 Stat. 5 (1957).
For Eisenhower's explanation to
Congress, see Department of Sta te Bulletin 39 (August 4
^
^
1958) :182.
^

.

.

.

.

.

27

Allison, passim.
28

Bailey, pp.

901-902.

29

New York Times

.

26 October 1973, p.

1.

.
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by Congress, there were
ox^uxxicant mM.-^o
significant
mxlitary actions undertaken by Presidents acting
unilaterally.

President Polk moved troops
into disputed territory
between Mexico and the United
States before the Mexican
War
in 1846.

President Wilson armed American
merchantships
in 1917, before Congress
declared war against Germany.
And before the Second World War,
President Franklin D.
Roosevelt exchanged destroyers for
bases on British soil,
and ordered the occupation of
both Greenland and Iceland,
despite an act of Congress prohibiting
the use of inductees
outside the Western Hemisphere
In practice,

then.

Presidential authority to

threaten the use of force by deploying
the armed forces
abroad is well established. By implication.

Congress con-

ceded as much when it passed the War Powers
Resolution

which provides for termination by Congress of Presidentially- initiated hostilities, but requires only a
report

when the President deploys combat troops to

a foreign coun-

try and neither hostilities nor imminent hostilities are
involved.

Deployments in international waters not involv-

ing hostilities need not even be reported. 33
30

•^^See chap.

31
•^•^

2,

note

2,

supra.

House War Powers Hearings 1973

,

349-350.

pp.

32

Ibid., p. 354; Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940, 54 Stat. 885 (1940).
See Edward S. Corwin. Total
War and the Constitution (1947; reprint ed. Freeport, N. Y,
Books for Libraries Press, 1970), pp. 22-34.
,

chap.

^^Pub. L.
supra.

11,

93-148, 87 Stat.

555' (1973)

.

See my

6

,

4J9

Courts and

t he

Effects of Practice_ II

When we examine the views of
the Federal courts respecting war powers, we find only
a stray word here, possible grounds for inference there,
discussions of Congressional power, and refusals to
decide on "political questiongrounds
or on no grounds at all."^^
In one area not fully elucidated
by the Framers

that of protection of citizens and
property overseas, courts
have come down on the side of Presidential
power; and practice has confirmed what the judges have
pronounced.
In the Slaughterhouse Cases it was said
that one of

the privileges a citizen of the United States
could demand
IS

the care and protection of the Federal Government over his life, liberty, and property when
on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of
a foreign government
.

If so,

-J

then it is likely that the President will

have at least the initial responsibility for meeting that
demand.

And this implies that he has the power to do so.
The clearest expression of judicial support for

this view came in Durand v. Rollins, in which a Supreme
34

U.

S.

See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
297 (1917).

35

See the Vietnam War cases, chap.

8,

246

note 93,

supra.

Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall.
(1873).

(U.

S.) 36,

79
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Court justice riding circuit
held that the President
has
full power to interpose with
force in order to protect
citizens and their property abroad.

Apparently this extends to the
protection of those
in the process of becoming
citizens as well, as

the Supreme
Court affirmed when discussing
the Martin Koszta incident
38
in Neagle' s case.

In Neagle it was suggested that
the President

needed no laws or treaties to come to
the aid of citizens
abroad.

Scarcely a decade passed before President

McKinley asserted just such power in dispatching
5,000
soldiers to China to aid American ambassadorial

personnel

and Chinese converts to Christianity beseiged
by the
Boxers.

Congress was not in session when McKinley acted,

and the success of the enterprise precluded any criticism

when the legislature reconvened.
In defensive action of a different sort, President

Wilson, without Congressional authorization, sent the

Pershing expedition deep into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho
Villa, following the latter

raid on an American city.

's

37

Durand v. Hollins,
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
^^In re Neagle, 135

8 F.

U.

S.

39
Ibid.

40

See my chap.

4,

supra.

Cas

1,

.

Ill (No.

64 (1890).

4,186)

.

,
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Villa eluded Pershing for
nearly a year (1916-1917).
whereupon the force was withdrawn 41
In 1973, when the United
States Senate was in a
less than charitable mood when
it came to Presidential
powers, a war powers measure
containing the following Ianguage was approved.
this Act is not intended to
upon the recognized powers of the encroach
President
as Commander
Chief and Chief Executive
to conduct hostilities authorized
by the
Congress, to respond to attacks or
the imminent threat of attacks upon the
United
btates, including its territories and
dcssessions, to repel attacks or forestall
the
imminent threat of attacks against the Armed
Forces of the United States, and, under
proper circumstances, to rescue endangered
citizens and nationals of the United States
located in foreign countries. ^2
.

.

.

m

'

In sum, the Senate recognized what the courts
and

practice had established, and what, given the institutional
capabilities of Congress and the President, could hardly be

otherwise
Treaties and Area Resolutions
Since VJorld War II the United States has been in-

volved in two major armed conflicts, one in Korea (1950)
and one in Indochina (1965).
41

See my chap.

5,

If "war" in the Constitutional

supra.

42

U. S., Congress, Senate, A Bill to Make Rules Gov erning the Use of the Armed Forces of the United States in
Absence of a Declaration of War by the Congress " sT 440
93d Cong.
1st sess
1973 p~. TT This measure was adopted
119 Cong. Rec 25119 (1973).
by the Senate 20 July 1973.
,

.

,

,

.

.

492

sense is to be defined by
the magnitude of the
conflict,
both in terms of size of
the troop- involvement
and duration of the hostilities, then
surely these were -wars.The State Department defended
President Truman's
dispatch of forces to Korea on
the grounds that the United
States had signed the United
Nations Treaty, and the United
Nations Security Council had
recommended action in defense
of South Korea.
Although Congress fully supported
the
war at its onset, appropriated money,
and drafted troops
to conduct it, there was never any
explicit authorization
for the conflict.

Practice would seem to have established
that the
President, as Chief Executor of treaties and
Commander-in-

Chief of the armed forces may Initiate war on
his own
authority.
scrutiny.

history.

However.

I

believe this argument will not stand

The Korean episode has no analogue in American

At no time before 1950 was a conflict of such

major proportions begun and conducted solely upon the President's authority to enforce treaties.
Furthermore, the contention that a treaty could

justify a President in conducting war, in the Constitutional
43

U. S., Department of State. Memorandum of July
1950. in U. S., Congress, House, Background Information
on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Coun tries H. Kept. 127, 82d Con^.
1st sess.. 1951. pp. 4954
3,

.

,

44

See my chap.

7,

supra.

.

^93

sense of that

tern,,

is without foundation.

Court made clear in Reid

v.

As the Supreme

Covert, treaty provisions
may

not conflict with the
Constitution.

«

Quite simply, this

means that while the United
States ma^ commit itself
to go
to war in defense of a
treaty partner, it may not
fulfill
that commitment in violation
of Art.
1(8)

(U) of the Con-

stitution, which vests the power
to declare war in the
Con46
gress
It could hardly be said,

then,

that the President

gains from a treaty the authority
to violate the Constitution by imposing upon Congress' war
powers.

"in accordance with

.

.

.

If the phrase,

constitutional processes," in-

serted into a number of our major defense
treat ies^'^ is to
be any more than a mere redundancy, it
must mean
that the

United States is not obligating itself to
act in a manner
inconsistent with proper Constitutional procedure.

And

under the Constitution both houses of Congress are
needed
to authorize a war,
a treaty.

48

whereas only the Senate need approve

49

45

Reid V. Covert, 354

U.

S.

1

(1957).

46

Nor did the Court hold to the contrary in Missouri
Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
The rule there is that
the Tenth Amendment does not limit the treaty-making power.

v.

See e.g.. North Atlantic Treaty, arts.
48
U.

49

S.

Const, art.

Ibid., art.

II,

I,

sec.

sec.
2,

8,

cl.

cl.
1.

11.

5

and 11.

4^4

The State Department also
defended the Vietnam War
on the basis of treaty,
the SE..TO pact and
Protocol; only
in this case there was also
an act of Congress, the
notorious Tonkin Gulf Resolution
my view, however, the
Tonkin Resolution and the SEATO
pact plus Protocol, taken
together did justify the President's
use of force in Vietnam.
The language of the Resolution
was sufficiently broad
and the debates on the floor of
the Senate sufficiently
clear to conclude that Congress
intended to give the President the authority to order the use
of force in southeast
.

m

Asia.^-*-

However, even if their intent be clear,
"area

resolutions," like the Tonkin Resolution, have
also been
criticized for unconstitutionally delegating
Congressional

war power to the President.

It is said that they permit

the President to use force without specific enough
guidelines.

However, this argument is hardly compelling.
In the first place, area resolutions are in fact

quite specific in describing the area to be defended.
^^See my chap.

8,

supra.

Ibid.
52

See Francis D. Wormuth, "The Vietnam War:
The
President Versus the Constitution," in Richard A. Falk. ed.
The Vietnam War and International Law 4 vols. (Princeton,
N. J.:
Princeton University Press, 1968-1976), 2(1969):
.

781-99.
53

The Tonkin Resolution applied only to SEATO signatories and protocol states.
78 Stat. 384 (1964).

.

4?5

They are perforce less
specific respecting che
adversary to
be defended against, and
the ti.e when the use
of force .ay
begin.
However, a "whereas" clause
in the Tonkin Resolution indicated that the
"Coo^unist regime in North
Vietnam"
was co^itting aggression,
and section 3 permitted
Congress
to terminate the Resolution
at any time by concurrent
(veto-proof) resolution.
Secondly,

I

thought it settled that the
standards

for delegation of power were
more relaxed in matters of

foreign as opposed to domestic affairs
ever since the
Curtiss-Wright decision. ^5 There the
Supreme Court noted
the following:

Practically every volume of the United
States
btatutes contains one or more acts or
joint
resolutions of Congress authorizing action
by
the President in respect of subjects
affecting
foreign relations, which either leave the
exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard far more general
than that which has always been considered
requisite with regard to domestic affairs. 56
All told,

legal arguments against the authorization

of force by area resolutions (policy considerations not-

withstanding) are unconvincing.

In conclusion, while a

^^78 Stat. 384 (1964).
55

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
299 U. S. 304 (1936).
56

Ibid., p. 324.
For a discussion of more recent
holdings pertaining to delegation, see Rostow, pp. 887-90.
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treaty alone cannot authorize
the President to
cooMence
war, a treaty and an area
resolution combined, as
with
Vietnam, or even an area
resolution alone is a legitimate
vehicle for Congress to use to
warrant Presidential use of
force.
In the case of Vietnam,
however, fighting went on
after the Tonkin Resolution had
been repealed by Congress
in 1971.
The Nixon administration denied
it was ever depen-

dent upon the Resolution for
constitutional authority to
pursue its policies in Vietnam.
in the absence of the
Resolution, however, the President could
only rely upon his
own authority as Commander-in-Chief and
whatever authority
could be inferred from acts of Congress
such as defense

appropriations
Under these authorities it is doubtful that the

President had legal justification to do more than withdraw

American forces with due regard for their safety.

While

the Nixon administration did remove ground combat forces

steadily, it continued to wage the air war. even conducting
it over Cambodia after the signing of the cease-fire.

Ultimately. Congress cut off all appropriations for combat

activities in southeast Asia.

.

58

57

See chap.

8,

note 130, supra.

See chap,

8,

note 86 and accompanying text,

58

supra.

Actually, the issue raised
by the above events is
more properly related to the
President's authority in the
conduct or terminatio n of a
war. rather than the
con^encement thereof. As a general
rule. war. in the constitutional
sense, may not be commenced
or conducted in the absence
of
Congressional authorization. However,
the Commander-inChief has the obligation to use
force even without such
authorization where the defense of the
nation or the protection of armed forces already in
combat require
it.

Under this analysis, when American
ground forces
were safely extricated from southeast
Asia (March 1973),
the air attacks could no longer be
justified.

To draw an

analogy with another incident detailed in
this study, after
the Armistice ending World War I was agreed
to in November
1918,

President Wilson could no longer justify maintaining

United States troops in Siberia and north Russia.
Provided there is no infringement of the President's constitutional authority to provide for the protection of the United States, its forces and citizens. Congress

may regulate and restrict the conduct of war by the Com-

mander in Chief.

The Supreme Court so ruled in the Little

Case,^^ and, by implication, in the Steel Seizure
59^
See chap.
,

60

Little

v.

,

5,

Case.^"*"

supra.

Barreme,

2

Cr.

(U.

S.)

169 (1804).

^^Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
579 (1952).

U.

S.
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Congress asserted this power
recently, and probably
excessively, in the War Powers
Resolution.

A Theor y of Presidential War
-Commencing

.

Vn^.r-

Having surveyed the views of the
Framers of the
Constitution, developments in the
"Constitution of practice," and the few relevant court
opinions, we may now
develop a theory of Presidential power
to commence war
under the Constitution. This theory will

outline the areas

where Presidents have legitimate claims to
exercise authority.

Thus, what follows is not simply a description
of

Presidential claims to power, but rather

a

combination of

what Justice Frankfurter called the "words of the
Constitution and

.

.

.

the gloss which life has written upon

them."^^

There are three elements in the theory:

gency authority,

(2)

(1)

emer-

authority to enforce treaties, and

authority to carry out United States foreign policy.

(3)

Each will be discussed in turn.
(1)

There can be little doubt that the President

may respond unilaterally (i.e., in the absence of Congressional authority) to certain emergency situations.

9,

^^Pub. L.
supra.

93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).

He may

See chap.

63

579,

Youngs town Sheet & Tube Co.
610-611 (1952).

v.

Sawyer,

343 U.

S.
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not only use force in these
circumstances, but use force
tantamount to war in the Constitutional

sense of the term.

The circumstances include
attacks or imminent
attacks upon the nation, -^<-o
its territorip^
ucii xcories or t.^oo
possessions,
or its armed forces, even if
stationed overseas.
.

Furthermore, he may also employ
force short of war
in the Constitutional sense should
there be an attack on
or threat to American citizens or
their property on the

high seas or in a foreign nation.

Should war in the Con-

stitutional sense follow, the President would
be obligated
to obtain Congressional authorization in
order
to conduct

it.

The rationale for requiring Congressional authori-

zation in cases of war stemming from attacks upon citizens
or property, but not in cases of attacks upon American

territory or troops, is that the latter is likely to be a

more serious threat to the nation.
This is the only legitimate exception to the general rule that war in the Constitutional sense must be

authorized by Congress.

The exception is based upon the

President's ability to respond quickly in cases of grave

national peril.
(2)

Equally, there is little doubt that as Chief

Executive and Commander-in-Chief, the President may employ
force in order to execute treaty provisions.

However, a

treaty alone bestows no authority to commence war in the

500

Constitutional sense.

Should war ensue as a
result of such
a use of force, the President
would be obligated to
obtain
Congressional authorization.
"The President." John Marshall
said while in
Congress, "is the sole organ of the
nation in its external
relations, and its sole representative
with foreign
,,64
nations.
Although the Framers were unclear
or divided
(witness the Pacif icus-Helvidius debate)
on the question of
control over foreign relations, the President
has at various times in American history predominated.
(3)

It is no longer doubted that the President
may de-

ploy the armed forces for non-hostile purposes
anywhere in
the world.

Congress conceded as much in the War Powers

Resolution, where legislative authority to terminate troop

commitments was asserted only where hostilities or imminent

hostilities are involved.
It would also seem beyond doubt that the President

may deploy the armed forces so as

to threaten the use of

force in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United
States.

However, any hostilities ensuing as a result of

such deployments are not within the exclusive power of the
64

U. S.
Congress, Debates and Proceedings in the
Congress of the United States", 1789-1824 (Washington:
Gales and Seaton, 1834- 1856)
10 613 (1800)
The Supreme
Court reconfirmed this in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 319 (1936).
,

,

^^87 Stat.

:

555-556 (1973).
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President to conduct.

Rather, both Congress
and the President have concurrent authority
to control hostilities
short
of war where (a) a treaty
provision is not being enforced,
and (b) there is no national
emergency as described in section one, above.
In the absence of Congressional
regulations to the
contrary, the President has full
authority to connnence hostilities short of war in the course of
the conduct of United

States foreign relations.

With the exception of the en-

forcement of treaty provisions, and certain
defensive operations, however, Congress is entitled to
the last word on
this subject.

The War Powers Resolution may be viewed
as

an assertion of Congressional authority to
regulate hostilities short of war, while tacitly recognizing
Presidential

power in this area.
Should war in the Constitutional sense develop out
of the hostilities or troop deployments issuing out of the

conduct of foreign relations. Congress would have to

authorize it.
I

do not believe that Congress has the power to re-

strict the President in the areas of his exclusive control.

These areas are:

(1)

the use of force short of war to pro-

tect United States citizens or their property;

(2)

the use

of force up to and including force tantamount to war in the

Constitutional sense to protect the nation, its territories,
possessions and armed forces;

(3)

the use of force short of

512

war to implement treaty
provisions;

(4)

the deployment of

troops for non-hostile purposes;
and (5) the deployment of
troops so as to threaten the use
of force for diplomatic
purposes.
To the extent that the War
Powers Resolution is in-

tended to restrict the President
in these areas of exclusive control the Resolution is
unconstitutional.^^
One obvious difficulty with the
three-part theory

outlined above is the inability to
distinguish with precision "war" and hostilities short of war.
I

gested a "magnitude" test;^^ however,

I

have sug-

am not confident

that a precise distinction can be made in the
abstract.

Another likely objection to this theory is that it
opens the door to too many abuses of power by the
President.

For example,

I

have urged that the use of force to

protect American forces is within the exclusive province
of the President.

However, President Nixon justified the

controversial Cambodian Incursion of 1970 on the grounds
that as Commander-in-Chief he had the duty and power to

protect United States troops in Vietnam.
°°See my chap.

9,

supra.

67

See text accompanying notes 11 and 46, supra.
the testimony of John Norton Moore in U. S., Congress,
Senate, War Powers Legislation, Hearings Before the Com mittee on Foreign Relations 92d Cong., Isc sess., 1971,
p. 465.
Cf.

,

68

617.

Department of State Bulletin 62 (May 18, 1970):
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But the answer to this
objection is not only that
all power invites abuse, but
also that over the course
of
American history the legislative
branch has not been less
inclined toward war than the executive
branch.
In fact,

this study indicates that at the
start of every conflict
Congress is at least as "hawkish" as
the President.

This being the case, Congress is
more likely to
support the initial use of force rather
than oppose it. or
even press for escalation in order to
obtain a quick or
sure victory.
(That this occurs is often forgotten.
But

consider the support for General MacArthur's
expansive
Korean strategy.)
In short, Congress may not be a very

reliable check upon the President at the commencement
of
hostilities.

(The Cambodian Incursion is no exception;

it

occurred in the middle of an on-going war.)
Furthermore, placing too many checks upon Presidential power has risks for the conduct of American diplomacy,

especially in a crisis situation.

Consider the disadvan-

tages of a handcuffed Presidency in the midst of a Cuban

Missile affair; that would be to truly render the Constitution a "suicide pact."^^

(On the other hand do we want one

69

Cf. the views of Senator John Sherman Cooper
(D-Ky.) in U. S., Congress, Senate, War Powers S. Kept.
606 to Accompany S. 2956, 92d Cong.
2d sess
1972, p. 32.
,

,

.

,

''^"There is danger," warned Justice Jackson in a
freedom of speech case, "that, if the Court does not temper
its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it wi
convert the Constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide
pact." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1, 37 (1949) (dis
senting opinion)
The risks would seem even greater where
war powers are involved.
.

.
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man to make the awesome decisions
that could lead to nuclear
war?)

The Constitutional ideal, and
the ideal of this.s
theory is the cooperation of the
branches

in the decisic
.on

to make war.

The President can cooperate by
consulting

with Congress, in the most meaningful
sense of the word.
He can keep Congress informed, and
he can

request legisla-

tive support before taking action.

For its part,

the legislature can support the

President any number of ways short of a full-blown
declaration of war. including the use of "area resolutions"
as

authority for the conduct of war in the Constitutional
sense.

Congress must also appropriate funds for the con-

duct of foreign affairs, and although general defense

appropriations are probably insufficient to authorize the
conduct of war proper. Congress is free to terminate financial support if it disapproves of an activity

Legal arguments aside, the absence of inter-branch

cooperation in war-making is politically risky for the
President, as Presidents Johnson and Nixon found out.

Although, as the case of Lyndon Johnson demonstrates. Con-

gressional cooperation upon the commencement of
is no assurance of support thereafter.

71

See my chap.

9,

supra

a

conflict
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Nevertheless, while Congress may
be fickle, it is
prudent for a President to have its
support at the start
of hostilities.
In the current political climate
it is more
than prudent--it is essential.
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